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HANDBOOK 

FOR THE 

DIPLOMATIC HISTORY 

OF 

EUROPE, ASIA, AND AFRICA 

1870-1914 



By 
FRANK MALOY ANDERSON 

PROFESSOR OF HISTORY, DARTMOUTH COLLEGE 

and 

AMOS SHARTLE HERSHEY 

PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
UNIVERSITY OF INDIANA 

With the Assistance of 50 Contributors 



Prepared for the National Board for Historical Servios 




WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

1918 



HANDBOOK 



FOR THE 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY 



OF 



EUROPE, ASIA, AND AFRICA 

1870-1914 



By 

FRANK MALOY ANDERSON 

n 

PROFESSOR OF HISTORY, DARTMOUTH COLLEGE 

and 

AMOS SHARTLE HERSHEY 

PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
UNIVERSITY OF INDIANA 

With the Assistance of 50 Contrihutors 



Prepared for the National Board for Historical Service 




WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

1918 



/f- 



1"; 



0. ** *• 

JAN 4 19J9 



PREFACE 



Responding to a request for urgent public service, the National 
Board for Historical Service undertook in February, 1918, to pro- 
vide for the preparation of this survey of recent diplomatic history, 
with the understanding that the work should be so planned as to be 
ready for use within a very limited time. The immediate execution 
of this task was intrusted by the board to Profs. F. M. Anderson, 
of Dartmouth College, and A. S. Hershey, of Indiana University. 
They were fortunate in securing the cooperation of several other com- 
petent scholars, but within the limit of time originally agreed upon 
adequate treatment of the material was obviously impossible. Dur- 
ing the present summer the material has been revised by Prof. F. M. 
Anderson, though still under such limitations as to time and available 
material as to preclude exhaustive research in many cases. It is 
believed, nevertheless, that this manual will prove of substantial 
service to workers in this field. Hearty thanks are due to both 
authors, and especially to Prof. Anderson, for the generous public 
spirit with which they have given many hours of gratuitous service, 
as well as for the energy and intelligence which they have applied to 
their difficult task. 

National Board for Historical Service. 

September 20, 1918. 

(3) 



ACKNOWLEDGMENT. 



rhe preparation of this handbook has been made possible only by 
the splendid cooperation on the part of the contributors. The grate- 
ful acknowledgment of the editors is due to the following authors 
of articles: George B. Adams, C. D. Allin. J. F. Baldwin. Carl 
Becker, Crawford M. I >i^lx p, Louise Fargo Brown, J. 1*. Chamber- 
lain, Victor Coffin, F. W. Coker, Fiances G. Davenport, A. L. P. 
Dennis. Eloise Ellery, Ellen I). Ellis, Logan Essary, Sidney B. Fay, 
R. II. Fife, jr.. CarlE. Fish. Fred M. Fling, 1. P. Fox. I). P. Fraryj 
Evarts 15. Green, N. 1). Harris. P. F. Haworth, C. J. II. Haves, S. K. 
Hornbeck, F. F. Humphrey, Charles Kettleborough, Everett Kimball, 
Albert Kohlmeier. A..C. Kiev. W. E. Lingelbach, F. M. Linton. A. H. 
Lybyer, J. G. McDonald, W. P. Manning, W. W. McLaren. Frederick 
Moore, Nellie Xeilson, A. T. Olmstead, F. L. Paxson, P. C. Phillips, 
Bertha II. Putnam, Clarence Perkins, Comers Eead, Bemadotte E. 
Schmitt, (i. C. Sellery, Lucy E. Text or.' Ida C. Thallon. F. R. 
Turner, M. W. Tyler, F. A. Updyke, B. B. Wallace, J. A. Wooclburn, 
F. W. Williams. 

Profs. Evarts B Greene and J. T. Shotwell, of the National Boar*! 

for Historical Service, kept in constant (ouch with tin 1 work. Their 

counsel and cooperation greatly lightened the task of the editors. 

Port". J. F. Jameson and Prof. Dana C. Munro, of the board. Mr. G. 

L. Leer and Mr. II. F. Munro, also made helpful suggestions. Mrs. 

K. Schoepperle Lever and Mr. A. Heywood Knowlton, as secretaries 

tor the editors, were of the very greatest assistance. 

Frank Malot Anderson. 

Amos Shartle Hershey. 
(4) 



TABLE OF CONTENTS. 



Page. 

Introduction 9 

Section I. —1870-1878. 

1. The effort to prevent the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War, July 3 to 

July 19, 1870 21 

2. The protection of Belgian neutrality during the Franco-Prussian War 25 

3. The protection of Luxemburg neutrality during (he Franco-Prussian War. 27 

4. German seizure of neutral property during the Franco-Prussian War, 1870-1 . 29 

5. The sale of munitions of war to belligerents during the Franco-Prussian 

War 30 

6. The recognition of the Government of National Defence, 1870-71 33 

7. The Roman question, 1870-71 35 

8. The Black Sea question, 1870-71 '' 39 

9. The peace preliminaries of the Franco-Prussian War 42 

10. The Treaty of Frankfort, IS7 1 45 

11 . German arguments for the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, 1870-1 49 

12. The evacuation of France by the German armies, 1871-1873 50 

13. The formation of the League of the Three Emperors 54 

14. The Franco-German War scare of 1S75 55 

15. Chino-Japanese relations, 1872-1876 58 

16. The Kuldja affair, 1876-1881 59 

17. The Eastern question, 1875-1877 60, 

18. The Serbo-Turkish War of 1876 68 

19. The Austro-Russtan accord of L876 77 70 

20. The Russo-Eoumanian alliance of 1877-78 72 

21 . The Treaty of San Stefano, 1878 " :! 

22. The Congress of Berlin, 1878 77 

23. Austria-Hungary and the Balkan set dement of 1878 86 

24. Serbia and the Balkan settlement of 1878 88 

25. Bulgaria and the Balkan settlement of 1878 90 

26. Roumania and the Balkan settlement of 1878 :i:; 

27. Montenegro and the Balkan settlement of 1878 94 

28. The English protectorate over ( lyprus, 1878-1914 98 

29. The abrogation of I lie North Schleswig plebiscite agreement 99 

Section II.— 1878-1890. 

30. The Greco-Turkish frontier question, 1878-1881 I() l 

31. The Danube question, 1 s 7 1 1904 103 

32. The Suez Canal, 1881-1904 105 

33. The formation of the Dual Alliance, IS79 108 

34. The formation of the Triple Alliance, 1882 I I 1 

35. The renewals of the Triple Alliance ,- 113 

36. Roumaniaand the Triple Alliance, ix.s:>,-1914 I L5 

37. Bismarck's reinsurance treaty 117 

(5) 



r; 

Page. 

38. The Bulgarian devolution of 1885 119 

39. The Serbo-Bulgarian War of 1885-86 1-4 

40. The pacific blockade of Greece, 1SS i 1 27 

41. The Schnaebele* incident. 1887 128 

42. Franco-Italian animosity. I 16 129 

43. The partition of Africa, 1878-1885 131 

44. The establishment of the French protectorate over Tunis, 1881 L33 

45. The Dual Control over Egyptian finances. 1 876 -1883 135 

46. The British occupation of Egypt, 1882-1914 140 

47. The Soudan question, 1881-1899 i 146 

48. The acquisition of Madagascar by France. L882-1897 148 

49. Anglo-German rivalry in Southwest Africa. L883-1886 151 

\ 50. Anglo-German rivalry in East Africa, 1885 L890 153 

51. The question of West Africa, L880 L898 156 

52. The formation of the Congo Free State. L876-1885 161 

53. The Berlin Conference, L884-85 L64 

54. The delimitation of European colonies in Central Africa, 1885-1899 L67 

55. The international status of the Transvaal or South African Republic. 

1877- 1884 171 

56. British relations to the Boer Republics, 1884-1899 172 

57. The question of the Portuguese colonies 175 

'"58. The Anglo-Russian rivalry in Central Asia. 1878-1887 1 79 

59. The British acquisition of Upper Burma, 1885-S6 183 

60. Franco- Siamese relations, 1893-1904 * 184 

61. European encroachments in the Far East, 1S75-18S7 186 

62. The Franco-Chinese War, 1882-1885 187 

63. The journeys of William II to the Near East 190 

Section- III.— 1S90-1904. 

64. The dismissal of Bismarck. 1890 1 93 

65.. The Brussels antislavery conference of 1890 L95 

66. The formation of the Dual Alliance, between France and Russia, 1887-1893. 197 

67. The Zanzibar-Heligoland treaty of 1 890 201 

65. The Dreyfus affair 204 

69. Railway concessions in Turkey 205 

70. The Greco-Turkish War. 1897 211 

71. The Cretan question. 1868 L897 212 

72. The Armenian question, 1878-1897 216 

73. The Serbian Revolution of 1903 220 

74. Franco-Italian rapprochement, 1 S96-1902 221 

75. Relations between Italy and Abyssinia, 1893-1900 222 

76. The Fashoda affair, 1898-1899 224 

77. The attempted Franco-German accord of 1898 227 

78. The Kruger telegram 229 

79. The seizure of German ships during the Boer War 23 1 

80. The Treaty of Vereeniging, May 31, 1902 232 

81. France and Morocco, 1894-1904 234 

82. The annexation of the Congo Free State by Belgium, 1889-1908 237 

83. Chino-Japanese rivalry in Korea, 1876-1894 240 

84. The Treaty of'Shimonoseki, 1895 241 

85. The retrocession of the Liao-tung Peninsula by Japan, November 8, 1895. . 242 

86. The open-door policy in China, 1895-1904 , 243 

87. The leasing of Kiaou-Chau by Germany, March 6, 1898 249 



i 

Page. 

88. The Cassini convention, 1896 251 

89. The leasing of Port Arthur by Russia, March 27, 1898 252 

90. The leasing of Wei-IIai-Wei by Great Britain, 1898 253 

91. The Boxer Uprising, negotiations and settlement 254 

92. The Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 262^ 

93. Russo-Japanese rivalry in Korea, 1895-1904 265 

94. The Russian advance into .Manchuria, 1895-1903 268* 

95. The Russo-Chinese convention for the evacuation of Manchuria. April 8, 

1902 271 

96. Negotiations preceding the Russo-Japanese War, 1903-1904 272 

97. The abrogation of the Japanese extraterritorial city treaties, 1872-1894... 275 

98. The First Hague Conference, 1899 279 

99. The Anglo-French arbitration agreement of 1903 280 

Section IV.— 1904-1914. 

100. The formation of the Entente Cordiale 282 

101. Secret negotiations' between the Kaiser and the Czar in 1904-1905 288 ■ 

102. The seizure of neutral ships by Russia during the Russo-Japanese War. . 293 

103. The Dogger Bank incident, 1904 296 

104. The Treaty of Portsmouth 298 

105. The renewals of the A nglo- Japanese alliance, 1905 and 1911 301 

106. The open-door policy in China, 1904-1914 303 

107. Spheres of influence in ( 'hina, 1897-1904 306 

108. Railway concessions in China 311 - 

109. Chino-Japanese relations, 1905-1914 '. 315 

110. Japan's relations with Korea, 1904-1910 317 

111. China and the Six Power Loan Syndicate, 1908-1913 319 

112. Question of South Manchuria, 1905-1914 321 

113. The Thibet question, 1880-1914 327'] 

114. The Mongolian question, 1881-1915 329 

115. The Morocco crisis of 1905-1906 332 

116. The resignation of Delcasse, 1905 334 

117. Italy and Morocco 338 

118. Spain and Morocco 339 

119. The Red Sea convention of December 13, 1905 343 

120. The Persian question, 1906-1914 345 

121. The formation of the Triple Entente 358 

122. The separation of Norway from Sweden 362 

123. The Baltic and North Sea conventions, 1908 365 

124. The Second Hague Conference, 1907 367 

125. The Reval interview, 1908 371 

126. The Turkish Revolution of 1908-1909 371 

127. The annexation of Bosnia-Herzego\ ina 374 

128. The Austrian occupation of Novi-Bazar, 1878-1909 378 

129. The Bulgarian declaration of independence, 1908 380 

130. The Bosnian crisis of 1908-1909 382 

131 . The Macedonian question, 1878-1908 385 

132. The Macedonian question, 1908-1912 391 

133. The Cretan question, 1897-1908 394 

134. The Cretan question, 1 908-1913 397 

135. The Casablanca affair, 1908-1909 398 

136. The Morocco convention of 1909 401 

137. The Morocco crisis of 1911 402 






-V 



H 

Page. 

138. The Potsdam accord, 1910 407 

139. The Bagdad Railway, L899 L914 409 

140. The Ealdane Mission to Berlin. L912 4 12 

141. The Tripoli question, 1902-1911 416 

142. The Treaty Oi Lausanne, 1912 419 

143. The formation of the Balkan alliance of 1912 421 

11 1. The efforts of the Powers to prevent the outbreak of the First Balkan War.. 426 

145. The Treaty of London. L913 429 

146. The Albanian question in the Balkan crisis of 1913 432 

147. The establishment of the Principality of Albania, L912 L913 

Lis. The effort to prevent the outbreak of the Second Balkan "War, 1913 437 

149. The Treaty of Bucharest, August L0, L913 439 

150. The Greco-Serbian alliance, L913 44] 

151. The Treaty of Constantinople, 1913 443 

152. The projected Austrian intervention in Serbia in L913 443 

L53. Naval and military conversations between England and France, L905 1912. -ill 

154. Military conversations between England and Belgium, 1906-1912 446 

155. The attempted An^lo-tiertnan naval agreement, L907 1914 447 

150. The projected Anglo-German accord, 1914 449 

157. The London naval conference of L909 451 

158. The Roman question, 1871-1914 158 

159. Franco-German relations, 1S7 1-1914 463 

1(50. The growth of European armaments in relation to European diplomacy 

1ST 1-1914 » 468 

Appendix 1. 

Documents 475 

Appendix II. 

Collections of treaties and diplomatic documents most frequently cited 482 

I mlex 483 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY, 1871-1914. 



INTRODUCTION. 

The diploma* ic history of Europe from 1870 to 1914 falls naturally 
into four rather sharply defined periods: 

(1) 1870-1878. From the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War 
to the Congress of Berlin. 

(2) 1878-1890. From the Congress of Berlin to the retirement of 
Bismarck. 

(3) 1890-1904. From the retirement of Bismarck to the opening 
of the Russo-Japanese War. 

(4) 1904-1914. From the opening of the Russo-Japanese War to 
the beginning of the World War. 

A section of this volume is devoted to each of these periods. Ar- 
ticles which overlap any of the periods are placed in the section 
devoted to the period with which they seem most naturally connected. 

SECTION I. 1870-1878. 

During the earlier part of this period nearly everything of much 
importance in the diplomatic history of Europe was connected with 
the Franco-Prussian War. In view of the importance of the trans- 
action at (he lime and of (he significance attaching to some of them 
in connection with the World War quite a number of articles bearing 
<>n the diplomatic hist< ry of the Franco-Prussian War are included. 
There are articles on the effort to prevent the outbreak of the war (1), 
the protection of the neutrality of Belgium and of Luxemburg (2 
and 3), German seizure of neutral property during the war (I), 
and on the sale of munitions of war to belligerents (•">). The col- 
lapse of the Second Empire on September 4, 1870, raised a prob- 
lem, which is dealt with in the article on the recognition of the 
Government of National Defence (<">). An article (8) is devoted 
to the adjustment of the Black Sea question which arose out of the 
action of Russia in declaring in October, L870, that it would no 
longer he bound by the terms of the Treaty of Paris (1856) rela- 
tive to the Black Sea. There are also articles dealing with the 
diplomatic aspects of the taking of Rome by the Italian Governmenl 
■in September. L870 (7). on the preliminaries of peace (9), and 

(9) 



10 

on the Treaty of Frankfort (10). An article on the German argu- 
ments for the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine states the reason put 
forward by Germany in attempted justification of the annexation 
of that region and points out the real reasons for that action (11). 
The series dealing with the Franco-Prussian War ends with an article 
describing the manner in which the evacuation of France by the 
German armies was brought about in the years 1871-1873 (12). 

After the Franco-Prussian War and until his retirement in 1S90, 
Bismarck dominated the international affairs of Europe to a degree 
seldom paralleled by any other individual. Since the final over- 
throw of Napoleon in 1815 the only person who exercised an 
influence at all comparable with that of Bismarck in the years 
indicated was Metternich in the period 1815-184:8. From 1871 on 
Bismarck's chief and almost exclusive aim in foreign policy was 
to preserve for Germany the gains she had made by the Franco- 
Prussian War. 

As the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine made the restoration of a 
really friendly feeling between France and Germany impossible, 
Bismarck was haunted with the fear lest France should find allies 
and thereby a coalition hostile to Germany would develop. Bis- 
marck, therefore, bent his efforts toward securing the complete 
isolation of France. His success was remarkably speedy and com- 
plete. It was secured and maintained throughout the period 
by the arrangement commonly called the League of the Three 
Emperors, on which an article has been included (13). The article 
on the Franco-German war scare of 1875 (14) has a close connec- 
tion with this topic, since it shows the kind of danger to which France 
was constantly exposed owing to the isolation forced upon her by 
Bismarck. 

In this period European diplomacy was concerned almost wholly 
with European affairs. The problems of Asia and Africa did not 
engage the attention of diplomatists in any very large measure until 
the following period. There are. however, in this section two articles 
dealing with the Far East. One relates to the Kuldja affair (16), 
the other describes Chino-Japanesc relations, 1872-1876 (15). 

During the latter years of the period the most important features 
of European diplomacy arose out of the Eastern Question, as the 
problem of the existing status and future disposition of the Ottoman 
Empire was then called. Turkish misrule, especially in the Balkan 
Peninsula in the years 1875-1877, was the occasion for a series of 
negotiations involving all the states which bad signed the Treaty of 
Paris (1856) and the Balkan principalities. These difficulties, which 
in their diplomatic aspects are treated in the article entitled the 
Eastern question, 1875-1877 (17). finally resulted in the Russo- 
Turkish War of 1877-1878. Nearly all of the remaining articles in- 



11 

eluded in this section relate to that war and the settlement which 
grew out of it. As the settlement was the cause of great dissatis- 
faction in many different quarters and created conditions which 
had a large influence in bringing about the World War, several 
articles dealing with various aspects of the matter have been in- 
cluded. There are articles on the Serbo-Turkish War of 1876 (18), 
on the understanding between Russia and AYistria-Hungary shortly 
before the Russo-Turkish War began (19), on the alliance between 
Russia and Roumania during the war (20), on the Treaty of San 
Sic fa no arranged by Kussia and Turkey at the close of the war 
(21). en the Congress of Berlin (22), which revised this treaty 
and arranged the final settlement. In view of the importance of the 
settlement, a series of five articles (23-27) deals separately with the 
case of each State, except Turkey, which had a direct territorial in- 
terest at stake in the settlement arranged for the Balkan Peninsula. 
A number of articles dealing with problems which arose out of 
stipulations included in the Treaty of Berlin will be found in the sec- 
tions to which they seem most appropriately attached. The series 
dealing with the Eastern question closes with an article on the Eng- 
lish protectorate over Cyprus, 1878-1914 (28), that island having 
been acquired from Turkey by Great Britain on the eve of the 
assembling of the Congress of Berlin. 

Soon after the adjournment of the Congress of Berlin Bismarck 
obtained from Austria-Hungary a small installment of recompense 
for the assistance he had there rendered to the Dual Monarchy. This 
took the form of a release for Germany from the obligation which 
Prussia had contracted in 1866 by article 5 of the Treaty of Prague 
whereby Prussia was bound to permit the people of North Schleswig, 
an overwhelmingly Danish district, to determine by free vote whether 
they should be returned to Denmark. The final article of the sec- 
tion (29) deals with this matter. 

SECTION II. — 1878-1890. 

At the Congress of Berlin Bismarck professed to play the role of 
" honest broker," i. e., to seek no personal or German interest, but 
to act as the impartial friend of all parties and to facilitate the ar- 
rangement of a satisfactory adjustment. Whether or not he actually 
did seek to play that role is a matter about which there is, perhaps, 
loom for a difference of opinion. Russia, at any rate, was aggrieved 
at the settlement reached, and held that Bismarck had sacrificed 
the interest of Russia to promote the advantage of Austria-Hungary. 
The arrangement known as the League of the Three Emperors there- 
fore no longer met the requirements of the situation from the stand- 
point of Bismarck. He could no longer count upon the friendship 
of Russia to such a degree as to assure the complete isolation of 



12 

France. Some other device must be substituted. Bismarck speedily 
found the necessary arrangement in the form of a close alliance with 
Austria-Hungary. This was the (Austro-German) Dual Alliance, 
to the formation of which an article is devoted (33). Three years 
after the formation of this alliance the arrangement, from the Bis- 
marckian point of view, was improved by the entrance of Italy into 
the combination. This is dealt with in the article on the formation 
of the Triple Alliance (34). It is followed by articles on the re- 
newals of the Triple Alliance (35) and oh Roumania and its relation 
to that alliance (36). Bismarck was able to assure the continued 
complete isolation of France by entering into his well-known rein- 
surance treaty with Russia. An article deals with that subject (37). 

The affairs of southeastern Europe occupied the attention of dip- 
lomatists much less in this period than in the preceding one. A 
series of three articles deals with more important problems of that 
character: the Bulgarian Revolution of 1885 (38); the Serbo-Bul- 
garian War of 1885-86 (39) ; and the pacific blockade of Greece. 
1886 (40). 

The readiness of Bismarck, several times displayed between 1871 
and 1890, to threaten France with war lends interest to the article 
on the Schnaebele incident (11). which was a good example of that 
form of Bismarckian method. 

Throughout the entire period, but especially during the later years. 
questions arising out of the colonial enterprises of Europe, espe- 
cially in Africa, occupied much attention. As late as 1878 only 
a small portion of Africa, consisting chiefly of the Mediterranean 
coast, the southern end of the continent, and scattered regions along 
the west coast, was under the control of European States. Within 
the next dozen years nearly all of the hitherto unclaimed portion 
of the continent passed under European control. Rivalry for pos- 
session and the adjustment of boundaries gave rise to a series of dip- 
lomatic problems. A large number of such questions were settled 
by agreements between the powers directly interested. There were 
also some important general settlements of difficult African prob- 
lems. Problems of this sort were so numerous and involved that de- 
tailed treatment here is out of question. But a number of articles 
have been included which deal with some of the most significant fea- 
tures of the general problem. Among these are the articles upon the 
partition of Africa. 1878-L s s"t ( 13) ; the establishment of the French 
protectorate over Tunis, 1881 (14) ; the Dual Control over Egyptian 
finances. L876-1883 (45); the British occupation of Egypt, 1882- 
1914 (-If.) ; the Soudan question, 1881-1899 (IT) : the acquisition of 
Madagascar by France. fs;si>-ls9T (18) : Anglo-German rivalry in 
Southwest Africa. 1883-1886 (49); Anglo-German rivalry in East 
Africa. 1885-1890 (50); the question of West Africa, 1880-1898 



13 

(51) ; the formation of the Congo Free State, 1876-1885 (52) ; the 
Berlin Conference, 1884-1885 (53) ; the delimitation of European 
colonies in Central Africa, 1885-1899 (54) ; the international status 
of the Transvaal or South African Eepublic, 1877-1884 (55) ; British 
relations to the Boer Republics, 1884-1899 (56) ; and the question of 
the Portuguese colonies (57). 

In this period Asiatic problems had not become as numerous or 
as important as they were to prove in the following period. But 
(here were a number of such .problems. The section, therefore, closes 
with, a series of six articles dealing with Asiatic matters: The 
Anglo-Russian rivalry in Central Asia, 1878-1887 (58) ; the British 
acquisition of Upper Burma, 1885-86 (59) ; Franco-Siamese rela- 
tions, 1893-1904 (60) ; European encroachments in the Far East, 
issj-issl (61) ; the Franco-Chinese War, 1882-1885 (62) ; the jour- 
neys of William II to the Near East, the first of which took place 
shortly before the end of the period (63). 

SECTION III.— 1890-1904. 

In the period 1890-1904 the problems of diplomacy in large meas- 
ure arose out of or were greatly influenced by four new factors 
affecting the international situation: 

(1 ) The collapse or abandonment near the beginning of the period 
of Bismarck's system for securing the isolation of France through 
the Triple Alliance in combination with his reinsurance treaty with 
Russia. 

(2) The development of the (Franco-Russian) Dual Alliance. 

(3) The adoption by Germany about 1890 of the policy of Welt- 
politik. 

(4) The Chino-Japanese War, 1894-95, and the changed situa- 
tion in the Far East, due in large measure to the war. 

Nearly all of the articles in the section deal with problems which 
were caused or Avere much affected by one or more of these influences. 
A few, however, deal with other matters. 

The section opens with an article on the dismissal of Bismarck, 
considered in relation to the foreign policy of Germany (64). It 
is naturally followed by an article on the development of the (Franco- 
Russian) Dual Alliance (66). After articles on the Zanzibar- 
Heligoland treaty of 1890 (67) and on the Dreyfus affair (68). 
there follows a series of articles dealing with matters arising out of 
the affairs of southeastern Europe and the Near, East. The first of 
the series aims to set forth the -history of railway concessions in 
Turkey other than the Bagdad Railway (69). Others in the series 
.leal with Greco-Turkish War of 1897 (70), the closely connected 
Cretan question (1868-1898) (71), and the Armenian question 
from 1878 to 1897 (72). The series ends with an article which 



14 

describes the action of the leading States in regard to the Serbian 
Revolution of 1903 (73), and aims to point out the significance of 
that occurrence for the course of later events in southeastern Europe, 

In this period, as in the preceding ones, African problems fre- 
quently occupied the attention of diplomatists. A series of articles 
is, therefore, devoted to that general topic. The clash between Italy 
and Abyssinia, growing out of. the colonial enterprises of Italy in 
the Red Sea region, is dealt with in the first article of the series, 
entitled Relations between Italy and, Abyssinia, 1803-1900 (75). 
The narrative is carried down to the time when Italy desisted from 
all effort to assert any claim of control over Abyssinia and acknowl- 
edged its entire independence. The article on the Fashoda affair 
1898-1899 (7G) explains the settlement of conflicting territorial 
claims in the upper Nile region and makes plain the importance of 
that settlement in clearing the way for the development of the 
Entente Cordiale. From 1882 until after the Fashoda affair French 
resentment against Great Britain was constantly increasing, largely 
on account of colonial rivalry. Shortly before this hostile feeling 
reached its climax in the dispute over Fashoda an attempt was made 
to utilize" the possible opportunity thereby presented to bring about 
closer and more amicable relations between France and Germany. 
The idea of this project and the reasons for its failure are explained 
in the article on the attempted Franco-German accord of 1898 
(77). Events connected with the Boer War are handled in the 
articles on the Kruger telegram (78), the seizure of German ships 
during the war (79), and the Treaty of Vereeniging (80). The 
beginning of the Morocco question is considered in an article on 
France and Morocco, 1894-1904 (81). The Congo question, after 
the establishment of the Congo Free State, is treated in its diplo- 
matic aspect in the article on the annexation of the Congo Free State 
by Belgium, 1889-1908 (82). 

A group of 15 articles, the largest in the section, bears witness to 
the important role which after 1895 the Far East played in diplo- 
matic history. The first of these articles deals with Chino-Japanese 
rivalry in Korea, 1876-1894 (83), thereby throwing light on the 
outbreak of the Chino-Japanese War. The peace at the close of the 
war is treated in articles on the Treaty of Shimonoseki (84) and 
on the retrocession of the Liao-tung Peninsula by Japan (85). 
An article on the ''Open-door policy" in China, 1895-1904 (86), 
deals with a most significant phase of the general Chinese problem, 
while the encroachments of European states upon portions of Chi- 
nese territory, seeming to foreshadow dismemberment, are handled 
in articles on the leasing of Kiaou-Chau by Germany (87), the 
Cassini convention (88), the leasing of Port Arthur by Russia 
(89), the leasing of Wei-Hai-Wei by Great Britain (90). The 



15 

Boxer Uprising, due in large measure to these encroachments, is 
treated in its diplomatic bearing (91). Matters connected directly 
with events and circumstances which led to the outbreak of the 
Russo-Japanese War are treated in articles on the formation of the 
Anglo- Japanese alliance of 1902 (92), Russo-Japanese rivalry in 
Korea, 1895-1904 (93), the Russian advance into Manchuria, 1895- 
1903 (91), the convention for the evacuation of Manchuria, 1902 
(95), and the diplomatic negotiations preceding the outbreak of 
the Russo-Japanese War (96). The series closes with an article 
on the abrogation of the Japanese extra-territoriality treaties of 
Japan (97). 

The section concludes with articles on the First Hague Conference 
(98) and on the Anglo-French arbitration treaty of 1903 (99), the 
latter of which did much to pave the way for the Entente Cordiale. 

SECTION IV. — 1904-1914. 

From the standpoint of diplomatic history during 1901—1914 the 
events of most far-reaching influence were: 

(1) The negotiation of the convention of April 8, 1904, between 
France and England. 

(2) The signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth. 

(3) The Turkish Revolution of July, 1908. 

It would not be difficult to point out for nearly every matter dealt 
with in the articles under this period that there is a close and easily 
discoverable connection with some one of the three events. 

The section, therefore, appropriately opens with articles on the 
formation of the Entente Cordiale (100), and on the secret negotia- 
tions between the Kaiser and the Czar in 1905 and 1906 in conse- 
quence of the new international situation (101). 

For the Russo-Japanese War there is an article on the Dogger 
Bank incident (103), another on the seizure of neutral ships by 
Russia during the war (102), while the negotiation and terms of 
peace at the close of the war are described in the article on the Treaty 
of Portsmouth (101). As that treaty contributed largely to the cre- 
ation of a new situation in the Far East, the series of articles which 
follows seeks to state the essential facts in regard to the most im- 
portant of the diplomatic transactions arising out of that situation. 
Since Japanese influence was paramount in the Far East, and that, 
in turn, depended in considerable measure upon the relations between 
Japan and England, there is an article on the renewals of the Anglo- 
Japanese alliance in 1905 and 1911 (105). Important phases of the 
general Chinese problem are dealt with in articles on the open-door 
policy in China, 1904-1914 (106) ; spheres of influence in China, 
1897-1904 (107) ; railway concessions in China (108) ; and on Chino- 
Japanese relations, 1905-1914 (109). There are also articles dealing 



- 16 

with Japan's relations with Korea. 11)04-1010 (110), and with China 
and the Six Power Loan Syndicate, 1908-1913 (111). The prob- 
lem of the outlying and loosely connected portions of the Chinese 
Empire is considered in its diplomatic aspects in the articles on the 
question of South Manchuria, 1905-1918 (112) ; the Thibet question, 
1880- MM I ( 11-".) : the Mongolian question, 1881-1915 (114). 

The theatrical journey of the Kaiser to Tangier and his speech 
there. (March, 100.')) precipitated the first of the European en 
over Morocco. This action by Germany was obviously influenced 
by the supposedly weakened condition of France, due to the fact 
that her Russian ally was stil! engaged in war with Japan and was 
already threatened with revolution. It was also the German counter- 
stroke to the formation of the Entente Cordiale. There can he 
little doubt that Germany hoped and expected that the new arrange- 
ment between France and England would thereby he destroyed or 
so seriously weakened that it would no Longer have any real value 
for France. The episode as a whole, including the Algeciras Confer- 
ence which terminated it. is treated in the article entitled, The 
Morocco crisis of 1905-G (Id). Other important matters closely 
connected with this crisis are treated in the articles on the resignation 
of Delcasse. 1905 (116), Italy and Morocco (117), and Spain and 
Morocco (118). Another somewhat related topic is treated in the 
article on the Red Sea convention, December 13, 1906 (110). 

At intervals for many years the Long continuing internal weakness 
of Persia made that country occasionally the subject of diplomatic 
discussion. After the Persian Revolution of 1000 such questions 
came up frequently. Russia and England, with territorial posses- 
sions bordering- on Persia and with claims to important interests in 
the country, were the Slates most directly concerned. Put Germany, 
on account of the Bagdad Railway and its ambitions in the Near 
East, was also interested. An article on the Persian question. 
1000-1014 (120), deals with the matter. .V separate article on the 
Potsdam accord, 1010. to be found further along- (138), has also a 
bearing on the subject. 

The continued solidity of the (Franco-Russian) Dual Alliance, 
the attempt of Germany to destroy the Entente Cordiale in the iirst 
Morocco crisis, the growing Anglo-German antagonism, and the 
desire of Russia for speedy recovery from the disaster of the Rus io 
Japanese War and the revolutionary movement which followed it, 
led in L907 to the drawing together of Russia, France, and England. 
This important development is treated in the article on the formation 
of the Triple Entente. 1007 (121). 

After nearly a century, marked by frequent dissension, the per- 
sonal union between Sweden and Norway was dissolved in 1905- 
1007. The diplomatic side of this adjustment is treated in an article 



17 

on the separation of Norway from Sweden (122). A separate article 
deals with the closely related topic, the Baltic and North Sea conven- 
tions of 1908 (123). This is followed by an article on the Second 
Hague Conference, 1907 (124). 

At the Reval interview, June. 1908, to which an article is devoted 
(125), Edward VII and Nicholas II were reported to have come 
to an agreement upon the reforms they were prepared to demand of 
the Turkish Government in regard to Macedonia. A desire to antici- 
pate the presentation of these demands is believed to have precipitated 
the revolution in Turkey long in process of preparation by the 
Young Turks. This revolution, to which an article is given (126), 
was the starting point and in large measure the cause for a chain 
of important events leading directly to the World War. Those of 
the events which occurred in 1908-9 and a number of other mat- 
ters closely connected with them are handled in a series of articles, 
the first of which deals with the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(127). It is followed by an article on the Austro-Hungarian occu- 
pation of Novi-Bazar (128), and that by another on the Bulgarian 
declaration of independence (129), which came immediately after 
and as a direct consequence of the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
The action of Austria-Hungary in annexing Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
which was deeply resented by Serbia, precipitated a crisis, which 
nearly led to a general European war. The matter is dealt with in 
the article entitled the Bosnian crisis, 1908-9 (130). 

At the moment of the occurrence of the Turkish Kevolution and 
for some weeks afterwards there seemed to be good reason for the 
belief that the Young Turk'; could and would attempt to carry out 
the attractive program of reforms included in their profession of 
principles. Whatever possibility there may have been for the reali- 
zation of that expectation was destroyed by the action of Austria- 
Hungary and Bulgaria. The developments of the next three years 
showed the Young Turks accentuating instead of removing the evils 
which afflicted the Christian subjects of the Sultan. This feature 
of the situation brought to the front important questions which in 
one form or another had frequently been the subject of diplomatic 
consideration. Macedonia and Crete were especially under discus- 
sion at that time. The Macedonian question from 1878 to 1912 is 
dealt with in two articles (131 and 132), the Cretan question from 
1897 to 1912 also in two articles (133 and 131). 

The settlement of the Morocco question, arranged by the Algeciras 
Conference in 1906. served to prevent the tension over the subjects 
between France and Germany from again becoming acute until in 
1911. But there were meanwhile difficulties springing out of the 
matter. One of them is dealt with in the article on the Casablanca 
53706—18 2 



18 

affair (135). Other difficulties were adjusted for a time by the 
Morocco convention of 1909, to which an article is given (136). 
The most dangerous stage in the entire Morocco controversy, includ- 
ing the settlement finally reached in the convention of November 4. 
is treated in the article entitled. The Morocco crisis of 1911 (137). 

From about L901 to 1908 Tripoli, nominally a part of the Ottoman 
Empire, passed more and more under the control of Italy, though at 
least a semblance of Turkish authority was constantly maintained. 
The Turkish Revolution somewhat arrested this tendency, because 
the Young Turks set out to check it. Disputes over that situation 
finally resulted in 1911 in the outbreak of war between Italy and 
Turkey. The article on the Tripoli question, 1902-1911 (141) deals 
with this problem. In the article on the Treaty of Lausanne the 
negotiation and terms of the peace at the close of the war are de- 
scribed (142). • 

A series of articles is allotted to the diplomatic history of the 
Balkan Avars (1912-13). The first of the series, the formation of 
the Balkan Alliance, aims to set forth what is known of the genesis 
of that league (143). It is followed by an article dealing with 
the unsuccessful effort of diplomacy to avert the outbreak of war 
between the Balkan Alliance and Turkey (144). For the negotia- 
tions and terms of the important treaty which brought peace at the 
close of that war between the Balkan allies and Turkey there is 
an article entitled The Treaty of London, 1913 (145). As the 
problem of adjusting numerous conflicting claims in. regard to 
Albania was an important factor in the negotiation of that treaty 
and as the Albanian question played a very important part in the 
whole Balkan situation in 1912 ami 1913, two articles have been al- 
lotted to the matter. One deals with the Albanian question in the 
Balkan crisis of 1913 (146), the other with the establishment of 
the Principality of Albania. L912-43 (147). 

The diplomatic history of the Second Balkan .War is treated in 
three articles, one dealing with the effort of diplomacy to adjust the 
dispute between Bulgaria and Serbia and Greece which preceded 
the outbreak of the war (148).; (he second with the Treaty of 
Bucharest (lb'): and the third with the Greco-Serbian alliance of 
1913 (150). While Bulgaria was engaged in the Second Balkan 
War Turkey took advantage of the opportunity thus afforded to re- 
conquer part of the territory recently lost to Bulgaria. The peace 
at the close of this Turco-Bulgar War is dealt with in the article 
on the Treaty of Constantinople, L913 (151). 

A group of six articles deals with matters which belong to the 
closing years of the period and have a close connection with the 
World War. One aims to set forth what is known about the 
projected Austro-Hungarian intervention in Serbia in 1913 (152), 






19 

another deals with the Anglo-French military and naval conversa- 
tions, 1905-1912 (153), and a third with the military conversations 
between England and Belgium, 1906-1912 (154). The other three 
deal with various phases of the effort of diplomacy to make less acute 
the antagonism between Germany and England. One of these relates 
particularly to the attempt to arrange some agreement between the 
two countries as to naval programs (155). Another deals with the 
projected agreement of 1914, which is reported to have reached the 
stage for the signatures when the World War broke out (156). The 
third treats of the London naval conference of 1909 (157). 

The section concludes with a group of three articles dealing with 
matters of importance for the entire period 1870 to 1914; the Roman 
question, 1871-1914 (158) ; Franco-German relations, 1871-1914 
(159) ; the growth of European armaments in relation to European 
diplomacy, 1871-1914 (160). 



SECTION I.— 1870-1878. 



1. THE EFFORT TO PREVENT THE OUTBREAK OF THE 
FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR, JULY 3 TO 19, 1870. 

1. INTRODUCTION. 

The victory of Prussia in the War of 1866 led immediately to the 
creation of the North German Confederation and to the conclusion 
of military treaties between Prussia and the South German States 
not yet members of the Confederation. A new situation was thereby 
created in Europe. Its most marked feature was mutual suspicion 
and distrust in Germany and France. A belief that war would soon 
break out became widely prevalent in both countries. Tension be- 
tween France and Prussia rapidly increased. In France the 
chauvinist spirit was promoted by the ultra-Imperialists, who felt 
that unless the prestige of France was restored the Empire would 
be overthrown. In Germany the enmity toward Fiance was 
nursed by Bismarck, who thought that the South German States, if 
they came to fear French aggression, would join the North German 
Confederation. 

2. THE II0HENZ0LLERN CANDIDACY FOR THE SPANISH THRONE. 

Meantime the Spanish throne, vacant by revolution (1868), had 
been offered to several princes, among them Prince Leopold of 
HohenzOllern. Leopold at first declined, but in 1870, after the return 
from Madrid of Bismarck's secret agent, Von Versen, the offer was 
renewed and accepted. The acceptance, announced by the Havas 
Agency July 3 and published in the Paris papers July 4, 5, created 
the greatest excitement and indignation in France (Fester, I, 122, 
124, 129-133). The Emperor Napoleon and the ministry (Emile 
Ollivier, prime minister, and the Due de Gramont, minister of for- 
eign affairs) regarded the affair as a Prussian intrigue designed to 
humiliate France and to weaken her in a military way, in case of a 
war between France and Prussia ; and the Government at once took 
the ground that France could never permit a Hohenzollern to ascend 
the Spanish throne. The official declaration to the chambers, July 
6, affirmed the belief that " the good sense of the German people " 

(21) 



22 






and the "friendship of the Spanish people" would effect the with- 
drawal of Prince Leopold, otherwise " We shall know how to fulfill 
our duty without hesitation and without feebleness." (Angeberg, I, 
20; Fester, I, 134.) 

3. WITHDRAWAL OF THE HOHENZOLLERN CANDIDACY. 

To a request for explanations, the Prussian Government replied 
that it was not officially aware of the affair, which was a purely 
Hohenzollern family matter (Lesourd to Gramont, July 4; King 
William to Queen Augusta, July 5; Angeberg, I, 16; Fester, I, 123, 
125). The French Government made it known that if Leopold be- 
came King of Spain Fiance would regard it as a sufficient cause for 
-war, and the courts of Europe were requested to use their influence 
with Prussia and Spain. Marshall Prim, the actual head of the 
Spanish Government, declared himself willing to "facilitate"* Leo- 
pold's retreat, and July 10 he sent an agent to Berlin to urge the 
withdrawal of the acceptance (Mercier to Gramont, July 7, 9, 10; 
Angeberg, I. 32, 56, 7:'.; Fester, II, 12, 37, 62). The English Gov- 
ernment, most active of all the powers in endeavoring to prevent war. 
represented to France that Prince Leopold on the throne of Spain 
could not be a serious danger to a great country like France and 
regretted the aggressive language of the French Government (Letters 
of Granville and Lyons, July 5-8; Fester, I, 128, II, 4, 12, 15, 27; 
Angeberg, I, 18, 23, 24, 40, 41, 45, 48, 51); represented at Berlin 
that Leopold's candidacy was of no importance to Prussia, that Leo- 
pold would find the position a difficult one, and urged the Prussian 
Government to "discourage" the project (Granville to Loftus, July 
6; Fester, I. Ill; Angeberg, 1, 24): and very strongly urged upon 
the Spanish Government not to give effect to'the candidacy (Gran- 
ville to Layard, July 7; Fester. II, 8; Angeberg, I. 36, :'>7). 

Tic Austrian Government held the same language a! Madrid 
(Beust to Metternich, July 11: Angeberg, I. 87; Fester. II, 80), and 
at Berlin, while deprecating the attitude of France, expressed the con- 
viction that "the wisdom of the King and his influence as head of 
the Hohenzollern house will be utilized to prevent so unfortunate 
■a development." (Beust lo Munch, July 6; Fester, I. 141; Angeberg, 

I, 21.) The Russian Government, after some delay (Fleury to 
Gramont, July 7, 9; Buchanan to Granville, July 9; Fester. 

II, 9, 45, 54), made similar representations at Berlin (Fleury 
to Gramont, July 12; Fester, II, 95). The Italian Govern- 
ment strongly urged the Spanish Government to "come to some 
arrangement/' (Layard to Granville, July 11: Fester, II, 83). 
Meanwhile the French Government, through Benedetti at Ems, re- 
peatedly urged upon King William to refuse his consent to Leopold's 
becoming King of Spain. The king failed to comply with the request, 



23 

but said that if Leopold should withdraw he would approve the 
withdrawal. (Benedetti to Gramont, July 9; King William to 
Queen A-iigusta, July 10; Fester, II, 45, 47, 63; Angeberg, I, 55. 56.) 
July 12, Prince Anthony of Hohenzollern, moved bj' the evident 
1 hough not expressed desire of King William (King William to 
Prince Anthony, July 10; King William to Queen Augusta, July 11; 
Fester, II, 64, 75), by the desire that a family matter should not be 
responsible for a European war (Prince Anthony to King William, 
July 11; Fester, II, 74), and perhaps by representations of the 
French Government conveyed through the Roumanian agent Strat 
(Ollivier, Hidden Causes of the Franco-Prussian War, 169-175), 
withdrew on behalf of his son, Prince Leopold, the acceptance of the 
Spanish Crown (Prince Anthony to Prim, July 12; Fester, II, 93; 
Angeberg, I. 106). 

4. THE DEMAND FOR " FUTURE GUARANTEES." 

To the great surprise of every one concerned this did not satisfy 
the Emperor Napoleon or the Due de Gramont, although a majority 
of the ministry would have been content with it. In opposition 
to very strong remonstrances by the English ambassador (Lyons to 
Granville, July 12; Fester, II, 109) and without consulting the 
ministry collectively the Emperor authorized Gramont to demand 
of King William that he should give "the assurance that he would 
nol again authorize that candidacy." (Gramont to Benedetti, July 
12; Fester, II, 109; Angeberg, I, 95.) 

5. THE EMS DISPATCH. 

The King refused, and upon a repetition of the demand he refused 
again (Benedetti to Gramont, July 13; Fester, II, 116, 117; Ange- 
berg, I, 107-109), and on July 13 sent through Abeken to Bismarck 
the famous Ems dispatch, relating the new demands of Benedetti 
and leaving Bismarck to decide "whether the new demand of Bene- 
detti should not be communicated to our representatives abroad 
and to the press." (Fester, II. 123; Ollivier, Hidden Causes, 
t84.) While the withdrawal of Prince Leopold "lifted a stone 
from the heart" of King William, Bismarck so much desired 
the war that he thought of resigning. The King's telegram 
furnished him with an unexpected opportunity. He at once 
"edited" the telegram in such a way that it would have "the 
effect over yonder of a red flag on the Gallic bull," and in this form 
gave it to the newspapers (Bismarck, the Man and the Statesman, 
II, 96-102 ; Ollivier, Hidden Causes, 281 ff.). The next day, July 14, 
the telegram appeared in the Paris papers, and had exactly the 
effect Bismarck desired (Fester, II, 143; Ollivier, 308). 



24 



6. OUTBREAK OF WAR. 



Austria ami Russia felt that the demand for "future guarantees" 
placed France entirely in the wrong, ami that nothing further could 
l>e done (Bloomfield to Granville, July L3; Fleury to Gramont, July 
L5; Fester, II, 141, 153). England thought the demands wholly 
unjustified, bul still worked to effeel a settlement (Letters of Lyons 
and Granville, July 11 -19; Fester. 1L 117 149, 165, L78). duly L5 
the French Government adopted measures equivalent to a declara- 
tion of Avar, and July 19 the Prussian Government was officially 
informed that a state of war existed (Ollivier, 335 365). 

BIBLIOGRAPH i . 

Falat. Edmund. Bibliographic generate de la guerre de L870 1S71 ; 
repertoire alphabetique el raisonne* des publications de toute nature 
concernant la guerre franco-allemande parties en France et a 
l'etranger. (Berger-Levrault, Paris, 1896.) Contains data as to all 
important publications on the subject. 

The mosl essential letters are referred to in the text. The follow- 
ing collections contain most of the published documents of an official 
character, together with other material : • 

Fester. Richard. Briefe, AJktenstiicke und Regesten zur Geschichte 
der Hohenzollernscheu Thronkandidatur in Spanien. 2 vols. 
(Teubner, Leipzig und Berlin, lid: 1 ..) Contains diplomatic corre- 
spondence, extracts from newspapers, and other material, arranged 
chronologically, and accompanied with bibliography to material 
dealing with events not included in the collection. The most con- 
venient collection for a study of the subject. 

Angeberg, Comte d*. Recueil des traites, conventions, actes, notes. 
capitulations et pieces diplomatiques concernant la guerre Franco- 
Allemande. 5 vols. (Amyot, Paris, L873.) Material for the period 
July 3-19 is contained in vol. I. pp. 12-206. Contains the principal 
diplomatic despatches, all in French. Much less useful than Fester. 

British Parliamentary Papers. Correspondence respecting the 
Denotations preliminary to the war between France and Prussia : lsTO 
[C 167.]. 

France. Enquete parlementaire sur les actes du gouvernemenl de 
la defense nationale: depositions el (emoins. 4 vols. (Paris, 1S7:>.) 

Das Staatsarchiv : Sammlung der offiziellen AJ$tenstucke zur Ge- 
schichte der Gegenwart. (Berlin, 1870.) German semiofficial pub- 
lication. Vol. XIX of this collection covers the period in question. 

co\ i iM pob \i;v accoi \ rs. 

Aheken. IF. Ein schlichtes Leben in bewegter Zeit (Berlin, 1898) : 
Benedetti, Comte. Ma mission en Prusse (Paris, 1871); Beust, F. F. 

Graf von, Aus drei Yiertel-Jahrhunderten. '2 vols. (Stuttgart, 1887) : 



25 

Bismarck, Prince. Bismarck the Man and the Statesman, being the 
Reflections and Reminiscences of Prince Bismarck, 2 vols. (Harpers, 
N. Y., 1899), translated under the supervision of A. J. Butler; 
Gramont, Due de, La France el la Prusse avant la guerre (Paris, 
1872); King Charles of Roumania, Aus dem Leber) Konig Karls 
von Roumanien, I vols. (Stuttgart, L894-1900) ; Loftus, Augustus, 
Diplomatic Reminiscences L862 is?!), 2 vols. (London. L894). 

011ivier,E. L'empire liberal. IT vols. (Paris, 1895-1914) . The 
essentia] matter on the beginnings of the war of 1870 contained in 
(his book has been extracted and translated under the title, The 
Franco-Prussian War and its Hidden Causes. (Little, Brown and 
Co., Boston, L912.) 

Russell, W. II. My Diary During the Last Greal War. (London, 
1871.) 

SK('<)\I)AI:V WORKS. 

Of the innumerable histories dealing with the origin of the war 
of L870 Hie following are perhaps the most essential: 

Delbruck, II. Der [Jrsprung des Krieges von 1870. (Walther, 
Berlin, L893.) 

La Gorce, Pierre de. Histoire du second empire. T vols. ( Paris. 
1894 1905.) Judicious, well-balanced treatment. Vol. VI for the 
beginnings of (lie war. 

Marcks, E. Otto von Bismarck, ein Lebensbild. (Stuttgart, 
1915.) 

Sorel, A. Histoire diplomatique de la guerre franco-allemande. 
•1 vols. ( Paris. 1875.) 

Rose. J. II. The Development of European Nations. I. ch. 1. 
Fifth edition. (New York, Putnam, 1916.) 

Sybel, II. von. (Die Begrundung des deutschen Reichs durch 
AVilliclm I. 5th revised edition.. 7 vols. (Munich and Leipzig, 
L889 1894.) Strongly biased. I»m Ictsed upon Prussian archives. 

2. THE PROTECTION OF BELGIAN NEUTRALITY DURING 
THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR. 

1. DANGER TO BELGIAN NEUTRALITY. 

The outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War brought danger to 
Belgian neutrality. Appropriate action to meet the situation was 
promptly taken by the Belgian Government. On July 15, the day 
the decision for war was made at Paris, the French ambassador at 
Brussels was informed that Belgium was firmly determined to main- 
tain its ueutrality and would be gratified to obtain from France 
an assurance that its neutrality would be respected. France gave 
the desired assurance on the following day. A similar proceeding 
brought forth a like declaration from Berlin on July 22. 



26 

Despite these assurances on the part of the belligerents there was i 
good deal of fear in England that Belgian neutrality would not b* 
respected. 

The chief and immediate cause of alarm was the publication of a 
draft treaty between France and Prussia drawn up in August, 1866, 
and allowing, under certain conditions, the annexation of Belgium 
by France. Publication took place in the London Times, July 25, 
1870. 

2. ENGLISH TREATIES WITH FRANCE AND PRUSSIA. 

On July 30 Granville sent identical notes to both France and Ger- 
many proposing a tripartite treaty, providing that if either party 
violated Belgian neutrality. England would cooperate with the other 
for its defense, but England's operations would be confined to Bel- 
gium. At the same time Russia and Austria, the other two signers 
of the 1839 treaty, were informed of this step. Both agreed to 
maintain Belgian neutrality, but declined to enter into any new 
agreement. Russia making such entrance conditional to a much wider 
guarantee treaty. Bismarck at once accepted the English project. 
France raised certain verbal objections, but finally agreed to* accept. 
(Statement of Gladstone. Aug. 8, Hansard, vol. 203, p. 1699, and of 
Granville, ibid., vol. 203, p. 1754.) 

3. DISCUSSIONS IN BRITISH PARLIAMENT. 

Meanwhile a debate took place in Parliament during the period 
July 30-August 10. Almost all participants, with the exception of 
certain pacifist- | Hansard, vol. 203, p. I738ff), defended the policy of 
maintaining Belgian neutrality, if necessary, by force of arms. But 
the treaty was criticised (1) as weakening the position of the 1839 
treaty, and (2) as likely to involve England, net only in Belgium 
but in other phases of the war as well. (See especially speech 
of Lord Cairns, Hansard, vol. 203, p. 1740.) Granville defended 
the treaty against the first charge by reference to the double agree- 
ment to maintain the Ottoman Empire, signed in 1856, the first by 
all the powers, the second by England. Austria, and France alone; 
and against the second charge by reciting the text of the treaty 
limiting British action to certain specified fields. (See his speech, 
Hansard, vol. 203, p. 1754.) 

IlIUElOtiKAPIIV. 

Morlev. .John. Life of William Ewart Gladstone. (New York, 
Macmillan, L913.) Short account. Morlev was in favor of Glad- 
stone's views. 



27 

Baguenault de Puchesse, G. La neutralite beige pendant ha guerre 
de L870-71. Revue d'histoire diplomatique, vol. 16, pp. 92-102 ( 1902). 

Walpole, Spencer. History of Twenty-five Years. Vol. II, I 
vols. (London. Longmans, 1904.) Also brief. 

Fitzmaurice, Lord Edmond. Life of Lord Granville, H. 39-42. 
(London, Longmans, 1005.) 

Hansard, T. C. Debates, vol. 203, passim 

British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 60, pp. 10-13, 841-842, 948. 
Parliamentary Papers. Franco-German War. No. 1 (1871). 

Das Staatsarchiv, vol. 19, documents listed on p. V, and vol. 20, 
p. III. 

3. THE PROTECTION OF LUXEMBURG NEUTRALITY 
DURING THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR. 

1. INTRODUCTION. 

An affair of some importance, particularly in the light of the 
events of 1014, is the German allegation made during the Franco- 
Prussian War that the French were violating the neutrality of Luxem- 
burg. England evinced an interest in this charge and the matter, 
although finally explained satisfactorily, brought up a point in regard 
to the position of neutral States in war time which shows Bismarck's 
policy in this respect and which furnishes an interesting comparison 
to the German violation of Belgian neutrality in 1014. 

2. THE GERMAN ALLEGATION. 

On December 3, 1870, Bismarck declared that the Prussian Gov- 
ernment could no longer consider itself bound to respect Luxem- 
burg's neutrality in the military operations of the German Army 
since there was no longer any doubt of a " flagrant violation of the 
neutrality of the Grand Duchy in the transit [of French soldiers] 
through it for the purpose of entering the active French forces, in 
the official further:) nee thereof by a functionary of the French Govern- 
ment, and in the toleration of such conduct by the Grand Ducal Gov- 
ernment." (Bismarck to Bernstorff, Circular Note, Dec 3, 1870, 
British Parliamentary Papers. Luxemburg. No. 1 (1871), pp. 1-2). 

Luxemburg thereupon produced a menacing letter in which the 
Prussian Government had threatened occupation of Luxemburg as 
early as November 27, 1870. The Grand Duchy further declared 
that the French Vice Consul had been called and had given a full 
explanation of his proceedings with reference to the complaint made 
by Prussia. 

3. THE ENGLISH PARTICIPATION. 

England, upon being informed of the note of December 3, re- 
served judgment for awhile: then on December 15 asked the Prus- 



28 

sian Government whether it had any present intention of acting on 
its charges. (Granville to Russell, Dec i:>, 1870, Ibid, p. 4.) It 
further, though still refraining from passing judgment until the 
facts were authenticated, protested to the Prussian Government 
against its summary action in declaring the treaty of L867 violated 
before proof had been given to the other signet's of a direct viola- 
tion. (Granville to Loftus, Dee. 17, L870, Ibid, pp. 6-7.) The 
question was thus raised as to whether a power is bound, before de- 
claring the guaranteed neutrality of a State to have been violated, 
to notify and consult with the other guarantors. Bismarck declared 
that no State was so bound. lie replied on December 24 that "the 
question is as to the military defence against military injuries which 
may be done to one of the belligerent Powers from the violation of 
the neutrality by the other: that every Power engaged in warfare is 
entitled to such a defence lias hitherto been uncontested by interna- 
tional law, and that the defence, if it is to be effectual, must take 
place at the proper time, lies in the nature of war." lie goes fur- 
ther and. although he notes that Germany did for the time confine 
itself to a communication of the state of affairs, adds: " But if Lord 
Granville expresses the opinion that even in such a case the course 
to be taken was that the Royal Government should bring its com- 
plaint of the violation of the neutrality before the other signataries 
of the Treaty, with the request that the operation of such a state of 
things should be taken into consideration, then 1 can not admit the 
justice of the demand so made upon us." (Bismarck to Bernstorff, 
Dec. 24, 1870, Ibid, pp. 31-32.) 

Bismarck said, however, that England could rest assured that no 
denunciation of the treaty of 1807 was intended, that no designs 
were cherished against Luxemburg, and. that only such measures were 
being taken bv Prussia as were necessarv for her militarv security. 
England accepted this statement and, noting Luxemburg's explana- 
tion, expressed the hope that the misunderstanding was settled and 
withdrew from the discussion. (Granville to Loftus, Jan. 7, 1871. 
Ibid. pp. 34 35.) 

4. THE 1. 1 XEMBT RG EXPLANATION. 

In the meantime Luxemburg had explained the offences to Bis- 
marck on December If as purely commercial and personal matters 
in which it had had as a Government no part. It further declared 
that if any violation of neutrality had been committed, Germany had 
been much more a guilty party than France. (Servais to Bismarck, 
Dec 1 I, L870, Ibid., pp. 10-25.) Three days later Luxemburg ap- 
pealed to England for protection of her neutrality should need arise, 
pointing out "'that the neutrality conferred on certain States in 
Europe would no longer have any real existence if the existence of a 



29 

state constituted as neutral in virtue of a treaty could depend on the 
will of a single one of the contracting powers." (Servais to Harris, 
Dec. 17, 1870, Ibid., pp. 9-10.) 

Bismarck replied to Luxemburg that Prussia was not wholly satis- 
fied with the explanations and, asking for an investigation of a spe- 
cific instance, suggested a commissioner from Prussia to discuss 
affairs with Luxemburg. The Grand Duchy in turn welcomed the 
proposition, and after a satisfactory explanation of the specific case 
had been made to him, Bismarck declared that further action would 
depend only on the state of affairs in the future and the matter was 
dropped. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

British Parliamentary Papers, Luxemburg, No. 1 (1871), contain 
the important documents. 

4. GERMAN SEIZURE OF NEUTRAL PROPERTY DURING 
THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR, 1870-1871. 

1. THE DUCLAIR INCIDENT. 

In the latter part of the year 1870, during the Franco-Prussian 
War, an incident occurred (spoken of as the "Duclair incident") 
which throws some light upon German conceptions of the rights of 
neutral property in warfare, more especially where the so-called 
droit d'angerie (right of angary) might seem to be involved. The 
incident caused considerable irritation in England. 

In the course of their military operations the necessity arose for 
the Germans of barring the course of the River Seine at Duclair. 
Enemy vessels being unavailable for the purpose, the Germans seized 
six British vessels and sank them in the river, the crews of the ves- 
sels being treated, it is said, with great brutality. 
. In a communication to Lord Odo Russell, British agent at Ver- 
sailles, dated December 26, 1870, Bismarck argued that the question 
at issue lav wholly outside the rules of international law, inasmuch 
as the problem was one which had never been discussed by inter- 
national jurists. He suggested, however, that the captains of the 
vessels, by refusing to enter into a "legal" contract which stipulated 
terms of payment for the use of the vessels, had themselves been 
guilty of an infraction of neutrality. 

But in a later communication, dated January 8, 1871, and in an 
interview with Lord Odo Russell, Bismarck expressed sincere regrets 
that the German troops had been obliged to take such action. He 
admitted the right of the British owners of the sunken vessels to an 
indemnity, and agreed that they should be fully compensated for 
(heir losses. Me claimed, however, that the sinking of the ships was 



30 

justified by international law. Still Later, on January 25, Bismarck 
Rsserted that the action taken was a "right in time of war [which] 
lias become a peculiar institute of international law, the jus angariae, 
which so high an authority as Sir Robert Phillimore defines thus: 
That a belligerent power demands and makes use of foreign ships, 
even such as are not in inland waters, but in ports and roadsteads 
within its jurisdiction, and even compels the crews to transport 
troops, ammunition, or implements of warfare." (Staatsarchiv, vol. 
21, p. 96.) 

2. TIIK SEIZI RE OK SWISS RAILWAY PROPERTY IX ALSACE. 

During the same war the German authorities in Alsace also seized 
for military use between six and seven hundred railway carriages 
belonging to the Centra] Swiss Railway, together with a considerable 
quantity of Austrian rolling stock, and kept this material in their 
possession for some time. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

For accounts of the " Duclair incident." see the Aiynial Register 
for L870 (London. L871), p. 110: Hall. W. E., Treatise mi Interna- 
tional Law (Oxford, Clarendon Press. L909, 6th ed., ed. by J. B. 
At lay), pp. 742 743. 

For the diplomatic correspondence, see I )'Angeberg, Count, Recueil 

des (rahes. conventions, etc.. concernant la guerre franco-allemande 

(Paris, Amyot, L873), Vol. IV, Nos. i>ll. 920, 957; Staatsarchiv, 

vol. 21, Nos. 1498 1509; Parliamentary Papers. Franco-German 

•War, Xos. :> and 6 (1871). 

5. THE SALE OF MUNITIONS OF WAR TO BELLIGERENTS 
DURING THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR. 

1. AMERICAN SALES TO FRANCE. 

During (he Franco-Prussian War France was compelled to buy 
vast amounts of munitions of war from neutral nations. The War 
Department of the United States had been authorized by Congress 
in lsi'.s to sell surplus ordnance stores and continued these sales 
throughout the period of the war (3 Wharton's Digest of Interna- 
tional Law, p. 512). Indirectly the French Government purchased 
the bulk of the $10,000,000 sales of the year L870-71. In October, 
L870, a New York linn, purchasers of one-half of the munitions, 
came under suspicion as being agents of the French Government, and 
all further sale- lo this company were at (nice forbidden, although 
the United States executed its previous contracts (Congressional 
Globe, 42d Cong.. 2d sess., 1018). Congressional committees ap- 



31 

pointed to investigate charges of breach of neutrality reported that 
the sales of munitions were not made under such circumstances as to 
violate the obligations of the Government as a neutral power, since 
it could not be proved that sales were made to known agents of the 
French Government (S. Kept. 183, II. Kept. 46, 42d Cong., 2d sess). 
The Senate committee erred against international law and the ac- 
cepted policy of the United States Government in stating that "if, 
instead of sending agents, Louis Napoleon or Frederick William 
had personally appeared at the War Department to purchase arms it 
would have been lawful for us to sell to either of them, in pursuance 
of a national policy adopted by us prior to the commencement of 
hostilities" (S. Kept. 183, 42d Cong., 2d sess.). This extreme view 
is not upheld by such eminent publicists as Hall (International Law, 
]). r>!)~) and Oppenheim (International Law, II, p. 377). 

•2. ENGLISH SALES TO FRANCE. 

Munitions to a smaller amount were purchased by France from 
private individuals in England. These sales were the cause for a 
formal protest on the part of Prussia, to which the British Govern- 
ment replied that England was not by international law 7 under obli- 
gation to prevent her subjects from committing such acts (Oppen- 
heim, International Law, II, p. 347; Hansard's Parliamentary 
Debates, vol. 205, p. 784). 

:;. INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE SALE OF MUNITIONS. 

By proclamation as well as by actual practice England and the 
United States recognized the right of the citizens of the respective 
countries to trade with the belligerents in contraband of war, subject 
to seizure in transit (Moore's Digest of International Law, VII, p. 
973). Neutrality, therefore, enjoins upon a nation abstinence from 
taking part in any operation of war, but does not force upon the 
neutral the necessity of making a prohibition on the commercial 
enterprise of its citizens (Westlake, International Law, Part II, p. 
1G1). 

This view has been consistently entertained for the past century 
by the United States and by nearly every European country. From 
the beginning of its national existence the executive department of 
the United States has upheld the doctrine of the legality of the sale 
of contraband (Washington, Neutrality Proclamation in American 
State Papers, Foreign Kelations, I, p. 140; 3 Jefferson's Works, p. 
558 ; Pierce on the Crimean War, Richardson's Messages and Papers, 
Y, p. 327; Moore's Digest of International Law, VII, pp. 955-973). 
The doctrine has, however, been most clearly enunciated by the 
judicial department in the decision of Justice Story in the case of 
the " Santissima Trinidad." " There is nothing in our laws, or in the 



32 

Law of nations, that forbids our citizens from sending munitions of 
wai- to foreign ports for sale. It is a commercial adventure which no 
nation is bound to prohibit and which only exposes the persons 
engaged in it to the penalty of confiscation" (7 Wheaton, p. 340). 

The English view as to the sale of munitions in time of war is in 
exact harmony with the American view, and in the parliamentary 
debates during the Franco-Prussian War the House of Commons 
refused to legislate to prevent the sale of munitions by municipal 
law. declaring that British law v\as in accordance with international 
law and with the municipal law of other nations (Hansard's De- 
bates, vol 205, p. 7s".). In the case of La Riviere v. Morgan, over 
the legality of sales made directly to agents of the French Govern- 
ment by English citizens, the British court decided that such opera- 
tions were entirely legal (Law Reporter, 7 Chancery, 550). The 
English judicial as well as the executive department concurred in 
the American view of the practice of a neutral State. 

I. GERMAN DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE. 

Although Germany protested at the time of the Franco-Prussian 
War, she lias in practice subscribed to the English and American 
positions, as is shown by her sale of munitions during the Boer War 
and the Russo-Japanese War (Gregory in American Journal of In- 
ternational Law. Oct., L905, p. 5)30; Hershey, International Law and 
Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War). A few countries have 
refused to subscribe to the doctrine as laid down by international 
law. Switzerland and Belgium prevented the sale of munitions 
during the Franco-Prussian War; but because of political prudence 
rather than because of the obligations of neutrality (Oppenheim, 
International Law, II, p. 377). 

.-,. THE HAGUE CONFERENCE ON THE SALE OF MUNITIONS. 

The Hague Conference of L907 laid down as a principle to be fol- 
lowed for war on land and sea that "a neutral power is not called 
upon to prevent the export or transport, on behalf of one or the other 
of the belligerents, of arms, munitions of war. or, in general, of any- 
thing which can be of use to an army or fleet" (Hague Convention, 
V. art. 7. 1907). From the evidence it may be concluded that the 
neutrality laws were not in the past and are not now designed to 
interfere with commerce even in contraband of war. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

Richardson, Messages and Papers, V; American State Papers, 
Foreign Relations, I; Debates in Congress, Congressional Globe, 42d 
Cong., 2d sess.; Debates in Parliament, Hansard Parliamentary 



33 

Debates, cciii-cev; Senate Report 183, 42d Cong., 2d sess. ; House 
Report 46, 42d Cong., 2d sess.; Scott, J. B., Cases in International 
Law, Seton v. Low, p. 779 ; 7 Wheaton, 340, Santissima Trinidad ; 
2 Wallace, 28, The Peterhoff; Law Reporter, 7 Chancery, 550, La 
Riviere v. Morgan. 

Moore. Digest of International Law. (Washington, Government 
Printing Office, 1906.) VII, pp. 955-973. Standard for American 
Interpretation. 

Wharton, Digest of International Law. (Washington, Govern- 
ment Printing Office, 1887.) II, pp. 512-513. On French sales. 

Westlake, Internationa] Law. (Cambridge, University Press, 
11)04-1907). Part II, pp. 161-177. Good for English views. 

Oppenheim, International Law. (New York, Longmans, 1912.) 
II, pp. 371-443. 

Hershey, A. S., The Essentials of International Public Law. (New 
York, Macmillan, 1912.) Ibid., International Law and Diplomacy 
of the Russo-Japanese War. (New York, Macmillan, 1906.) Ger- 
many's sale of ships. 

American Journal of International Law. (New York, Baker, 
l'.H I L917.) Historical summaries of doctrine of contraband. 

Annnls of American Academy of Political and Social Science 
(Philadelphia, The Academy, 1915). 

Hull, International Law. (Oxford, Clarendon, 1904), p. 557. 
Opposition to American sales in 1870. 

6. THE RECOGNITION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF 
NATIONAL DEFENCE, 1870-1871. 

1. INTRODUCTION. 

Sepl ember 3, 1870, word came to Paris that Napoleon ITT had been 
made prisoner at Sedan. At several meetings of the Corps Legislatif 
the overthrow of the Imperial Government and the substitution of 
some other form of authority was discussed. While the deputies 
debated, the people of Paris acted. On the morning of September 4 
the ' Imperial Government was overthrown, and word was sent 
through France that a new authority, a Government of National 
Defence, had been created by acclamation of the people. (Archives 
Diplomatiques, first series, vol. 40, 472-508.) Sep! ember 6 Jules 
Favre sent abroad to the diplomatic agents of France a circular com- 
munication, bidding them explain the situation (Ibid., pp. 511-13) 
to the governments to which they were accredited. 

2. RECOGNITION BY THE UNITED STATES. 

That very day the American Government instructed Minister 
Washburne al Paris not to hesitate to recognize the new government 
r,:;70G— 18 3 



34 

if it possessed effective power and was accepted by the people of 
France. Other communications followed, and that same day recog- 
nition was given together with the congratulations of the President 
and people of the United States upon the happy establishment of a 
republican government. (Foreign Relations of the United States, 
1870, p. G7.) 

3. OTHER PROMPT RECOGNITIONS. 

Two days later the American example was followed by Spain, by 
Italy, and by Switzerland, and also by Portugal shortly after 
(Archives Diplomatiques, lirst series, vol. 40. pp. 524-528, 545). 

1. THE DELAYED RECOGNITIONS. 

Thiers proposed that England give immediate recognition, but 
Lord Granville demurred, saying that the Republic had no legal 
sanction yet, since no constituent assembly had decided the future 
government of the country (Lord Newton. Lord Lyons, I, 316-17). 
A similar request was made at Vienna, for the French leaders desired 
the greater moral authority which recognition would give them, but 
Count Beust replied that the friendship of the Dual Monarchy was 
not dependent upon the form of the French Government, and that it 
would be contrary to international practice to give recognition be- 
fore the French people had pronounced their decision (Archives 
Diplomatiques, first series, vol. 40. p. 703). It was in vain that Count 
Chaudory instructed the French envoys to press the matter, declaring 
that more than nine-tenths of the people of Paris had voted in favor 
of the Government of National Defence (Ibid., vol. 41, 934-5, vol. 42, 
1348). Earl Granville submitted the matter to a meeting of the cabi- 
net, which again refused, saying that there was wanting that kind of 
stability which could be given Only by a constituent assembly (Ibid.. 
IV, 1374-5). The truth is that contemporaries might well doubt 
whether the new government possessed either legal sanction or actual 
power (Annual Register. 1870. p. 182). In after days Hanotaux pro- 
nounced it to have been merely a grand local council (Contemporary 
France. I, 15). and on several occasions during the siege of Paris 'the 
Red Republicans attempted to overthrow it (Lord Lyons. 1. 375). 
February 4, 1871. when hope was gone of deliverance from the Ger- 
mans, the Government of National Defence called for elections of 
representatives of the people, and a little later formally yielded up 
its powers to them (Archives Diplomatiques, first series, vol. 42, 
1406-71. 1487-0). England now decided, February 10. 1871. to give 
recognition at once (Lord Lyons. I, 307), and Austria-Hungary, de- 
siring to act with England, gave her recognition also (Archives Dip- 
lomatiques, first series, vol. 42. 1407, 1511). 



35 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

1. Archives Diplomatiques, Recueil Mensuel International de 
Diplomatic et d'Histoire, first series, vols. 40-42, contain most of the 
diplomatic correspondence relating to this subject. 

Moore, J. B. Digest of International Law, I, 127-128 (Washing- 
ton, Government Printing Office, 1906). 

2. Lord Newton, Lord Lyons, A Record of British Diplomacy. 2 
volumes (London. Arnold, 1913). Some excellent information on 
this subject from the British ambassador to France at this time. 

3. The Annual Register: A Review of Public Events at Home and 
Abroad, 1870. Some contemporary remark-. 

4. Hanotaux, G., Contemporary France (translated by J. C. 
Tarver), 4 volumes (New York, Putnam, 1903-9), contains some 
brief comments upon the subject. 

7. THE ROMAN QUESTION, 1870-1871. 

1. INTKODUCTIOX. 

The French troops guarding papal sovereignty in Rome were with- 
drawn July 29 to August 19, 1870, as a consequence of the Franco- 
Prussian War. Thereupon the Italian people and the Italian Parlia- 
ment called upon the King to occupy the papal territories. Visconti- 
Venosta, minister of foreign affairs, despatched a memorandum to 
the powers August 29, announcing that the Government had decided 
on immediate occupation. One Aveek later the French Empire fell, 
whereupon the September Convention ceased to be an effective guar- 
antee for the safety of the Pope and of the Patrimonium Petri 
against the aspirations of the Kingdom of Italy for possession of the 
city of Rome. 

On August 29 the Italian Government, in a circular transmitted 
to the other Governments of Europe, intimated its intention of occu- 
pying Rome. Settlement of the relations to be established between 
the Italian Government and the Papacy on the lines subsequently 
followed in the Law of Guarantees was foreshadowed. No strong 
protest or indication of hostile action came from any of the powers 



& 



2. TAKING OF ROME. 

Victor Emmanuel, in a letter dated September 8, called upon the 
Pope to accept the love and protection of the people of Italy in lieu 
of a sovereignty which could be maintained only through the support 
of foreigners. Pius IX replied, September 11, that such a letter was 
not worthy of an affectionate son. To the bearer of the ixwal appeal 
he intimated, September 10, that he might yield to force. 



36 

Gen. Cadorna, at the head of his army, entered papal territory 
September 11, and after having effected a breach in the walls of 
Rome, occupied the right bank of the Tiber September 20. Three 
urgent requests from the Pope induced him to occupy the Leonine 
City on the right bank September 21. A plebiscite October 2 an- 
nexed (hose papal territories to the Kingdom of Italy by a vote of 
133,681 to 1,507. Though it is probable that many of the papalists 
refrained from going to the polls, the figures indicated that public 
sentiment in the papal state was strongly in favor of annexation. 

3. LAW OK GUARANTEES. 

[taly effected its settlement of the papal question by the Law of 
Guarantees, May 13, 1S71. The vote of the chamber of deputies stood 
is.) to 10C>. The provisions of the law are as follows: 

Part I, Prerogatives of the Holy See. 

Article I. Pope's person declared sacred and inviolable. 

Article 2. Free discussion of religions questions allowed, but insults and 
outrages againsl ibe Pope to be punished as injury and insult to the King's 
person. 

Article .">. Pope granted royal honors and bis customary guard. 

Article 1. Annuity of 3,225,000 lire allotted for the maintenance of the Sacred 
College, the sacred palaces, tbe congregations, the Vatican Chancery, and tlie 
diplomatic service. 

Article 5. Exemption from taxation granted tbe sacred palaces, museums, 
and libraries and perpetual enjoyment of tbe Vatican and Lateral) buildings 
and gardens and of the villa at Caste] Gandolfo assured tbe Pope. 

Articles 6 and 7. Access of any Italian official or agent to tbe palaces or to 
any conclave or ecumenical council forbidden without special authorization 
from the Pope, council, or conclave. 

Article 8. Seizure or examination of ecclesiastical papers, documents, books, 
or registers of purely spiritual character forbidden. 

Article 1 9. Full freedom for the exercise of the spiritual ministry guaranteed 
the Pope and provision made Cor the publication of bis announcements on tbe 
doors of the Roman Church and basilicas. 

Article 10. Immunity extended to ecclesiastics employed by the Holy See and 
personal rights of Italian citizens bestowed on foreign ecclesiastics In Rome. 

Article 11. Diplomatists accredited to the Holy See and papal diplomatists 
while in Italy placed on same footing as diplomatists accredited to the Quirinal. 

Article 12. All papal telegrams and correspondence with bishops and with 
foreign governments to be transmitted free of cost In Italy and a papal tele- 
graph office served by papal officials in communication with the Kalian postal 

and telegraph system established. 

Article 13. All ecclesiastical seminaries, academies, colleges, and schools for 
the education of priests in the city of Pome exempted from all Interference on 
the part of the Government. 

Part II, Church a.nd State in Italy. 

Article it. Clergy allowed freedom of assembly. 

Article 15. Government relinquished its right of apostolic legation In Sicily 

and the appointment of its own nominees to the chief benefices d' the Kingdom; 



37 

bishops dispensed from swearing fealty to the King, though except in Rome 
and its suburbs, choice of bishops limited to ecclesiastics of Italian nationality. 

Article 16. Need for royal exequatur and placet abolished for all ecclesiastical 
publications, but the enjoyment of temporalities by bishops and priests made 
subordinate to the concession of a state exequatur and placet. 

Article 17. Independence of the ecclesiastical jurisdiction for spiritual and 
disciplinary matters maintained, but civil courts granted competence to pass 
judgment on the juridical effect of ecclesiastical sentences. Provision to be 
made by future law for the reorganization, conservation, and administration of 
all the church property in the Kingdom. 

Articles 268, 2G9, and 270 of the penal code were modified July 12 
to make ecclesiastics liable to fine and imprisonment for spoken or 
written attacks on the laws of the State or for fomenting disorder. 

Victor Emmanuel made his official entry into the new capital 
July 12, and the first Italian Parliament at Rome opened Novem- 
ber 21. 

I. TEMPORARY FINANCIAL MEASURES. 

At first the secretary general of the Italian foreign office had been 
received almost daily by Cardinal AntonelH, papal secretary of state. 
The royal commissioner of finance, as a precautionary measure, had 
seized the pontifical treasury, but, upon being informed that it con- 
tained the fund of Peter's Pence, the council of state authorized the 
restoration of that amount. The Holy See was indemnified for 
moneys expended for the October service of the coupon of the pon- 
tifical debt as the Italian State had taken over that debt. Cardinal 
Antonelli apprised the Government September 29 that the was unable 
to issue drafts for the monthly payment of the pontifical budget for 
the maintenance of the Pope, the Sacred College, the apostolic palaces, 
and fl"' papal guards. The Government honored the drafts and thus 
contributed an installment of the annuity afterwards placed at the 
disposal of the Holy See by the Law of Guarantees. 

5. PAPAL PROTESTS. 

Pius IX protested against both the principle and plan of the Law 
of Guarantees in a series of declarations of which the following were 
(lie more important: Protest of Cardinal Antonelli to the powers, 
September 20, 1870; papal letter to the cardinals, September 29, 
1870; papal encyclical of November 1, 1870; dispatch of Cardinal 
A nl one! li to the papal nuncios, November 8, 1870; papal encyclical 
of May 15, 1871. (French texts of these protests are in Archives 
diploma! iques, first series, vol. 48, pp. 86-88, 111-113, 1G7-17G, 179-184, 
228 234.) In the encyclical of May 15, 1871, the pope declared : "We 
will not admit and we will not accept, because it is absolutely impos- 
sible for us. the immunities or guaranties devised by the Piedmontese 
Government, whatsoever may be their tenor, nor any other of that 



38 

kind, with whatsoever sanction it may be clothed." " We never will 
accept any immunity or guaranty whatsoever, which, under pretext 
of protecting our sacred power and our liberty, would be offered in 
exchange for and to take the place of that temporal sovereignty with 
which Divine Providence has willed that the Apostolic Holy Sec 
should be provided and fortified and which is assured to us by legiti- 
mate and unattackable titles and a possession of more than 11 cen- 
turies." « Archives diplomatiques, first series, vol. 48, p. 231.) 

The essence of the papal position as to the Law of Guarantees is 
perhaps best expressed in a paragraph in the dispatch of Cardinal 
Antonelli to the papal nnncios. November 8, 1871: "An authority 
which lives and is exercised by virtue of a concession, and which, 
consequently, depends upon the gpod will or caprice of the one who 
concedes that authority, has not a life of its own and can not extend 
its influence beyond the limits which are imposed upon it and agreed 
to by its intrinsic and extrinsic conditions. Now. everybody knows 
that the head of the church has need of an unquestionable authority 
of his own, in order that the exercise of his spiritual authority may 
not be restricted by any cause nor interrupted at any thru?. It follows 
that, whatever the guaranty it may be proposed to give him, that 
authority will always be illusory if it remain subject to a sovereign or 
a lay power." ( Archives diplomatiques, first series, vol. 48, p. 183.) 

6. TIIK POWERS AND THE ROMAN QUESTION. 

France recalled Senard, French minister at Florence, who had writ- 
ten congratulations to Victor Emmanuel on the capture of Rome. 
The next minister, the Comte de Choiseul, was instructed to absent 
himself from Italy at the moment of the King's official entry into 
the new capital. Thiers hastened to appoint a French ambassador to 
the Holy See. But the powers as a whole, although fully notified 
of Italy's actions, took no steps to get the papal status embodied 
in an international agreement, and their general acquiescence made 
the Law of Guarantees an accepted fact. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

Annual Register, 1871. pp. 255-256; The Catholic Encyclopedia, 
article "Law of Guarantees"; Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th ed., 
article "Italy": Bertolini, F.. Storia d'ltalia dal 1814-1878, 2 pts. 
(Milan, Vellardi, 1880-1881) ; Brah, M.. Geschichte des Kirchen- 
staats (Mainz. 1807-1000). 3 vols.: Cadorna, R.. La Liberazione di 
Roma nelPanno 1870 (Rome. 1880): Cappelletti, L., Storia di Vit- 
torio Emmanuele II e del suo regno (Rome, E. Voghera, 1893), 3 
vols. ; Castellari, La Santa Sede (Milan. Societa editrice libraria, 
1903); Dollinger, F. V.. "Pius IX" in Kleine Schriften (Reush, 



39 

Stuttgart, 1890), pp. 558 seq.; Geffcken, F. H.. Die Volkerrechtliche 
Stellung des Papsttums (Rome, 1887) ; Gillet, Pie IX, sa vie et les 
actes de son pontificat (Paris, 1877) ; Giobbio. Lezioni do diplomazia 
ecclesiastica (Rome, 1899) ; Godkin, G. S., Life of Victor Emmanuel 
II (London, 1879), 2 vols.; Halekamp, Papst Pius IX, in seinem 
Leben und Wirken (2d ed., Miinster, 1870) : King, B., History of 
Italian Unity (London, Nisbet, 1899), 2 vols.; MacCaffrey, James. 
History of the Catholic Church in the Nineteenth Century (St. 
Louis. 1910), 2 vols.; Massari. G., La vita ed il regno di Vittorio 
Emanuele II Primo re d'ltalia (Milan, Treves, 1901), 2 vols.; Niel- 
sen, Fr., The History of the Papacy in the Nineteenth Century. 
trans, under direction of A. F. Mason (New York. Dutton & Co., 
1900); Orsi, P. L.. L'ltalia moderna (Milan, 1901); Pougeois, Ale- 
sander, Histoire de Pie IX et de sou pontificat (Paris. 1877-1888), 6 
vols. ; Raffaelc, de Cesare, Last Days of Papal Rome, 1850-1870 ; Stepi- 
schnegg, Papst Pius IX und seine Zeit (Vienna, 1879), 2 vols.: 
Trollope, Life of Pius IX (London, 1877), 2 vols.; Westlake, John, 
International Law (Cambridge, University Press, 1910), vol. 1, pp. 
37-39; Zini, Storia d'ltalia (Milan, 1875), 4 vols. 

For texts of documents, see Acta Pii IX (Rome n. d. ), pt. 1, vol. 
5, pp. 286 seq., 306 seq., 352 seq.; Acta Sanctae Sedis (Rome, 1870- 
1871). Archives Diplomatiques, first series, vol. 48, pp. 1-236. Par- 
liamentary Papers, 1870-1871. Rome, No. 1 (1871). See also Gaz- 
zetta Ufliciale. For text of the Law of Guarantees see British and 
Foreign State Papers, vol. 65, pp. 638-642, 

8. THE BLACK SEA QUESTION, 1870-187L 

1. THE BLACK SKA AND THE TREATY OF PARIS (1856). 

The Treaty of Paris (1856) aimed. to establish a balance of power 
in the Near East by (1) protecting Turkey against Russian naval 
power in the Black Sea. and (2) safeguarding Russia against attack 
in that quarter by ;i third power. It neutralized the Black Sea, de- 
clared it open to merchantmen of all nations, forbade the establish- 
ment or maintenance of military-maritime arsenals on its coast, and 
interdicted it to men-of-war of the littoral and other States, admit- 
ting only a few Turkish and Russian vessels for coast service. An 
added convention bound the Porte, while at peace, to admit no for- 
eign ships of war into the Dardanelles and Bosphorus. 

2. RUSSIAN CIRCULAR OF OCTOBER 31, 1870 (APPENDIX I, 2 ) . 

At a critical stage of the Franco-Prussian War, October 31, 1870, 
Russia issued a circular note to the signatory powers denouncing 
the stipulations of the general treaty and the separate convention 



40 

with Turkey of the same date relative to the limit of her naval 
forces in the Black Sea. Russia declared it could not admit de jure 
that treaties violated in several of their general and essential clauses 
should remain binding in other clauses directly affecting the inter- 
ests of Russia. The reunion of Moldavia and Wallachia, effected 
by a series of revolutions at variance with the spirit and letter of 
the Treaty of Paris, illustrated the " modifications to which most 
European transactions have been exposed, and in the face of which 
it would be difficult to maintain that the written law. founded 
upon the respect for treaties as the basis of public right and regu- 
lating the relations between States, retains the moral validity which 
it may have possessed at other times." " Repeatedly and under va- 
rious pretexts foreign men-of-war have been suffered to enter the 
straits and whole squadrons, whose presence was an infraction of the 
character of absolute neutrality attributed to those waters, admitted 
to the Black Sea.'" 

:j. reception of Russian circulat;. 

Serious statesmen were not surprised by Russia's action. Gran- 
ville wrote to Gladstone that, excepting England and Turkey, all 
the cosignatories of the Treaty of Paris had favored modification 
of the Black Sea neutralization, previous to Russia's declaration. 
While not dissenting from the substance of Russia's claim, Gladstone 
was outraged by its formal basis. His memorandum to Granville 
contributed the pith of the latter's reply to Gortchakoff's note. 
"The question therefore arises, not whether any desire expressed by 
Russia ought to be carefully examined in a friendly spirit by the co- 
signatory Powers, but whether they are to accept from her an 
announcement that, by her own act. without any consent from them, 
she has released herself from a solemn covenant." (Hertslet. Map of 
Europe by Treaty. Ill, 1899-1900.) 

4. CALLING OF LONDON CONFERENCE OF 1871. 

Granville regarded war as a possible risk after the reply to Russia ; 
but the best English opinion was averse to war for the neutrality of 
the Black Sea. And with France unable to move, and Prussia back- 
ing Russia, England stood without allies. Yet, by a threat of war, 
Granville induced Bismarck to invite the states which had signed the 
Treaty of Paris (1856) to a conference at London to discuss the ques- 
tions raised by the Russian circular. (Morley, Gladstone. II, 353- 
355; Marriott, England since Waterloo, 427.) Great Britain, Aus- 
tria-Hungary, Italy, Germany, Russia, and Turkey were represented. 
France, on account of the war. was represented only at the last session. 



41 

5. LONDON CONFERENCE OF 1871. 

The first protocol of the London Conference, January 17, 1871, 
recognized " that it is an essential principle of the Law of 
Nations that no Power can liberate itself from the engagements of a 
Treat}-, nor modify the stipulations thereof, unless with the consent 
of the Contracting Powers by means of an amicable arrangement." 
(Hertslet, III, 1901.) This vindication of the sanctity of treaties was 
somewhat impaired by the fact that Russia, as a reward of submis- 
sion to international law, was given what she had affected to take. 
(Hall, op cit., 347-348; Lawrence, Principles of International Law, 
6 ed., 328.) Articles II and III of the treaty, which was signed at the 
close of the conference, March 13, 1871 (See Appendix 1) , maintained 
the principle of the closing of the straits to foreign men-of-war, as 
long as the Porte is at peace, and the free navigation of the Black 
Sea by merchantmen of all nations ; Article I abolished the neutrali- 
zation of the Black Sea, the exclusion of warships of the littoral 
powers, and the prohibition of military-maritime arsenals on its 
coast. (Hertslet, III, 1919-1923.) The Danube Commission, cre- 
ated by the Treaty of Paris (1856), was continued until 1883 and pro- 
vision was made to protect and continue its work. (See article. The 
Danube Question, 1871-1904.) 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

Parliamentary Papers, 1871, vol. 36, pp. 1-178, and Archives Dip- 
lomatiques, first series, vol. 45, pp. 177-374, give the most important 
documents for the London Conference. The protocols of the Con- 
ference are in British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 61, pp. 1193- 
1227. 

Goriainow, S. Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles, 144-312 (Paris, 
Plon, 1910). Important study, based on the Russian archives. 

Hall, W. E. A Treatise on International Law, pp. 344-348, 6th ed. 
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1909.) Brief account of legal aspects of 
Black Sea question. 

Fitzmaurice, Lord Edmond. Life of Lord Granville, II, 71-79 
(London, Longmans, 1905). 

Phillipson, C, and Buxton, B. The question of the Bosphorus 
and the Dardanelles, ch. 6. (London, Stevens, 1917.) 

Morley, J. Life of W. E. Gladstone, 5 vols. (London, Macmillan, 
1903.) Shows Gladstone's relations to the foreign office. 

Marriott, J. A. R. England since Waterloo. (New York, Put- 
nam, 1913.) Brief historical sketch. 

LaAvi-ence, T. J. The Principles of International Law, 6th ed. 
(New York, Heath. 1915.) 



42 

Hertslet. The Map of Europe by Treaty, 4 vols. (London, Sta- 
tionery Office, 1875-1891.) 

Holland, T. E. The European Concert in the Eastern Question. 
271-276. (Oxford. Clarendon Press, 1885.) 

Abel, Karl. Letters on International Relations before and during 
the War of 1ST0, 2 vols. (London, Tinsley, 1871.) Interpretation 
of current events by correspondent of the London Times at Berlin. 
Has appendix of documents relating to Black Sea, etc. 

9. PEACE PRELIMINARIES OF THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN 

WAR, 1870-1871. 

1. THE NAPOLEONIC EMPIRE AM) THE THIRD REPUBLIC. 

.With the capitulation of Sedan (Sept. 2, 1870), the Second 
Empire collapsed. September 4 the Republic was proclaimed at 
Paris and the Government of National Defence organized, with 
Favre as minister of foreign affairs. Paris having been invested 
September 19, Gambetta became (Oct. 9) the head of a "delega- 
tion" from the Paris Government, first at Tours and later at Bor- 
deaux. The new Republic was recognized by the United States Sep- 
tember 6. and subsequently by the other powers. (See article. The 
Recognition of the Government of National Defence, 1870-1871.) 
Meantime Empress Eugenie in England claimed authority as 
"Regent." and the allegiance of the French Army in Metz to the 
Government of National Defence was uncertain. Bismarck, with 
the invading arm v. at first dealt with representatives of the various 
French factions, and showed a disposition to play one off against the. 
other, declaring on one occasion that the Paris government did not 
represent ''the will of France,"'' and suggesting either the calling of 
the old Napoleonic assembly, or a general election. (Busch, Bismarck 
in the Franco-German War. I, II passim, especially I. 219. 266; 
II. 302-303, 3 12 : Foreign Relations of the United States. 1870. 67-68; 
Memoirs of Prince Hohenlohe-Schillingsfurst, II, 52-54.) 

Early in September the Government of National Defence was mak- 
ing overtures through the British foreign office to Bismarck, who in- 
sisted upon securities (the delivery of forts). September !). Thiers 
was sent by Favre on a mission to London. St. Petersburg. Vienna, 
and Florence in an effort to secure from the powers offers of inter- 
vention, mediation, or good offices, but without substantial result, 
except that Great Britain, Russia. Austria, Italy, Spain, and Turkey 
proposed an armistice, (favre. Gouvernement de la Defense Na- 
tionale, I, 126-283, 420-432; 11. 25-56; British Parliamentary Papers, 
Franco-German War. No. 1 (1871). pp. 60, 94, 99, 116, and passim; 
Busch, Bismarck, I. 144, 167-168; Rothan. Souvenirs Diplomatiques, 
383-385.) 



4:; 

2. NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN ARMISTICE SEPTEMBER, L870 JANUARY, 1871. 

Through Lord Lyons, British ambassador in Paris, a conference 
was arranged at Ferrieres (Sept. ID), but Bismarck refused 
Favre's request for an armistice, demanding that France should ac- 
cept the principle of territorial cessions and securities- (Favre, 
(ioiiverneinent. I. 420-432; Busch, Bismarck, 1G7-108.) Further 
abortive negotiations took place at Versailles and elsewhere (Oct. 
1 to Nov. 7) on the subject of an' armistice and a general 
election. Action by the papacy was suggested (Jan. 6, L8, L871), 
and Favre made an attempt to attend the London Conference on the 
Black Sea question (Jan. 14. 15. See article, The Black Sea Ques- 
tion, 1870 1871), in the hope of securing a discussion of '"ail the 
questions which divide Europe," but was prevented by Bismarck. 
Finally, direct negotiations foe an armistice were held at Versailles 
between Bismarck and Favre (.Ian. 23-28), and on January 28 they 
agreed upon the capitulation of Paris and an armistice (exception 
made of the region idiout Belforl ) for 21 days to permit the election 
of a National Assembly. All of France, including Msace-Lorraine 
and the occupied district-, took- part in this election. 

::. THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY \ M> THE PEACE PRELIMINARIES. 

The elections held under the armistice resulted in a victory for 
the peace pari y, and the National Assembly, which mei ;it Bordeaux, 
February 12. chose Thiers as Chief of the Executive Power. Nego- 
tiations for peace were then held at Versailles (Feb. 21-26). The 
Prussian military party stood out for Belfort and a large part 
of French Lorraine including Nancy, as well as Met/, but Bis- 
marck doubted the wisdom of annexing so much French population, 
and was probably influenced by the opinion of the neutral States. 
France was accordingly allowed to keep Belfort and Nancy. Eng- 
land protested against the indemnity as excessive and may have 
helped to secure its reduction from six to five milliards. The pre- 
liminaries of peace were signed February 20. 1871, subject to ratifica- 
tions by the National Assembly. (Sic article, The Treaty of Frank- 
fort.) 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 
CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTS OF INTERVIEWS, WITH DOCUMENTS. 

Busch, Moritz. Bismarck in the Franco-German AVar, 1870-1871. 
Authorized translation from the German. 2 vols, in one. (New 
Fork, Scribner, no date.) Important, owing to the personal char- 
acter of the negotiations. Based on and for the most part quoted 
from contemporary diary of Bismarck's confidential press agent. 



44 

Necessary to note carefully what Busch heard from Bismarck and 
what from others not in Bismarck's complete confidence. 

Ftivre, Jules. Gouvernement de la Defense Nationale, Paris, 1871, 
•I vols. Favre was chief negotiator with Bismarck. Many docu- 
ments and accounts of conversations dictated promptly after they 
occurred, though lacking the photographic exactitude of Busch. Let- 
ters of Thiers give conversations with Granville and Gladstone. 

ACCOUNTS, REMINISCENT ANT) HISTORIC, [NTEBSPEBSED WITH DOCUMENTS. 

Lord Newton. Lord L}'ons, a record of British diplomacy. (Lon- 
don, 1013.) 2 vols. Vol. I, 322-37."), gives account of the activity 
and observations of Lord Lyons, British ambassador at Paris, and 
intimate with the Favre government. 

Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice. The Life of Granville George Leve- 
son-Gower, second earl of Granville, K. G., 1815-1891. (New York. 
1905.) 2 vols. Granville was the British foreign minister. Vol. I, 
30-80, covers this period; well informed, hut discreel. 

Morley. John. The Life of William Evarts Gladstone. (New 
York, 1911). 3 vols. Gives an intimate view of the man who con- 
trolled British policy. Vol. II, 338-3f>s. 

Simon. Jules. The Government of M. Thiers. From February 8, 
1871, to May 21, 1873. From the French. (London, 1879). 2 vols. 

Lee, Sidney. Queen Victoria. (New York, 1903.) 

SPECIAL STUDIES. 

Rothan, G. Souvenirs Diplomatiques L'Allemagne et L'ltalie. 
1870-1871. (Paris, 1881.) 2 vols. Vol. I. L'Allemagne, pp. 39-91. 
French minister at Florence. 

May. Gaston. Le Traite" de Francfort. (Paris. 1909.) Excellent 
study, with strong background of international law and diplomatic 
practice. Did not have access to archives. 

Hanotaux, Gabriel. Contemporary France. (Westminster. 1903- 
1909, 4 vols.) Vol. I, translated by Tarver, valuable as work of dis- 
tinguished historian and foreign minister. 

Sorel, Albert. Histoire diplomatique de la guerre franco-alle- 
mande (Paris. 1875), 2 vols., pp. 435-439. An early work by a his- 
torian of high standing. 

<M l H'lAI. DOCUMENTS. 

Parliamentary Papers. Franco-German War, No. 1 (1871). 

Foreign Relations of the Tmited States, 1870. pp. 67, 68, 119, 126, 
160-170, 193, 206-230. 

Archives Diplomatiques, first series, vols. 40-43, passim. Staats- 
archiv, vols. 19-20, passim. 



45 
10. THE TREATY OF FRANKFORT, 1871. 

1. PRELIMINARIES. 

The preliminary Treaty of Versailles, signed February 26, 1871, by 
Thiers and Favre for France and Bismarck for Germany, and 
ratified by the National Assembly March 1, included these general 
provisions: 

(a) Cession of Alsace and Lorraine, including Metz, to Germany; 
France to keep Bel fort. 

{b) Payment of 5 milliards of francs ($1,000,000,000). 

(c) Gradual evacuation by German troops. 

It also provided that negotiations for the definitive treaty of 
peace should be opened at Brussels immediately after the ratification 
of the preliminary treaty by the French National Assembly and the 
German Emperor. (See article, The Peace Preliminaries of the 
Franco-Prussian War.) 

2. NEGOTIATIONS AT BRUSSELS. 

The negotiations at Brussels lasted from March 24 to May 4, 1871. 
Germany was represented by Count von Arnim and Baron von Bolan, 
France by Baron Baude and M. Goulard. The French representa- 
tives were not provided with official instructions. "It is, however, 
probable that M. Thiers maintained personal communications with 
them and that he traced the line of conduct for them to follow." 
(Hanotaux, I, 282.) 

At the opening of the negotiations the Germans presented five 
demands : 

(a) That the war indemnity of 5,000,000,000 francs be paid in 
coin. 

(b) That the railroads in Alsace-Lorraine be turned over to Ger- 
many without any other condition than an indemnity for the holders 
of the bonds. 

(c) That all treaties between France and Germany which had 
been abrogated by the war be restored, including the commercial 
treaty of 1862. 

(d) That an indemnity be allotted to Germans expelled from 
France during the war. 

(e) That a clause relative to private property at sea be intro- 
duced into the treaty. 

The French representatives resisted the German demands and 
ought to obtain stipulations that 1,000,000,000 francs of the indem- 
nity be paid in coin, the remainder in 5 per cent bonds; that the 
evacuation of France by the German armies take place by July 1, 
1871; and that in annexing Alsace-Lorraine Germany should take 
over a proportionate share of the French public debt. 



46 

No protocols of the conferences at Brussels were kept. The ne- 
gotiations can not, therefore, be followed in detail. During the first 
month many points were discussed but no agreements were reached, 
.virile the difficult question of the definitive frontier remained in 
abeyance. On April 3 that question was brought forward and held 
a leading place in the discussions until May 4, when the negotia- 
tions were transferred to Frankfort. The uncertainty of the situa- 
tion in France, owing to the conflict between the Government of the 
National Assembly and the Paris Commune, appears to have been 
the chief cause for delay. The German Government apparently de- 
sired to wait until the outcome of the struggle should be clearly 
indicated. 

3. NEGOTIATIONS AT FRANKFORT. 

The negotiations at Brussels terminated on Mav 4 and were re- 
sumed at Frankfort on May 6. Jules Favre. minister of foreign af- 
fairs, and Pouyer-Quertier, minister of finance, represented France, 
while Bismarck appeared in person for Germany. In sharp contrast 
with the proceedings at Brussels the negotiation went forward rap- 
idly. Bismarck presented an ultimatum, but not until after previous 
discussion had developed the fact that agreement was almost certain, 
and with the explanation that his instructions required its presenta- 
tion. The treaty was signed on May 10. Ratifications were ex- 
changed on May 21. 

A. TERMS. 

The Treaty of Frankfort converted the preliminary treaty of Ver- 
sailles of February 26 (See article, The Peace Preliminaries of the 
Franco-Prussian War) into a definitive treaty modified in certain 
particulars. The two treaties, therefore, make up a single instru- 
ment containing the terms of peace at close of the Franco-Prussian 
War. The most important features were as follows: 

1. Alsace-Lorraine. — France surrendered to Germany, Alsace, ex- 
empt Belfort, and a part of Lorraine. Being permitted to choose 
between a larger and smaller radius about Belfort or the retention 
of the Thionville region, France, in the interest of greater security, 
choose the larger radius around Belfort. 

'2. Indemnity. — France was required to pay an indemnity of 5,000,- 
000,000 francs. A period of less than three years was allowed for 
payment. Interest was to be paid at the rate of 5 per cent front 
March 1, 1871. Payment could be made only in coin, Prussian. 
Dutch, or Belgian bank notes and "first-class negotiable bills to 
order or letters of exchange, payable at sight." 

3. Occupation and evacuation of French territory. — A large part 
of the territory of France was to be occupied by German troops 



47 

until the last installment of the indemnity had been paid. Evacua- 
tion was to proceed pari passu with the payment of the indemnity. 

(See articles, The Peace Preliminaries of the Franco-Prussian War 
and The Evacuation of France by the German Armies, 1871-187.°0 
The expense of maintenance of the army of occupation was to fall 
upon France. 

4. Choice of nationality for the people of Alsace-Lorraine. — 
Frenchmen born in Alsace-Lorraine and actually domiciled there 
were permitted to remain and retain their French nationality until 
October 1, 1872. No obstacle was to be put in the way of their re- 
moval before that date. 

5. Trade. — The two Governments agreed to " adopt as the basis 
of their commercial relations the system of reciprocal treatment on 
the footing of the most-favored nation." 

5 . APPRAISE M EN T. 

It is not too much to say that the Treaty of Frankfort exerted a 
more decisive and far-reaching influence than any other treaty or 
international agreement belonging to the period of 1871 to 1914. 
The reason for its great significance lay in the fact that it created 
the Alsace-Lorraine question. The injury done to France and the 
people of Alsace-Lorraine made a reconciliation between France and 
Germany after the Franco-Prussian War impossible. 

To meet that condition of affairs Bismarck labored, and with 
great success as long as he remained German Chancellor, to bring 
about the isolation of France. In pursuance of that aim he created 
the Triple Alliance. The existence of the Triple Alliance (See article, 
The Formation of the Triple Alliance) naturally and almost neces- 
sarily led in time to the formation of the Franco-Russian Dual Alli- 
. ance (See article, that title). As the development of German aims 
for world domination became more apparent the Dual Alliance came 
to be supplemented by the Triple Entente (See article, The Forma- 
tion of the Triple Entente). Europe thus became divided between 
two hostile and mutually distrustful coalitions. Peace rested upon 
so uncertain a foundation that it was likely to be destroyed by even 
a small incident. It escaped destruction by narrow margins on not 
less than four occasions in the series of crises which marked the 
years of 1905 to 1913. It succumbed in 1914. A chain of causation 
runs directly from the Treaty of Frankfort to the World War. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

I. DOCUMENTS. 

Convenient collections are: 

Villefort, A., Recueil des traites, etc., relatifs a la paix avec l'Alle- 
magne. (Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1879), 5 vols.; Hertslet, Ed- 



48 



ward, The Map of Europe by Treaty (London, Butterworths, 1875), 
4 vols.; translations of all the important international documents: 
Vol. Ill, No. 438, Preliminary Treaty of Versailles; No. 44G, Treaty 
of Frankfort; Nos. 442, 447, 448, 449, Additional conventions be- 
tween France and Germany. Map of ceded territory follows No. 446. 



II. ACCOUNTS BY PARTICIPANTS. 



Atkinson, F. M. (translator). Memoirs of M. Thiers, 1870-1873 
(London, Allen, 1915), especially valuable for preliminaries of Ver- 
sailles treaty. 

Busch, Dr. Moritz, Bismarck, Some Secret Pages of his History 
(London. Macmillan, 1898), 3 vols. "A diary kept during 25 years' 
official and private intercourse with the great chancellor." "An 
almost literal reproduction of Bismarck's words." [Preface.] 

Favre, Jules, Le Gouvernement de la defense nationale, 1871-2 
(Paris, Plcn, 1871-1875). 3 vols. Important for negotiations for 
both treaties by the official representatives of France. 



III. SECONDARY WORKS. 



May, G., Le Traite de Francfort. (Paris, Berger-Leverault, 1909.) 
The most valuable study. "Written from the legal standpoint. 

Debideur. A.. Histoire diplomatique de l'Europe, 1814-1878 I Paris. 
Alcan, 189] ), 2 vols. Scholarly, full bibliographies for each chapter. 

Hanotaux, Gabriel. Contemporary France [trans, by J. C. Tarver] 
(New York. Putnam,- 1903), 4 vols. The best general account. Au- 
thoritative, detailed, interesting. Based on best contemporary 
sources, with many direct quotations from them. 

Mazade, Charles de, La Guerre de France. 1870-1871 (Paris, Plon, 
187.")). 2 vols. By the editor of Revue de Deux Mondes. Appendix 
contains principal contemporary documents. 

Simon, Jules, Le Gouvernement de M. Thiers, 1871-1873 (Paris. 
Levy. 1879), 2 vols. 

Sorel, Albert, Histoire diplomatique de la guerre Franco-Alle- 
mande (Paris. Plon, 1875), "2 vols. Based on accounts of the par- 
ticipants. 

Valfrey, J., Histoire de la Diplomatic du Gouvernement de la 
Defense Nationale (Paris. Amyot, 1871-1873), 3 vols., and Ibid., 
Histoire du Traite de Francfort (Paris. Amyot. 1874-1875), 2 vols. 
Contain much unpublished material. Very valuable. 

Washburne, E. B., Recollections of a Minister to France. 1869- 
1S77 (New York. Scribner, 1883). 2 vols. By the American minister 
who, as a neutral, came into close contact with both sides. Much 
about Thiers. Favre. Bismarck, including letters. 



49 

11. GERMAN ARGUMENTS FOR THE ANNEXATION OF 
ALSACE-LORRAINE, 1870-1871. 

1. GERMAN PROPAGANDA FOR ANNEXATION, 1815-1870. 

German absorption of Alsace-Lorraine began at the close of the 
Napoleonic Wars, but at that time only a small segment of the 
territory was taken. Public opinion, however, was henceforth sys- 
tematically taught to regard these provinces as German and neces- 
sary for the safety of the German people. Politicians, the army. 
the schools, and the press, liberals and conservatives alike, declared 
for the "restoration" of the "enslaved" brothers. The Rhine was 
acclaimed a German river from whose borders the French must be 
expelled. 

The fact that the inhabitants of these provinces regarded them- 
selves as French and declared their determination to remain so did 
not dampen the ardor of the early " Pan Germans." Their writings 
and speeches often expressed bitterness at the unfilial attitude of 
these " degermanized " people, but their purpose remained the same. 

2. GERMAN ARGUMENTS FOR ANNEXATION. 

(a) Nationality. — Much emphasis was laid upon the claim that the 
people of Alsace-Lorraine were in fact Germans. German ethnolo- 
gists described skulls found in gravel pits as of German type. A 
more appealing argument was that of language. Many natives of 
these provinces speak a Germanic tongue; therefore, it was argued, 
they must be Germans. This, in spite of the fact that the sym- 
pathies, the interests, and the culture of the people were avowedly 
French. 

(7/) Historic rights. — Much emphasis was laid upon the argument 
for " historic rights." The new German Empire was the heir of the 
Holy Roman Empire, which at one time included within its borders 
both Alsace and Lorraine. It was, therefore, the duty of the empire 
to " resume" what had been German. The fact that this doctrine, if 
accepted, would justify the Germans in "resuming" still other lands 
that bad not yet fallen before their sword was disregarded. 

(r) Natural frontiers. — The French argument for the Rhine as 
the '" natural frontier" of France was met by the assertion that the 
Vosges Mountains were the "natural frontier" of Germany. The 
Rhine was not a frontier, but a German river. 

(d) Military necessity. — The arguments advanced by Germans 

before 1871 could not justify the cession of all these territories. The 

country around Metz was admittedly French and was beyond the 

"natural frontiers." For the incorporation of this region the law 

53706—18- — i 



50 

of military necessity was urged. Tt was the gateway into France 
which Von Moltke declared was worth 100,000 men. To the minds 
of some this French region must suffer the first shocks of the " next 
war" and thus protect Germans from suffering. It was felt also 
that the loss of Metz would greatly cripple the military strength of 
France. 

(e) Punishment. — German preachers had long urged that France 
was decadent and immoral and should be punished by God through 
the German people. Those Frenchmen who were to be made Ger- 
mans had the way opened to salvation, and their sons would honor 
the Germans as deliverers. 

(/) Political reasons. — Bismarck and others felt that the acquisi- 
tion of common property would prove useful in holding together 
the new German empire. The German States would now have a ma- 
terial interest in the maintenance of the new empire, and to further 
this policy the annexed provinces were organized as imperial terri- 
tory (Reichsland). 

(g) Economic reasons. — The northwestern part of this acquisition 
was rich in iron, additional supplies of which were vitally important 
to the development of German industry. To what extent this was a 
national motive is not clear, but there were in 1870 Germans who 
understood its importance. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

May, G. Le Traite de Francfort, ch. 6. (Paris, Berger-Levrault, 

1909.) Contains summaries and detailed references to the most im- 
portant German publications of 1870-1871 and earlier. 

Hazen, Charles D. Alsace-Lorraine under German Rule (New 
York, Holt, 1917), pp. 3-97. States the principal German arguments 
for annexation in clear and concise terms. 

Treitschke, Heinrich. Germany, France, Russia, and Islam 
(translation) (London, Jarrold and Sons, 1915), pp. 98-157. Goes 
over the whole field of German arguments, but puts greatest emphasis 
on " nationality " and " military necessity." . 

12. THE EVACUATION OF FRANCE BY THE GERMAN 

ARMIES, 1871-1873. 

1. THE TREATY OF FRANKFORT (SEE THE TREATY OF FRANKFORT, 1871). 

According to the Treaty of Frankfort (May 10, 1871), 19 depart- 
ments of France, including the northern forts of Paris, were to re- 
main under the occupation of a German Army of 500.000 men and 
150.000 horses, for the maintenance of which the French Government 
was to pay 1.75 francs a man and 2.25 francs a horse per diem. (See 
Appendix I, 4.) This occupied territory formed a wide area across 



51 

France from the Vosges Mountains to the English Channel. Many, 
other departments were occupied by the Germans during the war, 
but these were evacuated on or before the ratification of this treaty. 
If the stipulated payments were not made promptly, the Germans 
were permitted to levy taxes in the occupied departments or those 
near b} r . This territory was to be evacuated gradually, beginning 
near the channel, and the army of occupation reduced as the five 
billion francs of war indemnity were paid. 

2. BEGINNING OF THE EVACUATION. 

Accordingly three departments were evacuated July 22, 1871, on 
payment of the first half billion francs, and four more before the 
close of September, 1871, after one billion more was paid. 

3. NEGOTIATIONS TO HASTEN EVACUATION. 

So successful were the French loans that negotiations were started 
in August, 1871, to hasten payments and evacuation. (Hanotaux, 
Contemporary France, I, p. 337.) An agreement was reached with 
Gen. Manteuffel, commander of the army of occupation, but Bis- 
marck disavowed it. He predicted to the French charge d'affaires at 
Berlin that France would fight Germany again rather than pay the 
last three billions in 1874, when due. (Marquis de Gabriac, Souvenirs 
diplomatiques de Russie et d'Allemagne, p. 139.) The rapid recovery 
of France after the disasters of war made many German statesmen 
fear a war of revenge. (Hanotaux, Contemporary France, I, p. 
312.) Hence Bismarck wished to evacuate as little French territory 
as possible. 

October 12, 1871, a new convention was made in Berlin, providing 
lor almost immediate evacuation of six more departments of France 
and for the earlier payment of another half billion francs. (Ibid., 
pp. 340-344; Memoirs of M. Thiers, pp. 187-188.) The occupying 
army was cut down to 150,000 men and 18,000 horses, and the cost to 
1.50 francs a man and 1.75 francs a horse per diem. This left in 
German hands only six departments and Belfort, a strip from Bel- 
fort northwest about half way to the channel. The French negotiator 
was able to get these terms partly because the people of Alsace-Lor- 
raine wished the privilege of free export of their products into 
Fiance extended after its expiration in September, 1871, and the 
South Germans supported them. (Memoirs of M. Thiers, pp. 183- 
184). General Manteuffel also helped the negotiation along. 

4. FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS HALTED BY BISMARCK. 

By I he spring of 1872 President Thiers again wished to hasten 
full evacuation of France by earlier payments. But the rebuilding 
of the French Armv on the Prussian model and the debates in the 



52 



National Assembly regarding it made the German war party try (<> 
provoke another conflict with France before her full recovery. (Ibid., 
pp. 35] 355, pp. 236 237.) Chauvinistic agitation spread throughout 
Germany, This delayed negotiations till Late spring. Bismarck 
often showed a disposition to doubt the honest intentions of the 
French, (Busch, Bismarck, Some Secret Pages of His History, II. 
pp. L03 L04.) He affected to believe thej would make war .is soon 
as they recovered their fortresses, though the French envoy pointed 
out that they would hardly be so foolish as to till the German treasury 
in advance if they were planning war. Bismarck demanded that 
the army of occupation remain as large as before, even after it held 
Utile Int the French eastern fortresses oi' Verdun, Toul, ami Belfort. 
Thiers feared that Bismarck planned to get the money and then 
find some excuse to hold Belfort. (Memoirs of M. Thiers, pp. 
246 247.) 

... THE CONVENTION OF JUNE 29, 18 

At last. June 29, L872, a new treaty was made enabling France to 
pay the test o( the indemnity in installments up to Marcji 1. L875, <>r 
hasten the payment and secure quicker evacuation. (Ibicl., pp. 367 
369.) Two departments were to be evacuated L5 days after payment 
of one half billion, t w o more after the second billion, and the rest, 
including the forts. 15 days after the last billion was paid. But, 
until the full evacuation, those departments were not to be garri- 

ned by more French troop; than were needed to keep order. No 
further fortifications were to be built there by either French or Ger- 
mans until evacuation was complete. 

6. CONVENTION OF MARCH LS, 1873. 

After further negotiations Thiers succeeded (March L5, L873) in 
arranging for simultaneous evacuation of Belfort and the four re- 
maining departments, providing the fourth billion francs be fully 
paid on May 5, L873, and the fifth paid in the following four mom 
(Memoir- of M. Thiers, pp. 310 : >1S: Annual Register, L8T3, pp. 

I L25, lis 1 !u. The German occupying army appears already to 
have been reduced to 50,000 men A These payment- were promptly 
made, and accordingly Belforl and Nancy were evacuated Au- 
gust 1. Verdun was kept till September 16 following the final 
payment of the fifth billion Francs, with interest, on September 5, 
187 Thus full payment was made and evacuation secured nearly 
two years before required by the earlier treaty. 

7. INCIDENTS VNP QTJ LRKELS. 

During the German occupation there were some unpleasant inci- 
dents and quarrels between the civilian population and the Germans. 



53 

In November, 1871. French juries acquitted two men accused of kill- 
ing German soldiers. The German officers then had accused persons 
tried by military courts, which imposed the death penalty. (Zevortj 
Histoire de la troisieme rijpublique, I. pp. 153 154.) Bismarck was 
rather brusque in his diplomacy. June 16, 1871, he telegraphed that 
French soldiers had occupied some districts reserved for Germans, 
and thai they would be fired on that midnighl unless withdrawn. 
(Ibid., p. 286.) This worried Thiers greatly, because he feared Bi 
marck was seeking an excuse for an attack on France. Thiers or- 
dered the French officials to be very polite to the German officer . 
:iikI sent a special commissioner as a sori of diplomatic agent to rep- 
resent him ;it the headquarters of Gen. Manteuffel. (Hanotaux, 
Contemporary France, I. pp. 312 313.) This helped greatly in 
smoothing out these difficulties. In the six department!- to be evacu- 
ated In -f Tliicrs had new barracks built to house the German sol- 
diers. Their officers complained thai these buildings were unhealth- 
1'ul. and sometimes billeted the soldiers on the people instead. (Me- 
moirs of M. Thiers. p. \'.)-2.) This caused much friction. But, ■< a 
whole, (he French people were (juict and the German soldiers be- 
haved themselves. (Annual Register, L873, |). 141).) There was 
little of the recrimination between them, so common during the war. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

DOCUMENTS AM) OTHEB I'HIMAHV SOURCES. 

Villefort, A. Recueil des traites, conventions, etc., relatifs a la 
paix avec l'Allemagne. (Paris, Imprimerie Rationale, L879. •") vol- 
umes.) The standard collection. Contains all the conventions. 

Memoirs of M. Thiers, 1870-1873. Translated by F. M. Atkin- 
son. (New York. Pott, 1916.) Appendices Nos. 8-23 (pp. 341-369) 
give a number of important documents. Valuable. 

Documents emanant de M. Thiers. Occupation et Liberation. 
(Paris.) 

Marquis de Gabriac, Souvenirs diplomatiques de Russie et d'AUe- 
magne, L870 L872. (Paris, Plon, L896.) 

SECONDARY A< ' 0UNT8. 

Doniol, Henri. M. Thiers, le comte de Saint Vallier, le general 
de Manteuffel; liberation du territoire. (Paris, A. Colin, 1907.) 
The best single account of this subject. 

May, G. Le Traite de Francfort, chs. 11-12. (Paris. Berger- 
Levrault, 1909.) Valuable study from the legal standpoint. 

Valfrey. Histoire d^ traite de Francfort et de la liberation du 
territoire, 2 vols. (Paris. Amyol. 1874-1875.) 



54 

Hanotaux, Gabriel. Contemporary Franco. Translated by John 
Charles Tarver. (Westminster, Constable, 1903-1009.) 4 volumes. 
Very valuable. 

Zevort, E. Histoire de la troisieme republique. (Paris, Alcan, 
1896-1901.) 4 volumes. 

13. THE FORMATION OF THE LEAGUE OF THE THREE 

EMPERORS. 

1. INTUOIH t TIOX. 

After the Franco-Prussian War of L870 7J, with its accompanying 
completion of German unification and the erection of the modern 
German Empire, Bismarck, the German chancellor, whose diplo- 
macy had been mainly responsible for the war and its political re- 
sults, saw clearly thai Germany would not gain by further territorial 
aggression, but rather by the maintenance of peace. With this 
thought in mind, and also with the idea of strengthening Germany's 
position so as to make France hesitant about attacking her for the 
purpose of recovering French losses in the war just ended, Bismarck 
undertook to maintain the previously existing close friendship with 
Russia and to effect a rapproachement with Austria. Tie had 
purposely treated Austria with great moderation after her de- 
fer,! by Prussia (the leading member State of the new empire) in 
L866, with a future reconciliation in view, and by the close of the 
Franco-Prussian War Francis Joseph, the Austrian Emperor, was 
so far reconciled to existing conditions as to be willing to consider an 
offer o\' alliance. The dynastic relations between Germany and Bus- 
sin were already very friendly, the Russian Czar, Alexander II, 
being a nephew of William I, the Prussian King, now invested with 
the additional title of German Emperor. 

2. NEGOTIATION. 

Under these circumstances Bismarck found his task an easy one. 
lie persuaded his Emperor to take the first step by paying a visit to 
Emperor Francis Joseph at Ischl (August, 1871). A second meet- 
ing between the two Emperors took place at Salzburg the next month, 
ami the next year Francis Joseph visited the German Emperor at 
Berlin. As a result Austro-German relations grew sensibly more 
friendly. Russia now became concerned over this rapprochement in 
the making, and the Czar asked to be admitted as a third party. His 
request was readily granted, and from the time (December. 1^7'i) 
of the conference of these three rulers at Berlin dates what has been 
called, although improperly, the alliance of the three emperors. 






m 

3. TERMS. 

The thing that was formed was. in reality, only an entente which 
did not result in any formal treaties. It was generally believed at 
the time that an understanding for cooperation was secured on the 
following points: 

First, to maintain, territorially, the status quo on the basis of the 
latest treaties. 

Second, to seek in common the solution of whatever difficulties 
might arise in the Orient; and 

Third, to repress revolution under its new form, socialism. 

4. CONCLUSION. 

This arrangement was, in substance, a new Holy Alliance, from 
which its adherents hoped great things. However, friction speedily 
developed between Germany and Austria on the one hand and Russia 
on the other, and the entente after the Congress of Berlin fell apart. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY* 

Busch, Moritz. Our Chancellor. (New York, 1884.) 

Ward, A. W., et al. Cambridge Modern History. (N. Y., Mac- 
millan. 11)10.) Vol. 12, pp. L38-139. 

Rose. J. II. The Development of the European Nations. 2 vols. 
(New York, Putnam, 1905.) 

Debidour, A. Ilistoire Diplomatique, 1814-1878. 2 cols. (Paii<, 
Alean, 1891.) 

Fife, Robert Herndon. The German Empire between Two Wars. 
(New York, Macmillan, 1910.) 

Headlam, James Wycliffe. Bismarck and the Foundation of the 
German Empire. (New York, Putnam, 1899.) 

Lavissc et Rambaud. Histoire Generale. (Paris, Colin, 1901.) 
Vol. 12. 

Lowe, Charles. Prince Bismarck. (New York, Cassell, 1886.) 
2 vols. 

14. THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR SCARE OF 1875. 

1. INTRODUCTION. 

In the spring of 1875 there occurred the first of several sudden 
alarms, such as from 1871 to 1914 periodically disturbed Europe, by 
indicating that war between France and Germany was about to be 
resumed. To this i\:)y the facts of the episode have not been entirely 
cleared up. but their general trend is fairly plain. 



56 

L\ ORIGIN OF THE SCARE. 

There was undoubtedly a party in Germany which looked upon 
the rapid recovery of France from her defeat with astonishment and 

anger. Especially the reform of the French Army, including the 
creation of a fourth battalion to each regiment, was pointed to as 
threatening a war of revenge. Would it not be wise, they said, even 
a Christian duty, to provoke a conflict before France should have 
recovered her full strength and found an ally? There is no ground 
for supposing that the German Emperor himself had any such de- 
sign. But opinion differs whether the ensuing plot was furthered 
by Prince Bismarck or by a military party acting apart from the 
chancellor and even in spite of him. Bismarck afterwards claimed 
that, the whole affair was an intrigue of his enemies, especially among 
the clericals at home anil abroad, for the purpose of discrediting him 
(Reflections and Reminiscences, 11. p. 188), and German writers are 
prone to accept his version. It is true he sometimes deprecated " wars 
of prevention," but again he would let fall ominous threats like the 
following: " We want to keep the peace: but if France goes on arm- 
ing st) that she is to be ready in five years and bent oh war at the 
end of that time, then we will declare war in three years." (Denk- 
wiirdigkeiten des Fiirsten Hohenlohe-Schillingsfurst, 11. p. 107.) 

.".. Tin: THREAT ov WAR. 

Early in April. 1875, the Kolnische Zeitung, the Berliner Post, 
and the Xorddeulsehc Zeitung. papers usually in close touch with 
the Government, sounded the, alarm by a series of inflammatory 
articles to the effect of "War in sight." "France preparing a war 
of revenge," " The Orleans princes thus to conquer the throne again," 
vte. To the French ambassador at Berlin rumor became a positive 
threat when Ilerr von Radowitz, one of Bismarck's trusted agents. 
intimated the plan of the German armies to invade France, to 
threaten the capital, to demand an indemnity of ten milliards, which 
should be paid in not less than -JO years, and to require a permanent 
reduction of French armaments (Blowitz, p. L02). 

4. WHY THE PLOT FAILED. 

If this was the actual plot, it was foiled by two agencies, namely, 
the Czar of Russia, who was then about to visit Germany, and the 
London Times. On May 6 the Times published an article from its 
Paris correspondent (M. de Blowitz) revealing the whole matter 
to a startled public. Who inspired the article;? It may have been 
the French foreign minister, the Duke Decazes, as Blowitz says, or 
possibly the German ambassador, as Decazes gave out. At all events 



57 

the revelation served its purpose in making the project of a sudden 
war for the time impossible. The Czar, who under the circumstances 
could not pretend ignorance, intimated to the Kaiser his feeling 
against it. while his minister, Gortschakoff, scored a personal tri- 
umph over Bismarck by issuing a circular, "Now, peace is secured." 
Queen Victoria also is known to have written letters to the Czar and 
to the German Emperor in the interest of peace. (Lee. S., Queen 
Victoria, p. 431.) 

5. CONCLUSION. 

Naturally, no one ever avowed participation in a plot which failed 
so discreditably. Whether it was instigated by Bismarck or his 
rivals, the intention seems to have, been, if not actually to provoke 
a war. at least to terrorize France and so broach the subject of her 
disarmament. Perhaps there was mingled a wish to feel the diplo- 
matic pulse of Europe. In the latter case it proved only that the 
isolation of France was not as complete as had been supposed. 
From this moment there were at frequent intervals signs of a trend 
of Germany away from friendship with Russia and of the approach 
of Russia toward alliance with France. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

There are no oilicial documents. The narrative rests upon articles 
of the press, memoirs, and letters of persons concerned. Not all the 
letters cited have been published in full. 

The chief sources are : 

Bismarck, Prince von. The Man and the Statesman, trans, by But- 
ler ( New York, Harper, 1899), 2 vols., vol. 2, pp. 188-195; Busch, M., 
Bismarck, Some secret pages of his history (London, Macmillan, 
L898), 3 vols., vol. 2, p. 391; Blowitz, H. G. d,e, Memoirs (Xew York, 
Doubleday, 1903), pp. 91-115; Sir Robert Morier, Memoirs and Let- 
ters, 2 vols. (London. Arnold, 1911), II. ch. 30; Lee, Sidney, Queen 
Victoria, 430-432 (New York, Macmillan, 1903); Staatsarchiv, vol. 
is. pp. 47-70; Dreux, A., Dernieres annees de Tanibassade en 
Allemagne de M. de Goutaut-Biron, 1874-1877 (Paris, Plon, 1907). 
chs. 2 I. (Much the same material is in Broglie, An Ambassador of 
the Vanquished (London. Heinemann, 1896), pp. 165-239.) 

Further authorities are: 

Hanotaux, G., Contemporary France [translated], (Xew York, Put- 
nam. 1903-1909), 4 vols., vol. 3, pp. 210-260. The fullest narrative 
to be found. 

Debidour, A., Histoire diplomatique de l'Europe, 1814-1878 (Paris, 
A lean. 1891), 2 vols., vol. 2, pp. 470-474. Best general diplomatic 
survey. 



58 

Goolidge, A. C, The Origins of the Triple Alliance (New York, 
Scribner, 1917). pp. 53-64. Connects this incident with the events 
of the alliance. 

Seignobos, C. Europe since 1814, pp. 822-823 (New York. Holt. 
1899). Excellent condensed statement of essential facts and of con- 
flicting interpretations. 

Ileadlam, J. W., Bismarck. Heroes of the Nations (New York, Put- 
nam), pp. 383-385. An English writer's view. 

Gebhardt, B. Handbuch dor Deutschen Geschichte, II, 709-71:'.. 
Second edition. (Berlin, L901.) 

Blennerhassett, R. The Threatened War of 1875. National Re- 
view, vol. 46, pp. 410— 1:51. 

15. CHINO- JAPANESE RELATIONS, 1872-1876. 

\. JAPAN'S A.CQI Isri'ION OF THE LOOCHOO ISLANDS, 1872—1879. 

Japan began to pursue a vigorous foreign policy within a few 
vears after the restoration of the authority of the Mikado in 
1SG8. As early as 1872 she took up against China the case 
of some shipwrecked Loochooans who had been murdered off 
the southern coast of Formosa by Formosan savages. She claimed 
that the Loochooans. who had been paying tribute to both 
China and Japan, were Japanese subjects. China denied all 
responsibility in the matter. In 1872 Japan secured from the 
King of the Loochoo Islands a surrender of the treaties which Ids 
Government had made with the United States. France, and Holland. 
In 1871 the Japanese sent a military expedition to Formosa to 
exact penalties and obtain indemnity. The controversy almost led 
to war between Japan and China. Japan even going so far as to send 
an ultimatum to China, but at the last moment the British minister 
at Peking offered his mediation, with the result that China agreed 
to pay an indemnity and the Chinese Government tacitly recog- 
nized that the Loochooans were Japanese subjects. In 1879 the 
islands were finally and definitely incorporated as part of the Japa- 
nese administration. 

2. THE KOREAN WAR SCARE OF 1875. 

In September, 1S7~>. ;i Japanese gunboat was fired upon by a fort 
in Korea, with the unhappy continence that it- garrison was prac- 
tically annihilated. There was considerable excitement in Japan, 
and. as in 1872. a demand on the part of Japanese chauvinists for 
war, but wiser counsels prevailed, and an expedition was sent 
which succeeded in negotiating a treaty of "peace and amity." 
This treaty, signed on February 26, 1876, recognized the "complete 
independence" of Korea; but, though putting an end to Korea's 



59 

isolation, it marked the beginning of her gradual, but probably not 
then intended, subjugation to Japan (See article, Chino- Japanese 
Rivalry in Korea, 1876-1894). 

Strange to say, China was induced not only to assent to the Japa- 
nese proposals, but even to advise Korea to agree to. them. She 
cited her own example as a warning. Great and powerful though 
China was, her Government, she said, had found it impossible to 
close their country against foreigners, and had found protection by 
entering into friendly relations with them. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

For a good account of Japan's acquisition of the Loochoo Islands, 
see Hornbeck, S. K., Contemporary Politics in the Far East (Apple- 
ton, New York. 1016), pp. 105-107. 

For an account of the Korean War scare of 1875, see Longford, 
J. H., The Story of Korea (New York, Scribner, 101 1 ) . pp. i>00-306. 

16. THE KULDJA AFFAIR, 1876-1881. 

1. THE CHINESE RECONQUEST OF KULDJA, 187G. 

As far back as 1871, owing to certain disturbances in Central Asia. 
where Yakub Beg seemed to be establishing an empire and the Tun- 
gam were causing no end of trouble, the Russians had intervened for 
the purpose of preserving peace on their borders. With China's con- 
sent Russian troops had occupied the Province of Kuldja or Hi, and 
wore still in possession when the Chinese undertook the reconquest 
of the rebellious provinces in 1876, and the State of Kashgaria, over 
which Yakub Beg ruled, was finally recovered. 

2. THE LIVADIA CONVENTION OF 1S70. 

The successful conclusion of this campaign brought the Kuldja 
question to the foreground. During the negotiations which had led 
up to the Muscovite occupation of the province, the Russians had 
freely admitted that the Chinese were entitled to possession as soon 
as they had occupied it effectively. The Chinese, accordingly, sent 
Chenghow as special envoy to 'St. Petersburg, where he arrived 
early in 1870. A liter protracted negotiations a convention was drawn 
up at Livadia by which Russia surrendered the Kuldja Valley but 
retained that of the Tekes, which left in her hands the control of the 
passes through the Tienshan range into Kashgar. It was also 
agreed that China should pay an indemnity of 5.000,000 rubles 
toward the expenses of the Russian occupation. 

This Livadia convention was so unpopular in China that it was 
unanimously, condemned and the unfortunate envoy, Chenghow, 



60 

deprived of all his honors and condemned to decapitation. His life 
was. however, spared through tlie intercession of Queen Victoria. 

3. THE tim'aty OF st. PETERSBURG, 1881. 

The negotiations having thus been rudely broken off, the Chinese 
sent another envoy in the person of the Marquis Tseng, who hud 
been appointed as minister at the Court of St. James. Marquis 
Tseng succeeded so well that he recovered almost the whole Province 
of Hi. including Kuldja and the passes; In exchange for this resto- 
ration he agreed to pay an indemnity of 9,000,000 rubles. To the 
treaty of St. Petersburg (See Appendix 1. 1!>). which was signed on 
February 12, 1881, there were added certain commercial regulations 
which conferred many advantages upon Russian merchants engaged 
in overland trade with China. 

BIBLIOGRAPIIT. 

The fullest account of these matters is given by Cordier, 11.. His- 
toire des relations de la Chine avec les puissances occidentales, 1860- 
1900 (Alcan, Paris. 1902), Vol. II. chs. 9-12, pp. L62-2I&. A good 
brief account may be found in Douglas, R. K., Europe and the Far 
Kasi (University Press Cambridge, 1904), eh. L2, pp. 223-226. 

For the text of the treaty of St. Petersburg, see Cordier, op. cit, 
pp. 223 240, and Hertslet, China Treaties (London. 1908), No. 85, 
pp. !^:'> \'(. For an abstract of the abortive convention of 1879, see 
Cordier, op. cit., pp. 188-190. 

17. THE EASTERN QUESTION, 1S7.V1S77. 

1. THE HERZEGOVINA INSURRECTION. 

In the summer of 1875 there was an insurrection in Herzegovina. 
Sufficient grounds for an outbreak existed in the friction between 
Christian and Mussulman, ami in the inefficiency of Turkish rule. 
The uprising was characterized by barbarities, ami threatened to 
spread to the surrounding regions. The Disraeli ministry took the 
position that the Turkish Government should put down the revolt 
without the intervention of the powers. Only with reluctance, at the 
request o( Austria. Russia, and Germany, did it authorize the British 
consul to cooperate with the consuls of the other powers that hail 
guaranteed the Treaty of Paris ^i' L856, to localize the conflict by 
preventing the participation o( Serbia and Montenegro, anil to win 
the Forte to a policy of redress of grievances. The effort had no 
result, for the insurgents were unwilling, without a European guar- 
antee, to trust the reform measures published by the Forte. 



61 

2. THE ANDRASSY NOTE, DECEMBER 30, 1875. 

In December the three empires concerted a plan for pacification 
by persuading the Porte, to grant five reforms: Complete religious 
liberty; the abolition of tax farming; the application of direct taxes 
to local needs; the erection of a commission, half Moslem and half 
Christian, to superintend the reforms; and amelioration of the con- 
dition of the peasants. (See Appendix, I, 5.) The project was drawn 
up by Count Andrassy, the Austrian minister, and all the powers 
<< incurred unreservedly, except (Treat Britain, who gave her consent 
rather reluctantly, promising general support, but reserving judg- 
ment on the details, some of which she considered of doubtful prac- 
ticability. She pointed out that some of the reforms had already 
been promised by the Porte. In February the Porte announced 
that it found four of the suggestions acceptable, but that the local 
application of direct taxes would not fit into its system. The re- 
forms were proclaimed, but the insurgents, still distrustful, did not 
lav down their arms. On the contrary the movement spread. 

3. THE BERLIN MEMORANDUM. 

Again the three empires consulted and issued a memorandum from 
Berlin (May 13, 1876) with the request that France, Italy, and Great 
Britain concur. It was proposed that a two months' armistice be de- 
manded, during which action could be taken to pacify the insurgents, 
to localize the trouble, and to allow negotiations between the Porte 
and representatives of the revolted populations on the bases sug- 
gested by the latter, These were: Assistance in the repatriation of 
refugees, distribution of relief by a commission, concentration of 
Turkish troops, arms to be left with Christians as well as Mussul- 
men, and supervision of reform by the consuls of the power.-,. The 
paper closed with an intimation that the powers were prepared to 
take further action were these measures not successful. (See Ap- 
pendix I, <'>. ) 

I. GREAT BRITAIN AM) THE BERLIN MEMORANDUM. 

France and Italy gave immediate consent. The British Govern- 
ment expressed regret (May 1 ( .») that it was unable to cooperate. 
Seme of the proposed measures it characterized as unlikely to 
serve the desired end. others as subversive of the authority of the 
Sultan. The letters to British representatives which accompanied 
the reply showed that in this instance the Porte had not requested 
England's concurrence, as it had done on the two former occasions. 
(See Appendix T, 7.) They also showed annoyance that Great 



62 

Britain had not been consulted in the framing of the memorandum. 

On the other hand, the ministry did not suggest any alternative 
plan, although one of its members had one ready. (See Lang, Sir 
Stafford Northcote, vol. 2, p. 101.) 

To one portion of the Berlin memorandum the ministry agreed. 
It had suggested the sending of vessels, with instructions, to 
give protection in case of need to the Christian subjects of Turkey 
and to foreigners. Lord Derby announced that British vessels were 
being sent with orders to protect foreigners should necessity arise. 
The point was made that nothing should be done by the fleets to inter- 
fere with the Sultan's authority, and this, together with the number 
of British vessels sent and the position they occupied, caused Great 
Britain's action to be regarded by the other powers a> menace rather 
than cooperation. 

5. THE BULGARIAN MASSACRES. 

The Berlin memorandum was not presented to the Porte, because 
the Turkish Revolution in May. 18T6, seemed to promise a better 
order of things. This promise was proven illusory. Tiowever. by 
events in Bulgaria. Bashi Basouks and Circassians were sent to quell 
an uprising there, and they set about it in a barbarous fashion. The 
English ambassador protested againsj the use of these irregular 
troops, but to his home government reported the rumors of atrocities 
as greatly exaggerated. Disraeli was content to accept this view of 
the case, and took no steps until the stirring up of English public 
opinion by the newspapers and a fervid campaign by Gladstone 
forced him into action. (See Morley, Gladstone, vol. 2, p. 549, if.: 
Gallenga, vol. 2, p. 149, ff.) 

But the other powers were not content with the situation. Rus- 
sia was indubitably the leader in the effort to bring pressure on Tur- 
key. While Austria had been the prime mover in the Andrassy note, 
Russia was chiefly responsible for the Berlin memorandum, which 
was much firmer in tone. In June she turned to England for advice 
as to the next step. The regime Russia favored for the affected 
region was the creation of tributary States, with rectified boun- 
daries and local autonomy. This England approved, but ascertained 
that Austria-Hungary objected to such an arrangement and also, 
apparently with Italy, objected to the proposal, approved by Russia 
and Great Britain, that Montenegro be given a port. On Russia's 
request for information whether non-intervention would be Great 
Britain's attitude should Serbia enter the war. the answer was 
affirmative, but that she refused to bind herself in case of the pur- 
suance of a different policy by other powers. On June 30 Serbia 
entered the war and Montenegro followed on July 2. 



63 

6. RE1CIISTADT CONFERENCE AND TREATY OF PESTH. 

Russia came to an agreement with Austria at a meeting of the two 
sovereigns at Keichstadt in July. The result made known at the time 
was a decision for non-intervention. The arrangements made con- 
fidentially at Reichstadt were crystallized early the following year 
in a treaty signed at Pesth. This secret treaty has never been pub- 
lished in its entirety, but some of its provisions were that Austria 
should be neutral in cms.* of a war between Russia and Turkey and 
that in case of the complete success of the Russian arms Austria was 
to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina. No large State, Slav or other, 
was to be erected in the Balkans, and Constantinople was to be a 
free city. (See article on the Austro-Russian accord of 1876-7 
and Goriainow, 334, ff. Cf. Bismarck, Reflections and Reminis- 
censes, vol. 2, ch. 28, p. 235, American edition.) The treaty was 
dated January 15, 1877, but was not signed until March 18. Between 
the conference and the treaty Russia made an unsuccessful attempt 
to learn what would be the attitude of Germany in case Russia 
should take independent action. (See Goriainow, 319, ff., Bismarck, 
ch. 28.) 

7. BRITISH ATTEMPTS AT PACIFICATION. 

On August 20. 1876, Lord Derby telegraphed to Elliott, the British 
ambassador al Constantinople, thai British sympathy with the Porte 
had been entirely destroyed by the accounts of the Bulgarian atroci- 
ties, and that public opinion would not allow British interference, 
even in the event of a Russo-Turkish war. He must therefore use 
every effort to persuade the Porte to make peace. A fortnight 
earlier Great Britain had intimated to Serbia, which Avas being 
badly beaten, that an application to the powers for mediation would 
be favorably received in England, and the application had been 
promptly made. (Treat Britain thereupon with the assent of the 
powers proposed a several weeks* armistice. This the Porte refused 
to grant, but instead ordered an informal suspension of hostilities, 
tat ing the terms on which it was willing to make peace with Serbia. 
Great Britain declared these terms inadmissible, and suggested 
others, to which it had secured the assent of the other powers, includ- 
ing, after much difficulty. Austria-Hungary. These terms provided 
the status quo for Serbia and Montenegro; local or administrative 
autonomy for Bosnia and Herzegovina, guaranteed by the mediating 
powers; and guarantees against maladministration in Bulgaria. In 
snhiiiitting them the British ambassador explained that the state of 
public opinion in Great Britain made it impossible for the Govern- 
ment to render the Porte "the support which they might otherwise 
have hoped for," and that the terms represented modifications Great 
Britain had obtained from the other powers. 



64 

8. RUSSIAN RLEASURES. 

While Turkey was raising objections to the terms, Russia proposed 
that if the Porte refused (hem. Bosnia be occupied by Austrian troops 
and Bulgaria by Russian troops, while a joint naval demonstration be 
made by the powers in the Bosphorus. Great Britain objected to 
the first part of the scheme, and still more to the Latter part, in which 
she would play the dominant role. Hostilities having recommenced, 
Russia consented to another demand being made by Great Britain 
Tor an armistice, to be followed by a conference. The Russian 
suggestion was for an armistice of six weeks, and Great Britain 
asked for one of not less than a month. The Porte offered to grant 
one of six months. Russia, feeling that such a long armistice would 
lie injurious to Serbia and Montenegro, protested, and sent an ulti- 
matum to the Porte, threatening to break off diplomatic relations 
if within 48 hours a six weeks' armistice was not granted. The Porte 
immediately complied. 

9. ENGLISH VERSUS RT SSIAN VIEWS OF THE EASTERN QUESTION. 

The conference proposed by Great Britain was to meet at Con- 
stantinople, and her suggestions as bases for discussion were the in- 
dependence and territorial integrity of Turkey, and the abjuring by 
the powers of sellish designs against her. The bases for pacification 
were to be those already proposed— the status quo for Serbia and 
Montenegro, and local autonomy for Bosnia and Herzegovina. (See 
Appendix 1. i». ) These bases were approved by the powers, although 
Russia made the specific objection that the word "territorial" be 
omitted, as occupation might be necessary for pacification, and the 
general objection that the independence and integrity of Turkey must 
be subordinated to considerations of humanity and peace. (Parlia- 
mentary Papers (Turkey), L877, No. 1. p. 705 (Cd. L028).) 

In these Russian objections lay the key of the Russian and British 
positions. Beaconsfield's preoccupation with British interests in In- 
dia ami Egypt explains his policy of maintaining the Turk as Keeper 
of the Gates. His ministry made clear that they were suspicious of 
Russian ambitions in that direction, and attention had been called, 
among other things, to the large number of Russian soldiers in the 
Serbian forces. The zeal of the Russian people for the cause of the 
Balkan Slavs was undeniable, and the Czar endeavored to dispel 
British suspicions on November 2 by stating definitely that he had no 
ambitions either in the direction of India or Constantinople 
(Hertslet, IV,2509). In view of the arrangements for that city which 
Alexander II made with Francis Joseph a few months later we can 
believe in the sincerity of the Czar, but a powerful party in his 
dominions had other views. Disraeli certainly was not convinced, as 



65 

was shown by his sabre-rattling Guildhall speech of November 9, 
which gave the text for the famous Jingo refrain of the music hulls. 
Two days later the Czar spoke of the Russians shedding their blood 
among the Serbs for the Slav cause and announced that if concerted 
efforts failed to ameliorate the Balkan situation, Russia would act 
alone (Hertslet, IV. 2518). A few days later he showed that he was 
anticipating this eventuality by announcing the beginning of the 
mobilization of the Russian troops. 

10. THE CONSTANTINOPLE CONFERENCE. 

A well-informed British diplomat wrote (Appendix I, 10) during 
the conference at Constantinople that Lord Salisbury had come 
there convinced that no power was disposed to shield Turkey and 
that a new policy was therefore necessary for England; that Bis- 
marck was working for a war that would weaken Russia and break 
up Turkey; and that, therefore, it was desirable to draw near Russia. 
(Life of Sir William White, 116-118.) His instructions (See Ap- 
pendix I, 11), too, indicated greater firmness with Turkey. Un- 
fortunately the well-known Turkish sympathies of his colleague, 
Elliot, and certain actions of the. British ministry, created the im- 
pression with the Porte that they were still to have British support. 
Derby sent word to the Porte as well as to Salisbury on the eve 
of the opening of the conference that the Government would not 
assent to or assist in coercive measures against Turkey, but that in 
the event of war it could expect no assistance from England. The 
former part of the message more than counteracted the effect of the 
latter and created an impression of great friendliness, an impression 
which the ministry took somewhat tardy steps to dispel. (Parlia- 
mentary Papers, Turkey, No. 2 (1877), Nos. 78, 87, 148, 150.) 

The conference was in session from December 23, 1876, to Janu- 
ary 26, 1877. But as Russia had objected to the representation of 
Turkey and Great Britain had insisted upon it, preliminary sessions 
without the Turks were held from December 11 to December 22, a 
proceeding very galling to the Porte. On the first day of the formal 
session the proceedings were interrupted by a salvo of artillery, 
which (he Grand Vizier announced had been fired to welcome the 
proclamation of a new constitution for Turkey. He intimated that 
the work of the conference would in consequence be superfluous, but 
the delegates declined to take his view and the deliberations con- 
tinued. The proposals finally submitted to the Porte were modified 
through the efforts of the British delegates to a point where it was 
hoped they would be acceptable. They included flic appointment 
of the governors of the revolted Provinces for five years, with the 
53706—18- 5 



66 

assent of the powers, an international committee of surveillance, 
lorn I control of taxal ion, and admission of Christians into the militia. 
Salisbury solemnly warned the Porte o\' the danger of refusing the 
findings of the conference, bul after deliberation it decided thai they 
were unacceptable. The ambassadors thereupon, according to the 
conditions the^ had made, withdrew from Constantinople, leaving 
the embassies with the charge's d'affaires. 

I I. THE I ONDON PROTOCOL. 

Within two weeks AJbdul Hamid, who had been reigning since the 
previous August, dismissed the author of the now constitution from 
office, and with him went the slight prospect there may have been 
of a more libera] regime. But peace was made with Serbia 
and negotiations begun with Montenegro, and the powers again 
adopted a policy <^ watchful waiting. Russia, however, sent a spe- 
cial mission to discuss measures by which her demobilization and 
that of Turkey might be carried out, and the result of this mission 

was a protocol, signed by the powers on March 81. (See Appendix 

1, \-2.) It recognized the progress already made by Turkey, but 
threatened joinl action if the Porte did not immediately take full 
measures of pacification, putting reforms into execution and placing 
its forces on a peace footing. Russia annexed a declaration that 
Turkey, it* it. accepted the protocol, should send a special envoy to 
St. Petersburg to treat of disarmament and gave warning that recur- 
rence o( atrocities would cause her to stop demobilization. England 
declared that should reciprocal disarmament and peace between 
Russia and Turkey not result, the protocol would he null and void. 
Italy declared that she would he hound by her signature only as 
long as agreement between the powers was maintained. These indi- 
cations o\' divided counsels scarcely added to the force of the docu 
ment, which the Porte proceeded to decline. 

12. riii' in ssian DECLARATION ov w Mi. 

The Porte's refusal was issued April !>. and Russia thereupon 
decided to act alone. On April 1!> she announced that her armies 
were ahout to cross the Turkish frontier, on the 23d broke oil diplo- 
matic relations, and on the 24th declared war. Turkey protested, 

pointing out that according to article 8 of the Treaty iA' Paris (1856) 

Russia should have resorted to the mediation i^( the powers before 

making war. On receivingthe Russian declaration oi' April P.) Great 
Britain also made a formal protest against the act as a breach of 
the Treaty of Paris (1856). Further action she confined to a declara 
tion id' neutrality and a formulation of English interests in the East. 



67 

13. APPRAISEMENT. 

Ii has been customary (<> lay the blame for the outbreak of the 
Turkish Win- largely upon the policy of Disraeli in subordinating 
the English policy in Turkish matters to the interests of Great Britain 
in [ndia and Egypl and refusing to put pressure upon the Turk, who 
never yields except under pressure. There is also a school of historians 
who see in Bi tnarck the power that pullet I the wires and broughl about 
the war. Their case is not well documented, however, and the evidence 
so Ear available indicates that he rather played a waiting game. Re 
reni si in lies based on Russian and Austrian archives tend to prove that 
Andrassy, far from being a mere tool of Bismarck, hud :i strong 
Austrian policy of territorial aggression, :in<l thai he gave Russia 
every encouragement to pull his chesl mils out of the lire (Goriainow, 
ch. II). Exactly to whal extent Alexander [I's desire to befriend 
the Slavs under Turkish rule was (supplemented by territorial 
aims can not be estimated with the evidence available. But ii seems 
very clear that Turkey, whose failure to reform her ways brought on 
the war, was encouraged in her policy by her knowledge thai the 
Three Emperors' League (See article, The Formation of the League 
of the Three Emperors) was not I he firmest of alliances, that she had 
friends in ihe English ministry, and thai in case of war there was a 
chance of Greal Britain's intervention to defend British interests in 
the East. 

BIBLIOGRAPH v. 

SOURCES. 

France, Minist&re des affaires eTrangeres. Documents diploma- 
tiques. Affaires d'Orient. L875 1877. 

British and Foreign State Papers, vols. 66, 67. 

Ilerislei, Sir Edward. Map of Europe by Treaty. (London, 
L891.) Vol. iv. 

British Parliamentary Papers, 1.875 L878. The "State Papers" 
volumes contain many documents. 

i < ONDAB'V WOBKS. 

Avril, A. N^gociations relatives au (mile de Berlin. L875 issc>. 
(Paris, L886.) The best account. Written by a diplomat. Weill 
documented. Favorable to Russia. 

Cyon, Elie de. Historiede I'entente Franco- Russe. (Paris, L89&)i 
Strongly anti-German. Statements nol backed up with proof. 

Goriainow, Serge. Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles. (Paris, Ploir r 
p. Mo.) The author was the director of the Russian archives and base 
his work upon sources not generally known. 



68 

Lang, Andrew. Sir Stratford Northcote, first earl of Iddesleigh. 
(Edinburgh, 1890.) Vol. 2. Based on first-hand material, quoted at 
length. 

Morley, John. Life of Gladstone. (New York. Macmillan, 1911.) 
Valuable for contemporary English opinion. 

Rose, J. Holland. Development of the European Nations. 5th ed. 
(New York, Putnam, 1910.) Good brief account. 

Walpole, Spencer. History of twenty-five years. (London, 1908.) 
Vol. 4. Best account in English. Based on thorough use of Parlia- 
mentary Papers. In opinion agrees with Avril. 

White, Sir William. Life and correspondence, by H. Sutherland 
Edwards. (London. 1902.) Contains valuable letters. 

Bismarck, Otto, Prince von. Bismarck, the man and the statesman, 
being the reflections and reminiscences. (New York, Harper, 1899.) 

Gallenga. A. Two years of the eastern question. (London, 1877.) 
Vol. ii. Recollections of a newspaper correspondent. 

Loftus, Lord Augustus. Diplomatic reminiscences. (London, 
Cassell, 1894.) Vol. II. Lord Loftus was ambassador to Russia. 
Interesting personal touches. 

18. THE SERBO-TURKISH WAR OF 1876. 

1. ORIGIN OF THE WAR. 

Serbia's declaration of war upon Turkey, June 30, 1876, was made 
largely in consequence of her sympathy with the revolting provinces 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina. She had waited nearly a year in the 
hope that the great powers would induce Turkey to make reforms 
there. (Proclamation of the Prince of Serbia of war against Turkey. 
Hertslet, IV, No. 463.) The powers could not agree among them- 
selves and were inclined to defer collective action until Abdul Hamid, 
who had just become Sultan, should have made clear his temper and 
policy. 

2. THE ARMISTICE. 

Late in August the Prince of Serbia asked the powers to mediate. 
(Dispatch from the Earl of Derby to Lord Loftus, Oct. 30, 1870. 
Hertslet, IV, No. 467, p. 2488.) September 14, Turkey submitted to 
"the judgment and equitable appreciation of the mediating powers" 
the following peace proposal: Serbia to abolish her militia, to permit 
her fortresses to be reoccupied by Turkish troops, to send home 
emigrants from limitrophe provinces, to pay an indemnity, to allow 
the Ottoman Government to construct a railway from Belgrade to 
Nish. (Turkish Memorandum, Sept. 14. 1876. Hertslet, IV, No. 
466.) September 21 the powers suggested as a basis for" peace: 
(1) The stains quo, speaking roughly, for Serbia and Montenegro; 



69 

(2) local autonomy for Bosnia and Herzegovina; (3) guarantees 
against maladministration in Bulgaria; (4) a formal armistice. 

The powers did not present a united front with respect to the 
armistice. (Dispatch from the Earl of Derby to Lord Loftus, Oct. 
30. 1876. Hertslet, IV, No. 467.) Russia therefore took the matter 
into her own hands and sent an ultimatum to Turkey demanding an 
armistice of six weeks or two months. (Russian Ultimatum, Oct. 31,. 
1876. Hertslet, IV, No. 468.) Turkey complied. 

3. THE CONFERENCE OF CONSTANTINOPLE. 

England suspected Russia of working for her own ends in Tur- 
key. (Dispatch from Lord Loftus. Nov. 2, 1876. Hertslet, IV, 
No. 470; dispatch from the Russian Government, Nov. 3, 1876. 
Ibid., No. 471; Russian dispatch, Nov. 19, 1876. Ibid., No. 474.) 
She therefore proposed a conference, the basis for the deliberations 
to be (1) the independence and the territorial integrity of the Otto- 
man Empire; (2) a declaration that the powers do not intend to 
seek any territorial advantages, any exclusive influence, or commer- 
cial concessions; (3) the bases of pacification proposed to the Porte 
September 21. (Circulars addressed by the Earl of Derby to Her 
Majesty's representatives at Paris, Berlin, etc. Hertslet, IV, No. 
472. See also article, The Eastern Question, 1875-1877, sec. 10.) 

Russia contended that "the independence and integrity of Turkey 
must be subordinated to the guaranties demanded by humanity, the 
sentiments of Christian Europe, and the general peace." (Russian 
dispatch accepting proposals for a conference, Nov. 19. 1876. Herts- 
let. IV. No. 474, p. 2524.) 

The conference finally came to an agreement in a series of protocols. 
(Hertslet, IV, No. 475.) These were materially modified to meet the 
wishes of the Turkish plenipotentiaries (Protocols of Conferences,. 
Dec. 23, 1876-Jan. 20, 1877. Hertslet, IV, No. 477), only to be 
rejected by them in the end. The chief reason given for the rejec- 
tion of the protocols was that they failed to observe " the limits laid 
down by the English program and to conform to the stipulations of 
the Treaty of Paris as regards the nonintervention of the. powers in 
the internal affairs of the Empire/' (Dispatch from Safvet Pasha to 
Musurus Pasha. Jan. 25, 1877. Hertslet, IV. No. 478, p. 2545.) 

4. TREATY OF PEACE. 

February 28, 1877, Turkey of her own accord made peace with 
Serbia on the basis of the status quo, amnesty for the Ottoman and 
Serbian subjects "compromised in the late events," and evacuation 
within 12 days by Turkish and Serbian troops from territory "out- 
side the ancient frontier demarkation." (Protocol for the Restora- 
tion of Peace, Feb. 28, 1877. Hertslet, IV, No. 480.) 



70 



5. CONCLUSION, 



The Serbo-Turkish War of 187G-TT is only one factor in the whole 
Balkan crisis of 1875-1S77, and its' diplomatic problems can be fully 
understood only in connection with that crisis. (See article. The 
Eastern Question, 1875-1877.) 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

til 1 KIM. CORRESPONDENCE AND OTHEB DOCUMENTS; 

Hertslet, E. Map of Europe by Treaty. (London. L875-1891. 
1 vols.) 

The most important documents dealing with the Serbo-Turkish 
War arc the following: Xos. 463, 466-472, 474-475, 47s. t80, 482. 

SE< ONDARY AUTHOBITIES. 

Temperley, II. W. V. History of Serbia. (London. Bell, 1917.) 
Pp. 264-266. 

Ratchich, V. Le Royaume de Serbie : etude d'histoire diplomatique. 
(Paris, 1901.) 

Debidbur, A. Histoire Diplomatique de l'Europe, L814-1878. 2 
\() ] s. (Paris, Alcan, 1891.) A general account of the diplomacy of 
the period. 

Murray, William Smith. The Making of the Balkan States. 
Columbia University Studies. Vol. XXXIX, Xo. 1. (New York. 
Longmans, Green & Co., 1910.) Scholarly: full citation of authori- 
1 ies in footnotes. 

Miller, William. The Ottoman Empire, 1801-1913. (Cambridge, 
University Tress, 1913.) A careful account. 

MAGAZINE ARTICLES. 

Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, Feb.. 1877 (vol. 121, pp. 245- 
262). 

Valbert, G. Quelques reflexions sur la Conference de Constanti-. 
nople. Revue des deux Mondes, Feb.. L877, Vol. XIX. 3 e Periode, 
pp. 688 699. 

19. AUSTRO-RUSSIAN ACCORD OF 1876-1877. 

1. INTRODI CTION. 

The revolts in the Turkish Balkans in b s 7r> and Turkish barbarities 
in attempting to suppress them claimed the special interest of Aus- 
tria and Russia. These powers joined with Germany in a "con- 
fidential exchange of ideas"' and formulated a program of reforms 
to be demanded of Turkey. Acceptance by the Sultan could be 
secured only if it was apparent that the program had the united 



71 

support of the powers. But unanimity could not be obtained. Each 
power suspected the motives of the other powers. The British Gov- 
ernment was especially distrustful of Russia. (See article, The 
Eastern Question, 1875-1877.) Under these circumstances Russia, 
which Avas more intent on action against Turkey than any other 
power, sought an understanding with Austria-Hungary. 

2. ACCORD OF REICHSTADT, JULY, 1S7G. 

The Emperors of Russia and Austria with their prime ministers 
met at Reichstadt in July, 1876. to formulate an agreement regard- 
ing the Balkans. The text of this arrangement has never been offi- 
cially published, but Sosnosky describes the agreement as covering 
two possible situations. If the Turks defeated the Serbs and Mon- 
tenegrans, with whom war was in progress (See article, The Serbo- 
Turkish War of 1876), the status quo was to be preserved. If, on 
the contrary, the Turks were defeated, the basis of settlement should 
be as follows : Serbia and Montenegro were each to receive additions 
of territory, but Austria was to acquire the greater part of Bosnia, 
and Russia to extend her control over southern Bessarabia and the 
Black Sea. Greece was to obtain Thessaly. Crete, Bulgaria, Rumelia, 
and Albania were to be autonomous states. Constantinople and the 
adjacent country was to be constituted as a "free state" (Sosnosky. 
Die Balkanpolitik Osterreich-Ungarns seit 1866, vol. I, p. 152) . This 
agreement apparently presupposed the defeat of Turkey by the 
Balkan principalities, and when their military operations collapsed it 
became unworkable, except possibly to leave Austria a free hand in 
Bosnia. (See article. The Serbo-Turkish War of 1876.) 

3. THE CONVENTIONS OF PESTH, 1S77. 

Two secret conventions, signed at Pesth in January and April. 
1877. superseded the Reichstadt accord. These conventions, also, 
have not been published. Founder and Goriainow give the terms, 
probably with substantial accuracy. If war broke out between Rus- 
sia and Turkey the Dual Monarchy was to assume an attitude of 
benevolent neutrality toward Russia and was to support her diplo- 
matically. The most significant stipulations, as regards the per- 
manent Balkan settlement, were that Austria-Hungary was left at 
liberty to take possession of Bosnia-Herzegovina, while Russia was 
to get back Bessarabia, lost in 1856, and was to consent that no 
" larger Slavic State " should be erected from the territory of Turkey. 

4. CONCLUSION. 

The Austro-Russian accord of 1876-77 explains in large measure 
the neutrality of Austria-Hungary during the Russo-Turkish war 
of 1877-78, the attitude of the Dual Monarchy toward the Treaty 



72 

of San Stefano. and the reason why at the Congress of Berlin Bos- 
nia and Herzegovina were assigned to Austria-Hungary to occupy 
and administer. (Sec articles. The Congress of Berlin, and Austria- 
Hungary and the Balkan Settlement of 1878.) 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

Scarcely any of the documents bearing on this subject have been 
published in the official or semiofficial collections of diplomatic 
papers. Close summaries of the most important documents may be 
found in the books of Goriainow, Fournier, and Sosnosky. 

GoriainoWj S. Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles ch. 14 passim. 
(Paris, Fiov, 11)10.) 

Important study, based on the Eussian archives. 

Fournier. A. Wie Wir zu Bosnien Kamen, 21-23, 41— tl (Vienna. 
Reisser, 1909). Valuable for information from the Austrian archives. 

Sosnosky. Theodor von. Die Balkanpolitik Osterreich-Ungarns 
seit 1866. 2 vols. (Stuttgart and Berlin, 1913), vol. 1. pp. 152-160. 
Kniphasizes the Reichenbach accord. 

Louis-Jaray, G. L' Annexion de la Bosnie Herzegovina in 
Questions diplomatiques et coloniale of Feb. 1. L909, vol. 27. pp. 
158-159. 

Diplomaticus. The Secret Treaty of Bucharest. Fortnightly Re- 
view, 1908, vol. 90, pp. 828-837. 

Coolidge, A. C. The Origins of the Triple Alliance, 91-97. 111- 
1 L5. (Xew York, Scribner. 1917.) Good concise account. 

20. THE RUSSO-ROUMANIAN ALLIANCE OF 1877-1878. 

1. [NTRODTTCTION. 

At the time of the outbreak "of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877- 
1878 Moldavia and Wallachia formed a separate State, but it was 
still tributary to Turkey. Though calling itself Roumania, it was 
known to Europe under the name of "The United Principalities." 
For some j^ears (since about 1870) Roumania or The Principalities 
had been forced to revolve in the orbit of Russia (See article, Rou- 
mania and the Balkan Settlement). 

2. THE RUSSO-ROFMWi \X CONVENTION OF 1S77. 

At the conference of the powers which met at Constantinople in 

1876-1877. as also through attempted negotiation, Roumania tried 
in vain to secure a guaranty of hen- neutrality. Failing to secure the 
desired guarantee, Roumania determined to take its stand on the side 
of Russia. 



73 

Consequently, there was concluded on April 16, 1877, a Russo- 
Eoumanian convention in which Prince Charles of Roumania assured 
to the Russian Army free passage through Roumanian territory. 
Russia, on her part, agreed to maintain and respect the political 
lights of the Roumanian State, as also to maintain and defend her 
actual integrity. 

The situation created by the Russian use of Roumanian territory 
led inevitably to war between Roumania and Turkey and implied a 
Russo-Roumanian alliance. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

For a good account of the Russo-Roumanian accord of 1877. see 
D'Avril, A., Negociations relatives a traite de Berlin (Paris. 1886), 
pp. 208-235. For the text of the convention, see pp. 219-220. See 
also Whitman, S., Reminiscences of the King of Roumania (New 
York, Harper. 1899), p. 242. 

21. TREATY OF SAN STEFANO, MARCH 3, 1878. 

1. INEFFECTUAL NEGOTIATIONS. JUNE-DECEMBER, 1S77. 

On June 8, 1877, Russia informed England of her war aims (Pari. 
Papers. Turkey, 1878, XV, No. 1), and on July 20 the Czar, though 
not willing to suspend operations, was ready to treat for peace if the 
Sultan would make " suitable propositions " directly to Russia (Ibid., 
IX, Xos. 1 and 3). The Turks were not ready to treat (Ibid., II. 
No. 7), though England and Austria were afraid Russia might make 
peace independently with Turkey (Goriainow, Le Bosphore et les 
Dardanelles, p. 351). By September Turkey sent terms to Berlin for 
communication to Russia (Hardy, A Memoir. II. p. 32) ; in Novem- 
ber, after the fall of Kars, Russia drew her terms for Berlin and 
Vienna to be used as direct basis with Turkey (Goriainow, p. 355) 
in connection with. the fall of Plevna, December 10. 

2. TURKEY ASKS FOR PEACE DECEMBER, 1ST 7. 

December 12, following a hint from England, Turkey appealed to 
powers through England (P. P., Turkey. 187S. II. No. 1). Joint 
mediation failed, Germany refusing to act (Nos. 3, 5, 6), and Derby 
for Flngland claimed ignorance of Russia's terms. England asked 
for Turkish terms (No. 4) ; December 26 the Sultan asked for Eng- 
lish mediation (Nos. 8, 9). Derby communicated this to the powers, 
asking France to help at St. Petersburg (Archives diplomatiques, 
second scries, vol. 6. p. 1) ; Gortchakoff replied that Russia was ready 
for peace if the Porte would communicate directly with Russian field 



74 

headquarters, where they would learn tonus of armistice (P. P., 
Turkey, L878, 11. No. 10). Derby though! that Russia was trying to 
make peace "over the head of Europe" (Goriainow, p. 359) ami 
declared an armistice was for generals, but terms of peace were for 
governments, ami other powers were interested (P. P.. 11. Xo. 16). 
Meantime, December 29, the Czar sent terms of peace to Grand Duke 
Nicholas in the tield (Goriainow, p. 359). Turkey tried unsuccess- 
fully once more through England (Nos. 19, 20, 21). ()u January 8 
(he Turks finally communicated with the Russian commander, only to 
find that the Czar's instructions, scut by messenger, would not arrive 
for a week or ten days. The Grand Duke warned the Turks that 
acceptance of bases of peace must precede armistice (Xos. 24, 28, 29, 
30, 32, 34 38), though hostilities stopped in Bulgaria January 11 
(Xo. 41). 

3. RUSSO-TUlIKlsn NEGOTIATIONS, JANUARY, 1S7S. 

In spite of Russian warning the Turkish delegates who reached 
Russian headquarters at Kyzanlik January 19-20 were not ready to 
accept Russian terms (Pears: Forty Years in Constantinople, p. 27: 
P. P., Turkey. L878, 11. Xo. 10: 111. Xos. 11. 14. 25). The Czar had 
refused to stop the Russian advance (Ibid., 111. Xo. 9), and Philipp- 
opolis was taken January 10. Adrianople January 20. The Sultan 
considered possibility of abdication and flight to England (Hardy. 
11. p. 47). In a panic the Turks gave way (P. P.. III. Nos. 12, 13. 
15-19; Goriainow, p. 361), though Derby had telegraphed that any 
treaty affecting the treaties of 1856 and L871 must be an European 
treaty and would be invalid without assent of other signatories 
(P. P.. Turkev. 1878, 111. No. 6). Schouvaloff, Russian ambassador 
at London. January 25. gave terms to Derby, who had received only 
garbled versions from Layard.at Constantinople (Ibid.. Xos. 33 -38). 
Russia also promised that the question of the straits would not be 
se;t led independently (Ibid.. No. 43. V. Xos. 10, 11. 14-16; Goriai- 
now. p. 362), although Ignatiev already had instructions to include 
that matter in a general sense in the Turkish agreement and to up- 
hold the principle of the closing of the straits. This was on January 
27, when Layard at Constantinople had been begging for an English 
fleel (P. P., Turkey, 1878, VI, Xo. 1: Goriainow, p. 363). Such a 
situation led the English Government to recall the licet from the 
mouth of Dardanelles. Meantime Russian headquarters were moved 
to Adrianople. and further delay in negotiations ensued while the 
Russian armies advanced "on all sides" toward Constantinople (P. 
P.. Turkey, IV: V. Xos. 1. 5, 0. 13: VI. Xo. 3). The Grand Duke 
had received permission to use the greatest liberty of action if Eng- 
lish should disembark troops at any point (Goriainow, p. 364). 






75 

4. A It. All stick OF ADRIANOPLE, JANUARY 31, 1878. 

Under these circumstances the Turks gave up bargaining, signed 
preliminary bases of peace (Hertslet: Map of Europe by Treaty, IV, 
No. 514), and an armistice (Xo. 515) which led to further Russian 
advance (P. P., Turkey, 1878, VII, Nos. 2, 4, 6). England protested 
vainly (Ibid., XII, No. 7), when she learned that the Turks had sur- 
rendered even the main line of defense for Constantinople and that 
I he Russians were going to San Stefano (Ibid., XI, No. 2; XII. 
No. •"» : ( Joriainow, pi>. :'>C>6-368). Safvet Pasha, Turkish foreign sec- 
rotary, openly denounced England as betrayer of Turkey (Thomp- 
son : Public Opinion and Lord Beaconsfield, II, p. 376, quoting 
Daily News. Feb. 7). For a time there was possibility of a Russo- 
Turkish alliance following the peace. Under these circumstances 
(lie English fleet passed the Dardanelles in spite of Turkish pro- 
tests. (P. P., Turkey. 1878, XIV.) The Czar ordered an advance 
<m Constantinople, and the Turks Avere unable to secure the Avith- 
drawal of the British fleet. Thus matters stood February 13-21 
until Russia and England agreed not to occupy either shore of the 
Dardanelles and the (J rand Duke disregarded the Czar's order to 
occupy Constantinople. (Ibid., XVII; GoriainoAV, pp. 364-368.) 

r>. TREATY OK SAN STEFANO, MARCH 3, 187S. 

In the negotiations Ignatiev, with Czar's approval, tried to estab- 
lish as many points as possible but was restrained by Gortchakoff, 
who was anxious not lo break with England. (GoriainoAV. p. 368.) 
The Turks, encouraged by Austria and British ambassador, openly 
-aid there was no use in arguing, as this treaty would be revised at 
a congress. (Goriainow, p. 365.) The treaty (See Appendix I, 14) 
based on agreement at Adrianople provided for: 

(1) Independence and increase of territory for Montenegro and 
Serbia. 

(2) Independence of Roumania, with cession by Turkey of Dob- 
rudja, including the valuable port of Constanza, by Avay of indemnity 
for surrender by Roumania of Bessarabia to Russia. 

(3) Bulgaria an autonomous tributary principality, with Chris- 
tian government and national militia and a large increase of territory 
in Thrace and in Macedonia. Russian military occupation limited to 
two years. 

( I) War indemnity to Russia of 1,410,000,000 roubles. 

(5) In lieu of 1,100,000,000 roubles of the indemnity Russia Avas to 
obtain Ardahan, Kars, Batoum. Bayazet, and the territory as far as 
the Saganlough, in Asia, and Dobrudja, in Europe, the last of which 
was to be exchanged with Roumania for Bessarabia. 



76 

(6) Bosphorus and Dardanelles 10 remain open to neutral mer- 
chant shipping in time of Avar. 

(7) Reforms in government of Bosnia, Herzegovina, Crete. 
Epirns, Thessaly, and other parts of Turkey in Europe and of 
Armenia. 

(8) Amnesty and protection of rights of individuals. 

(9) Renewal of treaties of commerce. 

(10) Evacuation and exchange of prisoners. 

(11) Ratifications to be exchanged within 15 clays. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

1. DOCUMENTS AND SOURCE MATERIAL. 

Parliamentary papers. All the British published correspondence 

relating to Turkey for June, 1877, to April, 1878, is bound in volume 
81 of House of Commons Papers. 1878, viz: Accounts and Papers, 
vol. 30. State Papers (continued) Turkey, 1878. (Contains Cd. 
Xos. 1905, 1906, 1923, 11)21, 19ii:». L926, 1927, 1928, 1929, 1930. 1931. 
1932, 1919, 1951. 1952, 1954, L958, 1977. 1989, 1990, -2089, 2135.) 
Cited as P. P., Turkey, 1878, II, etc. Dispatches given* by number. 

Hertslet, E. The Map of Europe by Treaty, Vol. IV, 1875-91. 
(H. M. Stationary Office, London, 1891.) Contains the treaties, 
etc. A map showing changes in San Stefano made by Berlin treaty 
is at p. 2798. 

Anon. Les Russes devant Constantinople. Revue de Paris 1th 
year. Vol. IV (July 15, 1897), pp. 101-418. Documents from Rus- 
sian Field Headquarters, etc.. 1878. 

Goriainow, S. Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles. (Plon., Paris, 
1910.) Summary of unpublished Russian documents by the former 
director of the Imperial Archives. 

Thompson, G. E. ■ Public Opinion and Lord Beaconsfield. 1875 
1880. (2 vols. Macmillan, London. 1886.) Useful collection of 
extracts from parliamentary debates, newspaper correspondence, 
magazine articles, etc. 

The treaties are to be found in all of the big collections and ate 
often reprinted from the text in Hertslet, 

11. SECONDARE ACCOUNTS. 

Debidour, A. Histoire diplomatique de l'Europe. (4 vols. 
Alcan., Paris, 1891-1917.) Standard manual. 

Driault, E. La question d'orient depuis ses origines jusqu'a nos 
jours. (Alcan., Paris, 1898.) Convenient general view. 

Avril, A. Negotiations relatives au traite de Berlin. (Paris, 
Leroux, 1886.) Skillful review. 



77 

Argyll, Duke of. The Eastern Question from the Treaty of Paris. 
1856, to the Treaty of Berlin, 1878. and to the Second Afghan War. 
(2 vols. Strahan, London, n. d.) English liberal point of view by 
a contemporary. 

Gathorne-Hardy, A. E. (editor). Gathorne-Hardy, First Earl of 
Cranbrook. A memoir with extracts from his diary and corre- 
spondence. (2 vols.. London, 1910.) Contains inside opinions of 
British cabinet by the Secretary of War. 

Edwards, H. S. Sir William White, (Murray. London. 1902.) 
English diplomatic service. Contains letters from Layard. 

Midhat Pasha. Past, Present, and Future of Turkey. Contempo- 
rary Review, III (1878). pp. 981-99:1 Excellent general statement 
by liberal Turk. 

22. THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN, 1878. 

1. INTRODUCTION. 

The Congress of Berlin assembled on June 13, 1878, and ended its 
labors by signing the Treaty of Berlin on July 13. one month later. 
The fashioning of this important document, which has been called 
the constitution of the Balkan Peninsula during the following 30 
years, might seem to have been marveously speedy. As a matter of 
fact, nearly all of its more significant features had been agreed upon 
beforehand, so that the congress had little to do beyond gathering 
existing understandings into a unified, elaborated, and harmonious 
whole. The more important of the preliminary agreements which 
prepared the way for the Treaty of Berlin will be mentioned. 

2. NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE EASTERN QUESTION, 1876-187 7. 

On July 8, 1876, Emperor Francis Joseph and Czar Alexander II 
met at Reichstadt. and the former promised to remain neutral in 
a war between Russia and Turkey, provided he should be allowed 
to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bareilles (Les Turcs, 160- 
L61 ) quotes Caratheodory Pasha, who says that the Roumanian 
delegate, Cogalcineano, had handled the original memoranda of this 
meeting, in which Gortchakoff and Andrass}^ had set down the 
cession of southern Bessarabia to Russia and the extension of 
Austria into Bosnia and Herzegovina. (See article on the Austro- 
Russian accord of 1877.) On November 2, 1876, Lord Loftus, 
British ambassador to Russia, reported to his Government that the 
Czar had spoken to him of the provisional occupation of Bosnia by 
Austria and of Bulgaria by Russia, with a naval demonstration by 
the British at Constantinople, and of the erection of Serbia and 
Roumania into independent kingdoms. (Hertslet. pp. 2509-2510.) 



78 

At the preliminary meetings of the Conference of Constantinople, 
December 11-22, 1876, arrangements were proposed for peace and 
reform in the Turkish Empire, including new autonomous organiza- 
tions for Bosnia-Herzegovina and Bulgaria. Serbia and Montenegro 
were to be enlarged. (Ibid., 2526-2530, Parliamentary Papers, Tur- 
key, No. 2, 1877.) These plans were elaborated and proposed at the 
regular meetings of the conference and rejected by the Turkish 
representatives January 20, 1877 (Hertslet, pp. 2541-2544. British 
and Foreign State Papers, vol. 68, 1104 ff.), as tending to destroy 
Turkish sovereignty in those areas. (Hertslet, 2547.) 

3. THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR, 1S7 7-1ST8. 

On June 8, 1877, after war had been begun between Russia and 
Turkey, Count Schuvaloff communicated to the Earl of Derby some 
views on Russian and British interests in the East, in which he sug- 
gested that Bulgaria, from the Danube to the Balkans, become " an 
autonomous vassal province under the guaranty of Europe " and 
that Montenegro and Serbia receive increases of territory. Russia 
should have compensation in southern Bessarabia and around Ba- 
toum, Roumania in a portion of the Dobrudja, and Austria in Bosnia 
and "partly in the Herzegovina." (Ibid., 2634-2639.) 

The war continued, and after the fall of Plevna in December, 
1877, the way to Constantinople was open. The British Government, 
supported by public opinion, began to fear the results of the Rus- 
sian success and prepared to take diplomatic and military action. 
Austria likewise became suspicious, and prepared to post troops in 
Transylvania, near the Russian line of communication. On Janu- 
ary 3, 1878. the Porte appealed to the powers for mediation. The 
refusal of Germany to take part in such a mediation made the 
British public apprehensive that Russia, supported by Germany, 
would try to force her own terms on Turkey. (Rose, I, Development 
of Modern Europe, I, 265.) On January 15 the British ambassador 
at Petrograd handed to Prince Gortchakoff an opinion of the British 
Government that any treaty between Russia and Turkey affecting the 
treaties of 1856 and 1871 must be a European treaty in order to be 
valid. (Hertslet, 2657.) 

4. THE TREATY OF ADRIA^OPLE. 

Russia and Turkey signed at Adrianople on January 31, 1878, a 
document (See Appendix I, 13) which combined with an armistice 
the " preliminary bases for peace," and provided for an autonomous 
Bulgaria, with a national Christian government and militia ; the in- 
dependence of Montenegro, Roumania, and Serbia, with increases of 
territory; autonomy for Bosnia and Herzegovina; reforms in other 



79 

Christian provinces of Turkey in Europe; an indemnity to Russia; 
and an understanding to secure the rights and interests of Russia in 
the straits. (Ibid., 2658-60). On February 5, 1878, the Austrian 
( Government proposed a conference at Vienna of the powers signatory 
to the treaties of 1856 and 1871. (Hertslet, 2668.) Baden was sub- 
stituted later as the place of meeting, and on March 7 it was proposed 
that not a conference but a congress be held, and that the place be 
Berlin (Ibid., 2697). 

Bismarck announced, in a speech to the Reichstag on February 19, 
that he proposed to act as an " honest broker, " with no partiality in 
favor of any country. 

5. THE TKEATY OF SAN STEFAN O, 18TS. 

Russian and Turkey agreed on a " preliminary treaty of peace " 
at San Stefano on March 3, 1878 (See Appendix I, 14), which set 
forth, with annexed maps, new boundaries for Montenegro and 
Serbia. (See article, The Treaty of San Stefano, 1878.) Bulgaria 
was laid out extensively, including all areas which were believed to 
contain a majority of Bulgarians. The plan proposed at the con- 
ference of Constantinople for the organization of Bosnia and Herze- 
govina was to be put into effect. Improvements and reforms were 
to be provided in Armenia. An indemnity of 1,410,000,000 rubles 
was to be paid by Turkey to Russia, but in lieu of 1,100,000,000 rubles 
of this sum the Dobrudja and the districts of Ardahan, Kars, Batum, 
and Bayazid were to be ceded. Ratifications were to be exchanged 
within 15 days (Hertslet, 2672-2696; Parliamentary Papers, Tur- 
key. Xo. 22 (1878) . Holland, Eastern question, 335-348, etc.) . This 
treaty proposed an arrangement very favorable to Russian and Bul- 
garian interests. It was, however, as regards its disposition of the 
Balkan peninsula, much more nearly conformable to the principle of 
nationality than was the Treaty of Berlin. While it has often been 
considered an attempt to " tie the hands of the Congress " (Rose, I, 
Development, 1, 272) , it became very serviceable to that body in exact 
conformity with its denomination as a " preliminary peace." 

G. NEGOTIATIONS FOR CALLING CONGRESS OF BERLIN. 

There was a sharp exchange of views between the British and 
Russian Governments as to the extent to which this treaty should 
come before the congress for discussion, which was settled by Prince 
Gortchakoff conceding "full liberty of appreciation and action'' 
to all the powers to be represented. (See account in Salisbury's 
circular note, referred to below, and Gortchakoff's dispatch, Herts- 
let, IV, 2707.) Gen. Ignatieff was sent to visit the European courts, 
and is supposed to have offered Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria. 



80 

The Hapsburg power, however, was not pleased with the blocking 
o( the road to Salonika by the interposition of the great Bulgaria, 
and asked special rights in Serbia and Montenegro, with control of 
Bosnia and Albania (Debidour, Histoire Diplomatique, II. 515). 
Apparently i( was this attitude of Austria that caused Russia to 
yield full discussion of the treaty (Skrine, Expansion o( Russia, 
259). Count Andrassy a few days later made a secrel agreement with 
England, obtaining thereby English support at the coming congress 
for the Austrian claims to Bosnia-Herzegovina. (Fournier, Wie- 
wir zu Bosnien kamen, p. 63.) 

Lord Salisbury issued a circular note on April L, L878, proposing 
modifications of the Treaty o\' San Stefano. in the direction of remov- 
ing exclusive Russian advantages, protecting British interests, and 
securing, without impairing Turkish sovereignty, improvement in 
the position of the subject peoples of 'Turkey (Hertslet, 2698 -7(H)). 
Prince Gortchakoff answered this on April :>, asking for specific 
proposals, ami adding comments in an annex. Russia's armies in 
'Turkey were losing effectives rapidly. She was not prepared for a 
general war. nor was any ally in sight in ease one shouhd break out. 
She was therefore ready to make considerable concessions. Count 
Shuvaloff, Russian ambassador at London, served as intermediary 
in carrying personally to Petrograd (starting May 7) a statement 
o( the British objections to the 'Treaty o( San Stefano. On his return 
he was able to reach, by May 30, a secret agreement with Lord Salis- 
bury, which was later embodied in the entire Treaty of Berlin (Rose, 
I, 278 "JS-J. The text of this agreement was published in the Lon- 
don Globe on June lb L878. Paul, H., History of Modern Eng- 
land, vol. 4. 52 53. It was reprinted by The Times, June 15, 
L878. The French text is in Staatsarchiv, vol. 34, No. 6749). The 
principal features were that the Bulgarian regions south of the 
Balkans were not to be withdrawn wholly from Turkish control; 
that the Sultan would have the right to canton troops on the 
frontiers o( southern Bulgaria; thai England would present the 
cause o( the Creeks of Thessaly and Epirus to the powers; that while 
feeling "profound regret" at the cession of southern Bessarabia to 
Russia, she would not dispute it: and that Bayazid, controlling the 
main route from Asia Minor into Persia, should be given back to 
'Turkey. Russia thus made considerable concessions, but in recom- 
pense Lord Salisbury abandoned the right to diseuss at the congress 
questions not mentioned in the secret agreement, and thus almost all 
independence o( decision was removed from the congress. 

7. THE CYPRUS row BNTTON. 

On the very day when this arrangement was made Lord Salisbury 
telegraphed to Mr. Layard at Constantinople to negotiate about 



81 

guaranteeing the Sultan's Asiatic posse sionj and receiving the ad- 
ministration of Cyprus (Parliamentary papers, Turkey, NTos. 36 
and 1:3, L878. Hertslet, EV, 2717 2720). A secrel agreement to this 
effect was drawn up June 1 (See Appendix 1, 16), with such prompti- 
tude as to suggest previous preparation. (Ibid., 2722 2723). Debi- 
dour (Histoire Diplomatique, II. 520) -suggests that England would 
liave been glad to take Egypt instead of Cyprus, but that France 
would riot have consented. She had stipulated Unit Egypt be not 
taken in hand by the congress. The principal features of the Treaty 
of Berlin and of the Cyprus Convention, which, while it stands sepa- 
rate, counts as si pari of the same great settlement, were thus fully 
determined before the meeting of the eon<fre -. (See article, The 
I • glish Protectorate over Cyprus, 1878-191 L) 

8. PROCEEDINGS 01 THE CONGRESS, JUNE 13 TO JULY 13. 

Prince Bismarck dominated the proceedings of the congress and 
used bis authoritative presence to drive the deliberations rapidly, 
suppressing at will the represent of 3mal] states w hen they were 

permitted to appear for -hort hearings before the ( longress, and limit- 
ing debate on the questions already arranged (Bareilles, Les Turcs, 
1 t8 175, gives extracts from the report of the Turkish delegate, Cara- 
theodory Pasha). The material to be embodied in the document \ 
drawn together in 20 sessions during 31 days. In spite of the pre- 
liminary arrangements there were rigorous debates between the rep- 
resentatives of Russia and England. Austria regularly voted with 
England, France usually did likewi 

The English plenipotentiary pported by the French, insisted 

upon admitting representatives from Greece to a hearing; when the 
disposition of Epirus and Thessaly should come up. The Bulgarian 
question occupied four days (June 22 to 26). The. new principality 
was reduced to about one-third of that arranged at San Stefano. 
Another third, under the name of Eastern Roumelia, was to have 
a separate status and a different organization, while the re- 
mainder was given bark to Turkey to constitute, under the name of 
Macedonia, that theater of robbery, arson, rape, and murder which, 
in full -i^ht of Kurope. disgraced the opening years of the twentieth 
century. On the 2Sth the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(Se< a it icle, Aust ria-Hungary and the Balkan Sett lement of 1878) by 
Austria \ ntlj proposed, to the surprise perhaps of none but 
the Turkish dele<rat< (Debidour, op. cit., II, 525; Bareilles, op. chV, 
168 170. relates how on July 13 the Turkish delegates, on peremptory 
orders from Co inople, required Andrassy, after fierce debate, 

to sign a separate paper affirming that the Austrian occupation 
would be provisional). The increments assigned to Serbia and 
53706—18 6 



82 

Montenegro ;>t San Stefano were materially reduced, so that, in 
Austria's interest, the two small States might be carefully Insulated 
from each other. To secure this object more thoroughly, it was pro 
\ ided that Austrian garrisons be stationed in the Sanjak of Novi- 
bazar, which was to Lie between Serbia and Montenegro. To recom- 
pense Serbia in part the territories of Pirot and Vrania were as 
signed to her. By this action animosity between Serbia and Bulgaria 
was made almost inevitable, since Bulgaria regarded the region as 
Bulgarian territory. The Greek representatives were heard, but re- 
ceived no award of territory. The Roumanians, forced to surrendei 
southern Bessarabia in order to soothe Russian pride for its loss in 
L856, as well as to bring Russia to the Danube River, were assigned 
the infertile Dobrudja, enlarged a little at the south at the expense of 

Bulgaria. The Armenians, left with a Turkish promise of reform, 

were not even to have the direct supervision of a single power, hut a 
futile reliance upon the joint consideration of the powers, (See 
article, The Armenian Question, h s 7S L897.) The revelation on June 
I of the Cyprus convention (See article, The English Protectorate 
over Cyprus, L878 PHI") gave Beaconsfield a dramatic prominence 
that rejoiced his soul, ami he showed no signs of qualms of con- 
science because of the inconsistency of the episode with the principles 
for which England and he himself were standing of the integrity of 
Turkey and the inviolability of the Sultan's sovereignty. England 
(.lid indeed assume not only the defense of the Sultan's Asiatic posses 
sions, hut the protection of the Armenians, both of which engage- 
ments she quietly abandoned within a few years without returning 
Cyprus to the Porte, The only power that showed any attachment 
to the principle now regarded as of paramount importance, the 
self-determination of people-, was Russia, hut even she did not hold 
to it against what -he conceived to be her interests. The powers 
are all paying to-day. quite directly, in the catastrophe of the World 
War, for their selfish departures from justice at the Congress of 
Berlin. Even at the time none of them was satisfied with their work. 
"Not one of the interested parties hut returned from the congress 
with some discontent, some disquiet, some new perm of hatred or of 
strife" (Debidour, op. eit.. 11. 580), 

'.i. TREAT! OF BERLIN (SEE APPENDIX 1. IT). 

The Treaty of Berlin, as signed duly L3, 1S7S. contained 01 articles, 
of which the principal contents were as follows: Articles 1 to L2 
established Bulgaria as an autonomous and tributary- principality 
under the Sultan of Turkey, defined its boundaries, provided for the 
election of a prince and the preparation of an organic law. a pro- 
visional Russian regime of not exceeding nine months, commercial 
and financial regulations, and so on. Articles L3 to 22 provided for 



83 

the Province of Eastern Roumelia, with administrative autonomy, 
delimitation of boundaries, ;i governor general, European commis- 
sions to arrange its organization and administer its finances pro- 
\i ionally, etc. Article 23 affirmed the organic law of Crete and pro- 
vided for applying similar laws el.-cu here in I he Turkish Empire. The 
frontiers of Greece were to !><• rectified (art. 24). Bosnia and Herze 
govina were to be occupied and administered by Austria-Hungary, 
and the Latter State was to have the right to keep garrisons and 
maintain military and commercial roads in the San jab of Nbvibazar 
(art. 25). Articles 26 to 33 declared Montenegro independent, en- 
larged its boundaries, and arranged its relations with Turkey. Ar- 
ticles ; 'l to 42 provided similarly for Serbia, and articles 13 to 51 
for Roumania. The control of the Danube by a European com- 
mission wascontinued in articles 52 and 57. (See article, The Danube 
Question, 1871 L904.) Article 58 ceded to Russia the districts of 
Batum, K;irs, and Ardahan in Asia, and the three subsequent arti- 
cles deall also with Asia, the last ( ( ;i) providing for reforms in the 
provinces inhabited by Armenians. Article 62 denned religious 
liberty for the Ottoman Empire, and the last two articles continued 
the treaties of Paris (1856) and London (1871) in points not super- 
eded ami arranged for ratification. 

10. APPRAISEMENT OF THE CONOR] 

The Congress of Berlin, which assembled on June L3, L878, will be 
forever famous for the great personalities which composed it and for 
the unsatisfactory settlement of the great questions brought before 
it. Undoubtedly it. left conditions in the Near East much better 
than they had been in L875, but scarcely an advantageous change can 
be credited to the deliberations of the congress itself. Both the im- 
provements in the situation, such as the independence of Montenegro, 
Serbia, and Roumania, and the autonomy of Bulgaria and Eastern 
Roumelia, and the shortcomings, such as the incomplete liberation of 
the Christian subjects of the Porte and the violation of the principle 
of nationality in the acquisitions of Russia, Austria, and England 
had been prepared beforehand. The predetermined compromise set- 
tlement which "in the Name of Almighty God" was sanctioned 
by the signatures of the brilliantly clothed plenipotentiaries \. 
filled with the seeds of oppression, bloodshed, and war. not excepting 
those of the World War. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

DOCUMENTS. 

Hertslet, Sir Edward. The .Map of Europe by Treaty. (I vols, 
(vol. I. 1875 L891), London, printed for Her Majesty's stationery 
office by Harrison and Sons. 1891.) Official collection of important 



84 

•documents, with indexes, tables of contents, maps, etc. Treaty of 
Berlin, with abstract of protocols (minutes), list- of subjects, table 
of contents, and notes, pp. 2729-99. 

Holland. T. E. (editor). The European concerl in the Eastern 
question: A collection of treaties and other public acts. (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, L885.) Introduction and notes by editor. 

Brunswick, Benoit. Le traite" de Berlin, annote el comments. 
(Paris, L878.) 

.Marten-. G. Fr. de. Xouveau reeueil general de traites et autre- 
actes relatifs aux rapport do droit international. II serie. Tome 
III. Leipzig. 

IV Clercq. Reeueil des trades de la France. Vol. XII. Under 
auspices of minister o( foreign affairs. Pari-. L881. Contains proto- 
cols and Treaty of Berlin. 

Alhin. Pierre. Pes grands traites politiques, reeueil des princi- 
palis testes diplomatiques depuis 1815 jusqu'a no- jours. (Paris. 
AJcan, L911.) 

Testa, Baron I. de. Reeueil de traites de la Porte ottomane. 10 

vols. (Paris. 1st',! L901.) 

Noradounghian, G. Reeueil d'actes internal ionaux de I'empire 
ottoman. (Paris. L897 1913.) 

tish and Foreign State Papers. Vol. 69, L877-1878. Compiled 
by librarian and keeper of the papers. Foreign Office. London. Wm. 
Ridgway. 1884. Contains protocols or minutes ^f the Congress in 
full. pp. 862-1078, and the treaty without maps or notes, pp. 7b>-7r.s 
(all in the otlieial French version). 

Archives diplomatiques. 2d series, vols. 5, 6. Paris, 1882 -".. Vol. 
6, pp. 1-320, contains correspondence of French representatives re- 
garding the treaties of San Stefano and Berlin. The Treaty o( Ber- 
lin is given, p. 28 1 if. 

Parliamentary Papers. (Blue books o\' the British Government.) 
There are more than LOO of these dealing with Turkey between 1876 
and L881. 

Documents diplomatiques. Affaires d'orient. Congres de Berlin. 
Paris. L878. Livres jaunes of the French Government. 

Document] diplomatici. Libri verdi oi' the Italian Government. 
l s 77.and L'878, Atl'ari d'oriente. 

BOOKS. 

Rose, -I. H. The development of the European nations, IS7i>-1 ( .>U. 
(Fifth edition. -J vols, in 1. Now York, t!. P. Putnam'- Sons. L916.) 
A thoughtful and impartial history, with special attention to inter- 
national relations. Written in 1905, extended by three additional 
chapter- to November. L914. Vol. I. pp. 264 298 deal with the 
Balkan settlement of 1S78. 



85 

Miller, \Y. The Ottoman Empire, 1801-1913. (Cambridge, Uni- 
versity Press, 1913.) A valuable and accurate compendium of the 
rise of the Balkan States. Internal affairs of Turkey relatively neg- 
lected. Some bias shown in favor of the Greeks. Pp. 382-398 dis- 
cuss the Treaty of Berlin. 

La Jonquiere, A., Vicomte de. Histoire de I'empire ottoman. (2 
vols. 3rd ed., Paris, Hachette, 1914.) Especially full account in the 
second volume of the period since 1870. 

Bareilles, Bertrand. Les Turcs, ce que ful leur empire, leurs 
comedies politiques. (Paris, Perrin, 1917.) Chapter 6 gives direct 
information about the Treaty of Berlin from the report of the Turkish 
delegate, ( 'atheodory Pasha. 

Debidour, A. Histoire diplomatique de l'Europe, 1814-1878. 2 
vols. (Paris, Alcan, 1916.) 

D'Avril, A. Negociations relatives au traite de Berlin et aux ar- 
rangements qui ont suivi. (Paris, Leroux, 1887.) 

Choublier, M. La question d'Orienl depuis le traite de Berlin. 
(Paris, 1897.) 

Duggan, Stephen Pierce Hayden. The Eastern Question — a study 
in diplomacy. (New York. Columbia 'University Press. 1902.) 

Sosnosky, Theodor von. Die Balkanpolitik Oesterreich-Ungarns 
seii 1866. (Berlin, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1913.) 2 vols. 

Bamberg, V. Geschichte der orientaliscen Angelegenheit im Ziet- 
raume des Pariser und Berliner Friedens. (Berlin, G. Grote, L892).. 

Beer, Adolf. Die orientalische Politik Oesterreichs seit 177 L 
(Prag, 1883.) 

Guarini, G. B. La Germania e la questione d'oriente lino al con- 
gresso di Berlino. (Rome, Loescher, 1898.) 2 vols. 

Bonghi, R. II congresso di Berlino e la crisi d'oriente. (2nd 
ed. Milan, Treves, 1885.) 

MAGAZINE ARTICLES. 

The Nation (New York), in vols. 26 and 27, contains many articles 
by E. L. Godkin and others on the affairs in Turkey and the con- 
gress and Treaty of Berlin. See vol. 26 : 37, 53, 194, 237, .'598: vol. 27: 
6, 50, 65, 108, 159, 234. 

Campbell. The resettlement of the Turkish dominion-. Fort- 
nightly Review, April, 1878. N. S., vol. 23, pp. 543-00. 

Dicey, E. England's policy at the Berlin Congress. Nineteenth. 
Century, vol. 3, p. 779. 

Vambery, A. Russia and England: Batoum and Cyprus. Fort- 
nightly Review. Vol. 46, p. 372. 

Blennerhasset, R. Austria and the Berlin treaty. Fortnightly 
Review, November, 1908. Vol. 90, pp. 751-64. 



86 

Hahn, S. Diplomatie im Orient soit Beendigung des russisch- 
turkischen Krieges. Unsere Zeit, (Leipzig, F. A. Brockhaus, L880.) 
Vol. 2, pp. Id. 240. 

Cumming, A. N. Secret History of the Treaty of Berlin. Nine- 
teenth Century, July, L905, Vol. 58, pp. 83 90. 

M. K. Waddington at the ministry bf foreign affairs and the Ber- 
lin congress. Scribner's, February, L914. Vol, .V>. pp. 203 220. 

MAPS ILLUSTRATING TBEAT1 OF BERLIN. 

Series in Hertslet, Map of Europe In Treaty, v. 4. Maps to illus- 
trate Treaty of San Stefano alone are to be found after pp. 2674 
(Montenegro); 2676 (Serbia); 2680 (Bulgaria); 2788 (Eusso- 
Turkish frontier in Asia). 

Page 2766, map of Bulgaria showing the boundaries as proposed 
by the Treaty oi' San Stefano and as fixed by the Treaty of Berlin. 
Stanford's Geographical Establishment: e. 26| m. to 1 inch; names 
iA' places taken from Austrian stall' map. 

Page 2774, Eastern Roumelia (Stanford's, etc.). 

Page 2782, Montenegro (ditto). 

Page 2786, Serbia (ditto). 

Page 2790, Bessarabia. Dobrudja, Danube Delta, Isle of Serpents. 
etc. (ditto). 

Page •_'T! ) t. Russo-Turkish frontier in Asia (ditto, except scale, 
which is c. 334; m. to 1 inch). 

Page 2798, Turkey in Europe, to illustrate Treaty of Berlin (ditto, 
except scale. 90 m. to 1 inch). 

Page 2798 (immediately following previous map), map showing 
territory restored to Turkey by Congress of Berlin (ditto). 

Page 2798, map illustrating Treaty o( San Stefano and Treaty of 
Berlin. 

Rose. Development of European Nations. 1. 284. (Stanford's. Lon- 
don. 133 m. to 1 inch.) 

Map illustrating treaty oi' Berlin in Europe and Asia, in Miller. 
Ottoman Empire. 398. (Cambridge, University Press, L913), c. 140 
m to 1 inch. 

23. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND THE BALKAN SETTLEMENT 

OF 1878. 

1. CIRCUMSTANCES FAVORING AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. 

Austria-Hungary entered the Congress o\' Berlin (Sec article, that 
title) in 1878 under circumstances exceptionally auspicious for the 
realization of the aims which Count Andrassy, minister of foreign 
affairs, formulated for the Dual Monarchy. Shortly before the 



87 

Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 began Austria-Hungary had come 
to an understanding with Russia (See article on the Austro-Russian 
accord of 1876-77) which undoubtedly contained stipulations very 
favorable to the designs of the Dual Monarchy upon Bosnia- 
Herzegovina. The strong opposition which Austria-Hungary imme- 
diately manifested to the Treaty of San Stefano could count with 
certainty upon the firm support of Great Britain, which as well as the 
Dual Monarchy was bitterly hostile to the proposed Great Bulgaria. 
The attitude of the small Balkan States was not to count for much in 
the congress unless in conjunction with that of a great power. 
Austria-Hungary could, therefore, make use of the hostility of Ser- 
bia. Greece, and Roumania to the idea of Great Bulgaria to break 
down that scheme and could then disregard the wishes of those States 
whenever that course should prove convenient. Finally Austria- 
Hungary could count upon the firm support of Bismarck, who. 
though claiming to play the role of the "honest broker," was intent 
upon using the occasion to make more solid the close understanding 
between Germany and Austria-Hungary, even if that should produce 
some difficulty as regards the third member of the League of the 
Three Emperors (See article, that title). 

2. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND THE TREATY OF BERTJOJ 

Under the circumstances it was not surprising that Austria-Hun- 
gary secured its wishes on practically all points where its interests 
were involved. By article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin (See Appendix 
I, 17) Austria-Hungary obtained the right to occupy and admin- 
ister Bosnia and Herzegovina, though the inhabitants were by large 
majority Serbs and refusal to annex them to Serbia left that State 
outraged in national sentiment and shut off from all access to the 
sea (See article on Serbia and the Balkan settlement of 1878). That 
Austria-Hungary was to occupy and administer Bosnia-Herzego- 
vina instead of annexing them outright was not due to any reluctance 
on the part of the Congress of Berlin to permit annexation nor to any 
consideration for Serbia. The chief reason for the arrangement was 
to be found in the internal situation of the Dual Monarchy. In 
Hungary the Magyars and in Austria the Germans were not willing 
at that time to increase the strength of the Slavic forces in the Dual 
Monarchy. Occupation and administration was therefore more ac- 
ceptable than annexation. 

Novi-Bazar, lying between Serbia and Montenegro, and inhabited 
by Serbs, though much coveted by those States, each of which asked 
for its division between them, was chiefly through Austro-Hun- 
garian influence, restored to Turkey. But article 25. also secured to 
Austria-Hungary the right to keep garrisons and have military and 



88 

commercial roads there. (See article, The Austrian Occupation of 
Novi-Bazar, L878- L909.) .Vt Austria's insistence Montenegro was 
restricted in extent as compared with the Treaty of San Stefano and 
subjected to various conditions formulated in the interest of Austria- 
Hungary. (See article, Montenegro and the Balkan Settlement of 
L878.) In short, the settlement of L878 represented a successful 
first step in the Drang nach Osten. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

See bibliography of the Congress of Berlin and of other articles 
dealing with differenl phases of the Balkan settlement of 1878. 

24. SERBIA AND THE BALKAN SETTLEMENT OF 1878. 

1. INTRODUCTION. 

Though Serbia had been unsuccessful in its war against Turkey in 
L876 and had engaged in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 on the 
side of Russia onlv at a comparatively late date in the stcuggle, the 

Serbs were not without some hope, as the end of the latter war drew 
near, that their little state might emerge from the approaching set- 
tlement o( Balkan affairs with its long Standing national hopes real- 
ized. 

These hopes aimed chiefly at two things: (1) Independence, (2) 
extension of tin 1 Serbian boundaries to include all of the territory 
inhabited by Serbs and still under Turkish authority. The territory 
in question fell into two divisions: ( 1) Old Serbia, a somewhat 
vaguely defined region lying to the east, south, and southwest of 
Serbia, (2) Bosnia-Herzegovina. 

•J. SERBIA AMI THE TREATY OK s,\\ STEFANO. 

The Treaty of San Stefano was the first disappointment for Serbia. 
It stipulated for the independence of Serbia, also for an increase of 
territory. But the amount of territory which it proposed to bestow 
on Serbia was inconsiderable, only a small fraction of Old Serbia. It 
was evident that Russia intended to bestow its favor chiefly on 
Bulgaria. 

:;. SERBIA and THE CONGRESS or man, ix. 

The calling of the Con«rress of Berlin revived the hopes of Serbia. 
lint it became evident at a very early Stage that the Serbs had very 
little basis for expectation o( a favorable outcome from its delibera- 
tions. The Serb representatives were refused admission to the con- 
gress. Later on they were not even permitted to appear before the 



89 

congress to present an argument in behalf of the Serb claims. From 
the French delegates the Serb representatives Learned that Bismarck 
attached the greatest importance to securing the satisfaction of 
Austria-Hungary and that Serbia would succeed only in so far as 

she was in accord with Austria. 

Under the circumstances, since it was well known that Austria- 
Hungary was intent upon the acquisition of Bosnia-Herzegovina for 

herself and there was some knowledge of her understanding in 
regard to that subject with Russia (See article on the Austro-IJussian 
Accord of L876-1877), Serbia did not venture in the formal papers 
which she communicated to the congress to lay claim to Bosnia- 
Herzegovina, knowing well that by so doing she ran the risk of 
getting very little of Old Serbia. 

I. Till. TREATY OF BERLIN AM) SERBIA. 

The Treaty of Berlin provided, so far as Serbia was concerned, a 
solution which was altogether such an one as Austria-Hungary 
wanted for Serbia. As a distinguished French historian has re- 
marked (Emile Denis. La grande Serbe, p. 108). it was in line with 
the Hapsburg policy as pursued toward Serbia ever since: To 
tolerate the existence of Serbia as long as she would be a docile 
vassal and would serve to extend little by little her ( Aust ro- 
ll ungarian) influence toward the south; to crush her without pity 
from the moment when it should attempt to fulfill freely her desti- 
nies as an independent power. Serbia got a recognition of its inde- 
pendence and a slightly larger but somewhat different extent of 
territory than had been contemplated in the Treaty of San Stefano. 

5. SERBIAN DISAPPOINTMENT. 

The passionate disappointment of Serbia at this outcome can be 
judged by two contemporaneous Serb utterances. One is that of a 
Serb publicist in 1S7."> when the rising in Bosnia had raised Serb 
hope- that at length the time was approaching when the Serbs of 
that region might be united with those of Serbia. " Bosnia-IIerze- 
govina is for us not only that which Trentino and Triest are i'ov 
Italy and the Alpine Provinces of Austria are for Germany. It 
has for Serbia the importance which the environs of Moscow ha\e 
for Russia and the most vital parts of Germany and France for the 
( rermans and the French." The other is that of a Serb poet, writing 
after the conclusion of the Treaty of Berlin. "The Treaty of Berlin 
has a little enlarged the chains of Serbia, but thereby rendering 
them more terribly solid. The light of day breaks only to reveal 
the mutilation of Serbia, only that its wounds may be clearly dis- 
cerned and that it may be struck where it is still intact. The night 



90 

has dispersed only in order that the Serbs may no longer dream of 
their unity, that unity for which they have undergone so many sacri- 
fices." 

6. APPRAISEMENT. 

The Balkan settlement of 1878 in the ease of Serbia exhibits in 
striking fashion two things: (1) The failure of all the powers to 
take into account the rights of nationality as represented by the 
Christian States of the Balkan peninsula, to which failure must be 
attributed in large measure the unhappy state of affairs which pre- 
vailed in southeastern Europe from 1878 to 1914, which condition 
became one of the most potent factors in bringing about the World 
War; (2) the failure of Russia in 1878 to appreciate its responsibility 
toward the Slavic peoples of southeastern Europe other than the 
Bulgars, thereby Leaving them defenceless in the presence of an ill- 
informed and indifferent Europe to the tender mercies of Austria- 
Hungary, already well embarked upon its Drang nach Osten policy. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

Denis, E. La grande Serine, 10-2-113. (Paris, Delagrave, 1915.) 
Admirable short account by a leading authority. 

Ay rib A. Le Traite de* Berlin. (Paris, Leroux, 1886.) Stand- 
aril authority. 

GeorgeVitch, V. La Serbie au Congres de Berlin. In Revue d'his- 
toire diplomatique. (1892.) Vol. 5, pp. 483-552. Detailed and 
thoroughly documented study. 

Peritch, J. Le traite de Berlin et la question de la nationality par 
rapport a la principante de Serine. Revue generale de droit inter- 
national public, vol. 7. pp. 181-214. 

Temperley, H. W. V. History of Serbia. (London, Bell. 1917.) 
Ch. 13. Concise, authoritative. 

George \ itch. V. Die Serbische Frage. (Stuttgart, Deutsche Ver- 
lages Anstalt, 1909.) 

25. BULGARIA AND THE BALKAN SETTLEMENT OF 1878. 

1. INTRODUCTION. 

At the beginning of 1S76 all of Bulgaria was an integral part of 
Turkey. In the first part of that year the Christians of Bulgaria 
rose in revolt against the Turkish officers. The officers used irregu- 
lar troops called bashi-bazouks to repress the revolt and committed 
such atrocities that the peoples of Europe were stirred. Serbia and 
Montenegro declared war on Turkey. Disraeli, the premier of Eng- 
land, feared Russia too much to help the cause of Bulgar freedom, 
while Gladstone and the English people sympathized too much with 



91 

the Bulgars to permit the English Government to help Turkey. On 
April 24, L877, the Czar of Russia declared war on Turkey, disclaim- 
ing any desire for Constantinople. After the Russian entrance into 
Adrianople on January 20, 1878. the Sultan sought peace. On 
March 3, 1878, Russia and Turkey agreed to the Treaty of San 
Stefano. 

2. TREATY OF SAN STEFANO. 

By this treaty Bulgaria was constituted an autonomous and tribu- 
tary principality under the suzerainty of the Sultan, with a Christian 
governor freely elected by the population, confirmed by the Sultan 
with the assent of the powers. This Bulgaria represented the 
" ( Jreater Bulgaria " of the Middle Ages. By the boundaries defined 
in the treaties it would extend, roughly, from the Danube on the 
north to the iEgean on the south and westward to Albania. All of 
this region was to be one principality. 

« 

3. CONGRESS OK BERLIN. 

When the treaty became known the English Government feared 
that such a Bulgaria would be the avenue through which Russia 
could reach the Aegean and threaten the I^nglish trade route to 
India. Austria feared that because of the development of the Pan- 
Slavic feeling in Serbia and Montenegro, Russia would not live up 
to the Convention of Pesth (See article.The Austro-Russian Accord of 
L876-1877), in which Russia had agreed that Austria might occupy 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Greece protested against the inclusion of 
Macedonia and the Aegean littoral in Bulgaria, and Serbia against 
the inclusion of territory on her eastern and southern frontier. Rou- 
mania was grieved at the loss of southern Bessarabia, and Turkey 
saw an opportunity of regaining part of her territories. Austria 
proposed a conference at Vienna, but the powers preferred to accept 
the invitation of Bismarck to come to Berlin. England, Russia, 
Austria. Germany, France, Italy, and Turkey signed the Treaty of 
Berlin on July 13, 1878. 

4 . TREATY OF BERL] N . 

By the Treaty of Berlin (See Appendix I, 17) " Greater Bulgaria " 
was divided into three parts. The part north of the Balkans, minus 
a few square miles in Dobrudja assigned to Roumania, was erected 
into an autonomous tributary principality under the suzerainty of 
Turkey, precisely as arranged for by the Treaty of San Stefano. 
The region south of the Balkans was to be called Eastern Roumelia 
and was to remain subject to the direct political and military author- 
ity of the Sultan under conditions of administrative autonomy. A 



92 

European commission, acting with the Sultan, was to fix the admin- 
istrative and judicial system. The governor-general was to be a 
Christian, nominated by the Sultan for a term of five years with the 
assent of the powers. Macedonia, the third portion, was to remain a 
part of Turkey, as before the war. A Russian army of 50,000 men 
was to occupy Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia for nine months after 
the ratification of the treaties. 

5. RESULTS OF THE SETTLEMENT FOR BULGARIA. 

For Bulgaria the chief results of the settlement were: (1) The 
Treaty of San Stefano added the sandjak of Toultcha, in the Do- 
brudja, to Roumania. This was occupied b} 7 a mixture of Bulgars, 
Roumanians, and Turks. Berlin added a part of Dobrudja to the 
south of Toultcha occupied almost exclusively by Bulgars. This 
raised an ''irredenta " question for Bulgaria against Roumania; (2) 
because the efforts of Russia in behalf of Bulgaria, the latter looked 
to Russia for direction, 1878-1886; (3) because San Stefano erected 
a "Greater Bulgaria," it aroused in the Bulgars the hope of restor- 
ing the Bulgaria of the Middle Ages. At that time there was a na- 
tionalist feeling in Bulgaria and Roumelia, but none in Macedonia. 
The desire in Serbia and Greece to acquire parts of Macedonia 
was not at that time so developed as later on. It seems quite prob- 
able that, if liberally treated in other matters, they might have 
finally acquiesced in Bulgarian possession of that region if San 
Stefano had been allowed to stand. When the Congress of Berlin 
handed Macedonia back to Turkey it encouraged Serbia, Greece, and 
Bulgaria with the hope that ultimately they might annex parts of 
that region, thus leading to the antagonisms which finally brought 
on the Second Balkan War, 1913. (See articles on the Macedonian 
question, 1878-1908, 1908-12.) ■ 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

Holland, Thomas Erskine. The European Concert in the Eastern 
Question. (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1885.) Contains text of the 
treaties of San Stefano and Berlin in English. 

Chaunier, A. La Bulgarie. Etude d'histoire diplomatique et de 
droit international, pp. 20-35. (Paris, Rousseau, 1909.) 

Cambridge Modern History. (Cambridge, University Press, Eng- 
land, 1911.) Vol. 12. General account and bibliography. 

Report of the International Commission on the Balkan Wars. 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Washington, 1911. 

Debidour, A. Histoire diplomatique de l'Europe (1814-1878). 
(Paris, Alcan, 1891.) Vol. 2, ch. 13 passim. 

See also bibliography of article. The Congress of Berlin. 



93 
26. ROUMANIA AND THE BALKAN SETTLEMENT OF 1878. 

1. INTRODUCTION. 

During the period 1870-1877 the statesmen of France lost interest 
in Roumania, those of England continued to neglect her, and those 
of Austria-Hungary for the most part continued to oppose her. 
Roumania was forced to revolve in the orbit of Russia. When war 
between Russia and Turkey became imminent, the Roumanian cabi- 
net voted to- remain neutral and Prince Carol tried to get the Great 
Powers to guarantee this neutrality. Failing in this, Carol agreed 
to a convention April 16, 1877, granting free passage to Russian 
troops through Roumania, Russia promising to respect political 
rights and to maintain and defend actual integrity of Roumania. 
(See article. The Russo-Roumanian Alliance of 1877-78.) Tur- 
key interpreted her suzerainty over Roumania literally and began 
bombardment of Roumanian towns on the Danube, whereupon Rou- 
mania declared her independence of Turkey May 23, 1877. When 
the Russian troops were halted before Plevna in Turkey, the Czar 
urgently plead for Carol to lead the Roumanian Army to the rescue. 
Carol went, and turned the tide. 

2. TREATY OF SAN STEFANO. 

The Roumanians were not admitted into the negotiations of the 
Treaty of San Stefano between Turks and Russians. By this treaty 
Turkey recognized the complete independence of Roumania and 
ceded to Russia the Dobrudja with the right reserved to Russia to 
cede Dobrudja, a little favored region occupied for the most part by 
non-Roumanians, to Roumania in exchange for southern Bessarabia. 
The Roumanians protested to the powers against the ingratitude oP 
Ivu-sia and were among those who desired a conference. 

3. CONGRESS OF BERLIN. 

At the Congress of Berlin the Roumanians were not admitted as 
members, but on the insistence of Lord Salisbury their delegates were 
permitted to state their case. (Protocol No. 9. Hertslet. IV, 2744.) 
The congress in general confirmed the arrangement of San Stefano 
so far as Roumania was concerned, with the exception that the Berlin 
congress drew the southern boundary line of Dobrudja from a point 
east of Silistria on the Danube to a point south of Mangalia on the 
Black Sea. instead of the line from Cheravavoda to a point north of 
Mangalia. as provided in San Stefano. 

4. APPRAISEMENT OF THE SETTLEMENT. 

The added region was occupied almost entirely by Bulgars. The 
settlement turned the Roumanians asainst Russia because: (1) Of 



94 

resentment ;it the ingratitude of Russia, whose army had been saved 
at Plevna by the Roumanians; (-2) of the fear that Russia would 
insist on crossing Boumania in developing her hold upon the 
Balkans; (3) Russia's reaching the north bank of the mouth 
of the Danube would threaten Roumania's economic outlet to 
the Black Sea and through the Dardanelles; (4) Russia's an- 
nexation of 350.000 Roumanians in southern Bessarabia who 
had been subject to Roumania since 185G aroused discontent among 
the Bessarabians and the "irredentist" party in Roumania. The 
settlement left friction between Bulgaria and Roumania because: 
(1) In adding Dobrudja to Roumania it raised an irredenta question 
with Bulgaria; (2) in failing, through the opposition of Russia, to 
include the fortifications around Silistria in Roumania it exposed 
Roumania to attack from the south. The negotiations at Berlin had 
disclosed the fact that little help would come from England or France. 
For this and the above reasons Roumania chose to revolve (1879-1913) 
in the orbit of Austria, a Government for which Roumanians had 
no love because she held three and one-half million unredeemed Rou- 
manians, but a Government too powerful and near to be the object of 
unfriendly treatment until Roumania had grown stronger (See 
article. Roumania and the Triple Alliance. 1883-1911). 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

Avril. Traite de Berlin (Paris, Leroux. 1886), 208-235, 384-401. 

Holland, Thomas Erskine. The European Concert in the Eastern 
Question, etc. (Clarendon Press. Oxford, 1885.) 

Seton- Watson, R. W. Roumania and the Great War. (Constable. 
London, 1915.) General Account of Roumania's relations to Euro- 
pean powers. Map following page 99 shows distribution of Rou- 
manian peoples. 

Mitrany, I). Roumania. Her History and Politics. (Oxford. Uni- 
versity Press, 1915.) 

Ha/en, Charles Downer. Europe since 1815. ( Xew York, Holt. 
1910.) General account. 

27. MONTENEGRO AND THE BALKAN SETTLEMENT 

OF 1878. 

1. MONTENEGRO AS EFFECTED BY THE TREATY OF SAX STEFANO. 

In her war with Turkey, declared July 2, 1876, Montenegro's 
armies occupied in general the following districts: (a) To the north 
and east the region of the Piva in the Herzegovina and part of 
Bihor in Novi Bazar; (b) the Zubci district and the coast of Spizza 
to the Boy ana River (including Dulcigno, Antivari, and Spizza) ; 



95 

(c) Xiksic; (</) the Kuci region and parts of Albania. (Congress 
of Berlin, Protocol 8, annex 2, in Parliamentary Papers, Turkey. 
Xo. 39 (1878). Cambridge Modern History, vol. 12, pp. 386 seq.) 

By the bases of peace signed at Adrianople (Hertslet, Map of 
Europe by Treaty, No. 514. Russia and Turkey) January 31, 1878, 
it. was provided that " the independence of Montenegro shall be 
recognized by the Porte, and that Montenegro shall have an increase 
in territory equal to that which fell into her hands by the fate of 
arms, the definitive boundary to be fixed hereafter." 

Hence by the Treaty of San Stefano (See Appendix I, 14), March 
3, 1878, Montenegro was dealt with as follows: 

(a) She received a very large increase of territory (See, too, 
Hertslet, No. 578, Lord Granville's letter in 1880 for statement of 
these gains and the maps in Hertslet referred to below) in the Bos- 
nian cazas, in Xovi Bazar where her line was nearly coterminous 
with Serbia's, the Gusinje region of Albania, and in addition Spizza, 
Antivari, and Dulcigno on the coast. A European boundary com- 
mission was to fix the boundaries, the general course of the frontier 
being indicated in the treaty (art. 1). 

(b) The Porte recognized " definitivement " her independence. 

(c) Other provisions regulated her relations with Turkey, the posi- 
tion of inhabitants of the border districts, and military works. 

This large increase of territory may have contributed to the call- 
ing of the Congress of Berlin. Austria-Hungary took the initiative 
in suggesting the congress. She was the power especially affected 
by the extension of Montenegro's frontier in Novi Bazar, and was 
intent upon obtaining possession of Bosnia and the Herzegovina. 
She and Italy were interested, also, in the Adriatic ports. 

2. MONTEXEGRO AS EFFECTED BY THE TREATY OF BERLIN. 

At the congress of Great Powers at Berlin the most important 
questions raised (for the protocols of this congress, in which the dis- 
cussion is recorded, see Parliamentary Papers, 1878, Turkey. Xo. 39 
(1878). Hertslet, Xo. 528, summary) with regard to Montenegro 
were : 

(1) Her independence. Great Britain took exception to the word 
" definitivement," since she had not recognized Montenegro's inde- 
pendence (protocol 10). The other powers had recognized it, in 
principle, or formally! 

(2) The extension of territory. The objections of the Porte were 
that more land had been taken than was conquered (protocols 8, an- 
nex 2). The Porte desired back certain strategic positions, the 
Gussinie and Plava regions, wdiich were Albanian and Antivari, which 
it said was Albanian. It had no objection to the cession of Spizza and 
the Bosnian districts. 



96 

Austria's objections on this point wore that she herself desired 
Spizza. Her reasons as given, on request, to Italy, who also "had 
important interests to protect on the Adriatic" (protocol 12), were 
that Spizza was very small, that it commands Antivari, and can 
" alone insure and facilitate the object of Austria-Hungary, which is 
to take care that the port of Antivari and its coast should preserve 
q purely commercial character." (Protocol 12. See Driault, p. 231.) 

Ilenee by the Treaty of Berlin, duly 13. 1878 (See Appendix 1, 17), 
Montenegro's independence was recognized and her territory was 
reduced to the limits indicated in the protocols of the congress, limits 
which even so doubled her original territory. She lost some of the 
Herzegovina on the north, her line followed the Tara, not the Lim 
River (leaving Priepolje and other places in Novi Bazar to Turkey. 
to be garrisoned by Austria: see treaty, art. 25, and footnote to 
Holland, p. 293, and to Hertslet, p. 2780) : she gave up Dulcigno to 
Turkey, and Spizza to Austria to be incorporated in Dalmatia. She 
kept Antivari under severe restrictions; she could have no ship or 
flag of war, her waters were closed to all ships of war; she accepted 
Austrian maritime and sanitary police, the Dalmatian maritime code. 
and received Austrian consular protection. She was allowed a free 
railway. Other articles of the treaty provide for the security of 
Ottoman property and religious foundations in the annexed dis- 
tricts, for diplomatic agents, the evacuation of territory, and for the 
determination by the powers and the Porte, of Montenegro's share 
of the Ottoman debt for the new territories. 

3. ADJUSTMENTS AFTER THE TREATY OF BERLIN. 

The boundary commission sat from April 30 to September 8, 
1879; from May 10. 1880. to January 28, 1881; and again in Febru- 
ary, 1S81. The protocols (See Parliamentary Papers. 1880. Turkey. 
No. 2) are important in showing the policy of the powers, the ob- 
struction measures of Turkey, and also the social and racial con- 
ditions in Albania. 

The first difficulty arose over discrepancies between the Austrian 
staff map used at the congress and local nomenclature, and the allow- 
ance to be made for racial and religious differences. 

The second difficulty arose over the > Gussinie-Plava region of Al- 
bania. Here Turkey used the Albanian League as her instrument, 
inciting rebellion. The Corti Compromise was adopted April 18, 
1880 (Hertslet, Nos. 563, 564). To compensate Montenegro for the 
fertile Gussinie-Plava region, she was to be given the sterile region 
of the Kuci Kraina, which, however, was Slavic and dominated 
Podgoritza. Turkey agreed to accept this, but delayed, offering 
excuse after excuse, notwithstanding :m identic note of the powers 
on June 11. 



97 

At last an alternative suggestion was made on Lord Granville'ij 
initiative, that the port of Dulcigno go to Montenegro in exchange 
for ( Irussinie-Plava. (See Documents Diplomatiques, loc. cit., pp. 196 
c( seq.). Austria required that it be subject to article 29 of Treaty 
of Berlin. The Porte requested also Dinosi. (Ibid., pp. 350 et seq.) 
This was granted: but a naval demonstration at Antivari (September 
"28, 1880) was necessary, and also a threat by Great Britain to occupy 
Smyrna, October 1, 1880 (Ibid.. No. 2, pp. 95, 113 et seq.), before 
Dulcigno was yielded by the Porte. November 25, 1880. (Ibid., No. 2, 
p. 120 et seq. Hertslet, No. 579.) Dulcigno's boundaries were estab- 
lished by the second session of the commission. (Ibid., No. 580 and 
map.) Spizza's were received from Austria at the third. (Ibid., No. 
581 and map.) There were some later slight readjustments of the Al- 
banian line with Turkey. (Ibid.. Nos. 603, 604, 605.) 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

DOCUMENTS. 

Parliamentary Papers: Turkey, under years 1878-1880 for texts 
and protocols. 

British and Foreign State Papers : For the same years, especially 
vol. 69. 

Documents Diplomatiques, 1880, Affaires du Montenegro. 

Hertslet. Map of Europe by Treaty. Nos. 514, 518, 528, 530, 552, 
•580, 581. 

Holland. European Concert in the Eastern Question, pp. 227 et 
seq., App. II. pp. 335 et seq., 356 et seq., texts of treaties. 

SECONDARY AUTHORITIES. 

Cambridge Modern History, vol. 12. chap. XIV- by W. Miller, 
especially p. 386 et seq. 

Driault. La Question d'Orient. 3d ed. (Paris, Alcan, 1905.) 

Marriott, J. A. E. The Eastern Question. Chap. XII. (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1917.) 

Pose. J. H. The Development of European Nations, especially 
chaps. 7. 8, 9. (New York, Putnam, 1916.) 

Lavisse et Eambaud. Histoire Generale. Vol. XII, chap. XIII, 
and p. 505. 

Debidour, A. Histoire Diplomatique de l'Europe, 1814-1878. 
2 vols. (Paris, Alcan. 1891.) 

Baron d'Avril. Negotiations Relatives an Traite de Berlin. 
(Paris, Leroux, 1887.) 
53706—18 7 



98 

MAPS. 

Maps used in determining boundaries are conveniently reproduced 
in Hertslet, pp. 2782, 2956, 3018, 3097, 3130, 3140. 
Seh racier. Atlas Historique, Carte 51. 

28. THE ENGLISH PROTECTORATE OVER CYPRUS, 

1878-1914. 

1. ACQUISITION As A PROTECTORATE BY ENGLAND, IXTs. 

The question of Cyprus grew out of the events of the war of 
1S77-7S between .Russia and Turkey. The main aim of British 
diplomacy was the defense of Asia Minor against Russia, and it was 
evidently considered thai the island of Cyprus would be a good ba>e 
from which the British cooperation in this defense could be directed. 
It was also valuable as a defense of the Sue/ Canal. To this end a 
convention was negotiated with Turkey. June f, 1878 (See Appen- 
dix 1, 16), by which, if Russia retained Kars. Batoum, and Ardahan, 
or made further attacks on Asia Minor, England would cooperate 
with Turkey in their defence, and Cyprus should be given over to 
English occupation ami administration (analogous to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina). Reforms were promised by Turkey for Asia Minor. 
England was to pay a fixed tribute yearly for the island. 

■2. BRITISH OCCUPATION, L878— 1914. 

With the turning of Russian interests to the eastward, the defense 
of Asia Minor through this means became unnecessary, and Cyprus 
has never been converted into a strong military base. With the 
acquisition of Egypt by England it lost, at least relatively, its im- 
portance for the defense of the Suez Canal, The majority of the 
inhabitants are Greeks, and Cyprus has become more and more to 
Greece " unredeemed " territory. England has. however, retained 
it, feeling, up to 1914, that if British control was withdrawn, honor 
demanded that it be given back to Turkey. 

3. ANNEXATION, NOVEMBER 5, 11)14. 

In 1914, with the entrance of Turkey into the war. the convention? 
lapsed and England annexed Cyprus. (See Decree, Nov. 5, 1914 
Near East, Vol. 8, p. 16.) 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. 69, p. 71 1. 
The. Near Ea>t. Vol. 8, p. 16 ( November 6, L914). 
Marriott, ,1. A. R. The Eastern Question. (Oxford. Clarendon 
Press. 1D17.) The best general account of the problem. 



99 

Orr, C. W. J. Cyprus under British Rule. (London, Scott, 1918.) 
Hanotaux, G. Contemporary France. 4 vols. (New York, Put- 
nam, 1903.) Translated by J. C. Tarver (vol. 4 for this period). 
The best account of the Near East, 1877-1878. 

Walpole, S. History of Twenty-five Years. Vol. 4. (New York, 
1908.) The account of this period from the English standpoint, 
(tear, but lacks the authority and access to sources enjoyed by 
Hanotaux. 

29. THE ABROGATION OF THE NORTH SCHLESWIG 
PLEBISCITE AGREEMENT. 

1. THE TREATY OF PRAGUE. 

By article 5 of the Treaty of Prague, August 23, 1866 (See Appen- 
dix I, 1), Prussia agreed "that the inhabitants of the northern dis- 
tricts of Schleswig shall be ceded to Denmark if they express a wish 
to be united thereto by vote freely given." The treaty, however, did 
not contain any stipulation as to the period of time within which the 
vote was to be taken, nor did it specify the extent of territory cov- 
ered by the words " the northern districts of Schleswig." The article 
in question was put into the treaty at the request of Napoleon III, 
who had been asked by the Danes of northern Schleswig, against 
(heir will separated from Denmark in 1864, to take an interest in 
their behalf. 

2. EFFORTS TO OBTAIN EXECUTION. 

Afterwards Prussia showed no haste to carry out the terms of 
article 5. The request of a delegation from North Schleswig for 
an audience with King William to thank him for the inclusion of 
the article in the treaty was refused. In the Prussian Parliament 
the article was criticized. Bismarck in reply, while defending the 
article, declared that the principle of nationality could not be con- 
formed to in all cases and pointed out that the vague character of 
the article gave a certain latitude in the execution of it. When a 
little later the French Government called attention to the matter 
with a view to bringing about the execution of the article, Prussia 
denied vigorously the right of France to concern itself in the ques- 
tion. In 1867 there were negotiations between the Danish and the 
Prussian Government on the subject. Prussia professed a readiness 
to carry out the stipulation but demanded guarantees in behalf of 
Germans living in the region. The demands put forward have been 
characterized by Emil Elberling (Question du Schleswig) as follows: 
" The concession of such guarantees would have inevitably involved 
a continual interference of Germany in Danish affairs and would 



100 

have rendered Denmark dependent upon Germany." Under those 
conditions the negotiations came*to nothing. Later negotiations had 
the same result. After the Franco-Prussian War many German 
newspapers, probably taking their cue from the Government, argued 
that (In' article having been inserted in the treaty at the instigation 
of Napoleon III, was no longer to be regarded as obligatory, unless 
Austria should demand it. 

3. ABROGATION. 

In 1878. when Austria-Hungary had recently incurred considerable 
obligation to Bismarck for the manner in which he had favored her 
program at the Congress of Berlin, and while the pourparlers leading 
to the Dual Alliance of 1ST!) were in progress, Germany induced 
Austria-Hungary to consent to a treaty abrogating article 5 of the 
Treaty of Prague. Some excuse for the disregard of the claims of 
Denmark in the matter was made out of the fact that a Danish 
princess had recently married the Duke of Cumberland, the pre- 
tender to the Hanoverian throne who had refused to renounce his 
claim to that throne, though Hanover had been, annexed to Prussia in 
L866. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

Franz de Jessen (editor). Manuel historique de la question du 
Sleswig. (Copenhagen. 1906.) Consists of articles by various au- 
thors. Contains an admirable map showing the linguistic situation 
in North Schleswig. Pro-Danish, but fair and accurate. The text 
of the abrogation treaty of August '28, 1S78, is in British and Foreign 
State Papers, vol. 09, pp. 778-774. 



SECTION II.— 1878-1890. 



30. THE GRECO-TURKISH FRONTIER QUESTION, 1878-1881. 

1. GREECE AND THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN. 

In February, 1878, the Greek Government sent troops across the 
Turkish frontier, on the pretext that Thessaly was in a state of in- 
surrection. A few days later they were withdrawn. (Hertslet, Map 
of Europe by Treaty, IV, 2780.) Shortly after, when the affairs 
of the Near East were being settled at the Congress of Berlin. M. 
Waddington, the French representative, proposed that the Greek 
frontier should be rectified by being extended so as to include Thes- 
saly and Epirus. Supported by the Italian plenipotentiary, he 
gained the assent of all members of the congress, except the Turkish, 
and the 24th article of the Treaty of Berlin provided that in case 
Turkey and Greece were unable to agree about the rectification siig 
gested, the powers reserved it to themselves to offer mediation. 
(Ibid., pp. 2749, 2750, 2779, 2780.) M. Waddington's suggestion 
was made July 5, a week before the congress concluded its sessions, 
and is embodied in the 13th protocol. (Hertslet. IV. 2749-50.) Ar- 
ticle 24 of the treaty of Berlin provided : 

" In the event of the Sublime Porte and Greece being unable to agree 
upon the rectification of frontier suggested in the 13th Protocol of 
the Congress of Berlin. Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Great 
Britain, Italy, and Russia reserve to themselves to offer their media- 
tion to the two parties to facilitate negotiations." 



NEGOTIATIONS, 1878-1880. 



Not long after the congress had broken up, the Government of 
Greece notified the powers that it had addressed the Sublime Porte, 
but that the answer returned after some delay was altogether evasive. 
It therefore asked for the exercise of the right of mediation reserved 
to them, since otherwise there seemed small prospect of putting the 
decision of the congress into effect. (British and Foreign State 
Papers, LXXII, 405-407.) Mediation was undertaken, but the Turk- 
ish Government employed very dilatory tactics, hoping, as usual, that 

(101) 



102 

the jealousies of the powers would prevent real intervention for 
Greece. Several Greco-Turkish commissions assembled, but wore 
unable to agree. 

S. CONVENTION OF MAT 24, L831. 

In Juno, 1880, after an interchange of notes, a joint communication 

was sent to the Porte, thai it was to the interest of the powers for 
the matter to be settled. (Hertslet,IV,2958 2961.) The result was 
that a convention was signed, May 24, 1881, giving to Greece much 
of Thessaly and part of Epirus, altogether somewhat less than 0.000 
square miles. The treaty signed May "21. 1881, is entitled "Conven- 
tion between Great Britain, Austria-Hungary. France. Germany, 
Italy, Russia, and Turkey, for the settlement of the frontier between 
Greece and Turkey." (British and Foreign State Papers, LXXXII, 
382-9; Hertslet, IV, 3042-3052.) The more important provisions 
were: the frontier hot ween Turkey and Greece was minutely 
described, a line running from above the headwaters of the Sale- 
morias and the Arta by an irregular course eastward to the sea : the 
inhabitants ^( the regions ra\vA to Greece were to have rights equal 
with those of the Hellenic citizens; life, property, customs, and 
religion wore to he scrupulously respected; proprietary rights 
granted by the Sultan were to he recognized by the Greek Govern- 
ment; the Sultan was to dispose oi! his crown properties in the dis- 
tricts ceded: inhabitants of neighboring regions might continue to 
enjoy old rights of pasturage in the cv^vA districts; freedom of 
religion and worship was guaranteed to Mussulmans; the Govern- 
ment of Greece was to assume a proportional part o( the Turkish 
public debt; inhabitants desiring to retain Ottoman nationality 
might have three years in which to leave; full amnesty was granted 
on both sides. (Ibid.) Some of these provisions are interesting with 
reference to characteristic Balkan problems. (See also Hertslet, IV. 
2966-2973.) 

BIBLIOGRAPHr. 

Sir Edward Hertslet. The Map Of Europe by Treaty. 4 vol- 
umes. (London. L875-1891.) In this standard collection the Treaty 
of Berlin may he conveniently consulted. 

British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 7-2. pp. 405-537, 736 7:'.7. 
contain the treaty of L881, and the numerous negotiations Leading 
to it. 

British Parliamentary Paplrs; Greece No. 1. L879, Nos. 1 -and 2; 
L880, Nos. 1. 2, 5, and 6, L881, contain the negotiations. 

P. D. Holt and A. W. Chilton. The History of Europe from L862 
to PHI (New York. Macmillan, L917), contains an excellent brief 
account, page 248. 



103 
81. THE DANUBE QUESTION, 1871-1904. 

1. TREATY OF PARIS. 

The Treaty of Paris in 1856 applied the principles of free naviga- 
tion as declared by the Congress of Vienna (1815) to the Danube. It 
created two commissions for the river. One was the Danube Riparian 
Commission composed of representatives of Wurtemberg, Bavaria, 
Austria, Turkey, Serbia, Roumania, and Bulgaria — the riparians — 
and was to be pennament. It was given the duty of (1) drafting 
navigation and river police regulations; (2) abolishing the obstacles 
of every nature to free navigation on the river; (3) carrying out 
uecessary improvement works: and ( t) maintaining the navigability 
of the mouths of the river and the neighboring seas after the dissolu- 
tion of the European commission. 

The other was the European commission, which was authorized to 
deepen the delta channels of the river and the bars in- front of its 
mouths, so that seagoing ships could ascend to river ports. It was 
"understood" that the commission would be dissolved in two years, 
but, in fact, its work was scarcely begun in that time. As the riparian 
commission proved a failure and a navigation authority at the mouths 
of the river was imperative in view of the inefficiency of the Turkish 
Government, the European Commission was continued and its powers 
increased by giving it control over the police and regulation of naviga- 
tion on that pari of the river under its jurisdiction, by various agree- 
ments from L858, which were incorporated in the Public Act of 1865, 
signed by the powers represented (British and Foreign State Papers, 
Vol. 55, pp. 93-127). The works and personnel of the commission 
were neutralized by the Public Act (article 21). 

2. TREATIES OF LONDON AND BERLIN. 

By the Treaty of London. March 13. 1871 (See Appendix I, 3. and 
article The Black Sea Question, 1870-1871) the European Commis- 
sion was continued until April 24. 1883, and the neutralization of the 
commission, its works and personnel expressly sanctioned. In the 
Treaty of Berlin, July 13. 1878 (See article, The Congress of Berlin), 
Roumania was given a seat in the commission, whose jurisdiction was 
extended up the river to Galatz, the first important Roumanian port, 
" in complete independence of the territorial authority" (Roumania ). 
To meet die new situation caused by Russia becoming a riparian, the 
independence of Roumania and its acquisition of the former Turkish 
delta of til-- Danube, and the autonomy of Bulgaria, " and to increase 
the guarantees" of freedom of navigation, all fortresses on the river 
were to be razed, no new ones erected, and warships prohibited below 
the Iron Gates. Regulations for the river from Galatz to the Iron 



104 

Gates, where a series of cataracts interfered with navigation — and the 
Austro-Hungarian boundary began — were to be drawn by the Euro- 
pean Commission, assisted by delegates of Serbia and Bulgaria as 
riparian States. 

3. TREATY OF LONDON, 1883. 

By the Treaty of 'London. March 10, 1883 (British and Foreign 
State Papers, vol. 74, pp. 20-22), the jurisdiction of the commission 
was extended to Braila in Roumania, practically the head of naviga- 
tion by seagoing ships, and it was continued for 21 years, to April 24, 
1904, then for three-year periods unless one of the parties, a year 
before the expiration of a term, announced its intention of proposing 
modification in its constitution or powers. Control of the northern 
embranchment of the delta, on which Russia for part of the distance 
owned one bank, Roumania the other, was turned over to the riparian 
powers, and a mixed commission composed of Austria-Hungary, the 
riparian powers of Russia. Bulgaria, and Serbia was created to ad- 
minister the admirable regulation drawn up for the Braila-Iron 
Gates section. Because of the opposition of Bulgaria and Roumania, 
who were not represented at the conference which drafted'the treaty, 
the mixed commission never came into being and the regulation never 
took effect. 

4. CONCLUSION. 

The European Commission has accomplished a universally com- 
mended work as an engineering organ in improving the channel and 
the bar and in building up the port of Soulina at the mouth of the 
river. It has also efficiently policed navigation in the jurisdiction, at 
first through Turkish officials under its control, but since 1882 through 
officials appointed by and responsible solely to itself. It has met all 
its expenses from tolls on shipping paid directly into the treasury. 
It is a striking example of an efficient international organ which in a 
limited sphere has operated to general satisfaction. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

Parliamentary Papers, 1872. vol. 70. Report on Improvement of 
Danube; 1894, vol. 90, Further Report on the Improvements Made 
in the Navigation of the Danube, 1878-1893 ; 1907, vol. 87, Report on 
Operations of European Commission on the Danube. These reports 
are made by the retiring English commissioner and are short state- 
ments of the work of the commission, principally its engineering 
work. They are of great value. 1878, vol. 82 (Turkey). Treaties and 
other Documents Relating to Navigation of the Danube, 1856-1875. 
Baicoianu, C. 1. Le Danube. (Paris, Sirey, 1917.) 
Demorgny, G. La Question du Danube. (Paris, Sirey, 1911.) 



105 

Englehardt, Ed. La question des embouchures du Danube in 
Revue des Deux Mondes, July 1, 1870. 

Maioan, Jean-Constantin. La Question du Danube. (Paris, La- 
rose, 1905.) 

Les traveaux de la Commission Europeene des bouches du Danube, 
1856-1911. (Vienna, Gerold, 1913.) 

Yoisin Bey. Les Travaux d'amelioration de l'embouchure du Dan- 
ube et du Bras de Soulina. (In Annales de Ponts et Chaussees, Sept. 
1. 1893.) 

de Saint Clair, Andre. Le Danube: etude de droit international. 

(Paris, 1899.) 

For good, brief accounts, see Bonfils, H., Manuel de droit inter- 
national public (7th ed., Paris, 1914), pp. 351-355; Moore, J. B., 
Digest of International Law (Washington, Govt. Printing Office, 
1906), Vol. I, pp. 630-631; and Schuyler, E., American Diplomacy 
(Scribner's, New York, 1886), pp. 352-363; Krehbiel, E., The Euro- 
pean Commission of the Danube, in Political Science Quarterly 
(March, 1918), vol. 23, pp. 38-55. 

For documents and treaties, see British and Foreign State Papers ; 
Hertslet, Map of Europe by Treaty (London, 1891, in 1 vols.) ; Hert- 
slet. Commercial Treaties, vol. 26, pp. 862-904 ; and Sturdza, Recueil 
de documents relatif a la liberte de navigation du Danube (1904). 

32. THE SUEZ CANAL, 1881-1904. 

1. INTRODUCTION. 

In 1854 F. de Lesseps obtained from Said Pasha, viceroy of 
Egypt, a concession to organize a universal company for the financ- 
ing of the construction of a ship canal across the Isthmus of Suez. 
This concession was later ratified by the Sultan of Turkey, and the 
canal was formally begun in 1859. But owing to various difficulties, 
among them the diplomatic opposition of England, the work was 
delayed many years. 

A new firman was obtained in 1866 which contained the clause 
declaring the canal always open to all merchant vessels without dis- 
tinction of nationality. The canal was formally opened to traffic 
in 1869. 

In 1873 an international commission, called by the Sultan, met at 
Constantinople and declared the navigation of the canal open and 
common to warships and to vessels not used for the transport of 
troops. 

Events like the purchase by the British Government, in 1875, of 
the Khedive's shares, giving Great Britain a controlling interest 
in the canal, and the British occupation of Egypt in 1882 were the 
cause of general concern, and resulted in a demand for the so-called 
neutralization of the Suez Canal. 



106 

J. CONFERENCE OF PARIS, 1885. 

The bases for an arrangement of this kind were proposed in the 
celebrated circular note (See Appendix I, -2-2) of January 3, 1883, 
which Lord Granville addressed to Paris, Vienna, Berlin, Rome, and 
St. Petersburg. A conference, composed of delegates from nine 
Slates, met at Paris, on March 30, 1885, but it failed to come to an 
agreement. Long diplomatic negotiations followed which finally 
resulted in the Treaty of Constantinople. 

3. THE TREATY OF CONSTANTINOPLE, L888 (SEE APPENDIX I. 37). 

This treaty was signed by Great Britain, Germany, Austria. 
France. Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Russia, and Turkey. It de- 
clares (Art. 1) that "the Suez Maritime Canal shall always be free 
and emeu, in time of war as in time of peace, to every vessel of com- 
merce or of war. without distinction of flag." 

The other main provisions of the treaty are as follows: The canal 
must never be blockaded, and no act of hostility may be committed 
either in the canal or in its ports of access, nor within the 3-mile 
limit. Vessels of war of belligerents shall not revictuat or take in 
stores in the canal and its ports of access, except in so far as may 
be strictly necessary. ::: * * Their stay at Port Said and in the 
roadstead of Suez shall not exceed 2 1 hours, except in case of dis- 
tress. In such case they shall be bound to Leave as soon as possible. 
(Art. I.) " In time of war belligerents shall not embark 
within the canal and its ports of access either troops, munitions, or 
materials of war." (Art. .">.) At no time shall belligerents keep war- 
ships in the waters of the canal, but nonbelligerents may station war- 
ships in the ports of access of Port Said and Suez, the number of 
such war vessels not exceeding two for each nonbelligerent power. 
(Art. 7.) The execution of the treaty is placed in the hands of the 
agents in Egypt of the signatory powers and of the Egyptian and 
Ottoman Governments. (Art. 8.) 

Article 10 recognized the right i^ the Sultan and the Khedive to 
take such "measures" as they "might find necessary to take for se- 
curingby their own force- the defense of Egypt and the maintenance 
of public order." England had taken such measures when she crushed 
the revolt under Arabi Pasha. 

It should be noted that, according to the terms of the Treaty of 
Constantinople, the Suez Canal is not. strictly speaking, neutralized. 
for this would require that it be closed to all belligerent warships. 
It is. in a sense, internationalized, inasmuch as it is made free and 
open to the vessels of all nations. 

It should also be noted that at the Paris conference of 1885 the 
British delegates bad formulated a general reservation as to the ap- 



107 

plication of the principles proposed in so far as they "might fetter 
the liberty ol their Government during the occupation of Egypt by 
the forces of Her Britannic Majesty." In 1888 Lord Salisbury re- 
newed this reservation. In 1898 Lord Curzon declared in the British 
I [ouse of Lords that, owing to these reserves, " the convenl ion of ( !on- 
stantinople had not. been brought into practical operation." By article 
6 of the Anglo-French declaration of April 9,1904 (Appendix 1,68), 
relating to British and French interests in Egypt and Morocco, the 
Brit ish Government declared that they adhered to the si ipulat ions of 
the 1 reaty of October 29, 1888, and that they agreed to their being put 
into force. But whether with or without express reservation, it must 
be conceded that Great Britain has the right to take such mea-ures as 
may he necessary for t he defense of the Suez ( 'anal. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

The most extensive study of the administration, construction, and 
exploitation of the Suez Canal appears to be that by Voisin Bey, 
F. P.. Le Canal de Suez (Pari-. C. Dunod, 1902-1906), in 7 volumes. 
See also Charles-Roux, J.. L'isthmus et le Canal de Suez (Paris, 
Hachette, L901 ). in 2 volume.-, and Lesseps. F. de. Recollections of 
Forty Years ( New York. Appleton, 1888), in 2 volume-. 

For studies of the international status of the canal, see Camand, 
M. L.. Etude sur la regime juridique du Canal de Suez (Grenoble, 
1899) : Dedreux. R., Der Suezkanal im internationalen Rechte (Tu- 
bingen, 1913); Rossignol, L. M., Le Canal de Suez (Paris. 1901); 
Holland, T. G., Studies in International Law (Clarendon Press, Ox- 
ford. L889), pp. 270-293; Asser, T. M! C, Le Canal de Suez in 
Revue de droit international public for 1888, Vol. XX. pp. 529 ff.; 
Travers Twiss, La neutralization du Canal de Suez, in Revue de droit 
international public. Vol. VII. pp. 682 ff. ; ibid., in Revue de droit 
international public. XIV. pp. ~>r2; ibid., in op. cit. XVIL pp. 615 
ff. : Martens, F. de, "La question Egyptienne," in Revue de droit 
international, XIV. pp. 355 ff. : and Rolin-Jacquemyns, Delibera- 
tions de I'Institut de Droit Internationa] sur le Canal de Suez, in 
Revue de droit international. X. pp. 100 ff. 

For good brief accounts, see Bonfils, IP. Droit international public 
(Paris, L914, 7th ed.), pp. 336 339; Freycinet, C. de, La question 
d'Egypte (Paris, n. d.), pp. 99-204; White, A. S., The Expansion of 
Egypt, ch. 7 (London. Methuen, 1899) : Moore. J. B., Digest of Inter- 
national Law (Washington, Govt. Printing Office. 1906), Vol. Ill, 
po. 262 268; and Lawrence, T. G., The Suez Canal, in Essays on 
international Law (Cambridge. 1885), pp. 41-88. 

For the text of the Treaty of Constantinople, see Albin, P.. Les 
grands traites politiques (Paris. Alcan, 191-2). pp. 382-387. For an 
English text, see Parliamentary Papers. Commercial, Xo. 2 (1889). 



108 

For diplomatic correspondence relating to the subject, see British 
Parliamentary Papers, Egypt, No. ID (1885) ; ibid.. Commercial, 
No. 2 (1889) ; Ministere des affaires strangers, Documents diplo- 
matiques, Commission Internationale pour le libre usage du Canal de 
Suez (Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1885); ibid., Negociations rela- 
tives au reglement international pour le libre usage du Canal de Suez 
(Paris. 1886-1887). 

For an extensive bibliography on the Suez Canal, see List of Books 
and of Articles iu Periodicals Relating to Interoceanic Canals and 
Railway Routes published by the Library of Congress (Washington, 
Govt. Printing Office, 1900), pp. 95-13L 

33. THE FORMATION OF THE DUAL ALLIANCE, 1879. 

1. TREATY OF OCTOBER 7, 1879. 

The pact between Austria and Germany, known as the Dual Alliance, 
was signed at Vienna on October 7. 1879. It provided (See Appendix 
I, 18) that the two powers, if either should be attacked by Russia, 
should make war and conclude peace together. Should either power 
be attacked by an aggressor other than Russia, the other power agreed 
to observe an attitude of benevolent neutrality toward its ally. But 
if Russia should come to the support of the attacking power, the 
agreement to lend mutual assistance should become operative and 
war should be waged and peace concluded in common as if Russia 
were the aggressor. The treaty was to be kept secret. 

2. WHY THE ALLIANCE WAS MADE. 

An alliance between Austria and Germany had long been in the 
mind of Bismarck. As far back as the Austro-Prussian War of 
L866 he demanded moderation in the treatment of Austria from the 
military party, urging that Prussian statesmen must keep in mind 
the possibility of such an alliance at some time in the future (Bis- 
marck's Reflections and Reminiscences, ch. 20). After 1870 the 
danger of French efforts to regain her lost provinces of Alsace and 
Lorraine could not be dismissed. To offset this Bismarck had dex- 
teriously brought about the League of the Three Emperors, a league 
of the rulers of Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Russia. (See 
article. The Formation of the League of the Three Emperors.) 
With Russia relations had been particularly cordial because of the 
friendship between Emperor William and the Czar. This friend- 
ship was severely tried by the outcome of the Congress of Berlin and 
Bismarck's so-called neutrality. Russia had stood faithfully by 
Prussia when her affairs were at a critical stage, and she now felt 
that her loyalty had been very badly rewarded. Bismarck com- 



109 

placently allowed the congress to give to Austria the administration 
of affairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, thus starting her on a course 
of ambitious expansion in the Balkans and raising an insuperable 
barrier between Russia and Austria-Hungary by intensifying their 
rivalry in the Balkans. (See article, The Congress of Berlin.) 
In the face of this it was an open question whether, the League of the 
Three Emperors could be maintained, even though Bismarck had left 
the congress pledged to its continuance. Sooner or later he had to 
choose between his two allies. 

Pan-Slavists denounced Germany's conduct, and a bitter contro- 
versy raged between the newspapers of St. Petersburg and Berlin. 
Further irritation was caused in Russia by the apparent hostility of 
the German representatives on the international committee for the 
determination of the boundary of Bosnia. During the winter of 
1878-79 the Russian press even talked of a Franco-Russian alliance, 
and the Government increased the army in Poland. The critical 
moment came when Alexander II. getting more and more resentful 
at the trend of Bismarck's policy, expressed himself in emphatic 
terms against the eiforts to sacrifice the good relations with Russia 
for those of Austria. 

3. NEGOTIATIONS. 

Bismarck felt compelled to take decisive measures, and on August 
27-28, 1879, held a conference with Count Andrassy, the Austrian 
prime minister, at which a closer alliance between the two countries 
was favorably discussed. But they had scarcely separated when Wil- 
Liam I and his nephew, the Czar, met at the Russian frontier town 
of Alexandrovo. The two monarchs became completely reconciled, 
and the Kaiser returned to Berlin absolutely opposed to the idea of 
an Austro-German alliance directed against Russia. 

In this crisis Bismarck threatened to resign. William I finally 
agreed to negotiations for a defensive alliance which must, however, 
not be specifically directed against Russia. When Bismarck reached 
Vienna on September 21 he found Count Andrassy unwilling to sign 
a general treaty of alliance. Russia, from the standpoint of Austria, 
was the only menace; against attack from this source alone should 
provision for common defense be made. As this view coincided 
entirely with that of the German chancellor, if not with his instruc- 
tions, the terms of the agreement were drawn up. and later in Sep- 
tember laid before the respective Governments for ratification. 

4. OPPOSITION OF AMI-LI AM 1. 

Again Emperor William refused to accept Bismarck's view, de- 
claring that ratification of the treaty by him would be a breach of 
faith with the Czar. He protested that he would abdicate rather than 



110 

give his consent, and urged that Russia be admitted to the alliance 
and the League of the Three Emperors be renewed. Bismarck once 
more threatened to resign. But he had taken the precaution of enlist- 
ing the support oi' the Leading statesmen of the Empire. The King 
o( Bavaria and the crown prince were on his side. Von Moltke 
brought the influence of the military authorities to his support. Fi- 
nally the entire ministry threatened to resign it' the treaty were not 
ratified. The Emperor at last yielded and gave his consent, stipulat- 
ing that, although the terms of the treaty remain secret, he mighl 
in case ot need inform the (V.ar of its scope. 

5. PUBLICITY. 

The news o( the alliance soon transpired. In Russia the Pan- 
Slavists' anger increased in bitterness and their denunciation con- 
tinned. Alexander J I. to whom the Kaiser sent the preamble oi' the 
treaty on November I. was loss resentful. Indeed, his letter, while 
not reassuring, was friendly in tone. The full text o[' the treaty was 
not made public until February 3, L888. The agreement then ap- 
peared simultaneously in the Berlin Official Gazette, in tjie AJbenpost 
of Vienna, and the Pester Lloyd, with the explanation that publicity 
w as given to it in order to put an end to doubts as to the purely defen 
she character of its provisions. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

British and Foreign State Papers. 1SS-J. vol. 7;». pp. 270-272. 
Gives a good translation of the text of the Dual Alliance. The Ger- 
man is found in Schulthess, Europaische Geschichtskalendar, 1888, 
vol. 29, pp. 21-23; the French in Alhin, pp. 58 60. 

Coolidge, A. C. Origins of the Triple Alliance. (New York. 
Scribner, L917.) The best acc< unt in English. Treats both the Dual 
Alliance and the inception of the Triple Alliance. 

Alhin, Pierre. Les grands traites politiques des principaux textes 
diplomatiques deupis isle jusqu'a nos jours. (Paris. Alcan. L911.) 

Bismarck, 0. E. L., Prince von. The Man and the Statesman, 
Reflections, etc. (translated), 2 vols. (New York, Harper. L899.) 
Very good on the policy of Bismarck toward Austria and Russia in 
connection with the Dual Alliance, but necessarily to he used criti- 
cally, especially in this connection. 

Memoirs of Prince Chlodwig Hohenlohe-Schillingsfurst (trans- 
lated), 2 vols. (X. Y., Macmillan. L906), which are frequently in 
disagreement with Bismaivk. 

Busch, M. Bismarck, Some Seeret Pages of His History. (New 
York. Macmillan. L898.) 3 vols. 

Hanotaux, G. Histoire de la France Contemporaine. (Paris, Com- 
bet, L908.) Vol. IV, p. 388. 



Ill 

Chiala, L. Pagine di Storia Contemporanea dal 1858 al 1897. 
(Turin. Koux, 1898.) 3 vols. Semiofficial and containing many texts. 

Kohl, H. Wegweiser durch Bismark's Gedanken und Erinnerun- 
gen (Stuttgart, J. C. Cotta, 1898), p. 170 et passim. 

34. THE FORMATION OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE, 1882. 

1. TERMS. 

The Triple Alliance was made in 1882 between Austria-Hungary. 
( rermany, and Italy. It was really an extension of the Dual Alliance 
(See article, The Formation of the Dual Alliance), entered into in 
1n7 ( .> by the first two powers. Only one of the treaties in operation 
dining the earlier years of the alliance have been published. It ap- 
pears, however, that there were three separate treaties and that the 
Austro-German treaty was that of 1879 made public in 1888 (See 
article, The Formation of the Dual Alliance, 1879). The effed of the 
three treaties was to create an arrangement of substantially the fol- 
lowing form: If France attacked Germany or Italy, the two powers 
were pledged to act together against her; if Russia attacked Germany 
or Austria, both were to make war on Russia; and if France and 
Russia attacked any of the three powers, all three woidd declare war. 
By L912, if not earlier, it appears that a single treaty had replaced 
the earlier separate treaty. By its terms, if one or more members of 
the Triple Alliance should be attacked by one or more of the Great 
Powers outside of the Alliance, without direct provocation being 
given, the other members were to go to the assistance of the member 
attacked. If a member of the Alliance, believing that its security 
were threatened .by a Great Power outside of the Alliance, should de- 
clare war on that Power, the other two members were to observe a 
benevolent neutrality toward their ally while each had the right to 
determine for itself whether to make common cause with its ally. 
(Text of the articles in the Austro-Hungarian Red Book, " Diplomatic 
! documents concerning the relations of Austria-Hungary with Italy " 
(1915), pp. 189-190.) 

2. WHY ITALY ENTERED. 

The circumstances that brought about this extension of the alliance 
arc fairl}* well known. Bismarck, though feigning indifference at 
first, welcomed the new ally that not only made Germany's position 
impregnable, but caused a more tractable mood in Austria and Rus- 
sia. But it was Italy which sought an alliance that seemed so out of 
accord with her history and her interests. The reasons are clear. 
She had been completely isolated for some years, particularly since 
the Congress of Berlin; she feared intervention by outside powers to 
restore the temporal power of the Pope ; she w 7 as bitterly disappointed 



112 

over her lost opportunity in Tunis, and indignant at French occupa- 
tion in 1881 of that territory. 

The Italians not only came away from the Congress of Berlin with 
empty hands, but, in the words of Crispi, they had been " humiliated 
at Berlin as the last people in Europe * * * slapped and de- 
spised." (Chiala, Pagine di Storia Contemporanea, II, p. 17.) 
Upon the outburst of popular anger against France and the fall of 
the Cairol] ministry. Crispi visited Berlin to sound Bismarck on the 
possibility of an alliance. The latter gave him to understand that 
Germany was on good terms with Austria-Hungary, and that any 
agreement would have to be made in accord with Vienna. Encour- 
aged, Italy opened negotiations with her old enemy. Germany soon 
took a hand, and on May 22, 1882, two identical agreements, save for 
the Balkan article (not included in the German-Italian treaty), were 
signed. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

Annual Register, 18S8. English text of the published articles is 
found in the volume for 1915. German text in the Austrian Red 
Book. 

Coolidge, A. G. Origins of the Triple Alliance. (New York. 
Scribners, L917.) The best account in English. Treats both the Dual 
Alliance and the inception of the Triple Alliance. 

Bnsch, M. Bismarck, Some Secret Pages of His History. (New 
York. Macmillan, 1S98.) 3 vols. 

Tardieu, Andre. France and the Alliances. The Struggle for the 
Balance of Power. (New York, Macmillan. 1908.) Rather brief on 
the Dual and Triple Alliances. 

Leroy-Beaulieu, P. La France. Tltalie et la Triple Alliance, 
in Revue des deux Mondes. (Paris, 15 July, 1889; 15 Feb., 1891.) 

Pingaud, A. L'ltalie depuis 1870. (Paris. L915.) Gives a good 
.sketch of Italy's relation to the alliances. 

Albin, Pierre. Les grands traites politiques: recueil des prinei- 
paux textes diplomatiques depuis 1915 jusqu'a nos jours. 2d ed. 
(Paris. Alcan, 1912.) 

Fraknoi, Y. Zur Enstehungs Geschichte des Dreibundsvertrag, 
in Deutsche Revue for December. 1915. In the same periodical for 
January, 1916, by the same writer. Kritik des Driebundsrertrag. 

Bismarck. (). E. L., Prince von. Politische Reden. (Stuttgart. 
Cotta. L892-1905.) 

Singer, Arthur. Geschichte des Dreibunds. (Leipzig, Rabino- 
witz, 1904.) A good study from the German viewpoint. 

Chiala. L. Pagine di Storia contemporanea dal 1858 al 1897. (2d 
ed., Turin. Roux, L898.) 3 vols. Semiofficial and containing many 
texts. 

Stieglit/., A. N. LTtalie et la Triple Alliance. (Paris. 1906.) 



113 
35. RENEWALS OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE. 

1. INTRODUCTION. 

The Triple Alliance was renewed at least four times, the first time 
in March of 1887, the second time in June. 1891, the third time in 
June of 1902, and the fourth time early in December, 1912. It has 
often been asked why Italy should have been willing to continue for 
so long a period in an alliance from which she received but doubtful 
benefits at first, and which as time went on seemed to be clearly out 
of accord with her national policy. That the sentiment of opposition 
to the agreement grew as the years passed appears very clearly in the 
press and in the Chambers of Deputies at the time of the later re 
newals. 

In 1882 the alliance made secure the possession of Rome as the 
Italian capital in return (1) for Italy's virtual renunciation of her 
ambition to acquire what remained of unredeemed Italy in Austrian 
hands, and (2) for the adoption of a costly increase of her army and 
navy. As the years parsed the possession of Rome became assured 
without the support of the Triple Alliance agreement, while the mili- 
tary obligations Italy had undertaken as a member of the alliance 
•nntinued, and the sentiment of the Italians toward the completion of 
national unification grew in strength. This was accelerated by the 
fact that the interests of Italy and Austria-Hungary clashed in the 
Balkans. As a result of the absence of any real national or economic 
basis for the continuance of the treaty in the later years of its exist- 
ence, each renewal gave rise to vehement protests. 

2. RENEWAL OF 1S87. 

The first renewal in 1887 occurred before the existence of the 
alliance was publicly acknowledged, and there w r as no expression of 
opinion one way or the other. A year later it became known. 
William II, speaking in his first address to the Reichstag, after re- 
ferring to the Dual Alliance, said : " Similar historical associations 
and similar national considerations at the present time bind us to 
Italy. * * * our existing agreements with Austria-Hungary and 
Italy. "' etc. (See Appendix I, 36.) 

3. RENEWAL OF 1S91. 

The second renewal of the treaty was effected in 1891, a year before 
the time for its expiration, and apparently for six years with a pro- 
vision for its continuance automatically for six years more, if it was 
not formally denounced before. Much heralded royal visits fol- 
lowed. Italy's royal pair visited Berlin, wdiile Emperor William II 
and the Empress attended the silver wedding of Humbert and his 
53706—18 8 



114 

consort in Kome in the following year. The good feeling continued 
till about 1898, after which difficulties between Italy and Austria, 
the revival of an intense Italian nationalism, and a better under- 
standing between Italy and France began to undermine it. 

4. RENEWAL 'OF 1902. 

The alliance was only renewed in 1902 through the personal efforts 
of Von Billow and of Francis Joseph. In 1911 came the war upon 
Tripoli, in which Italy found her allies secretly hostile. Austria 
brusquely demanded that the operation of the Italian fleet against 
Epirus be discontinued, because she claimed it was a violation of 
article 7 of the treaty relative to the maintenance of the status quo 
in the Balkans. Italy accepted the situation, but her resentment was 
very keen. Public opinion in Italy became more and more hostile to 
the alliance. 

5. RENEWAL OF 1912. 

Nevertheless in 1912, a year before the time set for the serving of 
notice, the three powers, anxious over the difficulties in tjie Balkans, 
again renewed the treaty. From the Italian point of view this was 
significant because of the cordial relations with France and the mani- 
fest understanding with the rival group of powers in regard to Mo- 
rocco and Tripoli earlier. Many publicists in the countries of the 
Triple Entente favored this renewal, fearing lest a failure on the part 
of Italy to renew the alliance might become the occasion for some 
decisive act by Germany and Austria-Hungary which would seri- 
ously imperil the peace of Europe. An interpellation was addressed 
to the foreign minister by Signor Barzilai, who charged the Govern- 
ment with weakness in its dealings with Austria-Hungary and 
alleged that the Triple Alliance was both useless and burdensome 
to Italy. The Marchese di San Giulano replied that the Triple 
Alliance, kept alive and made fruitful by the close relations between 
its members, must remain the foundation of Italian foreign policy 
and the pivot on which it turned. The Chamber indorsed his decla- 
ration, and two days later it adjourned until February 6, 1913. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

The available literature on this topic is not extensive. The differ- 
ent historical annuals like the Annual Eegister, Schulthess, Euro- 
paischer Geschichtskalendar, L'Annee Politique, Questions Dip- 
lomatique et Coloniales, etc., give shorter or longer accounts of 
the renewals in the volumes for 1887, 1891, 1902, 1912, and 1915. 
Some of these, like the Questions Diplomatique, etc., often give valu- 
able excerpts from Italian and German newspapers. 



115 

Pingnad, A. L'ltalk de|mis 1870. (Paris, 1915.) Gives a good 
-ketch of Italy's relation to the Alliances. 

Singer, Arthur. Geschichte des Dreibunds. (Leipzig, Rabino- 
witz, 1914.) A good study from the German viewpoint. 

Reventlow, Ernst zu (Count). Deutschlands auswartige Politik, 
1888-1913. (Berlin, Mittler, 1914.) 

Biilow, Bernard von (Prince). Imperial Germany. (Transla- 
tion.) (London. London, Cassell, 1916.) 

Stieglitz. L'ltalie et la Triple Alliance, 1906. 

Barker, J. E. Italy's policy and her position in Europe. Fort- 
nightly, vol. 97 (1912), pp. 11-27. 

Benoist, C. L'ltalie dans la Triple Alliance. (Revue des Deux 
Mondes, June 1, 1894.) 

Cortesi. Italy and the Triplice. (North American Review, vol. 
188 (1908), pp. 793-802. 

Blind, Karl. A plea for the Triple Alliance. (National Review, 
vol. 17, 1891, pp. 767-783.) 

Crispi, F. Dual and Triple Alliance. (Nineteenth Century, vol. 
42 (1897), p. 673.) 

Fife, R. H., jr. Italy and the Triple Alliance. (North American 
Review, vol. 200 (1914), pp. 538-548.) 

Long, R, C. Germany's Mediterranean League. (Fortnightly, 
vol. 96 -(1911), pp. 874-890.) 

Outidanos. Triple Alliance and Italy's place in it. (Contempo- 
rary, vol. 56 (1889), pp. 469-488. 

Valbert, G. Un Publiciste Allemand et son Plaidoyer en faveur de 
la Triple Alliance. (Revue des Deux Mondes, June (1892), pp. 683- 
694.) 

36. ROUMANIA AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE, 1883-1914. 

l. roumaxia's relation to the triple alliance. 

Although Roumania was never actually a member of the Triple 
Alliance, through a treaty entered into in accordance with the pro- 
visions of the Roumanian constitution, there was a close connection 
maintained with the Triple Alliance from 1883 to 1914 by means of 
a personal adherence signed by King Charles. This agreement, 
whose existence had been long suspected in well-informed circles, 
became definitely known at the beginning of the World War. when 
King Charles informed the cabinet of the arrangement, and urged 
that Roumania join the Central Powers. The cabinet declined to 
recognize the legal validity of the arrangement and the King was 
forced to yield. 



116 

2. REASON FOB ROUMANIAN CONNECTION AVITH THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE. 

The reasons Which moved Roumania to take up a position favor- 
able to the Triple Alliance were: (1) The memories of the treat- 
ment received by Roumania at the hands of Russia during the crisis 
of 1877-78, and fear of further aggressions on the part of Russia in 
her advance to Constantinople. (See article, Roumania and the 
Balkan Settlement of 1878.) (2) The feeling of racial and cul- 
tural difference separating them from the Slavs, and a resultant op- 
position to Slav ambitions in the Balkans. These interests, being 
parallel to those of Austria-Hungary, led them into close relations 
with that Slate and through her to Germany. German schools were 
established in which many of the Roumanian leaders were trained 
(Mitrany, The Balkans, p. 302), and Germany and Austria together 
controlled 65 per cent of Roumanian imports. (Lewin, German Road 
to the East. p. 275.) 

.".. ROUMANIAN ALIENATION PROM THE* TRIPLE ALLIANCE, 1908-1914. 

The Triple Alliance was never very popular in Rounmnia owing 
to the ill-treatment of the Roumanians of Transylvania by Hungary. 
At the same time, parallel with Italy, whose policy Roumania had 
tended of late to follow on account of racial and cultural relation- 
ship. Roumania took a more independent attitude toward the Triple 
Alliance and built up good relations with Russia. Tn the First 
Balkan War Roumania preserved neutrality, but at its conclusion 
a boundary dispute arose between Roumania and Bulgaria over the 
Dobrudja frontier, of which the former demanded a rectification 
and the latter refused. Despite the offers (Mitrany in The Balkan-. 
p. 303) and threats (Beyens, Germany before the War. 263, quoting 
the declaration of M. Take Jdnescu) of Austria, in behalf of her 
Bulgarian protege. Roumania entered the Second Balkan War on 
the side of Greece and Serbia. This completed the breach with 
Austria, although not with Germany, who appears to have given her 
approval to this policy. (Reventlow, Deutschlands auswaertige 
Politik, 380.) Tn 1914, despite the efforts of King Charles, Rou- 
mania followed Italy into a policy of neutrality. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

Jorga, X. Quarterly Review. (1015.) Vol. 223, pp. 439-50. 

Probably the clearest statement of Roumanians policy. 

Seton-Watson, R. W. Roumania and the Great War. (London. 
Constable, 1015.) Pro-Roumanian, clear, but adds few new facts. 

Duggan, S. P. Balkan Diplomacy. Political Science Quarterly, 
vol. 32, pp. 224r-227, March. 1017. 



117 

Mitrany, D. et al. The Balkans. (Oxford, Clarendon Press. 1 ( .>16.| 

A very brief but clear account of Roumanian policy 1883-1914. 

Lewin, E. The German Road to the East. (London, Heinemann, 
1916.) Strongly anti-German, somewhat careless as to statement, 
valuable bibliograplry. 

37. BISMARCK'S REINSURANCE TREATY. 

1. SITUATION LEADING TO THE TREATY. 

After the establishment of the German Empire in 1871 Bismarck 
rightly judged that his greatest task was the keeping of what had 
been gained. He always feared that his work might be lost through 
attack by some hostile coalition. Therefore he strove to surround 
Germany with friends and allies and at the same time to isolate 
France. First he drew together Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Ger- 
many in the League of the Three Emperors (See article, that title), 
but this wasweakened as Russia and Austria drew apart because of 
rivalry in the Balkans. He next entered into the dual alliance with 
Austria-Hungary in 1879. (See article, The Formation of the Dual 
Alliance, 1879.) But Bismarck was skeptical as to the permanence 
of any alliance, and, although he justly had much confidence in Aus- 
tria, resolved to provide against eventualities and at the same time 
make his position still stronger by drawing Germany and Russia 
together again. He was resolved, therefore, that the wire to St. 
Petersburg should not be cut. (Cambridge Modern History, XII, 
158.) He would, as it were, take out a policy of reinsurance. (Mat- 
ter, Bismarck, III, 516.) The manner in which he carried out this 
reinsurance policy has been involved in much obscurity. Serge 
Goriainow, formerly archivist of the Russian ministry of foreign 
affairs, by the publication in the American Historical Review for 
January, 1918, of an article entitled, The End of the Alliance of 
the Emperors, has made possible a clear understanding of the matter. 

2. THE SECRET TREATIES OF 1S81 AND 1884. 

Doubting the stability of the alliance effected between Germany 
and Austria-Hungary in 1879, and fearful of the possibility of an 
alliance between Russia and France, Bismarck contrived to bring 
about the signing of a treaty June 18, 1881, to which Russia. Ger- 
many, and Austria-Hungary were the parties. The first article of 
this treaty stipulated that if any of the three powers should find' 
itself at war with a fourth great power, the other two powers would 
preserve a benevolent neutrality and would strive for the localization 
of the conflict. This stipulation w T as to apply to the case of a war 
between one of the three powers and Turkey, only in a case a previous 



118 

agreement had been arranged between the three courts as to the results 
of such war. The treaty was for the period of three years. In 18S4 
it was renewed with some modifications for another period of three 
years. 

3. NEGOTIATION OF THE REINSURANCE TREATY, 1887. 

In 1887, when the question of renewing the treaty of 1884 came up, 
Russia was unwilling to renew it. ,The clash of interests between 
Russia and the Dual Monarchy in Balkan affairs, especially in the 
matter of the Bulgarian Revolution of 1886 (See article, that title), 
made Russia unwilling to continue the earlier arrangement. After 
considerable negotiation, however, between Bismarck and Shuvaloff, 
the Russian ambassador at Berlin, a new treaty between Germany 
and Russia was signed June 18, 1878. This was the reinsurance 
treaty. 

4. TERMS OF THE REINSURANCE TREATY, 1S8 7. 

Article 1 stipulated that if either power should find itself at war 
with a third great power, the other would maintain a benevolent 
neutrality and devote its efforts to the localization of the conflict. 
This stipulation, however, was not to apply to " a war against Austria 
or France resulting from an attack made upon one of these two 
powers by one of the high contracting parties." This meant, of 
course, that Germany would help Austria-Hungary if Russia at : 
tacked the Dual Monarchy, while Russia need not remain neutral if 
Germany should attack France. 

By article 2 Germany recognized " the rights historically acquired 
by Russia in the Balkan Peninsula, and particularly the rightfulness 
of a preponderating and decisive influence on her part in Bulgaria 
and eastern Rumelia.*' Both courts pledged themselves to permit no 
modification of the territorial status quo in the Balkan Peninsula 
without a previous agreement between them. By the third article 
the parties agreed to uphold the existing rule in regard to the use of 
the straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles for belligerent 
purposes. 

5. TERMINATION. 

Negotiation for the renewal of the reinsurance treaty were in prog- 
ress at the time of Bismarck's dismissal in 1890. (See article, The 
Dismissal of Bismarck, 1890.) Bismarck was anxious for renewal. 
After the dismissal of Bismarck the Russian ambassador was sent 
for by the Kaiser and informed that German foreign policy would 
not be changed, and that Germany was entirely disposed to renew 
the treaty. A little later there was a change in German policy. 
The negotiation was transferred to the Russian capital and then 
allowed to drop. There has been much discussion about the reasons 



119 

why the German Government abandoned the reinsurance treaty 
policy. Opinion on the matter is still divided. Shuvaloff believed 
that the failure of Germany to renew the treaty could have two 
explanations: One, that the Kaiser counted on the accession of Great 
Britain to the Triple Alliance; the other, that Caprivi, Bismarck's 
successor, took more seriously than had Bismarck the German rela- 
tions with Austria-Hungary involved in the Triple Alliance arrange- 
ment. Whatever may have been the Kaiser's motives, the decision 
not to renew the reinsurance treaty was of importance. Russia, 
already showing considerable inclination toward an alliance with 
France (See article, Formation of the Dual Alliance between France 
and Russia, 1887-1893), was manifestly influenced in large measure 
to that course of action by the German decision as to the reinsurance 
treaty. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

Goriainow, S. The End of the Alliances of the Emperors. Amer- 
ican Historical Review, January, 1908. Vol, 23, pp. 324-349. Based 
on the Russian archives. Earlier accounts must be corrected in the 
light of this article. 

Otto von Bismarck. Bismarck, the Man and the Statesman : Being 
the Reflections and Reminiscences of Otto, Prince von Bismarck, 
etc. 2 volumes. (New York and London, Harper and Brothers, 
1899.) Translated by A. J. Butler. 

Fiirst Chlodwig zu Hohenlohe-Schillingsf iirst. Denkwiirdigkeiten. 
2 volumes. (Stuttgart and Leipzig, 1907.) Reports Bismarck's con- 
versations on the subject. 

The Annual Register : A Review of Public Events at Home and 
Abroad. 1884. (New series. London, 1885.) Contemporary account 
by one who had no special information. 

Matter, Paul. Bismarck et son Temps. 3 volumes. (Paris. 
Alcan, 1905-8.) Excellent account, giving the course of the negotia- 
tions and the terms of the convention, as they are generally under- 
stood. 

The textbooks and the standard histories have little about these 
matters, and have apparently copied that little from each other: 
though the brief account in Seymour, Diplomatic Background of the 
War, 1870-1914 (New Haven, Yale Press, 1916), p. 37, is excellent 
and the references are good. 

38. THE BULGARIAN REVOLUTION OF 1885. 

1. INTRODUCTION. 

In th'e agreement reached by Lord Salisbury and Count Shuvaloff, 
May 30, 1878, regarding a modification of the Treaty of San 
Stefano (See article, The Congress of Berlin, 1878), the outstanding 



120 

feature was the provision that the regions south of the Balkans 
which were inhabited mainly by Bulgarians should not be wholly 
withdrawn from Turkish control. (The Times (London), June 15, 
1878; Staatsarchiv, vol. 34, No. 6749.) Russia and England alike, 
failing to realize the independence of the Bulgarian character, antici- 
pated that the new province would come easily under Russian control. 
Russia desired and England feared the weakening of the Turkish 
power. Inasmuch as Russia had become willing to make concessions 
to prevent a war for which she was not ready, she accepted the reduc- 
tion of the new Bulgaria. 

2. BULGARIA AND THE TREATY OF BERLIN. 

As formulated in the first articles of the Treaty of Berlin, Russia's 
Bulgaria was cut into three parts — the principality of that name, 
lying between the Danube and the Balkans; the Province of Eastern 
Roumelia, south of this; and a remaining irregular portion, most 
of which was restored to the tender mercies of Turkey. England and 
Austria insisted upon this arrangement. Russia and the remaining 
members of the congress acquiesced. The feature most insisted upon 
was that the principality and the province should be entirely sepa- 
rate in government. Both were nominally still a part of Turkey, 
but Bulgaria was nearly independent, while Eastern Roumelia was 
subject to the quinquennial appointment of a governor (a Christian 
chosen by the Porte with the consent of the powers) and to the sta- 
tioning of Turkish garrisons along its northern frontier. 

3. RUSSIA AND BULGARIA, 187S-18S5. 

The Bulgarian Revolution of 1885 consisted in the union of the 
province with the principality. The events of seven years had so 
changed the situation that now Russia was opposed to the union, 
while England desired and supported it. The Russian attempt at 
domination in both regions had met with increasing resistance from 
prince and people, and it had become evident that instead of being a 
foothold for Russia near Constantinople, Bulgaria was a barrier of 
increasing strength in the path of the Muscovite. 

Bulgaria remained under close Russian control until 1883, in which 
year, on September 18, Prince Alexander restored the constitution 
which he had suspended two years before, and henceforth followed 
as independent a policy as he found practicable. In September, 
1884, the three emperors of Austria. Russia, and Germany met at 
Skiernewice, and made an agreement for three years, one of whose 
, provisions is said to have been that they would not oppose the 
union of Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia " if it comes about by the 
force of circumstances." (Quoted by Rose, Development of Modern 



121 

Europe, II, 20-21, from Elie de Cyon, Historie de l'Entente Franco- 
Russe, 1895.) They also agreed not to allow Turkey to fortify the 
Balkan passes, and themselves not to occupy the Balkan princi- 
palities. This agreement may have bound the Czar's hands to some 
extent, but it also provided him with a solid backing, as long a s 
harmony prevailed between himself and his colleagues. 

4. RUSSIAN AIMS IN BULGARIA ABOUT 1SS5. 

Russia appears to have desired to unite the two portions of Bul- 
garia, but she wished first to secure the removal of Prince Alex- 
ander, who had crossed her wishes, and perhaps to secure the ap- 
pointment of the Czar as Grand Duke of Bulgaria. If the union 
could be accomplished under Prince Alexander, he would be strength- 
ened. If accomplished after his rule had been supplanted by Russian 
control, the area of that control would be doubled. It is affirmed that 
in the summer of 1885 the Czar's agents endeavored to bring on 
war between Roumania and Bulgaria in order to weaken the " un- 
grateful" states and give an opportunity for Russian intervention. 
(R. Leonoff, Documents secrets de la politique russe en Orient, 81- 
85, quoted by Rose, op. cit., I, 310 ff.) 

5. UNION PROCLAIMED. 

The time was ripe, however, for other action. Eastern Roumelia 
had thriven in seven years of comparative freedom, and most of its 
people desired to clasp hands with their brothers beyond the Balkans. 
A sudden uprising at Philipoppolis on September 18, 1885, resulted 
in the gentle expulsion of Gavril Pasha, the second Christian gov- 
ernor appointed by the Porte, and a prompt invitation to Prince 
Alexander to accept the rulership of Eastern Roumelia. (In British 
and Foreign State Papers, vol. 76. pp. 1243-1315, is to be found a 
series of dispatches dealing with the Eastern situation in the latter 
part of 1885.) On September 21 Alexander announced his election 
and acceptance as Prince of- Eastern Roumelia, and asked the inter- 
vention of the British Government toward obtaining the Sultan's 
sanction, " to avoid the useless effusion of blood, since the people 
have decided to defend with their lives the fait accompli." 

G. PRELIMINARIES OF THE CONSTANTINOPLE CONFERENCE. 

The Porte appealed on September 23 to the powers to rectify the. 
infraction of the Treaty of Berlin. A conference was proposed to 
be held at Constantinople to decide on what advice to offer the 
Prince. The English ambassador was instructed to labor to induce 
the Sultan to abstain from military intervention and to appoint 



122 

Alexander as prince for life over Eastern Roumelia. The British 
representatives at Athens and Belgrade wore also instructed to work- 
in the interests of peace. The Czar had been greatly enraged at the 

news, and prepared (o order the withdrawal of the Russian officers 
from the Bulgarian Army, believing that he would thus leave it 
helpless. Germany, Austria, and Italy abstained from taking a 
positive attitude. Serbia and Greece promptly began to prepare for 
war. resenting the enlargement of Bulgaria, fearing the reestablish- 
ment of the Great Bulgaria of the Treaty of San Stefano, and 
demanding equivalent enlargements of their own territory. The 
conference of ambassadors drew up a declaration on October I and •'> 
deprecating the violation of the Treaty of Berlin and urging peaceful 
dispositions. After some modifications this declaration was sent to 
the Porte and the Government of Bulgaria on October 14. On the 
following day the Austrian ambassador proposed, as agreed with 
Enssia and Germany, that a formal conference be held at Constanti- 
nople, which should request Prince Alexander to withdraw his troops 
from Eastern Roumelia on penalty of the Sultan's use of force, and 
with the intimation that compliance would be followed by a union of 
the provinces. 

7. CONSTANTINOPLE CONFERENCE. 

Lord Salisbury, on October 21, objected to the threat, of force, but 
appro veil the formal conference. He desired a preliminary basis 
for discussion to be agreed upon. The proposal made by the Porte 
In id dow n as a basis for the conference the maintenance of the Treaty 
of Berlin in conformity with the sovereign rights of the Sultan, the 
conference to consider the affairs of Eastern Roumelia alone. Lord 
Salisbury accept oil the invitation, and on November '_» sent a long 
dispatch elaborating the British point of view, and indicating clearly 
that a restoration of the status quo ante in Eastern Roumelia was not 
desirable. He took exception to the " balance of power" theory for 
the Balkan States. The Czar on November 3 gave indication of his 
intentions toward Prince Alexander by. dismissing him from the 
Russian Arm v. 

* 

s. THE SEBBO-BI it; \u WAR. 1885. 

Such was the situation when Serbia declared war on Bulgaria on 
November 11. The circumstances suggest strongly that this was 
with the approval of Russia and Austria, with Germany acquiesing. 
(These three powers were bound by the Skiernewicc compact o\' 
1SSI. and they acted together regularly during the events under dis- 
cussion.) The Bulgarians, though without the help of Russian offi- 
cers, promptly showed themselves more than a match for the Ser- 
bians. (See article, The Serbo-Bulgarian War of 1885 L886.) The 



] ° 



-■> 



three Emperors agreed on a proposal for an armistice on November 

24, to which England, France, and Italy adhered, and Count Kheven- 
hiiller enforced it on the Bulgarians, November 28, by the threat 
of Austrian military support of Serbia and Russian occupation of 
Bulgaria. (Rose, op. cit., p. 324, states that the Russian chancellor, 
on hearing of this threat, informed Vienna that the Czar would 
be very much displeased if the Austrian end of it were carried 
out.) Perhaps at this point the cooperation of the Emperors broke 
down. The pressure toward restoring the status quo ante in Eastern 
Roumelia slackened at about this time, and the English view of 
accepting the union rose toward acceptance. 

0. TURKISH THREAT or WAR. 

At I lie same time, Turkey, encouraged by Austria and Russia, and 
attempting to proceed without the knowledge of England, gathered 
troops on the border of Eastern Roumelia, and sent two delegates to 
Philippopolis with a proclamation which purported to convey the 
decision of the conference, but which had not been approved or even 
seen by the British representative. This proclamation aimed at re- 
storing substantially the status quo ante in Eastern Roumelia. Grad- 
ually, however, the Turks came around to see that Bulgaria was not 
hostile to them and not inclined to be aggressive, and that it was 
rather to their interest to make her strong and friendly than divided 
and discontented. To this belief no doubt Lord Salisbury contrib- 
uted. (See his conversation with the Turkish ambassador on Decem- 
ber 23. British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 76, p. 1311.) 

10. SETTLEMENT. 

On February 1, 1886, a Turco-Bulgarian convention (See Appendix 
I., 31) was drawn up, which conformed closely to the Treaty of Ber- 
lin, in that Alexander was appointed governor of Eastern Roumelia 
for a period of five years. Certain border districts were transferred 
back to Turkey. Mutual military aid was provided between Turkey 
and Bulgaria. The three emperors objected to the military alliance 
of Turkey and Bulgaria, and the implacable attitude of Czar Alex- 
ander toward his namesake was shown by the former's refusal to 
permit the latter's name to appear in the convention. The Brit- 
ish Government accepted these changes, and the convention was 
signed on April .">. 1886. It provided for the essential aim of the 
revolution of Philippopolis, in that the two portions of Bulgaria 
were left united. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

British and Foreign State Papers, vols. 76, 77. (1881-1886. Lon- 
don, Ridgway, 180-2.) Correspondence respecting Eastern Roumelia 
and Bulgaria, 1243-1315. 



124 

Rose, J. H. The Development o( the European Nations, L870- 
L914. 5th ed. 2volsinl. (New York, Putnam, 1916^ 

Holland, T. E. Studies in International, Law. 251-269 (Oxford. 
Clarendon Press, L898). Clear, concise account of essentials. 

Miller, W. The Ottoman Empire, L801-1913, (Cambridge, Uni- 
versity Press, L913.) 

La Jonquiere, A. Vicomte de. Historic de l'empire Ottoman. 
•_' vols. 3rd ed. (Paris, Hachette, L914.) 

Minchin, J, (i. C. The Growth of freedom in the Balkan penin- 
sula. (London. Murray. L886.) Consul Genera] for Serbia in Lon- 
don. Had been correspondent on Balkan affairs for the Times and 
Morning Advertiser. 

Leonoff, R. Documents Secrets de la politique russe in orient. 
(Berlin, Wilhelmi, 1893.) For secret aims of Russia as regards Bui 
garia. 

Chaunier, Auguste. La Bulgarie. Etude d'historie diplomatique 
et d.e droit international. (Paris, Rousseau. L909.) 

Edwards, 11. Sutherland. Sir William White: Memoirs and cor- 
respondence. (London, Murray, L902.) « 

Coulbault, J. Che phase de la question bulgare. Revue de droit 
international public (1896), 111, 513-536. 

The Eastern Roumelian insurrection. Saturday Review, v. C>0. 
399 WO. September 26, L885. 

Bryce, J. The troubles in southeastern Europe. (London. Octo- 
bers, L885.) Nation (New York), v. 41,357-358. October 29, L885. 

Langel, A. The Bulgarian revolution reviewed. (Paris. Decern 
ber 3, L885.) Nation (New York) . v. 41. 529-530. December 24, L885. 

Caillard, Vincent. The Bulgarian imbroglio. Fortnightly Re- 
view, v. 4 i. 840 851. L885. 

Schuyler, Eugene. United Bulgaria. The North American Re-. 
view, v. 111. 464 -474. L885. 

Laveleye, Emile de. The situation in the East. Contemporary 
Review, v. 50, 609 619. November. L886. 

39. THE SERBO-BULGARIAN WAR OF 1885-1886. 

1. PRELIMINARIES OV THE WAR. 

Kino- Milan of Serbia held that the union of Bulgaria- and 
Roumelia (See article on the Bulgarian Revolution of 18S5) meant 
a disturbance of the balance of power in the Balkans. Finding 
the proceedings of the conference of the powers at Constantinople 
too dilatory he proceeded to constitute himself the champion of the 
Treaty of Berlin. lie had reason to believe that his aspirations after 
territorial compensation would not be judged unjustifiable in AustrO- 



125 



Hungarian circles. (Phillips to Salisbury, Nov. 9, L885.; Parliamen- 
tary Papers, L886, vol. 75, No. 1. p. 249. See also Protetch, S., The 
secrel treaty between Serbia and Austria-Hungary, Fortnightly Re- 
view, January, L909, vol. 85, |>|». 838 849.) Serbian newspapers 
began in the u n( 1 1 ii in of 1885 to write of the balance of power and to 
air grievances againsl Bulgaria. 



2. oi TBREAK OF THE WAR. 



The Serbian troops, which hud been mobilized, osten ibly against 
Turkey, since the revolt in Philippopolis, were massed on the Bul- 

rian frontier. The Bulgarian prince sent a friendly letter to King 
Milan, which the latter refused to receive, and thereupon Bulgarian 
troops were seni to the Serbian frontier. To n remonstrance from 
Bulgaria thai Serbian troops were in Bulgarian territory Milan re- 
turned a denial, and Prince Alexander issued a proclamation that as 
il< Serbian king had stated that the 300 Serbians on Bulgarian soil 
were net Serbian soldiers they were to be treated as brigands. The 
reply of the Serbian monarch was a reiteration of his denial, and 
the statement that Bulgarian troops had attacked Serbian forces on 
Serbian territory, and that renewal of such attacks would be consid- 
ered a casus bell i. The next day he issued a declaration of war, basing 
his act ion upon changes in the Balkans, innovations in Bulgarian cus- 
toms regulations designed to injure Serbian trade, ill treatment of 
Serbian subjects in Bulgaria, and attacks upon tic Serbian Army. 
Alexander appealed to the powers and to the Porte. The Porte laid 
the responsibility of the war on his head because '0' the Eastern Rou- 
melian affair. 



TREATT OF BUCHAREST, MARCH :;. L886. 



The Bulgarian troops met the situation with unexpected spirit, and 
after a short and sharp campaign drove the invading army back 
the frontier. Prince Alexander was invading Serbia when a 
special envoy from Austria-Hungary on November 28 demanded 
that he grant an armistice, threatening, if he refused, to send troops 
to Serbia' assistance. This was apparently not an independent ac- 
tion of Austria, as joint action for pacification had been agreed 
upon by Austria, Russia, and Germany some time before, and Eng- 
land had been using Iter good offices to the same end. (Parliamentary 
Papers, L886, v. 75, No. 1. pp. 284 (No. 496) 301. (No. 503), 307 (No. 
:»11 ). 308 (No. 515), 310 (No. 519).) The armistice was proclaimed, 
and on March 3, L886, largely through the good offices of Great 
Britain, the Treaty of Bucharest was signed, restoring the status quo 
ante helium. 



126 

■i. APPRAISEMENT. 

There has been much speculation as to why King Milan wenl to 
war, but a sufficient explanation is that probably he saw in Bulgaria's 
case the possibilities of successful aggression and reckoned on the 
tradition of the old Serbian Empire to rally his people to a success- 
ful war. which would bring him much needed popularity. Bulgaria's 
armies were believed to be demoralized by the withdrawal of their 
Russian officers and the greater part of them won 1 on the Turkish 
frontier. Serbia as the champion of the Treaty of Berlin, which had 
robbed her o( the chance of annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina, seems 
absurd enough; on the other hand, it is not remarkable that Serbia. 
having been denied by the Treat \ of Berlin the acquisition o( terri- 
tory which she felt Legitimately belonged to her. should have been 
unwilling t^ see thai treaty infringed to the advantage of a neigh- 
boring State and to her own relative detriment. 

By assuming that role, too, she might feel more sure of the sup- 
port i)( A.ustria-Hungray, to' whom, in addition Milan's exploit, 
gave the opportunity to show how far she felt bound to carry out 
the spirit of the convention of L881. The success of her army 
assured Bulgaria of the continued possession of Roumelia, while it 
disappointed the hope of a greater Serbia. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

Parliamentary Papers, L886, vol. 75. Turkey, No. 1. 

Annual Register for L885 and L&86. 

Avril. A. Traite de Berlin. (Paris. E. Leroux. L886.) 

Rose,* J. Holland. Development of the European Nations. 5th ed. 
(New York, Putnam. 1916.) . 

Serins, Charles. La RoumeTie orientale et la Bulgarie actuelle. 
(Paris. A. Rousseau, L898.) 

Miller. William. The Ottoman Empire. (Cambridge. The Uni- 
versity Press. L913.) 

Becker, Georges. La guerre contemporaine dans les Balkans. 
(Paris, Berger-Levrault, L899.) 

Drandar, A. G. Les evenements politiques en Bulgarie. (Brus- 
sels, Falk, 1896.) 

lluhn. A. von. The struggle of the Bulgarians for National In- 
dependence. (London. Murray, L886.) By a newspaper correspond- 
ent, pro-Bulgar. 

Koch, A. Prince Alexander of Battenburg. (London, Whit taker. 
1887.) 



127 
40. THE PACIFIC BLOCKADE OF GREECE, 1886. 

1. CIRCUMSTANCES. 

At the Congress of Berlin the powers had recommended to the 
Porte to grant Greece a rectified frontier, and in 1881 Greece ob- 
tained about 9.000 square miles of territory in Thessaly and Epirus. 
Ji nt only a part of the territory claimed by the Greeks was actually 
secured (See article, The Greco-Turkish Frontier Question, 1878- 
1881). On January 4, 188G, the Greek Government addressed a note 
to the powers, demanding as compensation for the union of Bulgaria 
with Eastern Roumelia (See article, The Serbo-Bulgar War of 
ISS.j-86)., that the boundary between Turkey and Greece be that 
originally fixed by the Berlin congress, and threatening naval and 
military action. 

2. THE INTERVENTION BY THE POWERS. 

On January 24, the powers delivered a collective note at Athens, 
stating that "no naval attack by Greece against the Sublime Porte 
would be permitted." On the same day the Greek fleet left Salamis 
Bay; and all the great powers, with the sole exception of France, 
decided at the instigation of Lord Salisbury, to send warships to 
Suda Bay, in Crete, in order to prevent Greece from landing troops 
on the Turkish coast or attacking Turkish vessels. On February 2 
the Greek premier insisted that any interference with the free dis- 
posal of her naval forces would be " incompatible with the inde- 
pendence " of Greece. The combined fleet of the powers met at Sulva 
Bay soon afterwards, but Greece continued her warlike preparations. 

The allied squadron then proceeded to the Piraeus, and on April 
26 another collective note was delivered at Athens inviting the Greek 
cabinet " to place its land and sea forces on a peace footing as promptly 
as possible." Still another collective note was presented on May 6, 
and on May 8 the powers declared their intention to "establish a 
blockade of the coasts of Greece against all ships under the Greek 
flag * * *. All ships under the Greek flag attempting to run the 
blockade will render themselves liable to be detained." 

3. THE BLOCKADE. 

On May 10, the pacific blockade of Greece was declared and its 
limits and scope carefully defined. It applied only to vessels under 
the Greek flag and such vessels were only to be detained. 

It would seem that the number of ships actually detained was about 
70. The blockade resulted in some scarcity of provisions in certain 
places, but the British commander was given authority to relieve any 
cases of actual distress. 



128 

Meanwhile a now cabinet was formed in Athens for the purpose 
of carrying out the wishes <>( the powers; disarmament proceeded 
apace and the Greek Torres were ordered to withdraw from the 
frontier. The Porte also announced its intention to demobilize as 
soon as the Greeks should do so. 

After a good deal o( diplomatic correspondence between the 
powers, an agreement was reached and a joint note handed to the 
Greek Government on June 7. 'The blockade was raised, though h 
small squadron was left at Sulva Bay to see that the wishes o( the 
powers w ere carried out. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

See especially the Annual Register for L886, pp. 870 374; and 
Hogan, A. E., Pacific Blockade (Oxford, Clarendon Pre—. L908), 
pp. L26 L30, L37 171. See also Soderquist, X.. Le blocus maritime 
(Stockholm, L908) ; Bares, ('.. Le blocus pacifique (Toulouse, Ber- 
thoumieu, L898), pp. 10 II: and Standacher, II.. Die Friedens-blok- 
ade (Leipzig, 1909). 

For diplomat ie correspondence, see British Parliamentary Papers, 
Greece No. I (1886). 

41. THE SCHNAEBELJ3 INCIDENT, 1887. 

1. THE MAIN PACTS. 

On April 21, L887, the Havas agency published a dispatch to the 
effect that M, Schnaebel<5, a French police inspector, had been 
arrested on the Franco-German frontier, near Pagny, as he was on 

his way to Ars-sur Moselle to have an interview with the German 
poliee inspector there at the hitter's request. 

A dispute followed as to whether the arrest had taken place on 
French or on German territory, the French claiming that under the 
circumstances M. Schnaebele" was entitled to immunity even on Ger- 
man territory, since he had been invited to a conference by Ger- 
man officials. The reason given by the German authorities for 
the arrest was that in an inquiry into charges of treasonable prac- 
tices against a number of Alsatians, evidence had been produced that 
M. Schnaebele* was concerned in transmitting to Paris information 
as to German fortresses furnished by Alsatians in the pay of the 
French Government, and that an order had been given to arrest him 
if ever he should be found on German soil. 

2. SIGNIFICANCE. 

Within a week after his arrest, on April 28, M. Schnaebele* was 
released by order of the German Emperor, Tn a dispatch of the 
same date to the French ambassador at Berlin, Prince Bismarck 



L29 

explained thai though the German Government considered, in view 
of the proofs of guilt, the arresf to be fully justified, it was deemed 
expedient to release M. Schnaebele on the ground that bu iness meet- 
ings of frontier officials " must always be regarded as protected by a 
mutually assured safe conduct." 

The excitement caused by the arrest of M. Schnaebele" was very 
great, particularly at Par-is. It occurred soon alter a parlia- 
mentary campaign on the pari of the German Government to secure 
the passage by the Reichstag of the Septennate army law, or seven 
years credit for military expenses; and it was accompanied by such 
threatening and provocative language as to cause serioug concern, 
not only in France, buf throughout Europe. In France. Gen. 
Boulanger and his party wanted to .-.end an ultimatum demanding 
the release of Schnaebele and an apology. A large section of the 
German press demanded thai Germany make no concession. Elie de 
('von (La France et la Russie, La NTouvelle Revue, vol. <;:). p. 69, 
April 15. L80O) asserts that Bismarck brought about the incident; 
that Czar Alexander III. made apprehensive for the peace; of Kurope, 
wrote an autographic letter- to William I in regard to the matter, 
and that the Kaiser, going over the head of his chancellor, ordered 
the release of Schnaebele. There is still much mystery about the 
affair. The reasons for- the arrest and release of Schnaebele have 
never been satisfactorily explained. It seem not. unlikely that, liis- 
marck provoked this and one or two other- "incidents" about 1887 
for the purpose of putting pressure on France to counteract the 
Boulanger agitation. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

L'annee politique for 1887, pp. 69-87 (Paris, 1888); Despagnet, 
I-'.. La diplomatic de la troisieme r^publique et le droit des gens 
(Paris, L. Larose, 1004), pp. 134-138; The Annual Register for 

1887 (London, 1888), p. 247; Reinach, J., La Revue de Paris, August 
15. 1017; Staatsarchiv, vol. 18, Nos. 0500 and 0507. 

42. FRANCO-ITALIAN ANIMOSITY, 1886-1896. 

1. ENTBOnUOTION. 

The taking of Tunis by France in 1881 (See article. The Establish- 
ment of the French Protectorate over Tunis, 1881) created much ill 
feeling in Italy, where the public was looking forward to an Italian 
occupation at an early date. Five years later this tension had not 
diminished. Then a series of clashes between the French and Italian 
Governments over a number of matters led to a decade of such pro- 
nounced Italian animosity against France that it became a factor 
of considerable importance in the international situation. 
53706— is 9 



130 

2. TARIFF WAR. 

In 1886 a new commercial treaty between France and Italy was 
negotiated, but was rejected by the French Chamber of Deputies. 
Its rejection caused deep irritation in Italy, which retaliated by de- 
nouncing the existing commercial treaty of 1881, thereby leaving the 
two countries without any commercial treaty between them. From 
this action quickly developed a tariff war between the two countries 
which deeply affected their trade relations. French exports to Italy 
fell from 308,000,000 francs in 1887 to 181,000,000 in 1888, to 133,- 
000,000 in 1889, and still lower the next year. French imports from 
Italy fell within two years from 372,000,000 francs to 227,000,000 

3. CATHOLIC MISSIONS — ABYSSINIA. 

The use of Italian influence to try to take away from France its 
long exercised right of protecting Roman Catholic missions in China 
caused irritation in France, while several instances of mob misusage 
of Italian workmen in France led to sharp demands for their protec- 
tion by the Italian Government. Italian colonial activities in the Red 
Sea region were producing friction with King Menelik of Abyssinia, 
who turned for support to France, as French interests in the region 
were also affected by the forward colonial policy of Italy. Some 
encouragement appears to have been given to Menelik by France. 
His success in holding his own against Italy was naturally attributed 
by Italians to French support. 

4. CRISPI. 

Throughout these years Crispi, whether in office or not, was the 
most potent personality in Italy. His intense animosity toward 
France, a thing of earlier origin, was accentuated by his enthusiasm 
for the recently developed connection with Germany and the Dual 
Monarchy in the Triple Alliance. Crispi's influence, always active 
against France, was of great power in intensifying the ill feeling 
in Italy against France. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

Debidour, A. Histoire Diplomatique de l'Europe depuis le con- 
gres de Berlin jusqu'a nos jours. 2 vols. (Paris, Alcan, 1916.) Vol. 
I, pp. 129-133. Excellent short account. 

Despagnet, F. La diplomatic de la troisieme republique et le 
droit des gens (Paris, Larose. 1904), 637-641. Crispi, F. Memoirs. 
3 vols. (London, Hodder, 1912-1914.) Tardieu, A. France and the 
Alliance (New York, Macmillan, 1908), 80-88. 

Tardieu, A., Questions diplomatiques de l'annee 1904, pp. 5-13 
(Paris, Alcan, 1905). 



131 
43. THE PARTITION OF AFRICA, 1878-1885. 

1. EUROPEAN HOLDINGS IN AFRICA IN 187 7. 

When Stanley emerged from the interior of Africa in 1877, the 
hold of European nations upon that continent was a slight one. 
Great Britain held the Cape, with West Griqualand and Natal, and 
on the west coast had settlements at Gambia, Sierra Leone, the Gold 
Coast, and Lagos. The extent of these settlements was about 241,461 
square miles. France held Algeria and had settlements on the west 
coast in Senegal and on the Gold Coast, the whole amounting to 
about 426,523 square miles. Portugal held Senegambia and Portu- 
guese Guinea on the west, Angola in the southwest, and Mozambique 
in the southeast. The Spanish had a settlement at Corisco Bay. The 
total territory claimed by European powers was thus about 702,371 
square miles. 

2. EXPANSION OF EUROPEAN HOLDINGS. 1877-1885. 

After the explorations of Stanley and Livingstone the topography 
of Africa was known roughly, and some glimpse had been given of 
its possibilities. It was not strange that the movement toward ex- 
pansion that began about 1878 should have turned toward this great 
unoccupied field. The first indication of widespread interest in 
African colonization was given by the formation of the Royal 
African Association under the leadership of the Belgian King 
Leopold, which led to the establishment of the Congo Free State. 
(See article, The Formation of the Congo Free State, 1876-1885.) 
Great Britain gradually obtained control of Egypt and the territory 
to the southward, until by 1883 her influence was paramount there. 
(See articles, The Dual Control over Egyptian Finances, 1876-1883; 
The British Occupation of Egypt, 1882-1914; The Soudan Question, 
1881-1899.) In 1885 she proclaimed a protectorate in Nigeria. Dur- 
ing the same period her colonies already established were, almost with- 
out exception, extending their boundaries. In 1881 Tunis accepted a 
French protectorate (See article, The Establishment of the French 
Protectorate over Tunis, 1881), and by 1885 the extension of the in- 
fluence of France in West Africa and the Congo region had immensely 
enhanced her holdings. Her claim to Obock, near the southern en- 
trance to the Red Sea, was an old one, but the region was not 
actually occupied until this period. Spain's claim in West Africa 
was finally recognized as entitling her to several thousand square 
miles. German colonization of Africa began with the establishment 
of a protectorate over Angra Pequena in 1883, but her zeal was so 
untiring that by 1885 she had acquired 371,000 square miles. 



132 



.'.. EUROPEAN HOLDINGS IN 1888. 

Thus in a period of loss than 10 years the colonial possessions of 
Great Britain in Africa had increased from 241,000 square miles 
to 868,000; those oH France from 186,000 bo 726,000, those o( Portu- 
gal from 34,000 to 195,000, and Germany had acquired 371,000. In 
addition there had boon established the Congo Free State, <^' over 
a million square miles, ami Spain, from an indeterminate claim, 
had acquired a colony oi 243,000 square miles. While in L878 Euro- 
peans were in control of about 702,371 square miles of African terri- 
tory, in L885 they controlled about 3,461,128 square miles. 

Table of European holdings in Africa, 1877 and t885 
ORE \ C BRIT u\ 



1877. 



Grlqualand, v. 

Cape 

Gambia 

Gold Coast 

Lagos 

Natal 

Sierra Leone 



Total. 



Urea. 



S«. miles. 

17,800 

801,000 

ai 

6,000 
6,000 

li.i 12 
168 



241, mi 



1885 



Basutoland 

Beohuanaland 

Cape Colony 

ii imbia 

Gold Coast 



Natal 

Sierra Leone 

Walflsoh Hay 

. I ist I'io! s 

Egj i't (Protectorate) 
Total 



\roa. 



Sq. milet. 

10,290 

186,000 

241. otxt 

69 

16,000 

r;; 

21,180 

40S 

460 



394,240 



868,640 



Senegal settlements. . . 
Gold ooasl and Gaboon 
Algeria 



Total 



Senegambia and I ! oinea 

Angola. Benguela, and Mossamedes. 
Mozambique and Sofala 



Total 



FR INCE 



5</. km. 

20,000 

•us. ooo 



Senegambia 

Gold Coast and Gaboon. 

Congo region 

Obook 

Algeria 

Tunis (Proteotorate) — 



688,000 



GERMANY. 



Togoland 

Cameroons 

Damara and Great Namaqua 

ITsagora 

Wituland 



Total. 



POR DUG U ■ 



sg 


. milts. 

1,687 

14,700 

is, ooo 




84,887 



Senegambia, Blssao, eta 

Vngola. etc 

Mozambique and depen- 
dencies 

Congo dlsl i iots 



Total'. 



So. km. 
0,000 

20, 000 
130.000 

10, (XXI 

118,000 
12,000 



Total >1,170,000 



Sq. milts. 

400 

116,000 

230. ooo 

20,700 

6,200 



371, OCX) 



J??, km. 

26 

312,609 

382,083 



696,218 



So. milrt. 

3,600 

15,000 

so, 000 



195,360 



i 426,523 square miles. 

> 726,938 square miles. . , _ . .-, ... i 

s Portugal claimed a large hinterland thai other powers did not admit; tho latter Bguras are the i>mi*ti 
estinuto, tho former the Portuguese. Tho latter are used In estimating the total. 



L33 



Table of European holdings In ifriea, 1871 and 1885 Continued. 



1X77. 


An 




An 








8a. r 
1,000 











Kl '. LEOPOLD if. 



Congo I i' ■ 



8q. rnilm. 
I , 056, 200 



'I .,t*l, 703,371 g'luuro miles for J877;in<l 3,461,128 iquare rnil<-. tol 1880 



J'.IJ'.MOOKAJ'Jl Y. 



State man's 5Tear Book, 1878, 1886. (London, Macmillan.) The 
figures used have been taken from these volumes in mosl ci In 

the case of Portugal the figures for 1878 are taken from the 
volume for L876, a from L877 on the official estimates are so large 
as i" ' ■' eed the largest total for 1885. A similar procedure has been 
followed for Algeria. 

Harris, Norman I). Intervention and colonization in Africa. 
(Boston, Houghton, L914.) Deals only with the regions where inter- 
national competition has been a factor. 

Keltic. J. Partition of Africa. (London, Stanford, L893.) 

Johnston, IJ. II. A history of the colonization of Africa by alien 
races. (Cambridge, University Press, L899.) 

44. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FRENCH PROTECTOR- 
ATE OVER TUNIS, 1881. 

I. [NTROtfl ( TION. 

The conquest of Algiers by France in L830 and the physiographic 
continuity of that province, with the backward state of Tunis may 
be regarded as the real basie of the French protectorate over Tunis. 

2. RIVALS OI FRAN) E IN TUNIS, L861 -1881. 

For about 20 years prior to the establishment of the French pro- 
tectorate boil) Italy and Great Britain displayed a good deal of 
interest in Tunis, and it seemed not unlikely that Tunis would shortly 
under either Italian or British control. 

Immediately after the achievement of Italian unification Italy 
began to exhibit a deep interest in the future of Tunis. When the 
Bey went bankrupt in L869 a triple control over Tunisian finan< 
was established under British, French, and Italian controllers. In 
1880 the Italians bought the British railway from Tunis to Galetta. 



L34 
There was in Tunis a considerable and rapidly inoreasing Italian 

population. 

The genera] international situation in Europe from L878 to i ss, i 
undoubtedly helped to bring about the French occupation, Italy 
had returned from the Congress of Berlin (1878) with empty hands 
and yet with hopes of gaining Tunis, to which her eyes had been 
directed since 1862. During the sessions of t ho Congress ^( Berlin 
the French representative, Waddington, had been encouraged both 
by Lord Salisbury and by Bismarck to go into Tunis, although this 
encouragement was not known to the world for soino years. (DOCU 
ments Diplomatiques, Allaire- do Tunisie, Supplement, pp. 67 71, for 
correspondence between Britain and France. Bismarck's encourage- 
ment is briefly set forth, with references, in Rose's Development of 
the European Nations. 11. pp. ll L5 and notes. See also Hohenlohe- 
Schillingsfiirst, Memoirs, II. 279 280. Eng. tor.) 

3. win FRANCE TOOK CONTROL, L881. 

France's decision to send an army into Tunis in L881 was partly 
duo to Italy's increasing activities in the country (Fitoussi^ pp. L20 
26), and was publicly based upon the necessity of quieting the Tuni- 
sian natives who were raiding over tho Algerian frontier despite 
French protests. (Documents Diplomatiques, AJfaires de Tunisie, 
lsTl L880.) Emile Bourgeois, a weighty authority, doubtless puts 
the motives in their proper perspective when he says: "* 
From the Province o\' Constantine, the valley o( the Medjerda in- 
evitably led the French toward Tunis, when 1 the acts o\' brigandage 
of the Kroumirs on March 31, L881, gave a legitimate ground for 
interference." (Cambridge Modern History, vol. L2, p. L29.) 

The Sultan of Turkey attempted to interfere diplomatically on be- 
half of Tunis, but his pretensions to suzerainty over Tunis (Fitoussi, 
appendix, pp. xxvi XXXVl) were brushed aside by the French. 

•1. THE TREATY OF BARDO. 

After all opposition in Tunis was put down the French imposed 
upon the Hey the Treaty o[' Bardo, May L2, L881, which established 
the protectorate. The convention of dune 8, L883, modified the rela- 
tions o( the two powers in some respeets. (Texts of treaty and eon- 
vent ion in Fitoussi, appendix, pp. xxxvu-xxxix.) 

5. INTERNATIONAL si vri s ov TUNIS AFTER 1881. 

Turkey refused to recognize the accomplished fact and later only 
implicitly abandoned her claims to suzerainty. From the legal point 
o( view, as the French agreement admitted, the powers of Europe 
which had treaties of "capitulation" with the Government of Tunis, 



retained their rights thereunder after the establishment of the 
French protectorate (Fitoussi, pp. 168-74), but these were sue 
sively abrogated by mutual agreement, Great Britain being the first 
and Italy the last to consent. (Documents Diplomatiques, Revision 
des Traites Tunisiens, 1896-Janvier, 1897.) In judicial matters, 
therefore, the subjects of foreign States living in Tunis are substan- 
tially in the. same position as if they were in France itself. 

6. Till', FRENCH REGIME IN TUNIS. 

The Bey retains his titles, dignities, flags, coinage, etc., but the 
State's foreign relaf ions are controlled by France through the French 
Resident, and more and more the Bey tends to become a dignified 
figurehead, necessarily permitting the Resident to shape domestic 
policiei . 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

Despagnet, F. La diplomatic de La troisieme republique et le droit 
des gens (Paris, Larose, 1904). 213-247. Excellent account. 

Fancon, N. La Tunisie avant et depuis l'occupation francaise. 
(Paiis. Challamel, L893. 2 vols.) Detailed accounts in vol. 1. 

Fitoussi, Elie. L'Etat Tunisien, son origine, son developpement et 
son organization actuelle (1525-1901). (Doctoral thesis, Faculty 
of Law of Paris.) (Tunis, Picard, 1001.) With bibliography, pp. 

XLI-XMII. 

(Ministers des) Affaires Etrangeres. Documents Diplomatiques. 
Affaires de Tunisie, 1870-1881. (Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1881.) 

(Ministere des) Affaires Etrangeres. Documents Diplomatiques. 
Affaires de Tunisie. Supplement. April-May, 1881. (Paris, Im- 
primerie Nationale, 1881.) 

(Ministere des) Affaires Etrangeres. Documents Diplomatiques. 
Revision des Traites Tunisiens, 189ft- Janvier, 1897. (Paris, Im- 
primerie Nationale, 1896.) 

45. THE DUAL CONTROL OVER EGYPTIAN FINANCES, 

1876-1883. 

1. INTRODUCTION. 

The Dual Control over the finances of Egypt grew from the misrule 
and the impoverishment of the country by Ismail Pasha and from 
the political and financial interests of France and England in Egypt, 
especially in the Suez Canal. By the extravagance of Ismail. Egypt 
was led to the verge of bankruptcy. The Egyptian debt rose from 
£3,000,000 in 1868 to 801,000,000 in 1870. About £16,000,000 were 
spent on the Suez Canal: a considerable sum went into public works 
and experimentation which, if successful, would have increased the 



136 

prosperity of the country ; but a very large proportion of the whole 
sum was squandered by the extravagant personal expenditure of the 
Khedive. The Khedive, needing money, imposed heavy taxes, and in 
1875 sold his shares in the Sue/ Canal Co. to Great Britain for about 
£4,000,000. 

2. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CAISSE DE LA DETTE, MAY 2, 1S7G. 

Foreign financial intervention was precipitated by the action of the 
Khedive, who on April 8, 1876, issued a decree suspending payment 
on his treasury bills. Protests in behalf of the bondholders were 
made by foreign governments. To meet the situation the Khedive, 
by decrees of May '2 and 7, 1876, established the Caisse de la Dette, 
and provided for the consolidation of the debt. Two commissioners 
were appointed who, in addition to the discharge of certain speci- 
fied duties, were in general to act as the representatives of the 
bondholders. 

.:. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DUAL CONTROL, NOVEMBER 18, 1S7G. 

This arrangement caused much dissatisfaction, especially in Eng- 
land. As a result the Gosehen- Joubert commission, organized by the 
British and French creditors, undertook a mission to Egypt for the 
purpose of obtaining modifications of the financial scheme which 
the British and French bondholders considered necessary. This com- 
mission negotiated a new financial arrangement, the Dual Control, 
which was embodied in a khedival decree of November 18, 1876. 
Two controllers-general were to be appointed, one to supervise the 
revenue and the other the expenditure. A small body of European 
officials invested with more ample powers than had previously been 
conferred on European functionaries was now introduced into Egypt. 
But the Khedive had failed to recognize the importance of the 
changes to which he had assented. Cordial cooperation between the 
Khedive and the European officials was not secured. Egyptian 
finances remained in a chaotic condition. 

4. OPERATION OF THE DUAL CONTROL, 1876-1878. 

On March 30, 1878, the Khedive issued a decree providing for a 
commission with extensive powers of inquiry. After four months 
of laborious investigation this commission made its report in August. 
The Khedive hesitated as to the course he should pursue, but finally 
decided to adopt the recommendations of the commission. At the 
same time he announced the adoption of the principle of ministerial 
responsibility and the appointment of a new ministry, which in- 
cluded among the members the two commissioners of the Dual Con- 
trol. The officials of the Bnial Control having thus been appointed to 



137 

offices which gave them increased power over the finances of Egypt 
on December 12 the Dual Control was provisionally suspended, upon 
the ground that its continuance was incompatible with the plan for 
the new ministry. 

5. SUSPENSION OF THE DUAL CONTROL, DECEMBER 8, 187 8. 

Had the Khedive been disposed to work loyally with the new min- 
istry it was. perhaps, possible that the new plan might have worked 
successfully. But Ismail soon showed that he was intent on- regain- 
ing his personal power. On February 20, 1879, Nubar Pasha, the 
head of the ministry, was dismissed. A new cabinet, in which the 
two European ministers retained their seats, was appointed. But 
on April 7 it was abruptly dismissed and a new purely Egyptian 
ministry was put in its place. The excuse given for this action was 
the new financial plan supported by the minister of finance. A 
counter financial project was brought forward by the Khedive. A 
note of warning was sent by the British Government on April 25. 
The German Government took more decided action. The German 
consul general at Cairo delivered to the Egyptian Government the 
following protest : 

" The decree of the 22nd April, by which the Egyptian Govern- 
ment fixes, of its sole authority, the settlement of its debts and annuls 
acquired and recognized rights is regarded by the Government of 
Germany as an open and direct violation of the international obli- 
gations which the Egyptian Government assumed when they adopted 
the judicial reform. 

" The Government of Germany refuse, therefore, to recognize the 
said decree as having any obligatory effect, either as regards the 
rights of German subjects or the competency of the mixed tribunals; 
and they hold the Khedive responsible for all the consequences which 
may result from his illegal proceedings.'' (British and Foreign State 
Papers, vol. 70, p. 107D.) 

Identical protests from all the other great powers were delivered 
within a few days. 

6. REESTABLISHMENT OF THE DUAL CONTROL, SEPTEMBER 4, 1879. 

The powers had now become convinced that no dependence was to 
be placed on Ismail. After the concurrence of the Sultan had been 
obtained Ismail was advised, first by France and England, afterwards 
by Germany and Austria, to abdicate. He did not heed the advice. 
On June 26 the Sultan telegraphed Ismail inviting him to " retire 
from government affairs," and announcing that his son Twefik had 
been appointed his successor. 



138 

The deposition of Ismail was followed, September 4, by the res- 
toration of the Dual Control. A period of comparative quiet fol- 
lowed. The Controllers-General showed themselves men of "good 
sense and good temper." The Dual Control, in the face of serious ob- 
stacles, worked fairly well; some beneficial reforms were carried out; 
"matters were improving in Egypt." (Cromer, I, 173). But the 
Arabi Bey " nationalist " insurrection was in process of development. 
The outbreak of that revolt in 188*2 brought on the British occupation 
of Egypt (See article, that title). 

T. ABOLITION OF THE DUAL CONTROL, 1883. 

The Dual Control in financial matters continued for a time after the 
British occupation began, but was abolished January 18, 1883, by 
decree of the Egyptian Government. Its abolition caused consider- 
able friction between the British and French Governments. (For 
the correspondence, see British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 74, pp. 
1285-1318). England argued that its abolition was necessary, be- 
cause the quasi-political position of the controllers and the necessity 
of agreement both by them and their governments constituted a 
serious obstacle to good administration. (Ibid, p. 1296). France ob- 
jected on the ground that the English plan to replace the Dual Con- 
trol by a single financial councillor amounted to nothing more than 
the exclusion of the French controller. (Ibid, p. 1287.) 

BIBLIOGRAPHY - . 
DOCUMENTS. 

British and Foreign State Papers, vols. 67-75, contain nearly all 
of the most important documents bearing on the Dual Control. The 
following are the most important documents, with volumes and pages 
indicated : 

Egyptian decree establishing a '* caisse " for the service of the pub- 
lic debt. Cairo, May 2, 1876. 67: 1014. 

Egyptian decree respecting finances (appointment of controllers 
general, etc.) Cairo, November 18, 1876. 67:1024. 

Collective note of powers, March 28, 1878. 70 : 973. 

Egyptian decree appointing a commission of inquiry into the 
financial situation of Egypt. Cairo, March 30, 1878. 69 : 662. 

Conclusions of commission of inquiry adopted by Khedive. Au- 
gust 24, 1878. 70:994. 

Rescript of Khedive respecting administrative reforms. August 
28,1878. 70:997. 

Egyptian decree, December 8, 1878, suspending provisionally the 
foreign control established by the decree of November 18, 1876. 
69 : 667. 



139 

Egyptian decree, for the regulation of the debts of the Govern- 
ment." April 22, 1879. 70 : 608. 

Protest of the German Government against the Egyptian decree 
of April 22.1879. 70:1079. 

Depeche adressee a l'ex-Khedive, Ismail Pacha. June, 1879. 70 : 
1092. 

Egyptian decree, reestablishing the general control of receipts 
and expenditures; and appointing Mr. Baring and M. de Blignieres 
to be controllers general. September 4, 1879. 70 : 620. 

Egyptian decree, defining the attributes of the controllers general, 
November 15, 1879. 70 : 622. 

British circular letter to powers. January 3, 1883. 75 : 676. 

Egyptian decree, abrogating declarations of November 18, 1876, 
September 4. 1879. November 15, 1879. January 18. 1883. 74:1093. 

NARRATIVES. 

Cromer, Earl of (Sir Evelyn Baring). Modern Egypt. 2 v. 
(New York, MacMillan, 1908.) Fairly dispassionate account of 
events leading to and covering Dual Control by participant in latter 
portion. (Work also covers Cromer's administration under Dual 
Control.) Dual Control not a satisfactory solution of difficulties. 
Best account of whole episode. 

Dicey, E. Series of articles on Egyptian situation appearing in 
Nineteenth Century. ( 1 : 665 ; 2 : 854 ; 5 : 670 ; 7 : 333 ; 8 : 458 ; 12 : 161 ; 
12:804; from June, 1877, to November, 1882.) Good narrative of 
events. Personal opinion of Dicey that England should have as- 
sumed protectorate powers at outset. Dual Control worked better 
than might have been expected from inherent defects. 

Gaignerot, E. La Question d'Egypte (Albi, 1901). Fair treat- 
ment of period from point of view of Frenchman writing before the 
establishment of the Entente Cordiale. Dual Control imperfect in 
principle, destroyed central power but not evils attending it. 

Leroy-Beaulieu, A. L'Egypte et le Controle Anglo-Francais. 
Revue de Deux Mondes, 3me. periode 52:696-705. (1 Aug., 1882.) 
Defense of Dual Control. Condemnation of French Government for 
not intervening along with England and thus maintaining status quo 
ante. 

Franconie, J. Le controle financier international en Egypte An- 
nates des sciences politiques, vol. 13, pp. 750-765 (1898). 

Martens, M. F. La Question Egyptienne et le droit international. 
Revue de Droit International, vol. 14, 355^02 (1882). Anarchy 
prevailing in Egypt at time of writing (1881-2) due to European 
exploitation and Anglo-French control primarily. Dual Control con- 



140 

demned unsparingly from point of view of expediency and inter- 
national law. Threatened British-French relations. 

Keinach, J. The Egyptian question and the French alliance. 
Nineteenth Century. 1-2:821-838 (Dec. 1882). Frenchman who held 
England mistaken when she refused to intervene at Fiance's first sug- 
gestion, not France at refusal to intervene later. Would return to 
Dual Control as best for Egypt, whole Levant, and mutual relations of 
England and France. 

Wallace, D. M. Egypt ami the Egyptian question. London, 1883. 
Distinguishes between real nature of first and second control. Situa- 
tion under latter was hopeful but for military revolt. 

Worsfold, W. B. The Future of Egypt. ' (The Nation's Library) 
London, n. d. Brief narrative of events leading to British occupa- 
tion and supervision in 1882, followed by discussion of later events. 

46. THE BRITISH OCCUPATION OF EGYPT, 1882-1914. 

1. INTRODUCTION. 

The Dual Control over Egyptian finances (See article*, that title 1 . 
established in 1870. paved the way for more extensive foreign inter- 
vention in Egyptian affairs, though there is no evidence to show that 
such was the intention of either the French or British Governments. 
It is now manifest that the same considerations which had led to 
French and British control in financial matters were bound to lead 
to more extensive intervention in Egyptian affairs, unless through 
the operation of the Dual Control a more stable condition of affairs in 
Egypt could be secured within a comparatively short period. What- 
ever chance there may have been that Egypt might escape passing 
under foreign rule was destroyed by the hostility of Ismail to the 
Dual Control and. after his deposition in 1ST'.), by the rapid develop- 
ment of the 'Vrabi Bey insurrection. 

2. TIIK AKABI BEY INSURRECTION. 

That insurrection has been variously appraised. It has been de- 
scribed (e. g., by Kose, II, 153) as a chiefly military revolt, incited 
by restless and dissatisfied native officers in the Egyptian army for 
personal advantage. The opposite point of view has been well ex- 
pressed by Morley (Gladstone, III, 73). " It was in truth national 
as well as military: it was anti-European, and above all, it was in 
its objects anti-Turk." The movement began among the Arab officers 
who complained of the preference shown to officers of Turkish origin, 
later expanded into an attack on the privileged position and pre- 
dominent influence of foreigners, and finally was directed against all 
Christians, whether native or foreign. The leader was a fellah officer 



141 

known as Arabi Bey, who even found his way into the Egyptian 
cabinet. The cry " Egypt for the Egyptians " was raised, and the 
danger of a serious rising which could put in jeopardy the lives and 
property of Europeans made necessary the formulation of an 
Egyptian policy by European governments, especially the French 
and British. 

3. FRENCH AND BRITISH COOPERATION, 1SS1-1S82. 

In France the Gambetta "Grand Ministry" had taken office 
November, 1881. Gambetta had a clearly conceived and definite 
polic} 7 . He was opposed to permitting intervention in Egyptian 
affairs in any form by Egypt's nominal sovereign, the Sultan. As 
he believed that intervention in some form had become necessary, and 
that England would not be likely to regard with approval a purely 
French intervention, Gambetta strongly advocated an Anglo-French 
entente looking to common action, if actual intervention should 
become necessary. Gambetta proposed to the British Government, 
December 30, 1881, that the two governments transmit to the 
Khedive identical declarations announcing their support in the 
present and the future for the Government of the Khedive against 
any peril which might arise (Documents diplomatiques, Affaires 
d'Egypte, 1881-1882, pp. 11-12). The British Government, on the 
other hand, fearing the complications which might arise from the 
operation of such a policy as that advocated by Gambetta, was 
strongly inclined to favor the idea of a Turkish intervention. This 
policy was based upon the theory that the Sultan, as suzerain of 
Egypt, was best entitled to act, if intervention became necessary, and 
that he could be held accountable for what he did in Egypt and the 
conditions which obtained there. The correspondence between the 
French and British Governments and their common action in send- 
ing the joint note of January 2, 1882, to the Khedive, indicate that 
the British Government was about ready to yield its views and 
accept those of Gambetta. 

4. FRENCH WITHDRAAVAL. 

The overthrow of the Grand Ministry in January, 1882, exerted a 
decisive influence upon the Egyptian question. The British Gov- 
ernment was released from pressure in favor of an Anglo-French 
intervention. French policy, under Gambetta clear and precise, 
entered into a period of the greatest uncertainty. Eene Millet 
(Revue des deux mondes, 5th period, vol. 21, p. 780) asserts, with 
possibly a measure of exaggeration, but with substantial truth, that 
the Freycinet ministry, which succeeded that of Gambetta, changed 
its conduct 10 times within five or six months. " Our ministry," he 



L42 

says, "rejected at first all Lnter.vention in Egypt (Feb. 3, L882), A 
few days Later it proposed that of Furope (Feb. 6). On May 27 it 
declared itself hostile to the cooperation of Turkish troops, which it 
accepted on the 29th, rejected anew on June 3, and rallied to on the 
17th. At the beginning of May it accepted the idea of acting with 
the English, but at the end of the same month it preferred a con- 
ference at Constantinople. On June '_M it rejected limited action 
for the protection of the Suez Canal, accepted it on the 15th, hesi- 
tated again on the 27th, finally made a decision (in favor of the 
course") and fell on the 29th." 

Responsibility for the wavering course taken by the French Gov- 
ernment has usually been laid at the door of Freycinet, head of the 
ministry at that time. Unquestionably a large, share of the responsi- 
bility belongs to him. But his lack of decision reflected the state of 
mind of the French public opinion. The French protectorate over 
Tunis (See article, that subject) had been established less than a year. 
It was reported that at the Congress of Berlin Bismarck, as well at, 
Salisbury, had encouraged the French to go into Tunis. There Wfta 
widespread fear that Bismarck wanted to get France embarked upon 
a policy of colonial and foreign adventure which would leave her 
weak and helpless in the face of Germany. To avoid falling into 
that trap it was necessary for France to proceed with great caution 
as to Egypt. Clemenceau, in the debate which led to the fall of the 
Freycinet ministry, expressed the prevalent feeling: "Gentlemen, the 
conclusion from that which is happening at the moment is this: 
Europe is covered with soldiers; everybody stands alert; all the 
powers reserve their liberty of action for the future; let us reserve 
the liberty of France/' (Quoted by Freycinet, La Question d'Egypte, 
311.) 

5. ALEXANDRIA AND TEL-EL-KEBIR, 1882. 

While the British and French Governments were endeavoring to 
conic to an understanding, the situation in Egypt became so serious 
that some immediate action was required. In May, British and 
French fleets were .sent to Alexandria, and on the proposal of France 
an ambassadors 9 conference met at Constantinople, but accomplished 
nothing. On June 11 there was a massacre of Europeans at Alex- 
andria. A few days later the French Government, learning that the 
English would use force against the insurgents, if the rebellion was 
not speedily suppressed by the authority of the Khedive, ordered the 
French lleet to withdraw. Finally, on July 11, the British fleet bom- 
barded Alexandria. After the bombardment the British Govern- 
ment invited the cooperation of the' French and Italians in military 
measures against Arabi Bey, but both declined to act. The British 
Government thereupon decided to act alone. An army was sent to 



14.3 

Egypt under Gen. Wolseley, who defeated Arabi at Tel-el-Kebir on 
September 13, 188 l J, and seized Cairo. The rebellion quickly col- 
lapsed. The Khedive, who had taken refuge in Alexandria, returned 
to Cairo. Matters were temporarily adjusted by Lord Dufferin, the 
British ambassador at Constantinople, who was sent to Egypt as 
high commissioner. 

6. BRITISH INTENTIONS IN 1882. 

There has been much discussion as to the intentions of the British 
Government at the time when the occupation of Egypt began. The 
charge has been frequently made that the British Government maneu- 
vered to bring about intervention by England alone and intended 
that the British occupation should become permanent. A large body 
of evidence bearing upon the question is now accessible. It includes 
many of the private papers of most of the men who exerted any con- 
siderable influence on the course taken by the English Government. 
The evidence clearly shows that England intervened alone because 
France was not ready to act with her and that it was the sincere 
intention of the British Government, of which Mr. Gladstone was 
then the head, to restore the power of the Khedive, to keep him on 
the right path for a time by friendly advice, and then to withdraw 
the British forces. Later on it seemed to successive British Govern- 
ments, whether liberal or conservative, that this course could not be 
carried out. Withdrawal would leave Egypt a prey to anarchy and 
might lead to serious complications with other powers. 

7. THE GRANVILLE CIRCULAR OF JANUARY 3, 1883. 

On January 3, 1883, Lord Granville issued from the foreign office a 
circular dispatch (British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 75, pp. 676- 
679) which became " the original charter of British policy in Egypt" 
(Fitzmaurice, Life of Granville, II, 306) . It began by calling atten- 
tion to the fact that " the course of events " had thrown upon England 
the task which it " would willingly have shared with other powers " 
of suppressing military insurrection and of restoring peace and order 
in Egypt. No definite time limit for British occupation was named, 
but Granville assured the powers that England desired to withdraw 
her military forces " as soon as the state of the country and the organ- 
ization of proper means for the maintenance of the Khedive's au- 
thority will admit of it." Meanwhile, Granville announced, the sit- 
uation imposed upon England "the duty of giving advice with the 
object of securing that the order of things to be established shall be 
of a satisfactory character and possess elements of stability and 
progress." The circular was generally accepted as an additional and 
peculiarly solemn pledge that England would withdraw from Egypt 
within a few years at the latest. 



144 

8. FRENCH AND BRITISH TENSION OVER EGYPT, 1882-1904. 

Owing to the condition of affairs prevailing in Egypt and espe- 
cially in the Soudan, on account of the Dervish insurrection (See 
article, The Soudan Question, 1883-1899) the English Government 
did not see its way clear to withdraw from Egypt as promptly as was 
expected in 1882-1883. The failure to withdraw, in accordance with 
the announcement of the Granville circular, gave great umbrage to 
France, in which country there was much regret that she had not 
joined England in the occupation of Egypt in 1882. For over 20 
years ill-feeling over the Egyptian question was the principal cause 
for a considerable tension between France and England, which on a 
number of occasions became very acute. The inability of France and 
England to come to an understanding over Egypt contributed much 
to the success of Bismarck's efforts to keep France isolated, and was 
a leading cause for the " splendid isolation " of England, 1882-1904. 

During the earlier part of the period a number of efforts were 
made to arrange for the withdrawal of the British from- Egypt. In 
1884-1885 a plan for British withdrawal and for the neutralization 
of Egypt was discussed by the British and French Governments in 
connection with an adjustment of the Egyptian debt. Differences of 
opinion over the financial question made the effort fail. The effort 
which gave the greatest promise of success came in 1885-1887. 

0. THE DRUMMOND WOLFF CONVENTIONS, 1 885-1 8S7. 

On October 25, 1885. Drummond Wolff, for the British Govern- 
ment, signed a convention with Turkey (British and Foreign State 
Papers vol. 76, pp. 442-445) which to a certain extent at least sanc- 
tioned the British occupation until a further convention could be ar- 
ranged providing for British withdrawal. Such a convention, stipu- 
lating for withdrawal in 1890, was signed at Constantinople, May 22, 
1887 (Ibid, vol. 78, pp. 1080-1086) . Owing to dissatisfaction in regard 
to an article which made possible reoccupation by the British, if dis- 
order followed their withdrawal, French and Eussian influence at 
Constantinople was successfully exerted to prevent ratification of the 
convention. Shortly after that event the attitude of the British 
Government as to withdrawal began to change. For a time there 
was no abandonment of the idea of ultimate withdrawal, but action 
in the near future was no longer considered practicable. After a 
time the Government, acting in harmony with a strong feeling which 
gradually developed in England, tacitly accepted the idea of perma- 
nent occupation. 

10. ACCEPTANCE OF THE BRITISH OCCUPATION, 1904. 

After the outcome of the Fashoda affair (See article, that title) 
had frustrated the effort an influential group in France to bring the 



145 

Egyptian question before an European conference, public opinion in 
France began to recognize that further opposition to the continued 
British occupation of Egypt would probably prove futile and that 
it stood in the way of desirable cordial relations between the two 
countries. In 1904 advantage was taken of the changed attitude 
by the two Governments. The convention of April 8, 1904, included 
a declaration in regard to Morocco and Egypt (See article, The For- 
mation of the Entente Cordiale), France agreed "not to obstruct 
the action of Great Britain in that country by asking that a limit of 
time be fixed for the British occupation or in any other manner " 
(British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 97, p. 39) . On August 8, 1904, 
the British Government was able to announce in the House of Com- 
mons that Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy had also made the 
same agreement as to Egypt (Hansard, Fourth Series, vol. 139, pp. 
1351-1352). 

11. THE PRESENT STATUS OF EGYPT — A BRITISH PROTECTORATE. 

Up to the outbreak of the World War, Egypt was a case of double 
or ambiguous sovereignty. Nominally, she was an autonomous 
Province of the Ottoman Empire, ruled by a Khedive or Vice- 
roy. The Khedives admitted the suzerainty of the Sultan of Turkey, 
to whom they paid an annual tribute. Really Egypt was governed 
by the British consul general, who ruled Egypt through advisors in 
the different ministers. In fact, all matters of importance were de- 
cide at the British Agency. 

At the outbreak of the World War the reigning (but not ruling) 
Khedive Abbas Hilmi was at his summer home on the Bosporus. He 
refused to declare for the Allies and remained in Turkey after Tur- 
key had entered the war on the side of the Central Powers. This 
gave the British an opportunity to despose the unfriendly Khedive 
and establish a definite status for Egypt by making her an integral 
part of the British Empire. 

After six weeks of negotiation Prince Hussein Kamel, the oldest 
living representative of the family of Mohammed Ali, was induced to 
accept the position of Sultan of Egypt under a British protectorate. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

The best and most authoritative work on the British occupation of 
Egypt is undoubtedly that by the Earl of Cromer, Modern Egypt 
(New York, Macmillan, 1908), 2 vols. Among the numerous books 
dealing with this subject, the following are particularly noteworthy : 
Milner, A. (England in Egypt. (New York, Macmillan, 1892.) 
Freycinet, C. de. La question d'Egypte. (Paris, 1905.) Has a 
marked French bias. 
53706—18 10 



146 

Cameron, D. A. Egypt in the Nineteenth Century. (London, 

1898.) A useful summary of events up to 1882. 
Dicey, E. The Story of the Khedive. (London, 1902.) 
McCoan, J. C. Egypt under Ismail. (London, 1899.) 
Colvin, Sir A. The Making of Modern Egypt. (London, 1906.) 
White, A. S. The Expansion of Egypt, 69-61, 64-75, ' 170-179. 

(London, Methuen, 1899.) 
Resener, H. Ai'gypten unter Englisher Okkupation. (Berlin, 

1896.) A translation into French was published at Cairo in 1897. 
Planchut, E. L'figypte et l'occupation anglaise. (Paris, 1889.) 
Bourquet, A. La France et l'Angleterre et Egypte. (Paris, Plon, 

1897.) 

For good brief accounts, see Rose, J. H., The Development of 

the European Nations, 1870-1914 (New York, Putnam, *1916), II, 

ch. 4; and Hazen, C. D., Europe since 1815 (New York, Holt, 1910), 

pp. 557-561. 

For very recent developments, see Gibbons, H. A., The New Map 

of Africa (New York, The Century Co., 1916) , ch. 21. 

See also bibliography of article, The Dual Control over Egyptian 

Finances. 

47. THE SOUDAN QUESTION, 1881-1899. 

1. LOSS OF THE SOUDAN, 1884-1885. 

Through her intervention in Egypt in 1882 (See article, The Brit- 
ish Occupation of Egypt, 1882-1914), England became involved in 
an enterprise which resulted in humiliation and disaster. In 1884- 
1885 the Soudan, an Egyptian dependency, was in a state of open 
rebellion which threatened the speedy destruction of Egyptian con- 
trol over the region. This rebellion had been stirred up by a 
religious fanatic known as the Mahdi, or leader, who succeeded 
in arousing the fierce religious fanaticism of the Soudanese by claim- 
ing to be a kind of prophet or Messiah. He had proclaimed a re- 
ligious war, and an army of 10,000 men under an English officer sent 
to repress the revolt had been annihilated in November, 1883. The 
Gladstone Government decided to abandon the Soudan, which the 
Egyptian governing class greatly desired to reconquer. 

2. Gordon's mission and death at khartoum, 1884-1885. 

But the Soudan could not be wholly abandoned at once. It was 
necessary to make at least some effort to rescue certain troops who 
had been driven into fortresses and besieged there. The British Gov- 
ernment was unwilling to send a military expedition, but finally 
decided to send Gen. Gordon, former governor general of the Soudan 
under the Egyptian Government, who reached Khartoum, but was 



147 

in his turn besieged. A cry. went up in England for the relief of 
Gordon. The Government was extremely dilatory, but finally sent 
an expedition in September, 1884. It was too late. It reached Khar- 
toum on January 28, 1885, only to find that the place had been 
stormed a few days earlier, and Gordon, together with 11,000 of his 
men, had been massacred. This unfortunate outcome contributed in 
large measure to the downfall of the Gladstone ministry. 

3. THE RECONQUEST OF THE SOUDAN, 1896-1S98. 

For the next decade the Soudan was abandoned to the dervishes. 
But various factors, such as the desire to avenge Gordon's death, a 
sense of humiliation over the loss of the Soudan, the need of con- 
trolling the Upper Nile, the growth of British imperialism, and 
especially the bad effect of conditions in Soudan upon Egypt, made 
it certain that the reconquest of the Soudan would one day be 
attempted. 

In 1896 an Anglo-Eg}^ptian army was sent into the Soudan under 
Gen. Kitchener. Building a railway as he advanced, he progressed 
slowly but surely. At the Battle of Omdurman, September 2, 1898, 
the power of the Dervishes was completely annihilated. 

The British and Egyptian flags were both raised over the Soudan, 
and the Government established there was nominally a condomin- 
ium — a dual or Anglo-Egyptian rule. But for practical purposes the 
Soudan as well as Egypt became a part of the British Empire. 

The administration of the Soudan was organized on the basis of 
an agreement between the British and Egyptian Governments signed' 
on January 19, 1899. According to this agreement, the British and 
Egyptian flags are to be used together, and the supreme military and 
civil command is vested in a governor general who is appointed by 
the Khedive on the recommendation of the British Government. By 
this plan the administrative difficulties experienced in Egypt from 
the capitulations, mixed tribunals, and the general complexity of 
the legal system are avoided. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

On the Soudan question, see especially the Earl of Cromer, 
Modern Egypt (New York, Macmillan, 1908), 2 vols., Pt. II, chs. 
19-27, and Pt. Ill, chs. 28-33. 

Cocheris, Situation internationale de l'Egypte et du Soudan. 
(Paris, 1903.) 

Wingate, F. R. Mahdism and the Egyptian Sudan (1891). 

Journals of Maj. Gen. Gordon at Khartoum (1885). 

Pensa, H. L'Egypte et le Soudan egyptien. (Paris, 1895.) 

For good brief accounts, see Rose, J. H., The Development of the 
European Nations, 1870-1914 (New York, Putnam, 1916), Pt. II, chs. 



148 

5 and 6 ; Gibbons, H. A., The New Map of Africa (New York, Century 
Co., 1916), ch. 1; Harris, N. D., Intervention and Colonization in 
Africa, ch. 11 (Boston, Houghton, 1914) ; White, A. S., The Expan- 
sion of Egypt, 376-386 (London, Methuen, 1899). 

48. THE ACQUISITION OF MADAGASCAR BY FRANCE, 

1882-1897. 

1. INTRODUCTION. 

In the scramble for Africa that began after the Congress of Berlin 
of 1878, England and Germany encouraged France to take her 
share — England, because of her complications with Egypt; Ger- 
many, in order to distract France from the Vosges. Under the ener- 
getic leadership of Jules Ferry, Madagascar experienced the results 
of the new policy. 

In spite of friction between England and France in Madagascar, 
by 1882 the countries through an informal understanding had 
adopted an " identic attitude " toward the Hova, the most powerful 
of the Malagasy tribes and had recognized their supremacy over the 
whole island. 

2. CAUSES OF THE DISPUTE IN 18S2 BETWEEN THE HOVA GOVERNMENT 

AND FRANCE. 

(1) France objected to the Hova flags in the regions which she 
claimed by treaties made in 1840 and 1841 with various Sakalava 
chiefs. (Islands of Mayotte and Nossi-Be; protectorate over main- 
land opposite.) 

The Hova Government asserted that France had abandoned her 
claims by the recognition of Hova supremacy in the treaty of 1868. 

(•2) By article from above treaty, France claimed the lands of 
the late French consul, Laborde, for his heirs. 

The Hova Government held that a Malagasy law of 1881 forbade 
alienation of land to aliens. 

(3) France demanded an indemnity for injuries to her citizens. 

3. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FRENCH PROTECTORATE, 1SS3-1885. 

In spite of Hova missions to Paris and to London, France sent 
the Hova Queen an ultimatum on June 1, 1883 (See Appendix I, 23). 
It was rejected on the 9th. The war was ended by the treaty of 
December 17, 1885, practically establishing a French protectorate. 
France obtained complete control of Hova foreign affairs, but recog- 
nized Ranalvo III as Queen over the whole island except the Bay of 
Diego Suarez. (Ceded outright to France.) 



149 

In accordance with article '-'A of the Act of the Berlin Conference 
of 1884-85, the powers were notified of this treaty. 

On August 5 and November 17, 1890, England and Germany re- 
spectively recognized the French protectorate. (See Appendix I, 
39, 40.) 

4. CONVENTION OF 1890. 

Continued disturbances resulted in the French ultimatum of Octo- 
ber, 1894, which was rejected by the Hova. After defeat in war, 
Eanalvo III signed the treaty of October 1, 1895. recognizing the 
protectorate " with all its consequences." Internal and foreign affairs 
were to be controlled by France. The treaty was never ratified by 
the French Government. 

On January 18, 1896, Ranalvo signed a " unilateral convention," 
recognizing that France had taken possession of the island. (See 
Appendix I, 45.) On February 11 the powers were notified. On 
August 6 a law was passed declaring that France had taken posses- 
sion of the island. Early in 1897 Ranalvo was deposed and deported. 

Since 1897 there have been occasional protests by other countries, 
but no serious challenge of the right of France to the island. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

PRIMARY SOURCES ARRANGED IN ORDER 01 THEIR IMPORTANCE. 

Clercq, A. de. Compiler. Recueil des Traites de la France. 22 
vols. (Pedone-Lauriel, Paris, 1880-1917.) Vols. 8, 10, 15, 20, and 
21 contain the texts of French treaties, conventions, acts of cession, 
etc., in regard to Madagascar, from 1750 to 1900. Exceedingly valu- 
able. 

Parliamentary Papers. 1883, XLVIII. LXXXII; 1884-5, LV; 
188G, XL VII; 1890, LI, LXXXI; 1898, LX; 1899, CIX. Contain 
most important material, diplomatic notes, English, French Ma- 
lagasy, reports of envoys, texts of treaties, etc. 

Hertslet, Sir E. The Map of Africa by Treaty. 3rd ed. 3 vols, 
and a collection of maps. (Stationery office, London, 1909.) Con- 
tains brief summaries of the important conventions and treaties 
affecting Madagascar. Very valuable. 

Rouard de Card, E. Traites de Delimitation concernant l'Afrique 
FrancaLse. (Pedone, Paris. 1910.) Contains agreement of 1890 
between France and England. 

FRENCH SECONDARY SOURCES ARRANGED IN ORDER OF IMPORTANCE. 

Rouard de Card, E. Les Traites de Protectorate Conclus par la 
France en Afrique. (Pedone, Paris. 1897.) An excellent account of 
the French point of view of the diplomatic history of Madagascar. 



150 

Petit, M. Editor. Les Colonies Francaises. Petite Encyclopedic 
Coloniale. 2 vols. Larousse, Paris. 1902. Vol. II contains an ex- 
cellent article on Madagascar written by a number of scholars, with 
a good map and full bibliography, mainly, however, of French ma- 
terial. The historical and diplomatic history is by H. Froidevaux. 

Hanotaux, G. L'Affaire de Madagascar. (Paris. Levy. 1896.) 
Gives the point of view of the French Government. 

Lavisse, E. et Rambaud, A. Histoire Generale du IV Siecle a nos 
jours. 12 vols. (Paris, Colin, 1901.) Ch. 22, L'Empire Colonial 
Francais de 1870 a nos jours, contains a good account of Madagascar 
by Rambaud. 

Brunet, L. La France a Madagascar, 1815-1895. (Hachette et 
Cie., Paris, 2d ed., 1895.) Valuable as an example of a French 
polemic against both the Hova and the English. 

Darcy, Jean. France et Angleterre ; Cent Annees de Rivalite Co- 
loniale. L'afl'aire de Madagascar. (Perrin et Cie., Paris. 1908.) 
Useful for the French point of view. 

ENGLISH SECONDARY SOURCES ARRANGED IN ORDER OF IMPORTANCE. 

Madagascar Tracts, No. 1. " What are ' French claims ' on Mada- 
gascar ? " in Parliamentary Papers. 1883, XL VIII. This state- 
ment of the London Madagascar committee of November 22, 1882, is 
valuable for the English point of view. 

Sibree, Rev. James. Article on Madagascar in Encyclopedia 
Britannica. 11th ed. London. 1910-11. A valuable account by 
a scholar who lived many years on the island, and knows the language 
of the natives. Contains an excellent bibliography. 

Johnston, Sir H. H. A History of the Colonization of Africa by 
Alien Races. New revised edition. (Cambridge, University Press, 
1913.) Contains a good short account of Madagascar. 

Oliver, S. P. The True Story of the French Dispute in Madagas- 
car. (London, Unwin, 1885.) Valuable for the English point of 

view. 

Blind, Karl. The Fictitious French Claim to Madagascar, Con- 
temporary Review, December, 1894, pp. 883-889. A bitter attack 
on French diplomatic methods and denial of French rights in 
Madagascar. 

Rose, J. H. The Development of the European Nations, 1870- 
1900. 2 vols, in one. (New York, Putnam, 1916.) Vol. II, ch. 7. 

Grandidier, G. Bibliographe de Madagascar. 2 vols. (Comite 
de Madagascar, Paris, 1905, 1906,) A very complete bibliography. 



MAPS. 



Cravier, G. La Cartographic de Madagascar. (Cagniard, Rouen, 
C'hallamel, Paris. 1896.) Contains valuable series of early maps of 



151 

Madagascar ; also facing p. 438 an excellent modern map taken from 
Nouvel Atlas Colonial de H. Mager. Echelle: 1: 4, 100,000. 

49. ANGLO-GERMAN RIVALRY IN SOUTHWEST AFRICA, 

1883-1886. 

1. INTRODUCTION. 

The Anglo-German colonial competition in South Africa began 
with the controversy in the Angra Pequena incident. Previous to 
1883, Germany took but little part in African affairs. Bismarck, who 
had little interest in colonies, postponed successfully her entrance into 
the field of colonial politics until he had secured the position of the 
new German Empire through the adoption of his tariff program (July, 
1879) and the creation of the Triple Alliance in 1882. At that time 
neither the German Government nor any of her traders had terri- 
torial possessions in Southwest Africa. The Gesellschaft der Rhein- 
ischen Missionen, which had been at work in this region since 1842, 
had 12 mission stations and considerable property in Great Namaqua- 
land and Herreroland. In 1863 and in 1880, the British Government 
was asked by Germany to give protection to these missionaries dur- 
ing the periods of conflict between native races. Great Britain de- 
clined to use force, but sent representatives who settled the troubles 
by mediation. As a result of the opening of trade between British 
merchants and the natives along the coast, 10 islands near Angra 
Pequena Bay were put under British protection in 1863 and 1869, 
which was extended to Walfish Bay and 300 square miles adjacent to 
it on March 12, 1878. But the British Foreign Office was unwilling 
to assume the burden and responsibility of establishing a protectorate 
over the entire region between the Orange River and Portuguese 
Angola. 

, 2. THE LTTDERITZ EXPEDITION. 

The German Imperial Government, fully cognizant of these facts, 
determined to start a colony on a part of this unoccupied territory. 
On February 7, 1883, Count Herbert Bismarck raised the question of 
territorial jurisdiction in Southwest Africa in an interview with 
Sir Julian Pauncefote, undersecretary of state, at the foreign office. 
He said the German Government, without having the least design to 
establish any footing in South Africa, was ready to extend its pro- 
tection to a German trader who was about to set up a factory on that 
coast, in case England was unwilling to do so, or had no jurisdiction 
in that region. In April Herr F. A. E. Luederitz, a Bremen mer- 
chant, was permitted to send an expedition to Southwest Africa 
which secured 150 square miles of land on Angra Pequena Bay, in- 
creased in August to a large strip of territory extending from the 



152 

Orange River to latitude 26° S. and reaching 20 miles into the in- 
terior. On September 10 a " memorandum " was left at the British 
Foreign Office stating that Herr Luederitz had purchased 150 square 
miles of territory on Angra Pequena Bay and asking if England 
claimed suzerainty over that district. This was followed by an in- 
quiry on November 16 requesting a definite statement of the British 
claims in this region and the basis of these claims. Lord Granville 
replied on November 21 that British sovereignty had been proclaimed 
over "Walfish Bay and the islands near Angra Pequeiia Bay. But, he 
added, " Her Majesty's Government consider * * * that any 
claim to sovereignty or jurisdiction by a foreign power between 
the southern point of Portuguese jurisdiction at latitude 18° S. and 
the frontier of Cape Colony would infringe their legitimate rights." 
(British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 75, p. 531.) 

3. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GERMAN PROTECTORATE. 

The British Foreign Office, without taking any further steps to 
assume a protectorate over the territory in question or to define 
clearly its own position, permitted the Colonial Office to occupy the 
next six months in persuading the Government of Cape Colony to 
take over the jurisdiction of the region north of the Orange River. 
Meanwhile, impelled to action by pressure from Germany and by in- 
timations, confidently given on June 4 and 14, that Bismarck could 
not recognize the right of Cape Colony to annex Angra Pequena 
and that England's delay was a cover for Cape Colony's action in 
seizing the land, the British Foreign Office declared on July 14, 
1884, that it would not oppose the German claim to a protectorate 
ever Angra Pequena. On August 7, the German warship Elisabeth 
took possession of the whole coast from the Orange River to latitude 
26° S. At first the British Government protested against this ex- 
tension of claims, but on September 19 it recognized the German 
protectorate over Southwest Africa from the Orange River to the 
Portuguese possessions on condition that their own claims to Walfish 
Bay and the islands along the coast were not questioned. To this 
Germany assented. 

4. ADJUSTMENT OF BOUNDARIES. 

A joint commission was appointed to settle the question of private 
claims such as those of De Pass and Luederitz; and Great Britain 
officially recognized German suzerainty over the whole region em- 
bracing approximately 215,000 square miles between the Orange 
River and the Portuguese boundary at latitude 18° S. The eastern 
boundary of this new German possession was finally fixed in the 
Anglo-German treaty of July 1, 1890, by which Germany received a 



153 

large accession of territory and access to the Zambesi River. 
(See article, The Zanzibar-Heligoland Treaty of 1890.) The 
northern line was determined in an agreement with Portugal, signed 
on December 30, 1886, by which the German boundary was pushed 
north to the Kunene River. Thus the German Empire acquired its 
first African colony comprising 322,450 square miles of territory. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

The Angra Pequena correspondence is in British Parliamentary 
Papers (Blue Book) for 1884, Angra Pequena, nos. 4190, 4262, 4265; 
British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 75, 528-53 ; the German Weiss 
Buch, 1884; and the Staatsarchiv, vols. 43, 44. 

J. Scott Keltic. The Partition of Africa. (London, Stanford, 
1895.) 

H. H. Johnston. History of the Colonization of Africa by Alien 
Races. Cambridge, University Press, 1899. 

N. D. Harris. Intervention and Colonization in Africa, ch. 4. 
(Boston, Houghton, 1914.) 

Lowe, Charles. Prince Bismarck. 2 vols. (Boston, Roberts, 
1895.) 

Hahn, Ludwig. Fiirst Bismarck. 5 vols. (Berlin, Hertz, 1878- 
1891.) 

50. ANGLO-GERMAN RIVALRY IN EAST AFRICA, 1885-1890. 

1. INTRODUCTION. 

The Sultans of Zanzibar had been overlords of East Africa since 
1837. Their suzerainty on the mainland extended from Tungi Bay 
northward to Witu, and as far inland as Lakes Tangayika and 
Victoria Nyanza; but their claims to all this territory had never 
been clearly established, and their hold over many of the local 
chieftains was slight. 

2. BEGINNING OF GERMAN ACTIVITY IN EAST AFRICA. 

Through the efforts of the German East African Co. (chartered 
in February, 1885) and its agents, who were busy making treaties 
with native chiefs between November, 1884, and July, 1885, German 
protection was officially extended to some 60,000 square miles of 
territory in the interior of East Africa, opposite the island of 
Zanzibar. Sultan Bargash, ruler of Zanzibar, protested officially, 
on April 27 and May 11, to the Governments of Germany and 
England, respectively, against the activity of these German agents. 
Great Britain declined to interfere; and, on August 11, 1885, Bar- 
gash was compelled by a German naval demonstration to recognize 



154 

the German claims, and to withdraw his troops from the territory 
in dispute as a preliminary to a settlement. 

3. ANGLO-GERMAN CONVENTION OF 18S6 (SEE APPENDIX I, 34). 

Through the influence of the British Foreign Office, however, a 
commission of three was appointed to delimit the boundaries of 
(he Sultan's possessions. This commission made its report on June 
9, 1886; and, on the basis of its recommendations, Great Britain and 
the German Empire reached an agreement concerning the position 
of th'e Sultan and their own territorial claims in East Africa on 
October 29 of the same year (British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 
77, 1130-1132). The islands of Zanzibar, Pemba, Lamu, and Mafia, 
and a strip of the codst 10 miles wide, extending from the middle of 
Tungi Bay to Kipini at the mouth of the Tana River (together with 
five town* north of Kipini), were assigned to Sultan Bargash, who 
accepted the decision on December 1. 

4. SPHERES OF INFLUENCE. 

The two Governments defined roughly their respective ' ; spheres of 
influence " in the interior as reaching from the Umba River as a divid- 
ing line, north to the Juba River for England, and south to the 
Rovuma River for the German Empire. As considerable uncer- 
tainty existed concerning the geographical features of this inland 
region, it was agreed that the claims of both States were to extend 
westward as far as Victoria Nyanza in accordance with the new 
German theory that possession of the coast implied ownership of 
the interior. The correspondence between Lord Salisbury and 
Baron von Plessen also shows, that an understanding existed to the 
effect that the Germans were to. keep south of Lake Victoria in their 
explorations and expansion, and the British north of it, the boundary 
being a line drawn from the north of the Umba River past the 
northern base of Mount Kilimanjaro to a point where the first 
degree of south latitude intersects the shore of Lake Victoria. In 
order to secure seaports and control of the coast trade, both England 
and Germany (1888) leased the coast strips bordering on their claims 
from the Sultan of Zanzibar. 

5. TREATY OF JULY 1, 1890. 



Baron Lambermont ended the Anglo- German dispute concerning 
the control of the islands of Lamu, Manda, and Patta, and the ports 
of Kismayu, Brava, and Merka, by an award in favor of England 
in 1889 (Hertslet, Map of Africa by Treaty, pp. 891-899). And 
on July 1, 1890, the German and British Governments signed an 



155 

agreement, after several preliminary discussions, which set definite 
limits to their protectorates in East Africa, and brought to an 
end a number of lively controversies. By this treaty (See article. 
The Zanzibar-Heligoland Treaty of 1890. See also Appendix 
I, 38) Witu, Zanzibar, and Uganda passed under British protec- 
tion, while Heligoland (in the North Sea) and a large district 
west and south of Lake Victoria went to Germany, bringing her 
boundaries to Lake Tanganyika and Nyassa. Of East Africa, the 
Imperial German Government received 384,000 square miles of terri- 
tory. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

COEEESPONDENCE. 

British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 77, pp. 1099-1139 ; vol. 78, 
pp. 1253-1302, 1077 ; vol. 79, pp. 325-386 ; vol. 81, pp. 87-132. 

TBEATIES. 

German treaties with native tribes. British and Foreign State 
Papers, vol. 77, pp. 10-22. 

Anglo-German, October 29, 1886. Hertslet, Commercial Treaties, 
vol. 17, pp. 1174-76. 

Anglo-German, July 1, 1890. British and Foreign State Papers, 
vol. 82, pp. 35^7. 

NAEBATIVES. 

Lugard, Capt. F. D. Rise of our East African Empire, 2 vols. 
(London, Blackwood, 1893.) 

Johnston, H. H. The Uganda Protectorate. (London, Hutchin- 
son, 1902.) 

Bruckner, B. Jahrbuch der Deutschen Kolonial-Politik. (Ber- 
lin, 1899.) 

Mayer, Hans. Das Deutsche Kolonialreich. 2 vols. (Leipzig, 
1909.) 

Keltie, J. Scott. The Partition of Africa. (London, Stanford, 
1895.) 

Johnston, H. H. History of the Colonization of Africa by Alien 
Races. (Cambridge, University Press, 1899.) 

Harris, N. D. Intervention and Colonization in Africa. (Boston, 
Houghton, 1914.) Chap. 5. 

MAP8. 

Harris, N. D. Intervention and Colonization in Africa, p. 86. 
Hertslet, Map of Africa by Treaty, 3 vols, and atlas (London, 
Stationery Office, 1909). 



156 
51. THE QUESTION OF WEST AFRICA. 

l. INTRODUCTION, 

This article deals with the portion of West Africa lying between the 
southern boundary of Morocco and the Congo River, there being else- 
where articles treating Morocco, the Belgian Congo, Portuguese West 
Africa, and German Southwest Africa. It is confined to international 
relations, neglecting national activity and individual colonial growth. 

2. THE BONOS INTERESTS OF WEST AFRICA. 

There is one nominally sovereign State. Liberia, founded by free 
negroes sent from the United States by the American Colonization 
Society nearly a century ago and declared an independent nation a 
little before the middle of the nineteenth century. Of Portuguese 
territory, which in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and for some 
time thereafter nominally embraced the entire coast, there remains 
within the limits set, Portuguese Guinea (a small portion of the main- 
land a short distance southeast of that nation's much more important 
Cape Verde Islands) and two cocoa islands, San Thome and Principe. 
in the Gulf of Guinea, near the Equator. Spain has Rio de Oro, ex- 
tending some 700 miles along the coast opposite to her Canary Is- 
lands: the island of Fernando Po, in the Gulf of Guinea; and a little 
block id* nearby continental territory between German and French 
possessions. 

8. THE LEADING ASPIRANTS FOR WEST AFRICA. 

The remainder of West Africa was divided, during the last two 

decades of the nineteenth century, between France, England, and 
Germany. ' The last has two detached territories — the small ToffO" 
land north of the Gulf of Guinea, and the much larger Cameroon* 
east of that gulf, stretching inland to Lake Chad. England has 
four detached possessions — the very small Gambia wedge a Utile 
north o( Portuguese Guinea, the larger Sierra Leone Colony some 
distance southeast, the still larger Gold Coast Colony lying west 
of German Togo, and the princely domain of Nigeria, lying on 
both sides of the lower course of the River Niger and extending 
toward the heart of the continent to Lake Chad. Lying back of and 
touching all of the others named and containing several times as 
much territory as all of them combined, is the great French imperial 
domain, having six separate frontages on the coast, bounded on the 
south by the Belgian Congo, on the east by the Anglo-Egyptian 
Soudan and Italian Tripoli, and on the north by the Mediterranean 
Sea. 



157 

4. BEGINNING OF THE RIVALKY. 

Missionaries, explorers, and traders from the three chief contest- 
ing nations had been active during most of the nineteenth century, 
and English and French political authority had been established and 
recognized at several isolated spots, but Germany made no attempt 
to secure a political footing until 1884. In that year the scramble 
for the still unclaimed regions of Africa began, not only in West 
A frica, but in all other parts of the continent, which continued with 
increasing intensity for more than a decade, and at the end of the 
century left very little of the great continent unclaimed or unoccu- 
pied by one of the three. 

About 1870 the French from the Senegal settlements in the extreme 
west had begun activity toward the interior, and by the end of that 
decade had reached the Upper Niger, establishing their authority and 
securing recognition from the native chiefs. To counteract expanding 
French influence the English from the Lower Niger organized more 
efficiently in 1879, began extending their treaty relations with the 
native chiefs, and by the middle of the next decade had secured rec- 
ognition of British authority well up the Middle Niger and in the 
valley of its eastern tributary, the Benue, as far as Lake Chad. 
They had even bought out some of the French claims. When the 
French, going south from the head of the Niger, approached British 
Sierra Leone settlements the two Governments entered into an agree- 
ment in 1882 for the settlement of their territorial claims in that 
region. This was the first of a long series of agreements for that 
purpose to be noticed further on. 

5. OKIl.vrAN ACTIVITY. 

As in the case of English and French, German enterprise began 
by the activity of individuals or private organizations. In 1878 the 
German African Society was formed and four years later the German 
Colonial Society. Many Germans, officials as well as others, opposed 
the establishment of colonies. Even Bismarck was slow in being con- 
vinced that Germany should embark on an African colonial policy, and 
after he started he moved slowly and cautiously. As is shown in the 
discussion of the matter elsewhere (See article, Anglo-German rivalry 
in Southwest Africa), it was not until Great Britain had refused, 
after being repeatedly questioned (1883) to assume responsibility for 
the protection of German subjects in Southwest Africa outside of 
Walfish Bay that Germany declared a protectorate over that region 
early in 1884. He also requested and obtained assurances of courteous 
1 reatment by British officials in Africa for Dr. Nachtigal, who, it was 
represented, was going to make explorations and learn the state of 



158 

German commerce in the Gulf of Guinea. But, following the ex- 
ample of France and England, Dr. Nachtigal proceeded to make 
treaties with native chiefs with whom neither of the western powers 
had yet concluded treaties, although many of the same chiefs had 
requested that English sovereignty and protection should be extended 
over them. As a consequence of these agreements, a German protec- 
torate was declared over Togo and the Cameroons in the middle of 
the same year, 1884. The English officials had been trapped and were 
much disturbed because they had failed to see and forestall Bis- 
marck's schemes. 

G. BERLIN CONFERENCE, 1884-85. % 

Between May and November of 1884, by means of an extensive cor- 
respondence, the cabinets of London and Berlin arranged for the in- 
ternational conference on African affairs which sat at the latter capi- 
tal from November 15, 1884, to February 26, 1885, and decided on 
rules to govern the future activity of the powers in Africa, especially 
what should constitute spheres of influence and a valid occupation of 
territory (See article, The Berlin Conference of 1884-85) . Thereafter 
ensued the race between the three contestants to see which*would se- 
cure the most of the unoccupied territory. England and France had a 
considerable start, and they maintained their lead. The rich Niger 
Valley, already in their control, was left to them, and the Nile was, 
dominated by England. Leopold of Belgium had preempted the 
Congo Basin, and Portugal claimed the Zambesi. To Germany, so 
late in the field, seemed to be left only the less productive and less 
hospitable portions; but she proceeded to appropriate the most and 
best she could get her hands on. 

7. ANGLO-GERMAN ADJUSTMENTS. 

In May, 1885, the first of a series of agreements was reached draw- 
ing a line between British Nigeria and German Cameroons; and 
Germany's protectorate over the latter was recognized by England 
in spite of the latter's resentment over the outcome of Dr. Nachtigal's 
activities. A contest followed to obtain possession of the Upper 
Benue and Lake Chad, which resulting in an agreement of 1886, 
recognized accomplished facts by admitting Germany to a small por- 
tion of the headwaters of the Benue and the southern shore of Lake 
Chad, but leaving England the rest of the valley of that river and 
the western shore of the lake. In 1893 a very important agreement 
recognized as within the German sphere all of that central African 
region lying south and east of Lake Chad between Nigeria on the 
west and the Anglo-Egyptian Soudan on the east. It was thought 
that Great Britain had gained much by admitting Germany here in 
order to block the efforts of France to unite her possessions in the 



159 

Soudan with those in the Congo by means of a wide strip of this 
territory touching the eastern side of Lake Chad. This Anglo-Ger- 
man settlement confirmed the friendly relations established by the 
Zanzibar-Heligoland transfers of 1890 (See article, The Zanzibar- 
Heligoland Treaty of 1890). A convention of 1901 provided for the 
marking of the boundary between the British Gold Coast Colony and 
German Togoland, as had been partially settled by conventions in 
1890 and 1899; and in 1904 notes were exchanged recognizing the 
description of this boundary as drawn by the commission. In 1906, 
1907, and 1909 conventions and reports of commissions established 
and described the line between Nigeria and Cameroons from Lake 
Chad to Yola; and in 1913 another agreement recognized the con- 
tinued markings from Yola to the sea. 

8. FRANCO-GERMAN ADJUSTMENTS. 

Between France and Germany preliminary agreements of 1885 and 
1887 prepared the way for the important convention of 1894 by 
which Germany transferred to France by far the larger portion of 
the central African territory which in the preceding year England 
had recognized as within the German sphere. Thus, contrary to the 
wish of England, France instead of Germany became neighbor to 
the Anglo-Egyptian Soudan and was admitted to the eastern shore 
•of Lake Chad. The boundary was drawn between the German Cam- 
eroons and what thus became French Equatorial Africa. An agree- 
ment of 1897 fixed the boundary between German Togo on the one 
side and French Dahome and Soudan on the other, and in 1912 a 
declaration was signed concerning the delimitation of this frontier. 
Early in 1908 a new convention defined the boundary between the 
French Congo and the German Cameroons. In consequence of the 
Morocco crisis of 1911 (See article, that title), readjustments were 
agreed upon in November, 1911, and in September, 1912, of the 
boundary between the German Cameroons and French Congo and 
Equatorial Africa, so that a wedge of German territory extended 
southward from the Cameroons to the Congo, and another eastward 
to the Ubangi, admitting Germany to the great central African 
waterway and cutting off the French Congo from the rest of the 
equatorial possessions of that power, breaking the continuity of 
French territory from the Mediterranean to the Congo. However, 
so long as that river remains a free international highway, the actual 
loss to France is negligible. 

9. ANGLO-FRENCH ADJUSTMENTS. 

The long series of Anglo-French agreements begun in 1882, as 
stated above, continued through 1890-1893 and 1895, drawing bound- 
ary lines between the French Soudan on one side and English Nigeria, 



160 

Gold Coast, Sierra Leone, and Gambia on the other, and providing 
for commissions to mark them. In 1896 an agreement was effected 
accepting the report of a commission which marked the boundary 
between Dahome and Nigeria. In the middle of 1898 a new agree- 
ment was signed concerning the delimitation of the frontier on both 
sides of the Niger River from Lake Chad to the sea, which was to be 
ratified within six months, and notes were exchanged providing for 
the simultaneous evacuation of territories which each had yielded to 
the other. But the Anglo-French crisis of that year over their ac- 
tivities on the Upper Nile, usually known as the Fashoda incident 
(See article, The Fashoda Affair, 1898-1899), strained their relations 
almost to the breaking point, and the time specified for evacuation 
was allowed to lapse without exchange of ratifications; but later in 
the year, after amicable settlement of the difficulties on the Nile, the 
time for exchanging ratifications of the West African agreement was 
extended to one year. On the day before its expiration the exchange 
was effected, June 13, 1899. In the meantime, on March 21, a declara- 
tion had been signed completing the West African settlement and 
drawing a line between French Soudan and Anglo-Egyptian Soudan. 
Amicable relations were resumed. As a part of the Anglo-French 
entente (See article, The Formation of the Entente Cordiale) , effected 
in 1904, those powers arranged for the settlement of all unsettled 
boundaries between their West African (as well as other) possessions. 
Commissions appointed to mark the unmarked portions reported and 
their reports were accepted by agreements of 1906, 1910, 1911, and 
1913. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

DOCUMENTS. 

The following is a list of some of the more important documents 
referred to (approximately in the order in which they have been 
mentioned above) which are found in British and Foreign State 
Papers. Most of them may be found in other documentary collec- 
tions also, especially in the British Parliamentary Papers, in the 
Archives Diplomatiques, and in Hertslet, Map of Africa by Treaty. 
The Berlin Conference documents are in British and Foreign State 
Papers, vol. 75, pp. 1013-1036, 1178-1257, and vol. 76, pp. 4-20, 1021- 
1034. 

Anglo-German Relations: Agreement of May 7, 1885, vol. 76, p. 
773; correspondence, 1884-1885, vol. 76, pp. 755-778; agreement of 
Nov. 15, 1893, vol. 85, p. 41; agreement of September 26, Decem- 
ber 2, 1901, vol. 99, p. 360; notes of June 25, 1904, vol. 99, p. 363; 
agreement of March 19, 1906, vol. 99, p. 366 ; notes of February 22, 
March 5,4909, vol. 102, p. 93; agreement of March 11, 1913, vol. 106, 
p. 782. 



161 

Franco-German Relations : Agreement of May 25, 1887, vol. 78, p. 
38; convention of March 15, 1894, vol. 86, p. 974; agreement of July 
23, 1897, vol. 89, p. 584; convention of April 18, 1908, vol. 101, p. 1003 ; 
convention of November 4, 1911, vol, 104, p. 956; declarations of 
September 28, 1912, vol. 106, pp. 974, 1001. 

Anglo-French Relations: Convention of June 28, 1882, vol. 77, 
p. 1007; arrangement of August 10, 1889, vol. 81, p. 1126; declarations 
of August 5, 1890, vol. 82, p. 89 ; agreement of June 26, 1891, vol. 83, 
p. 43 ; papers submitted March 30, 1892, vol. 34, pp. 844-859 ; agree- 
ment of July 12, 1893, vol. 85, p. 31 ; agreement of January 21, 1895, 
vol. 87, pp. 4-13; report of commission, October 12, 1896, vol. 91, p. 
103 ; convention of June 14, 1898, vol. 91, pp. 38-57 ; notes, June 14, 
1898, vol. 91, p. 109; notes of March 22, April 5, 1904, vol. 99, p. 356; 
notes of March 18, April 25, 1904, vol. 99, p. 203 ; agreement of Octo- 
ber 19, 1906, vol. 99, pp. 217-229 ; convention of May 29, 1906, vol. 
99, p. 194; agreement of February 19, 1910, vol. 103, pp. 260-294; 
notes of July 6, 1911, vol. 104, p. 149; agreement of September 4, 
1913. vol. 106, p. 763. 

Scores of treaties and agreements between native chiefs and one 
or other of the three great powers are to be found scattered through 
the volumes above cited. 

NARRATIVES. 

From the many books treating the subject it is difficult to select the 
few most useful. Among them are: 

Keltie, J. S., Partition of Africa (2d ed., London. Stanford, 1895), 
for agreements and events before the date of its publication, and for 
very many useful maps. 

Gibbons, H. A., New Map of Africa, 1900-1916 (New York, Cen- 
tury Co., 1916), for the period since 1900, and in some chapters ante- 
cedent events are traced. 

Johnston, H. H., Sir, Colonization of Africa (2d ed. Cambridge, 
University Press, 1913), which in addition to good textual material 
has an extended bibliography and a chronology. 

Rose, J. H., The Development of the European Nations, 1870-1900 
(5th ed., New York, Putnam, 1916), for a brief general discussion. 

Cambridge Modern History, vol. 12 (New York, Macmillan, 1910), 
for a still briefer treatment and in the appendix a bibliography. 

52. THE FORMATION OF THE CONGO FREE STATE, 

1876-1885. 

1. INTRODUCTION. 

Livingstone's discoveries and Stanley's exploration of the Congo 
River system in equatorial Africa from 1874 to 1877 had aroused 
53706— IS 11 



162 

intense interest in Europe on the part of statesmen and traders as 
well as missionaries, scientists, and philosophers. 

2. king Leopold's conference of 187«, 

In 1S7G King Leopold of Belgium called a conference of leading 
explorers and geographers to " discuss the question of the exploration, 
and the civilization of Africa, and the means of opening up the in- 
terior of the continent to the commerce, industry, and scientific enter- 
prise of the civilized world," and to consider measures for extinguish- 
ing " the terrible scourge of slavery known to prevail over wide and 
populous tracts in the interior of the continent." This conference met 
and was participated in by representatives from Great Britain, 
France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Russia. As a result 
of its deliberations an International African Association was formed 
with its seat at Brussels, whose purpose was the exploration and civil- 
ization of central Africa. 

3. THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF THE CONGO, 1S7S. 

The Belgian committee at Brussels displayed the greatest activity, 
especially after the return of Stanley, who visited Brussels at the 
invitation of King Leopold. On November 25, 1878, a separate com- 
mittee of the International Association was organized at Brussels. 
It soon afterwards became the " International Association of the 
Congo," which in turn was the forerunner of the Congo Free State. 
The Belgian King from the first supplied most of the funds of the 
association, which, naturally, assumed more and more the character 
of a Belgian enterprise. Mr. Stanley, acting as its agent in the 
Congo, was displaying great activity in founding stations and mak- 
ing treaties with various native chiefs. 

4. ANGLO-PORTUGUESE CONVENTION OF FEBRUARY 2G, 1S84. 

The activity of the International Association of the Congo began 
to attract the attention of interested European powers. Portugal 
and France both advanced claims to the Congo region, based on 
discoveries and explorations. On February 26, 1884, Earl Granville, 
the British secretary for foreign affairs, concluded a convention with 
Portugal, recognizing both banks of the Congo as Portuguese terri- 
tory. This convention was never ratified, but it led directly to the 
summoning of the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 (See article, that 
title)> and to the recognition of the International Association as a 
sovereign State. On April 23, 1884, Col. M. Strauch, the president 
of the association, addressed to the French minister for foreign 
affairs a note (Archives Diplomatiques, second series, vol. 12, p. 326) 



163 

in which he declared that the association would not cede its posses- 
sions to any power " except in virtue of special conventions which 
may be concluded between France and the association fof fixing rhe 
limits and conditions of their respective action/' The note further 
declared that the association engaged to give France the right of 
preference if, through unforeseen circumstances, it were compelled to 
sell its possessions. 

5. RECOGNITION OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE CONGO FREE STATE, 1884. 

The United States was the first great power to recognize the asso- 
ciation as a sovereign State, on April 22, 1884. The next power to 
recognize the flag of the International Association as that of a 
friendly power, doing so on November 8, 1884, was Germany. Her 
action was followed by that of Great Britain on December 16, of 
Italy on December 19, of Austria-Hungary on December 24, of Hol- 
land on December 27, of Spain on January 7, 1885 ; of France and 
Russia on February 5, of Sweden and Norway on February 10, of 
Portugal on February 14, and Denmark and Belgium on February 23. 

G. BOUNDARY TREATIES. 

Thus, early in 1885, King Leopold had secured the recognition of 
the association as an independent State, but its territorial limits 
were not as yet clearly defined. The boundaries were fixed in a 
series of treaties with France, Portugal, and Great Britain bearing 
dates ranging from 1885 to 1906. (For a list of these boundary 
treaties see Encyclopedia Britannica [12th ed., 1910], Vol. VI, p. 
919.) 

7. KING LEOPOLD BECOMES HEAD OF THE CONGO FREE STATE, 1S8 5. 

On April 28, 1885, the Belgian chamber authorized King Leopold 
" to be chief of the State founded in Africa by the International 
Association of the Congo," but declared the union between Belgium 
and the new State of the Congo " shall be exclusively personal." The 
Belgian King at once began the work of organizing and administer- 
ing the new State. On August 1, 1885, he addressed to the powers 
a circular note in which he declared the neutrality of "the Inde- 
pendent State of the Congo," which had been proclaimed by the 
Berlin conference (See article, The Berlin Conference of 1884-1885). 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

The literature on this subject is enormous. The most important 
documents may be found in American Journal of International Law, 
III, Supplement, 5-26: Perhaps the fullest and most authoritative 



164 

account of the formation of the Free State is that by Stanley. H. M., 
The Congo and Founding of its Free State (New York. Harper, 
1885). in 2 vols. See also Chapaux, A., Le Congo, historique. diplo- 
matique, etc. (Brussels, 1894) ; Wauters, A. J., L'Etat independent 
du Congo (Brussels, 1899) ; Boulger, D. C, The Congo State (Lon- 
don, 1898). 

Among the numerous special studies or monographs dealing with 
various phases of the subject (particularly juridical) may be cited: 
Reeves, J. S., The. International Beginnings of the Congo Free State, 
in Johns Hopkins University Studies (Baltimore, The Johns Hop- 
kins Press, 1894), XI-XII: Blanchard, G., Formation et Constitu- 
tion politique de L'Etat independent du Congo (Paris, A. Pedone, 
1899); Moynier, (J.. La fondation de l'Etat independant du Congo 
(Paris, 1887) : Xys, E., The Independent State the Congo ami Inter- 
national Law (Brussels, n. <i.». 

For brief accounts, see Rose, J. II.. The Development of the Euro- 
pean Nations, 1870-1914 (New York. Putnam, L916), Vol. II. ch. 8; 
Harris. X. 1).. Intervention and Colonization in Africa (Boston, 
Houghton. 1914). ch. 2: and Keltic J. S., The Partition oi Africa 
(London, Stanford. 1893), ch. 14: Beeves. J. S.. The origin of the 
Congo Free State, considered from the standpoint of international 
law. American Journal of International Law, III. 99—118, Janu- 
ary, 1909. 

53. THE BERLIN CONFERENCE OF 1884-1885. 

1. IXTKODUCTIOX. 

In 1884 the activities of the International Association of the Congo 
had begun to attract the attention of interested European powers 
(See article. The Formation of the Congo Free State.) On February 
26. 1884. an Anglo-Portuguese convention (which, however, was 
never ratified) recognized both banks of the Congo as Portuguese 
territory. 

This disposition of the Congo called forth a flood of criticism. 
Apart from interested motives of some of the colonizing powers it 
was generally felt that to hand over this region to a backward State 
like Portugal was to condemn it to a regime characterized by unpro- 
gressiveness and corruption. As early as April 22, 1884. the United 
States recognized the International Association of the Congo as a 
sovereign State — a step which was also taken by Germany on Xovem- 
ber 8 and by other European States in the latter part of 1884 and 
the first part of 1885. 

2. THE nilXCIPLES GOVERNING THE BERLIN CONFERENCE. 

In October. 1884, Chancellor Bismarck, who was just beginning to 
show an interest in African colonization issued invitations to the 



165 

interested powers (including the United States) to a conference at 
Berlin which should base its discussions and conclusions upon the 
following principles: 

(1) Freedom of commerce in the basin and mouths of the Congo. 

(2) Application to the Congo and Niger of the principles adopted 
by the Congress of Vienna, with a view to sanctioning free navigation 
on several international rivers, principles which later had been also 
applied to the Danube (See article, The Danube Question, 1871-1904) . 

(3) Definition of the formalities to be observed in order that new 
occupations on the coast of Africa might be considered effective. 

3. THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE. 

The conference consisting of delegates from all the countries of 
Europe (excepting Switzerland) and the United States, met at Berlin 
on November 15, 1884. and continued its deliberations until February 
26, 1885. The decisions of the conference were incorporated into a 
general act (See Appendix I, 29), of which the main points may be 
thus summarized : 

(1) The 14 States which signed the general act of the Berlin Con- 
ference obligated themselves in a general way to " strive for the sup- 
pression of slavery and especially of the negro slave trade" (article 
6) ; and article 9 declared: 

Conformably to the principles of the Law of Nations as they are recognized 
by the signatory powers, the slave trade being interdicted, and as the operations 
which, by land and sea furnish slaves to the trade ought to be equally consid- 
ered as interdicted, the powers who exercise or shall exercise rights of sov- 
ereignty or an influence in the territories forming the conventional basin of the 
Congo, declare that these territories shall not serve either for a market or 
way of transit for the slaves of any race whatever. Each of the powers en- 
gages itself to employ all the means in its power to put an end to the com- 
merce and to punish those who are occupied in it. (See article, The Brussels 
Antislavery Conference of 1890, for further measures against the slave trade.) 

(2) The act declared that " the commerce of all nations shall enjoy 
complete liberty " within (a) " all the territories constituting the basin 
of the Congo and its affluents" (b) "in the marine zone extending 
along the Atlantic from the parallel 2° 30' southern latitude to the 
mouth of the Loge," and (c) in a carefully defined zone east of the 
Congo Basin, extending as far as the Indian Ocean. The conven- 
tional basin of the Congo was defined as comprising all the regions 
watered by the Congo and its affluents, including Lake Tanganyika, 
with its eastern tributaries. 

( :) ) Freedom of navigation of the Congo, the Xiger, and all their 
affluents was also provided for. 

(4) Trade monopolies were prohibited, and provision made for 
civilizing the natives, the suppression of the slave trade, and the 
protection of missionaries, scientists, and explorers. 



1GG 

(5) As regards navigation only such taxes or duties wore to be 
levied as had "the character of an equivalent for services rendered 
to navigation itself"; and it was further provided (article 16) that 
"the roads, railways, or lateral canals, which may be constructed 
with the special object of obviating the innavigability or correcting 
the imperfection of the river route on certain sections of the course 
of the Congo, its affluents, ami other waterways, which are assimilated 
to them by article 15, shall he considered, in their quality of means of 
communication, as dependencies of this river and shall he equally 
open to the traffic of all nations. And as on the river itself, so there 
shall he collected on these roads, railways, and canals only tolls calcu- 
lated on the cost of construction, maintenance and administration, 
and on the profits due to the constructors"; while as regards the tariffs 
of these tolls, strangers and natives of the respective territories were 
to be treated "on a footing of perfect equality." 'This regime was 
also to apply to the Niger (articles 27 29). 

(6) Each power having territories comprised in the conventional 
basin of the Congo could declare its territory neutral. The signatory 
powers hound themselves to respeel such neutrality, provided the 
duties of neutrality were observed, and also to lend their good offices 
to have such territory neutralized during a time of war. In case of 
serious dissension over matters arising from the act there was to be 
recourse to mediation or arbitration before an appeal to arms. 

| 7) The power which henceforth shall take -possession of a territory 
upon the coast of the African continent situated outside of its present 
possessions, or which, not having had such possessions hitherto, shall 
come to acquire them, and likewise the power which shall assume a 
protectorate there was required to address a notification to the other 
states which were parties to the Congo act (article 34). 

" The signatory powers of the present act recognize the obligation 
to assure, in the territories occupied by them, upon the coasts of the 
African continent, the existence of an authority sufficient to cause ac- 
quired rights to be respected and, the case occurring, the liberty of 
commerce and of transit in the conditions upon which it may be stip- 
ulated " (article 35). 

4. THE UNITED STATES AND THE BERLIN ACT. 

The delegates of the United States at the Berlin Conference signed 
the act, but President Cleveland, "holding that an engagement to 
share in the obligation of enforcing neutrality in the remote valley of 
the Congo would be an alliance whose responsibilities we are not in a 
position to assume." abstained from submitting the act to the Senate 
for ratification. (Message to Congress. Dec. S. 1885. Foreign Re- 
lations of the United States. 1885, p. \x.) The United States, there- 
fore, did not become a party to the Berlin act. 



167 

BIBLIOGRAPHY". 

For good secondary accounts of the Berlin conference of 1884-85, 
Reeve . J. S.. The International Beginnings of the Congo Free 
State to Johns Hopkins University Studies (Baltimore, The Johns 
Hopkins Pre* , L894), XF XII: Rose, J. If.. The Developmenl of 
the European Nations, L870 1914 (New Fork, Putnam, 1916), Vol. 
II. ch. 8; Harris, X. D., Intervention and Colonization in Africa 
(Boston, Houghton, 1914), ch. 2; and Keltie, J. S., The Partition 
of Africa (London, L893), ch. 1 1. 

Catellani, E. L., Le colonie e la Conferenza <li Be,rlino (Turin, 
1885) eems to be Hi' mo I complete study of the work of the con- 
ference. 

For <h'' English text of the genera] act, see Supplement to Ameri- 
can Journal of [nternational Law for 1909, Vol. ITT, pp. 7-25, or 
Hertslet, Map of Africa by Treaty, II. pp. 468 186. The protocols 
of the conference are in British anrl Foreign Stuff- Papers, vol. l'>. pp. 
1178 L257, vol. 70, pp. 1021-1054. 

For the protocols and proceedings of the conference, see Protocoles 
el Acte General de In Conference 'I'- Berlin, L884-1885. See also 
Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, Documents Diplomatiques, Af- 
faires 'In Congo et 'I'- I'Afrique Occidentals (Paris, [mprimerie Ra- 
tionale, 1885) ; and Correspondence concerning the Berlin Congo 
Conference (Senate Ex. Doc. No. L96, t9th Cong., 1st sess.). 

54. THE DELIMITATION OF EUROPEAN COLONIES IN 
CENTRAL AFRICA, 1885-1899. 

1. INTJfOIM < TIO.V. 

The Occupation of Central Africa by European States was a 
gradual and haphazard affair. There was no prearranged scheme of 
partition or agreement among the powers to follow any generally 
prescribed lines in their expansion. Tn the main, the movement had 
its inception in certain small settlements of the different Kuropean 
States whose holdings and spheres of influence were incirea ed 
through the agency of explorers and trading companies until they 
came into touch with similar agencies extending the control of 
of her European powers in the same region. Competition for cer- 
tain valuable areas or advantageous positions then arose, which led 
to sharp diplomatic controversies and caused considerable popular 
excitement in the home countries. Fortunately, recourse to arms 
never took place, though \>\iic]- feeling was often aroused. As there 
was plenty of room in Africa for the acquisition of large colonies, a 



168 

reasonable and fair compromise was always possible. The peaceful 
adjustment of these and other African disputes constitutes one of the 
greatest achievements of European diplomacy during the period 
between 1871 and 1914. 

For purposes of analysis, it is necessary to classify carefully the 
various agreements between European States concerning their in- 
terests in central Africa. They may be readily grouped under four 
headings: The Congo Free State treaties, the Anglo-French treaties, 
the Anglo-German treaties, and the Franco-German treaties. 

2. CONGO FREE STATE TREATIES. 

Between November 8, 1884, and February 23, 1885, a series of 
agreements was concluded between the International Association of 
the Congo and a number of European States, including Great Britain, 
France, Germany, Belgium, and Portugal, by which the Congo Free 
State was created and its boundaries definitely fixed. (See article, 
The Formation of the Congo Free State.) It was to embrace about 
900,000 square miles and to extend from the French Congo and the 
Ubangi and Mbomu Rivers on the north, to Portuguese West Africa 
and Northern Rhodesia on the south, and from the Congo River on 
the west to the borders of British Uganda, German East Africa, 
and Lake Tanganyika on the east. Portugal relinquished a small 
strip on the north bank of the Congo to the Free State, but was com- 
pensated by the control of the south bank as far as Noki and the 
Province of Cabinda. The exact boundary line's were all adjusted 
later by special agreements and by special commissions which sur- 
veyed the country accurately and set up boundary posts, such as 
the Congo-Portuguese commission headed George Grenfell, which 
delimited the Congo-Portuguese boundary line between May, 1892, 
and June, 1893. 

3. ANGLO-FRENCH TREATIES. 

(a) By the treaty of June 28, 1882, the watershed between the 
Mellicouri and the Great Scarcies Rivers was fixed as the dividing 
line between French Guinea and Sierra Leone (British). 

(b) The treaties of August 10, 1889, and of June 26, 1891, deter- 
mined the boundaries between the British colonies of Gambia, Sierra 
Leone, Gold Coast, and Lagos, and the adjoining French colonies 
on the west coast as follows: Gambia was to include all the land 
within 10 kilometers of both sides of the Gambia River, and to ex- 
tended into the interior as far as Yarbatenda. Sierra Leone was to 
end at latitude 10° N., and Gold Coast, Lagos, and Dahomey at the 
9° ; but the two latter were to be separated by a line running north 
from the intersection of the meridian of Ajarra Creek with the 
coast. 



169 

(c) By the treaty of August 5, 1890, a general boundary was 
drawn roughly between the British and French spheres of influence 
in Central Africa by a line running from Say on the Niger River 
due east to Lake Chad (Sokoto to be included in the British sphere). 

(d) The treaty of June 14, 1898, provided for the delimitation of 
the Dahomey-Nigeria boundary line, the disputed Borgu-Boussa 
district being divided between England and France ; also, the north- 
ern boundary of the British Gold Coast Colony was moved up from 
latitude 9° N. to latitude 11° N. ; and all boundary questions relat- 
ing to the French and British possessions in West- Central Africa 
were settled. The negotiations leading to this treaty began with an 
agreement between England and France on January 15, 1896, which 
provided for the appointment of a commission of four to determine, 
by an examination of titles and claims, the most equitable delimita- 
tion of the French and British possessions on the lower Niger. The 
commission held two sessions: February 8 to May 22, 1896, and 
October 24, 1897, to February, 1898; and the results of its efforts 
were summed up in two notes presented by the representatives of 
England and France, respectively, on February 18 and 24, 1898, 
and embodied in the convention of June 14, 1898. 

(e) The treaty of March 21, 1899, stipulated for a settlement of the 
boundary between the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and the French sphere 
of influence on the upper Congo and Lake Chad regions. Bahr el 
Ghazal and the old Province of Dar Fur were retained for Egypt, 
while the Kingdom of the Wadai, with the two valuable oases of 
Tibesti and Borku, went to France. This treaty was the outcome of 
the expedition of Major Marchand from the upper Congo to the 
Nile and of the resulting Fashoda incident. By its provisions the 
French rounded out their Sahara possessions south of Tripoli, joined 
them securely with their Lake Chad lands, and these again with the 
French Congo colony. (See article on the Fashoda affair.) 

By this series of five treaties (or groups of treaties) a definite and 
permanent connection was established between all the French colo- 
nies in West, Central, and South Central Africa, and the boundary 
lines between the British and French protectorates (Gambia, Sierra 
Leone, Gold Coast, Nigeria, French Guinea, Ivory Coast, and Da- 
homey, the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, and the French Congo) in 
western and central Africa were successfully delimitated. 

4. ANGLO-GERMAN TREATIES. 

(a) Southwest Africa. — In 1884 Great Britain, in correspondence 
with Germany, recognized the German claims on the southwest coast. 
By the treaties of October 29, 1886, and July 1, 1890, the final 
boundary of German Southwest Africa was determined on the east 



170 

and south, giving access to the Zambesi River, A supplementary 

treaty between Germany and Portugal on December 30, 1886, estab- 
lished the northern boundary of German Southwest Africa from the 
Cunene River to the Zambesi. 

(b) East Africa. — A preliminary boundary line (from the mouth 
of the Umba River to Lake Victoria) was established between the 
British and German spheres of influence in East Africa by the treaty 
of October 29, 1886. The final delimitation of boundary between 
German and British East Africa, by lines drawn from the mouth of 
the Umba River to Lake Victoria (east shore), from the west shore 
of the same lake to the Congo Free State border (leaving Uganda 
andl'nyoro to England), and from Lake Nyanza to Lake Tan- 
ganyika (separating northern Rhodesia from German East Africa), 
was effected by the treaty of July 25, L893. The treaty of December 
30, 1886, fixed the boundary between German and Portuguese East 
Africa. 

(c) West Africa. — The boundary between Nigeria and the Cam- 
eroons was carried near to Vola by notes exchanged in April and 
May, 1885, and July and August, 1886. It was adjusted by treaties 
of July 1, 1890, and April 14, 1893, and prolonged to Lake Chad 
(giving both England and Germany access to the lake and assigning 
most of the Adamaua district to Germany) by treaty of November 15, 
1893. The Togoland-Gold Coast boundary was also adjusted by the 
treatv of July 1. 1890. 

6. I'KANCO-GERMAN TREATIES. 

In the treaty of December 24, 1885, the southern boundary of the 
Cameroons was fixed as the River Campo and the definition carried 
inland to 15° E. By the treaty of March 15, 1894, the northern por- 
tion of the French Congo and German Cameroons had their borders 
determined. The French claims to the Baghirmi country were rec- 
ognized, thus giving France access to Lake Chad. By the treaty of 
Juty 23, the Togoland-Dahomey line was extended to the 11° N. 
latitude. 

From the above analysis it will be seen that the main lines delim- 
inating the possession of European States in Central Africa and 
those fixing the boundaries of these regions with adjacent colo- 
nial possessions of European powers in West, East, and Southwest 
Africa were all completed between 1885 and 1899 by negotiation and 
treaties. In nearly every instance these lines were surveyed and 
marked out carefully later by joint commissions working in Central 
Africa. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

The treaties, notes, and other official documents indicated in this 
article, are nearly all in British and Foreign State Papers, Herts- 



171 

let's Commercial Treaties, Hertslet's Map of Africa by Treaty, the 
Archives Diplomatiques, the British blue and the French yellow 
books. For .secondary accounts see: 

Harris, X. D. Intervention and Colonization in Africa. (Boston, 
Houghton, 1914.) 

Dubois and Ten-ice. Un siecle d'expansion coloniale. (Paris, 
Challamel, 1902). 

Keltie, J. S. The Partition of Africa, 2d ed. (London, Stanford, 
189:.. ) 

Banning, E. Le partage politique de l'Afrique d'apres les trans- 
actions internationales les plus recentes. 1885-1888. (Paris, 1888.) 

White, A. S. The Development of Africa, 2nd cd. (London, 
Philip, 1892.) 

55. THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF THE TRANSVAAL 
OR SOUTH AFRICAN REPUBLIC, 1877-1884. 

1. THE ANNEXATION OF THE TRANSVAAL, 1877. 

In 1877 the Transvaal, whose independence had been recognized 
by Great Britain in 1852, was annexed by Lord Beaconsfield's 
Government on the ground that its independence was a men- 
ace to the peace of other British possessions in South Africa. A 
delegation of Boers (among them Paul Kruger) was sent to Eng- 
land to protest and demand the restoration of independence. This 
mission was unsuccessful. 

2. THE PRETORIA CONVENTION, 1881 (SEE APPENDIX I, 20.) 

In December, 1880, the Boers rose in revolt and on February 27, 
1881. defeated a small detachment of British troops on Majuba Hill. 
Mr. Gladstone, who had succeeded Lord Beaconsfield as head of the 
British Government, restored to the Boers their independence. But 
the Pretoria convention of 1881, which sanctioned this arrangement, 
contained an express reservation of the suzerainty of the British 
Crown. 

This arrangement was far from satisfactory. The word " suzer- 
ainty" had no precise meaning and was resented by the Boers as a 
limitation upon their independence. 

3. THE LONDON CONVENTION, 1884 (SEE APPENDIX I, 26). 

In 1884 this unsatisfactory Pretoria Convention was replaced by 
a new treaty called the London Convention, which restored to the 
Transvaal the old name of South African Republic, omitted the pre- 
amble of the Pretoria Convention in which the unfortunate word 
" suzerainty ? ' occurred, and inserted a provision (very important 



172 

in view of what occurred later) to the effect that " white men were 
to have full liberty to reside in any part of the Republic, to trade 
in it, and to be liable to the same taxes only as those exacted from 
citizens of the Republic." 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

For the main facts, see Harris, N. D., Intervention and Coloniza- 
tion in Africa (Boston, Houghton. 1914), ch. 8; and Cona, F. R., 
South Africa from the Great Trek to the Union (London, Chapman, 
1909), chs. 6 and 8. For the Pretoria and London conventions, see 
Hertslet, Map of Africa by Treaty (London, 1909), Vol. I, pp. 222- 
234. 

56. BRITISH RELATIONS TO THE BOER REPUBLIC, 

1884-1899. 

1. CONVENTION OF 18S4 (SEE APPENDIX I, 2g). 

The political relationship between Great Britain and the Trans- 
vaal after 1884 Avas based upon the convention of Pretoria 1881 and 
upon that of London 1884. Both are in the form of grants from a 
superior to an inferior. (See Appendix I, 20 and 26.) The earlier 
convention gave to the Boers of the Transvaal a large measure 
of local self government under British " suzeraintv." The latter con- 
vention, restoring to the Transvaal its old name of South African 
Republic, gave almost complete local autonomy to the Boers, Avhile 
narrowly restricting their freedom of action in foreign affairs. 

The word " suzerainty " did not appear in the convention of 1884. 
Because of this omission the Boers claimed that the former British 
right of supervision, implied in the word suzerainty, had now been 
abrogated. (Despagnet: La Guerre Sud Africaine, pp. 2-8.) The 
British at first, through their colonial minister Lord Derby, admit- 
ting that the word suzerainty had been eliminated, insisted that 
they had kept " the substance " (Parliamentary Papers, Cd. 9507, p. 
34) of their control. Later British statesmen argued that not even 
the word suzerainty had been allowed to disappear, because, they 
said, the convention of 1884 was not a substitute for the entire con- 
vention of 1881, but merely for the articles of that convention. 
Hence they insisted that the preamble of the earlier convention 
with its recognition of British suzerainty was binding after 1884, 
as before. (Mahan, The Merits of the Transvaal Dispute, North 
American Review, vol. 170, pp. 314-315.) The fact appears to be 
that the convention of 1884 was loosely and hastily drawn, with 
no thought that its uncertainty of phraseology would later en- 
danger the peace of the world. (Sydney Brooks, England and 



173 

the Transvaal, North American Review, vol. 169, p. 66. West- 
lake : L'Angleterre et la Republique Sucl Af ricaine, in the Revue de 
Droit International et legislation comparee, vol. 28, pp. 275-276. 
See also his Angleterre et Les Republiques Boers in the same Review, 
vol. 32, p. 546.) 

2. GRIEVANCES OF THE UITLANDERS AFTER 1886. 

The discovery of gold in the Transvaal in 1886 led to a great 
influx of English miners and speculators. Difficulties quickly arose 
between the native Boers and the aggressive foreigners — the Uit- 
landers. The ambitious plans of Cecil Rhodes, who dreamed of a 
South Africa united under British rule, clashed sharply with the 
ambitions of the Boer leaders for the maintenance unimpaired and 
possibly even the extension of the powers and territory of the South 
African Republic. The immediate occasion of the clash between 
Boers and Uitlanders was the determination of the former to main- 
tain Boer supremacy in the Republic. The Uitlanders published 
broadcast accounts of their grievances. Naturalization and the ac- 
quisition of the right to vote were made very difficult for them. 
They were forced to bear a disproportionate share of the taxes and 
of the military service. (Bryce : Impressions of South Africa, 2d ed., 
p. XVIII.) 

3. THE JAMESON RAID. 

Exasperated by these abuses and the apparent failure of their at- 
tempt to obtain redress through appeals to Great Britain, and in- 
spired, possibly, by the hope of displacing the Boer Government, 
Dr. Jameson, the British administrator of Rhodesia, with a few 
hundred troopers, invaded the Transvaal in 1895. This unfortunate 
aggression had the two-fold result (1) of deeply embittering the 
Boers against the Uitlanders, and (2) of making it increasingly 
difficult for the Government of Great Britain to demand redress 
for their grievances. This difficulty was greatly increased by the 
Kaiser's telegram to Kruger (See article, The Kruger Telegram, 
1896). 

4. THE MILNER MISSION, 1897. 

A special commissioner, Sir Alfred Milner, sent from England in 
1897. reported to his Government (Staatsarchiv, vol. 63, pp. 263-283) 
that the condition of British subjects in the Boer Republic was in- 
tolerable. He insisted that the Boers were planning to extend their 
hegemony over the whole of South Africa. The issue, as he put it, 
made an instant appeal to Englishmen. 



174 

5. NEGOTIATIONS, 1898-99. 

During 1898 and 1899 a series of conferences were held between 
the representatives of the British and the Boer Governments in a 
vain attempt to adjust the difficult controversies, particularly that 
over the franchise for the Uitlanders. (Parliamentary Papers, Cd. 
9404, 9518, and 9521. The Boer franchise law of July 26, 1899, and the 
British and Boer proposed modifications of the law are contained 
in the supplement to the Annals of the American Academy, vol. 16, 
pp. 47-57.) Elaborate legal arguments by the parties over the 
terms of the two conventions of 1881 and of 1884 hid the basic and 
fundamental causes of friction. These were political, economic, and 
racial antagonisms between the two peoples. Unable to accept 
Great Britain's terms, the South African Republic, October 9, 
1899, issued, its ultimatum. (Supplement to Annals of American 
Academy, vol. 16, pp. 57-61.) The British reply, which meant 
war, was issued October 10, 1899. (Ibid, p. 61.) The Orange Free 
State, since 1852, practically independent, threw in its lot with its 
sister Boer Republic, by the resolution of its Volksraad, September 
27, 1899. War followed in October between the two Boer Republics 
and the British Empire. (See article, The Treaty of Vereeniging. ) 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

Mahan, A. T. The Merits of the Transvaal Dispute. North Ameri- 
can Review, vol. 190, pp. 312-326. (1-899.) An excellent analysis of 
the evidence. 

Parliamentary Papers, Cd. 9507, 3914, 9404, 9518, 9521. Contain 
both British and Boer documents. 

Staatsarchiv, vol. 63, pp. 263-347, contains the most important 
documents for 1899. 

Martens. Nouveau Recueil General de Traites * * * 2d serie, 
Tome X. (Gottingue, 1885-86.) Contains conventions of 1881 and 
1884. 

British and Foreign State Papers, vols. 90-95, passim, contain 
most of the documents. 

Williams, Hugh. Selected Official Documents of the South Af- 
rican Republic and Great Britain. Supplement to vol. 16 (1900) 
Annals of American Academy, 72 pages. 

Despagnet, Frantz. La Guerre Sud Africaine au Point de Vue du 
Droit International. (Paris, A. Pedonne, 1902.) An elaborate pro- 
Boer discussion. 

Westlake, John. L'Angleterre et la Republique Sud Africaine, 
Revue de Droit International et legislation comparee, vol. 28 (1896), 
p. 268 et suiv. L'Angleterre et les Republiques Boers, Ibid, vol. 23, 
I'd series (1900), pp. 514-544. These two discussions are perhaps the 
best from the point of vieAv of international law. 



175 

Baty, T. International Law in South Africa. (London, Stevens 
& Haynes, 1900.) Contains a useful discussion of the question of 
suzerainty. 

Brooks, Sydney. England and the Transvaal, North American 
Review, vol. 169 (1899), pp. 62-76. An excellent brief analysis of 
the possibilities of compromise. 

Br3'ce, James. Impressions of South Africa. (New York, Cen- 
tury Co., 1897.) 

Hazen, C. D. Europe since 1815. (New York, Holt, 1910.) 

57. THE QUESTION OF THE PORTUGUESE COLONIES. 

1. INTRODUCTION. 

Portugal was the leader in modern colonial expansion. In the 
sixteenth century she claimed the whole of Africa, southern Asia, 
and eastern South America; and her claim was not seriously dis- 
puted by any strong rival. But her Asiatic colonies, except a few 
unimportant posts, were lost at the beginning of the seventeenth cen- 
tury and her South American possessions early in the nineteenth. 
She never actually controlled more than a few isolated spots on the 
African coasts; and when, late in the nineteenth century, the 
great European powers began their energetic efforts for African 
colonies, Portugal was in no position to resist their encroach- 
ments. However, she still retains in her feeble grasp enough 
territory to make her the fourth colonial power of Europe. 
Besides her Madeira and Cape Verde Islands off the north- 
western coast she has, not far from the latter, Portuguese Guinea 
on the mainland, the cocoa islands of San Thome and Principe in 
the Gulf of Guinea, the large territory of Angola, or Portuguese 
West Africa, and the smaller but more important Portuguese East 
Africa. Until after the scramble for the partition of Africa was 
well advanced, Portugal still hoped to retain sovereignty over a wide 
strip of territory stretching across the entire continent between the 
last two ; but British activity from the Cape, especially the imperial 
ambitions of Rhodes, crossed her path. 

2. ANGLO-PORTUGUESE ADJUSTMENTS. 

In 1875 the possession of Delagoa Bay was submitted for arbitra- 
tion to the President of France, who awarded it to Portugal, 
assuring her complete control of that bay and its important 
port, Lourenco Marques, the natural and almost essential outlet for 
the northern part of British South Africa, and the only really profit- 
able spot in Portugal's South African possessions. Between 1887 
and 1891 a long correspondence and several negotiations ensued be- 



176 

tween England and Portugal respecting efforts of the latter to retain 
sovereignty over territories not effectively occupied according to 
the rules agreed upon at the Berlin colonial conference of 1884-5 (See 
article, The Berlin Conference, 1884-1885) and her attempts to con- 
trol the trade by way of the Zambesi, neither of which the former 
would admit. In 1890 a convention was finally signed, but it was 
not ratified. A modus vivendi was thereupon arranged for a short 
time, and when it was about to expire, renewed until June 11, 1891, 
when a treaty was concluded, which, Gibbons says, " destroyed for- 
ever the hopes of Portugal to a transcontinental African colony." 
(Map of Africa, pp. 245-246.) It delimited in general terms British 
and Portuguese territory in southeast, southwest, and south cen- 
tral Africa. Portugal accepted the inevitable, and cordial rela- 
tions were restored. In 1892 the boundary of the British enclave 
south of Lake Nyassa was more carefully defined. A dispute hav- 
ing arisen over the execution of a provision in the treaty of 1891 
respecting Manica, the matter was, after three years of discussion, 
submitted to the arbitration of M. Vigliani, former president of 
the Cour de Cassation of Florence, and decided in favor of Eng- 
land in 1897. In 1901 Lord Milner, for England, concluded a tem- 
porary agreement maintaining treaty arrangements entered into 
earlier between Portugal and the then independent Transvaal Re- 
public, assuring a certain minimum of traffic from the latter by 
way of the Portuguese railway from Lourenco Marques to the 
Transvaal frontier, giving to goods coming by that route the same 
advantages as if they had come by way of the Cape or Natal, and 
permitting in exchange for these favors the recruiting in Portu- 
guese territory of necessary native labor for the Transvaal mines and 
other industries. Cape Colony and Natal objected to the arrange- 
ment; but it was sustained in London, slightly modified three years 
later, and in 1909, just before the Union of South Africa was effected, 
a new treaty was concluded by the Transvaal • Colony continuing 
these privileges for 10 years, in spite of serious objections by other 
members of the incipient union. In 1907, 1911, and 1912 there oc- 
curred exchanges of notes recognizing demarcations of various bound- 
aries between British and Portuguese dominions. 

3. ADJUSTMENTS WITH FRANCE AND GERMANY. 

While suffering from British encroachments where her ancient 
claims were not supported by effective occupation, Portugal has 
been supported by England against encroachments by a third power. 
In 1884 threatened efforts of France to extend her Congo claims over 
northern Angola were thus resisted and the Portuguese position on 
the southern bank of the lower Congo recognized and preserved. In 



177 

188G a Portuguese-German agreement established the boundary be- 
tween their Southwest African possessions, and another of the next 
year drew a line between their East African territories, a river con- 
stituting the dividing line throughout most of its extent in each case. 
German merchants, supported by their Government, maintained a 
persistent and successful policy of increasing their commerce with 
the Portuguese colonies, arousing suspicions that they intended to 
secure political influence, if possible. In 1891 limits were drawn be- 
tween Angola and the independent, or Belgian, Congo. 

4. Portugal's attitude toward her colonies. 

Much of Portugal's African soil is rich and would be productive 
if it were efficiently governed and intelligently developed ; but ineffi- 
ciency and mismanagement have characterized her colonial policy. 
Apart from the cocoa islands and the port of Lourenco Marquez, her 
African colonies are none of them self-supporting; and the surplus 
from these profitable possessions falls far short of counterbalancing 
the deficits in the budgets of the rest. Abuses in connection with the 
contract labor system (virtual slavery) by which workers have been 
recruited in Angola for the unhealthful cocoa islands have caused 
numerous riots and revolts, roused world-wide criticism, and occa- 
sioned international intervention. There has been considerable re- 
cent opposition in Portugal to the persistent colonial deficits and talk 
of abandoning or profitably disposing of the colonies, but the recent 
scramble of other European powers for African territory has in- 
creased the determination of Portuguese officialdom to cling to their 
unprofitable over-seas dominions, hoping that they may yet be able 
to reform abuses and make them both creditable and profitable. 

5. PROJECTED PARTITION OF THE PORTUGUESE COLONIES. 

In the last decade of the last century, when the relations of Eng- 
land and Germany were fairly cordial, there were persistent rumors 
that they were planning to divide the Portuguese possessions between 
themselves. Johnston (The Colonization of Africa, p. 115) says: 

In 1898, when the unsettled state of Africa and the rivalry between Britain, 
Germany, and France made it advisable to forecast an allotment of the Por- 
tuguese colonies, should they slip from the grasp of Portugal or be offered for 
sale, an agreement was entered into between Britain and Germany partitioning 
the Portuguese African possessions into spheres of influence. But it is under- 
stood that at a later date Great Britain, on renewing her old alliance with 
Portugal, guaranteed her the undisturbed possession'of her colonial dominions. 

Gibbons states (Map of Africa, p. 247) that according to this 
treaty, which was never published, Germany was to have acquired 
53706—18 12 



178 

"Portugal's Asiatic possessions, the northern part of her Easl African 
ami the southern part of her West African territories, and Walfish 
Bay from England, and the Latter was to have had all the rest 
of Portuguese Africa. In L908, and again in L909, rumors were 
rife in England that Germany was negotiating to get footholds 
on Portuguese possessions, and violent criticism of German in- 
trigues were voiced by the British press. (Ibid., pp. 249 250.) 
"During the four years between (he birth of the [Portuguese] Re- 
public and the beginning of (he European war there were constant 
rumors of the intention of Portugal to sell her colonies to Germany. 
Discerning readers could see in the way these reports were com- 
mented upon a clear indication of how Great Britain ami Germany 

were drifting toward war" (Ibid., p. 278). Partially successful 
efforts were made to reach understandings concerning their naval, 
commercial, and colonial rivalries. "Shortly before the outbreak of 
the war it was the belief in Portugal that the two great rivals had 
come to a new understanding. * * * The Times declared that 
there was nothing in the new Anglo-German accord to diminish the 
value i^( tin 1 Anglo-Portuguese alliance, and no intention to despoil 
Portugal, either by purchase or by any other means, of any of her 
colonies." (Ibid., pp. 273-274.) In another place (p. 262) Gib- 
bons says: 

la the spring of L914, however, the [Portuguese] colonial minister told Par- 
liament that not less than $40,000,000 was required, and that something must 
be done Immediately to demonstrate to the world the ability of Portugal to 
administer and develop this colony. 

Gibbons adds in a footnote that the minister '* had undoubtedly re- 
ceived official intimation of the serious 'conversations' going on at 
that moment between Great Britain and Germany, lie accepted 
during the same month, without Britain opposing, oilers of a German 

syndicate and German banks to help in Ajlgola." 

Prime LichnOWsky in My London Mission, L912 l!»ll. states (p. 

•J si) that in the projected Ajiglo-German accord of L914 (See article, 
that title) "An arrangement had been reached between us [Germany] 
and England, delimiting the interests of the two parties" in the 
African colonies of Portugal. His description of the projected agree- 
ment is as follows (p. 283) : 

Thanks to the conciliatory of the British government, 1 succeeded in giving 
to the now treaty a form which entirely corresponded to our [Germany's] wishes 
and Interests, ah Angola, as far as the 20th degree of Longitude was assigned 
io us, so thai we reached the Congo territory from the south. Moreover, the 
valuable islands of San TiToine and Principe, which lie north of the equator and 
therefore really belong to the French sphere of Interest, were allotted to us — a 
fact which caused my French colleague to enter energetic hut unavailing pro- 
tests. 

Further, we obtained the northern part of Mozambique; the Licango formed 

the boundary. 



179 



BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

DOCUMENTS. 



Nearly all of the more important documents referred to are 
printed in British and Foreign Papers. The following are the most 
importanl : Correspondence will) Great Britain, 1875, concerning the 
arbitration before the President of France, vol.70, pp. 338 341; corre- 
spondence with Great Britain, 1887-1800. vol. TO. pp. 100-2 L152, vol. 
81, 977-1033, vol. 82. pp. 207 :J17; modus vivendi with England, Au- 
gust 20, 1890, vol. 82. pp. 317-339; renewal of the same, May L3, 1 891, 
vol. 83, p. 25; correspondence with England, 1800 L891, vol. 83, pp. 
833-894; treaty with England, June 11, 1891, vol. 83, pp. 27 1 1 : arbi- 
tration with England, January 30, 1807, vol. 80, pp. 702-751; agree- 
ment wild Kngland, December IS, 1001. vol. 05. pp. 931 934; addi- 
tional articles to same. June 15, 1904, vol. 98, p. 1085; treaty with the 
Transvaal, April 1. 1000. vol. 102, pp. 110-120; boundary agreement 
with England, June 3, 1007. vol. 100, pp. 553 -555; another of October 
21-November 20, 1011, vol. 101. pp. 185-193; another of .July 22- 
August 9. 1912, vol. 105. pp. 270-280; correspondence with England 
concerning northern Angola. 1882 1881. vol. 75, pp. 1272-13:W. 170- 
482; treaties with Congo Free State, May 25, 1891, vol. 8:',. pp. 913 - 
918: correspondence with England concerning contract labor abuses, 
1909-1912, vol. 100, pp. 349-434. 

Prince Lichnowsky's revelations. My London Mission. 1012 1914, 
edited by Munroe Smith and Henry F. Munro, are in " International 
Conciliation," No. 127. June. L918. 



NABBAl hi;. 



Gibbons, H. A., New Map of Africa, 1900-1010 (New York, Cen- 
tury Co., 1916), for an excellent discussion, giving also the ante- 
cedent events before 1900; occasional footnotes suggest ource for 
further study. 

Johnston, H. II., Sir, Colonization of Africa (2d ed., Cambridge, 
University Press, 1913), of which the appendix contains an extended 
bibliography. 

Keltie, J. S., Partition of Africa (2d ed., London, Stanford, L895), 
for earlier part only, but many useful maps. 

Cambridge Modern History (New York, Macmillan, 1910), vol. 
12, of which the appendix contains a bibliography. 

58. THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN RIVALRY IN CENTRAL ASIA, 

1878-1887. 

1. INTRODUCTION. 

Afghanistan and Turkestan are far away from the Balkan penin- 
sula and Egypt, nevertheless', because of the extent of the great em- 



180 

pires of England and Russia, the fortunes of the four regions have 
been closely connected during recent decades. For example, the 
Balkan crisis in 1878 led to the Afghan War of 1878-1881, and the 
action of England in Egypt in the early eighties accelerated the 
Russian advance in Turkestan during the same j^ears. 

2. RUSSIAN ADVANCES, 185G-187S. 

After the Crimean War the Russian expansive energy, curbed for 
the time in southeastern Europe, found an outlet in advancing south- 
ward the line across Central Asia. England, after the Sepoy mutiny, 
I was willing that her rival should bring the power of Europe to 
bear upon the independent portions of Asia, especially since the 
Khanates of Khiva, Bokhara, Samarcand, etc., were fierce, barbarous, 
and disorderly. The circular which Prince Gortchakoff issued in 
[1864 (Rose, Development of European Nations. II, 59). explaining 
that Russia could not keep the peace with uncivilized and predatory 
tribes, and must press on until she came to regions controlled by a 
strong State, was accepted by England, especially since the doctrine 
was useful to herself. Tashkend fell in 1864, Bokhara ftfecame a 
vassal state in 1868, and Khiva in 1873. This brought the Russian 
advance to the neighborhood of Afghanistan, which had long been 
in special relations with England. 

8. ENGLAND AND AFGHANISTAN, 1S56-1875. 

A Iter the unsuccessful Afghan War of 1842, the English were con- 
tent with non-intervention, the payment of occasional subsidies, and 
the recognition of de facto rulers. When the Ameer Dost Mohammed 
died in 1863, the British Government refused special favors to his 
favorite and most capable son, Sher Ali. until the latter had estab- 
lished himself by the defeat of his opponents. The Ameer came to 
conference with Lord Mayo in March, 1869, and requested a guaranty 
of dynastic succession and a regular subsidy, while declining to 
admit a British resident into his capital. (Rose, Development of 
European Nations, II, 66-67.) He was promised only non-interfer- 
ence and the support of his independence. In 1873, alarmed at the 
Russian advance, Sher Ali proposed an alliance with the British. 
They refused and the Ameer began to despise them and to think of 
throwing in his fortune with the then more active Russians. 

4. THE BRITISH "FORWARD POLICY," 1S75-1S7S. 

Sir Bartle Frere, representing a group of advocates of "the for- 
ward policy " in India, proposed on January 1, 1875, that agents be 
established in Afghanistan and that Quetta be occupied. (Rose, De- 
velopment of European Nations, II, 77.) Disraeli was nothing loath 



181 

to abandon the policy of "masterly inactivity," and presently ap- 
pointed as viceroy of India Lord Lytton, a man inclined to action, 
and. like the premier himself, ready on occasion to subordinate 
scruple to his purposes. In 1877 he reported that Sher Ali was lost to 
the British, and that " it is rather the disintegration and weakening, 
than the consolidation and establishment of the Afghan power at 
which we must now begin to aim." (Quoted by Rose, Development 
of European Nations, II, 83.) In the following year he planned the 
creation of a State of West Afghanistan under a prince of British 
choosing, who should even claim Merv, which the Russians consid- 
ered to be within their own sphere. A few months later he gave up 
the idea of getting Merv, but advised the conquest and occupation of 
enough Afghan territory to secure the northwestern frontier of 
India. 

5. RUSSIAN ADVANCE, 1878-1 SS7. 

On the day of the assembling of. the Congress of Berlin, June 13, 
1878, when it was considered practically certain in England that no 
agreement would be reached, Gen. Stolietoff left Samarcand on a 
mission to the Ameer. He was admitted into Afghanistan, and plans 
were ready for three columns of troops to follow him. Russia, ac- 
cording to a plan of Gen. Skobeleff, would thus have anticipated 
England in the Afghan territory had it come to war between the two 
Empires. The signing of the Treaty of Berlin defeated this plan, but 
Stolietoff is believed to have made an agreement with the Ameer. 

On the 22d of September the guard of Sher Ali in the Khyber Pass 
refused to admit a British representative. An ultimatum was sent 
and no answer having been received, war was begun on November 20. 
Beaconsfield had said, November 9', that a scientific frontier was 
needed at the northwest of India, and this caused much criticism in 
England. Russia gave no active support to the Afghans. Kandahar 
was taken and Sher Ali fled. The British recognized his nephew, 
Yakub Khan, who accepted a British resident at Kabul. Major Ca- 
vagnari was appointed but was murdered with his guards in Septem- 
ber, 1879. The war was renewed. Abdurrahman, a claimant to the 
throne, who had been hiding in Russia, was given Russian aid and 
crossed the frontier. Being an intelligent and shrewd man, he pres- 
ently came to agreement with the British, who recognized him on 
July 20, 1880, and gave him £900,000. Lord Roberts made his famous 
march to Kandahar and rescued the British garrison there. The city 
was evacuated April 15, 1881, and the British withdrew from Af- 
ghanistan. The situation of eight years before was thus restored. 
Afghanistan, without a British resident, was a friendly State to 
England. 

The Russians had begun war on the Turkomans in the autumn of 
1878. After preliminary failures. Gen. Skobeleff took the last strong- 



182 

hold of the Turkomans on January 23, L881. The Russians began a 
penetration of the Khanate of Merv, and in 1884 began a further 
advance, supposedly in large part to obtain recompense for die 
British occupation in Egypt. It is supposed that the three em- 
perors sanctioned this advance at their conference at Skiernewice in 
September, 1881. but the English were greatly incensed and thought 
of war. Merv was taken, but the British acquiesced, and a boundary 
commission was appointed to determine the frontier between Russia 
and Afghanistan. (Correspondence between Great Britain and 
Russia respecting Central Asia. Merv, the Northwest frontier of 
Afghanistan and L883 L885 in British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 
76, pp. 1102-1232.) 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

Martens, G. Fr. de. Nouveau recueil general do trahes et autres 
actes relatifs aux rapports de droit international. Series 11 and III. 
(Leipzig, 1910.) 

Parliamentary Papers. Afghanistan. 1878. Central Asia, L881. 

British Foreign and State Papers. For correspondence ♦between 
Great Britain and Russia on Afghanistan, vols. 65, »><i, i>7. 68, 69, 70, 
75, 76, 77, etc. See general index. 

O'Donovan, E. The Merv Oasis. (New York, Putnam, 1883.) 
2 vol's. 

Roberts, Lord Frederick. Forty-One years in India. (New York, 
Longmans, Green X: Co., 1898.) 2 vols. 

Hensman, The Afghan War of 1878 L880. 

Lansdell, H. Russian Central Asia. (London. A. Low, Marston, 
Searle and Kivington. 1885.) 3 vo ' s - 

Lessar, Paul. La Russie et I'Angleterre dans I'Asie Centrale. 
(Paris. 1880.) From the Russian point of view. 

Marvin, Charles Thomas. Our public offices: embodying an ac- 
count of the disclosure of the Anglo- Russian agreement and the 
unrevealed secret treaty of May 31, L878. (London, Sonnenschein, 
3d edition, 188-2.) 

Chirol, V. The middle Eastern question or some political prob- 
lems of Indian defense. (London, John Murray, 1903.) 

PopoAvski, Josef. The rival powers in Central Asia, or the strug- 
gle between England and Russia in the East. Translated from the 
German of J. Popowski by Arthur Baring Brabant, and edited by 
Charles E. D. Black. (Westminster. Constable, 1803.) 

Curzon, Lord. Frontiers. (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1008.) 

Cur/on, Lord. Russia in Central Asia. (Loudon. Longmans, 
Green & Co., 1880.) Contains exhaustive bibliography. 

Curzon, Lord. Persia and the Persian question. (London, Long- 
mans, Green & Co., 1892.) 



183 

Skrine, F. H. The expansion of Russia. (University Press, Cam- 
bridge, 3d ed., 1915.) 

Rose, John Holland. Development of the European Nations. 
(New York, Putnam, 1910.) Vol. II, 44-142, contains a good account 
of the Central Asian question. There is a map of Afghanistan. 

Krause, Alexis. Russia in Asia. (New York, Henry Holt and 
Co., 1899.) 

Chesney, G. Russia and India. Nineteenth Centmv. :j: 005-010. 
April, 1878. 

Rawlinson, H. Advance of Russia in Asia. Nineteenth Century, 
April 17, 1885. Contains map of northwestern frontier of Afghan- 
istan. 

MAPS. 

See also those noted in above bibliography. 

Northwestern frontier of India. In Popowski, The Rival Powers 
in Central Asia. (Westminster, Constable, 1893.) 

The advance of Russia in the Caucasus and Central Asia in the 
XIX century. (Stanford's, London.) (100 miles to 1 inch.) 

In Skrine, Expansion of Russia. (Cambridge Universitv Press, 
1915.) 

59. THE BRITISH ACQUISITION OF UPPER BURMA, 

1885-1886. 

1. THE CHEFOO CONVENTION, 1870. 

The Chef oo convention of 1876 stipulated that the viceroy of 
India, at any time he saw fit, might send an expedition to Yunnan, 
one of the southern provinces of China. (Appendix I. 8.) In 1884 
an expedition was planned, but the Chinese protested on account of 
the size of the force which was to be sent, and during the negotia- 
tions which followed a compromise was arranged by which Chinese 
susceptibilities w r ere saved and the British obtained an important 
concession in Burma. 

2. THE O'CONEB CONVENTION, 1886. 

For some years British relations with Thcbaw. King of Burma, 
had been unsatisfactory. Consequently, Mandalay was occupied, 
Thebaw was taken prisoner, and Burma was formally annexed on 
January 1, 1886. But China claimed suzerainty over Burma. It 
was, therefore, agreed by the O'Coner convention, signed at Peking 
on July 24, 1886, that the mission contemplated in the Chefoo Con- 
vention should be abandoned in exchange for China's renunciation 
of claims of suzerainty over Burma. (See Appendix I, 33.) 



184 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

For a narrative of these events, see Annual Register for 1885 
(London, 1886), pp. 317-321; and Ibid., for 1886, pp. 421-423: For 
the text of the treaty of Chefoo, see Hertslet, China Treaties (Lon- 
don, 1908), Vol. I, No. 12, pp. 73-80. For the text of O'Coner's 
treaty of 1886, see Hertslet, op. clt., No. 15, pp. 88-90. 

60. FRANCO-SIAMESE RELATIONS, 1893-1904. 

1. EARLY FRENCH AGGRESSIONS, 1SG6-1S92. 

In another article (See The Franco-Chinese War of 1882-1885), it 
has been shown how France established a protectorate over Annam 
and obtained possession of Tonquin. She had also established certain 
rights over Cambodia on the plea that this country was tributary to 
Annam. On the same principle she urged that the eastern Provinces 
of Siam should owe allegiance to her. The French were constantly 
coming into conflict with the Siamese authorities along Siam's eastern 
frontier; France particularly claimed the western bank of tjie river 
Mekong from the Chinese Province of Yunnan to its mouth. The 
Siamese Government protested in vain against these claims and pro- 
posed a neutral zone 30 miles in width until an international commis- 
sion should determine the legitimate frontier. 

2. THE FRENCH ULTIMATUM OF 1893. 

In 1892-93 a French officer and his escort were murdered in 
Siamese territory and another officer was captured. An ultimatum 
was at once presented at Bangkok, which included the folloAving 
demands: (1) A recognition of the right of Annam and Cambodia 
[and through them of France] to the left bank of the Mekong and the 
islands; (2) evacuation of the posts held there by the Siamese within 
a month's time; (3) satisfaction for the various aggressions against 
French subjects in Siam and against French ships and sailors; (4) 
punishment of the culprits and pecuniary indemnities to the families 
of the victims; (5) indemnities of 2,000,000 francs for various dam- 
ages inflicted on French subjects; (6) an immediate deposit of 3,000,- 
000 francs as a guaranty for these claims, or in default, an assignment 
by way of security of the revenues of Battambang and Angker. (Doc- 
uments diplomatiques. Affaires de Siam (1893), pp. 6-7.) 

3. TREATY OF BANGKOK, 1893 (SEE APPENDIX I, 42). 

The result of this ultimatum was a treaty signed at Bangkok, Octo- 
ber 3, 1893. The following were its main provisions: (1) The 
Siamese Government renounced all claims to the whole of the terri- 



185 

tories on the left bank of the Mekong and to the islands in the river. 
(2) The Siamese bound themselves not to place or navigate any 
armed vessels on the waters of the great Toule Sop Lake, the Mekong, 
or their tributaries situated in the territory indicated in the next 
article. (3) In the third article the Siamese agreed not to construct 
any fortified post or military establishment in the provinces of Bat- 
tambang and Sien Rap, or within a radius of 15 miles from the right 
bank of the Mekong. (4) Inasmuch as the development of naviga- 
tion on the Mekong renders necessary certain works on its right 
bank or the establishment of relay stations for boats for wood and 
coal depots, the Siamese Government bound itself to give, at the re- 
quest of the French Government, all the necessary facilities for this 
purpose. (Ibid., pp. 14-17.) 

4. TREATY OF 1902. 

In 1902, taking advantage "of some differences relating to the correct 
interpretation of the treaty of 1893, France concluded another con- 
vention with Siam by which three additional provinces lying strictly 
within the basin of the Mekong River were ceded to her. (Ibid., 
1903, pp. 70-73.) But France showed a disposition to advance 
within the basin of the Menam River. This was within what Great 
Britain regarded as her sphere of influence. 

5. ANGLO-FRENCH AGREEMENT OF 1904. 

The consequence of this apparent conflict of interests was that 
in the Anglo-French Convention of April 8, 1904, there was included 
with the assent of Siam, an agreement (See article, The Forma- 
tion of the Entente Cordiale) by which the influence of these 
two powers in this region was strictly defined. It was mutually 
agreed that "the influence of Great Britain shall be recognized by 
France in the territories situated to the west of the basin of the 
River Menam, and that the influence of France shall be recognized by 
Great Britain in the territories situated to the east of the same re- 
gion, all the Siamese possessions on the east and southeast of the zone 
above described and the adjacent islands coming thus henceforth 
under French influence, and, on the other hand, all Siamese pos- 
sessions on the west of this zone and the Gulf of Siam, including the 
Malay Peninsula and the adjacent islands, coming under British in- 
fluence." At the same time, the two contracting parties solemnly dis- 
claimed all idea of annexing Siamese territory. (See Appendix 
1,68.) 

6. CONVENTION OF 1907. 

In 1907 a further convention was concluded between France and 
Siam (British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 100, pp. 1028-1034) 



186 

by which Siam returned to the French protectorate of Cambodia 
the Province of Battambang, recovering from France in rot urn cer- 
tain parts of the maritime Province of Krat which had boon ceded 
in 1904. This convention also modified the extra-territorial rights 
enjoyed by France in Siam. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

The most important documents are in the French Yellow Books: 
Ministere des Atl'aires Etrangeres; Affaires du Haut-Mekong (1898) ; 
Affaires de Siam (1893); Affaires de Siam. 1893-1903 (Paris, 
Imprimerie Rationale, 1893-1902). 

The most serviceable narratives of Franco-Siamese relations arc 
those by Douglas, R. K.. Europe and the Far East (University Press, 
Cambridge, 1004), ch. L9, pp. 389 408; and Cordier, H., Histoire 
des relations de la Chine avee les puissances occidentales. 1860-1902 
(Paris. Alcan, 1902), Vol. Ill, ch. 8, pp. 106-135. 

See also Lemire, Ch., La France et le Siam (Paris, 1003) ; and 
Lepesqueur, P.-Ch., La France et le Siam (Paris, Megard, 1897) ; 
and Campbell. J. G. D., Siam in the Twentieth Century (London, 
Arnold, L902), ch. 11. on "International questions." 

For texts and document-, more particularly the treaty of 1893, 
see Cordier, op. cit., pp. 131-132. 

61. THE EUROPEAN ENCROACHMENTS IN THE FAR EAST, 

1875-1887. 

1. THE GENERAL SITUATION. 

In 1868, when the restoration of the authority of the Mikado had 
been effected and a progressive or "enlightened" government in- 
stalled, the new Japan found herself facing a number of European 
footholds or vantage points on the mainland of eastern Asia. 

Russia was in possession of the Pacific Coast (including the Island 
of Saghalien and Primorsk Province) as far south as Vladivostok. 
China had ceded Hong Kong to England in 1842, Macao to Portugal 
(1887). and had lost all control over the important port of Shanghai 
as a result of a series of concessions, exi ending over a number of 
years, to several European powers. 

■2. THE SETTLEMENT OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE DISPUTE RESPECTING 
SAKHALIEN AND THE KURILE ISLANDS, 187 B. 

In 1875 a Russo-Japanese dispute of some years' standing respect- 
ing the possession of the Island of Sakhalien was ended for the 
time being by Japan giving up to Russia the whole of Sakhalien in 
return for the recognition of Japan's complete sovereignty over the 



187 

whole group of the Kurile Islands. In 1905 Japan again secured 
possession of the southern half of Sakhalien Island (See article, The 
Treaty of Portsmouth). In 1876 Japan also incorporated the Bonin 
Islands. 

The encroachments of the French in Annam and the gains made 
by France at the expense of China during the period from 1882 to 
1887 are dealt with elsewhere. (See articles on Franco-Siamese Re- 
lations, 1893-1904, and The Franco-Chinese War, 1882-1885.) 

3. THE BRITISH OCCUPATION AND WITHDRAWAL FROM PORT HAMILTON, 

1885-1887. 

In 1885 occurred an incident which must have given to Japan con- 
siderable food for thought. Taking advantage of the quarrel between 
Japan and China over Korea, which resulted in the treaty of Tient- 
sin (1884—85), Russia proposed a convention that would have placed 
Korea under the virtual control of the Czar. But the intrigue 
became known ; and, at the instigation of China, the King of Korea 
refused to sign the proposed convention. 

• Determined to prevent such a danger in the future, Great Britain 
decided to occupy the group of islands off the southern coast of 
Korea forming the harbor known as Port Hamilton. The Chinese 
Government consenting, the British flag was hoisted on these islands 
in April, 1885. 

Russia at once protested and, after a heated controversy, the 
British withdrew from Port Hamilton on February 27, 1887, after 
Russia had given a positive assurance that under no circumstances 
would she encroach on Korean territory. China also gave an under- 
standing that no foreign power should ever be permitted to take pos- 
session of the islands. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

For a brief account of the settlement of the Russo-Japanese dis- 
pute in 1875, see Hornbeck, S. K., Contemporary Politics in the 
Far East (New York, Appleton, 1916), p. 197. 

For accounts of the British occupation and withdrawal from Port 

Hamilton, see Douglas, R. K., Europe and the Far East (University 

Press, Cambridge, 1904), pp. 248-491, and Cordier, H., Histoire des 

relations de la Chine avec les puissances occidentales, 1860-1892 

(Paris, Alcan, 1902), Vol. Ill, pp. 3-4. 

62. THE FRANCO-CHINESE WAR, 1882-1885. 

1. TREATIES OF 1862 AND 1874. 

The effort to establish French authority in the Indo-Chinese 
peninsula, after a series of unsuccessful attempts going back to the 
eighteenth century, was resumed by the government of Napoleon III. 



L88 

A treaty, signed at SaigoD in L862, conveyed certain provinces in 
southern Annam to France. In 1ST I another treaty was concluded 
with the king of Annam at Saigon by which the King recognized 
French sovereignty over all territory actually occupied by them. 
France, in her turn, recognized the sovereignty and "entire inde- 
pendence" of the 1 v i n ii of Annam, though the latter engaged to eon- 
form his foreign policy to that of France. 

•2. PROTEST or CHIN \. 

China took exception lo this latter treaty, pointing out (hat An- 
nam was a dependency o( China. Whereupon the King o( Annam. 
in 1S77. sent an embassy to China with tribute. In L881 Marquis 
Tseng declared formally that his Government repudiated the treaty 
of 1874 — a right which France refused to acknowledge. There 
Seemed serious danger o( war between the two countries, but China 
was not prepared for war. 

China chose another method oi' embarrassing the intruder. She 
subsidized the leader o( the Black Flags, a roving band o( marauders, 
to make incursions across the southern border. In L882 this band 
succeeded in inflicting two serious reverses on the French. It was 
necessary to send troops from France in order to restore the prestige 
of French arms. 

8. .\\N\M DECLARES WAR ON FRANCE, L882. 

In the meantime, the Bong of Annam declared war on France 
(1882), The capital, Hue. was soon occupied, and a protege of 
France placed on the throne. The following year (1883), Annam. 
in a new treaty, "recognized and accepted the protectorate of 
France." This is known as thie treaty of line. signed August 25,1883. 

•4. FUTILE NEGOTIATIONS. 

The Chinese were now thoroughly alarmed. Li llung-Chang was 
appointed commander in chief in South China. Instead <^\' proceed- 
ing io the proposed seat of hostilities, this astute Chinese statesman 
got no further than Shanghai, where he opened negotiations. But, 
desirous of shifting responsibility from his own shoulders to those 
of Marquis Tseng, he suddenly left Shanghai for Tientsin. Mean- 
while, the marquis had been at work trying to secure the interven- 
tion of one o( the western powers. The United States offered (o arbi- 
trate, but the offer was rejected by France. 

On August '20. lSSo. Prince Kung was informed officially that a 
French fleet would at once blockade the ports o\' Tonquin and An- 
nam. Prince Kung protested, declaring that China would never 
give up her suzerainty over Annam. 



189 

War was now within measurable distance, but several bridges had 
to I)'- crossed before that happened. Negotiations had meanwhile 
been transferred to Paris, bul they also continued at Peking. Mar- 
quis Tseng was, however, soon recalled from Paris, and Prince Kung 
was di missed at Peking. Et looked as though the Empress Oowager 
was determined on war. 

5. TJIi: FOUBNIEB CONVENTION, 1884. 

A si range evenl now happened. On May 11, 1881. there was con- 
cluded ;ii Tientsin between Li-Hung-Chang and Capt. Fournier, 
commander of a French man-of-war, who was invested with full 
powers by a telegram from Paris, what is known as the Fournier 
convention. (See Appendix I, 27.) By this convention France 
bound herself to respect and protect against all aggression by any 
nation and under any circumstances the southern frontiers of China 
:ind Tonquin. China agreed thai she would a1 once withdraw her 
garrisons from Tonquin and would respect the treaties concluded 
between France and the King of Annam. The dates of evacuation 
were not fixed in the treaty, but simply marked down in a memo- 
randum. Li-Hung-Chang seems to have greatly exceeded his in- 
structions and character! tically misrepresented the nature of the 
'concessions made by China to the Empress Dowager, who appeared 
satisfied with the terms of the treaty as reported to her. 

The natural consequences followed. -The Chinese commandant 
received no instructions to withdraw the garrison from Tonquin, 
and when the French advanced to take possession an inevitable con- 
fliet followed, in which the French were defeated. 

France protested against what she claimed was an infringement 
of the Fournier convention. The Chinese Government claimed 
that the French had broken the treaty by attacking Chinese troops. 

0. THE FRENCH ULTIMATUM, JULY 12, 1884. 

France now sent an ultimatum. China appealed in vain to the 
treaty powers. Tn the short war that followed both sides gained 
some successes and suffered some reverses. 

7. TREATY 01' Ill.K. J 8 84. 

On June 6, 1884, another treaty, signed at Hue. was concluded 
between France and Annam, by which the Annamese agreed to ac- 
cept a French protectorate. In return France bound herself to 
guarantee the integrity of their territory. 

8. TREATY OF TIENTSIN, 1885. 

Through the good offices mainly of Sir Robert Hart, terms of 
peace were finally arranged at Tientsin on June 9, 1885, between 



190 

France and China. (See Appendix I. 80.) It was agreed; (I) 
That Prance and China mutually agree to maintain order in the 
provinces adjoining their respective borders. (2) 'That China do 
nothing to compromise the work of fortification undertaken by 
France ami agree to respect all the treaties, conventions, ami ar- 
rangements between France and Annam. (8) That within six 
months commissioners tix the frontier between China ami Tonking. 
There \\ ere also a cumber o\' articles relating to the trade permitted to 
Chinese and French merchants, the regulation o( passports, imposi- 
tion of customs duos, trade in arms and munitions, the expedition 
and importation o{ opium, the construction of railways, etc More 
purely commercial treaties were also negotiated in 188G and 1887. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

The fullest account oi' these matters (including texts and docu- 
ments) is given by Cordier, H., Historic des relations de la Chine 
avec les puissances occidentales, L86O-1900 (Paris, Alcan, L902), 
\ ol. 11. chs, L2-26, pp. 242 575. 

For a good brief account, see Douglas, R. K., Europe amH.he Far 
East (Cambridge, University Tress. L904), eh. L2, pp. 226 241, 
and eh. IS, pp. 86] 888. 

* 

63. THE JOURNEYS OF WILLIAM II TO THE NEAR EAST. 

1. FIRST JOURNEY, 18s:>. 

The first visit of William 11 to the Sultan took place in November, 
L889, and marked a very significant change in German policy toward 
the Near East. Bismarck had always claimed to he disinterested in 
that region, and although his statement that "the whole eastern 
question was not worth the hones of a Pomeranian grenadier" may 
understate his interest, yet he does not appear to have considered the 
Near East as a sphere o\' German expansion. But William II, 
backed by and under the influence of German industrialists, seems 
early \o have decided on the policy of pushing German interests in 
thai region. Bismarck, also, considered the friendship of Russia, to 
whom the Near Kast was a vital question, io he of sullieient impor- 
tance to Germany to avoid wounding Russian susceptibilities by 
German action at Constantinople. The new policy of friendship 
\'ov Turkey and German penetration in the Near East seems to have 
led io the clash between William 11 and Bismarck and was possibly 
one of the reasons for the fall of the chancellor in 1890. (See article, 
The Dismissal o( Bismarck, 1890.) 



191 

2. GERMANY AND PAN-ISIiASHSM. 

After 1800 German policy in regard to the Near East began to 
work- wilh the Pan- Islamic plane of Abdul-Hamid. Ever since the 
80's the Sultan had been cherishing the idea of uniting all the Mos- 
lems of the world around the government of Constantinople. Emis- 
aries were dispatched as far as Afghani tan to win over the Moslems. 
A propaganda was carried on in Persia, while in Africa strenuous 
attempts were made to win the Senussi a. border tribe between 

Tripoli and the Soudan as well a the Moslems of Tuni:-, and other 

North African protectorates. If this movement could he controlled 
by Germany it would mean a powerful leverage against both Eng- 
land and France, whose Moslem subjects numbered many millions. 

.",. THE ARMENIAN MASSACiMOS. 
The connection between German policy in the. Near rCast and the 

Pan-Islamic movement began to appear at the time of the Armenian 

massacres Of 1805. These and similar ma lacres of later date were 
due to efforts on the part of Pan-Islamic forces to root out from the. 
Turkish Empire all the non-Moslem peoples and thus unify the State 
as a Moslem power. The, refusal of the German Government to act 
with the other- powers in the interest of the Armenians made effec- 
tive action hy the, powers collectively and individually impossible. 

(See article, The Armenian Question, 1878-07.) The German am- 
bassador at Constantinople even refused to assist in the distribution 

of charitable aid. The German Government, held the value of 
German-Turkish friendship above the- dictates of humanity. This 
policy resulted in the strengthening of German influence at Con- 
stantinople and facilitated the granting by the Turkish Government 
of a number of economic concessions to German interests. 

4. SECOND JOURNEY, 1 HUH. 

In 1808 William II made his second visit to the Near East. His 
aim- at this time, appear to have been two: (1) To win for Germany 
control of the Pan-Islamic movement, and (2) to secure further 
economic concessions for Germany in Turkey. In pursuit of his 
fir I aim he made a, sensational -\> ech at the tomb of Sahidin in 
Damascus. "The 300,000,000 Mohammedans that are scattered 
throughout the world," he declared, "may rest assured that the Ger- 
man Emperor will eternally he their friend." (Quoted by Hu^ronje, 
The World War "Made in Germany." p. 71.) And lie also gave high 
praise to Saladin. The effeel of this speech is dubious. It may well 
have captured the heart of the leaders of Pan-Islam, hut as Prof. 



192 

Hugronje points out (pp. 71-72) the average Moslem had little in- 
terest in Pan-Islam and had little remembrance of Saladin. 

In his second aim William II appears to have been more success- 
ful. In 1899 came the first concessions for the Bagdad Railway (See 
article, that title) and in 1903 followed the firman for its construc- 
tion. From this time on the Bagdad Railway formed a cornerstone 
of German policy in the Near East. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

Cheradame. Le Chemin de fer de Bagdad (Paris. Hon. L903). 

Berard, V. Le Sultan, l'Islam et les puissances (Paris. Colin, 
L907). 

Hugronje, The Holy War "Made in Germany" (New York, Put- 
nam, 1915). 

Lewin, E. The German Road to the East (London, Heinemann, 
1916). 

See also bibliographies for articles on the Bagdad Railway and 
the Armenian Question. 



SECTION III.— 1890-1904. 



64. THE DISMISSAL OF BISMARCK, 1890. 

1. INTRODUCTION. 

The dismissal of Bismarck was only to a very small degree de- 
pendent on foreign policy, but was a question of authority — " whether 
the Bismarck dynasty or the Hohenzollern dynasty should rule." 
(Hohenlohe, II, pp. 424, 426.) Nevertheless the chancellor's cultiva- 
tion of Russia at the expense of Austria lay to some extent in the 
background. After secret treaties in 1881 and 1884, in 1887 Bis- 
marck had entered into his reinsurance treaty with Russia, which 
stipulated that if either found itself at war with a third great power 
the other would maintain toward it a benevolent neutrality. France 
was thereby isolated. (See article, Bismarck's Reinsurance Treaty.) 
The treaty, or agreement, was for three years, and 1889-1890 found 
Bismarck eager for its renewal. 

2. THE DISMISSAL AND GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY. 

From William IPs accession Bismarck seems to have urged the cul- 
tivation of Russia. In July, 1888, four weeks after his accession, the 
Emperor visited the Czar, afterwards paying his respects at Vienna 
and the South German capitals. To a reporter of the Novoe Vremja 
(May 10, 1890), Bismarck said that he had advised against the 
Emperor's visit to Constantinople in 1889, as likely to offend Russia. 
The Czar visited the Emperor October, 1889, and it is said that the 
Emperor intended to visit him at the hunting chateau Spala, in 
Lithuania, when Bismarck's objection (possibly fearing that too 
many meetings might cool Alexander's friendship), brought on a 
public display of temper against the chancellor October 13, 1889. 
(Egelhaaf, Bismarck, p. 384, for the rather uncertain proofs of this.) 
In the following March, just as the inner administrative conflict was 
coming to a head between them, the Emperor was greatly incensed 
because Bismarck had failed to mention to him a delayed communi- 
cation from the German Consul Raffauf at Kiev, regarding Russian 
military preparations. William felt that Austria should have been 
warned. Bismarck's action was probably due to anxiety lest this 
probably exaggerated report might prevent the renewal of the 
"reinsurance treaty." (All sources in Egelhaaf, Bismarck, p. 388, 
53706—18 13 (193) 



L94 

who claims personal information.) William told his generals after 
Bismarck's resignation thai the chancellor was too friendly io Russia 
at the expense oi Austria (second-hand to Hohenlohe, II, p. 125); 
he told Hohenlohe (pp. 126 27) that Bismarck had misrepresented 
him to Alexander. The Kiev report was one of the matters that 
brought the demand that Bismarck yield or resign. It echoes in the 
obscure paragraph in Bismarck's resignation letter oi March L8 
(first published by M. Busch in Berlin Lokalanzeiger, July 31, L898; 
now convenient, with the Emperor's replies of March 20, in Egelhaaf, 
Bismarck, 488 ff.)« Bismarck's determination to retain Russia's 
friendship was undoubtedly combined with a fear oi' British influence 
on the Emperor, 

.;. R] -si i is. 

The results of Bismarck's retirement were: 

(1^ The loss oi Russia's friendship: ^i) the "reinsurance treaty " 
was not renewed (Cf. for debate in Reichstag concerning this, Penzler, 
VII, pp. L59, L68) : (b) Caprivi tried to conciliate the Poles (against 
Russian policy) by language concessions (1891), by 1 1 to confirmation 
of Stablewski, a national Polish loader, as archbishop oi Posen- 
Qnesen (1891), etc.; (e) although visits between the Emperor and 

ir continued to take place, the French and Russians drew aearer 
together, the rapprochement culminating in the visit oi the French 
fleet to Kronstadt July 28, L891, and the formation of the Franco- 
Russian alliance (189J L898), 

(2) An improvement in relations with England, shown by the toast 
of the Emperor at the banquet to the Prince of Wales, March 21, 
L890, with its reference to joint maintenance oi European peace 
(Hohenlohe II, p. 422), and the conclusion of the Zanzibar Helgo- 
land treaty, dune L8, L890. (See article, that title.) 

(8) The improvement of relations with Austria and Italy by the re- 
moval of the fear that Germany was too friendly to Russia and by 
the reciprocity treaties, concluded bj Caprivi in L891. 

1. OONOia MO\. 

When Caprivi retired in L894 the Franeo-Russian alliance had 
stabilized matters, and the era id' Weltpolitik began independently 
of Bismarck policies. The Lasting result oi Bismarck's dismissal 
was the Franeo-Kussian alliance, something which the chancellor 
michl have delayed, hut could hardly have prevented. 

nuuaooK \riiY. 

Hohenlohe Schillingsfurst, Prince Chlodowig, Denkwurdigkeiten, 
English translation. -2 vols. (New York. Macmillan, I'MKk) Im- 
portant first-hand information. 



L05 

Delbrlick, II. I>i<' Eiohenlohe Memorien. Preussische Jahrbiicher, 
vol. L26, pp. 375 886. October December, 1906. 

&gelhaaf, ( /. Bi marck, ein Leben trnd sein werk. (Stuttgart, 
Krabbe, L911.) \ careful but very partisan study by an admirer, 
- I on much persona] informal ion- 

. Geschichte der aeuesten Zeit. (4tb Auflage, Stuttgart, 

Krabbe, 1^12.) Good resume*. 

Busch, M. Bismarck, Some Secret Page of bis II i tory. (New 
STork, Macmillan, 1898.) Mostly chatter, and bard to "control." 

Crispi, I'. Memoirs, II. 12T i-io. London, Hodder. L012 
Gives :j close new by an [talian diplomat al Berlin who reported 
to Crispi. 

Penzler, J. PiirstBi marck nach seiner Entla sung. Bde. 1 VII. 
(Leipzig, Fiedler, 1807 08.) 

Debidour. Histoire diplomatique de LTEurope depuie le Con 
grei de Berlin jusqu'a uos jours. I. L89 146. (Paris, AJcan, L016.) 
Good, concise aarral i re. 

Mevil, A. Bismarck et la Russie, Bevue hebdomaire, May 11, L907. 

I >.> (Prut ian) Staatsarcb iammlung der offiziellen Akten- 
stiicke (Aegidi and Klaubold), since July. 1861, If. 

Schulthess, Europaischer Geschichtskalender, since I860. 

Other ource in the text. Practically none of the State papers 
hare been published. 

05. THE BRUSSELS ANTISLAVERY CONFERENCE OP 1890. 

] . PI BPO 

The II signatory powei of the Berlin Conference of i 
ee article, thai title) had obligated themselves to "strive for 
the suppre sion of $la >ecially of the Negro slave trade." 

Bui these provi ioi re inefl d the same po iv< 1 1 partici- 

pated in another conference called together at BrusseL in L80O for 
the purpose of " putting an end to the crimes and devastation engen 
dered by the traffic in Afri efficiently protecting the 

aboriginal population of Africi for thai vast co 

tinent the benefits of peace and civilization." 

_-. J J.I; US OJ 1 l.' l. 

The genera] ad of the Br Conference (consisting of LOO arti- 

cle! I conceded a Limited right of visit and search of vt 
tonnage i Le than 500 toni within a great maritime zone extending 
from the western c of the Lndian Ocean (the Persian Gulf and 
the Bed Sea included), from Baluchistan to Cape Tangalane (Quilli- 
mane), to a coi rial Line which firsl follow:-, the meridian from 



196 

Tangalane till it intersects the twenty-sixth degree of south latitude, 
is then merged in this parallel, then passes around the Island of 
Madagascar by the east, keeping 20 miles off the east and north 
shore, till it intersects the meridian at Cape Ambre; from this point 
the limit of the zone is determined by an oblique line, which extends 
to the coast of Baluchistan, passing 20 miles off Cape Hodd (art. 21). 

For the purposes of investigation and trial, each signatory power 
agreed to appoint in the zone in question territorial or consular 
authorities, or special delegates, competent to deal with the cases 
covered by the convention. Such a magistrate, when an arrested 
vessel is turned over to him, must proceed to make a full in- 
vestigation according to the laws of his own country, in the presence 
of an officer belonging to the foreign cruiser. If it is proved that a 
flag has been fraudulently used, the arrested vessel is to remain at the 
disposal of the captor (art. 51). If the examination shows an act 
connected with the slave trade, proved by the presence on board of 
slaves destined for sale, or any other offense connected with the 
slave trade, for which provision is made by special convention, the 
vessel and cargo are to remain sequestrated in charge of the magis- 
trate. The captain and crew are then to be turned over for trial to 
the tribunal of the nation whose flag they used (arts. 54r-57), and the 
slaves are to be set at liberty as soon as judgment has been pro- 
nounced. Damages are to be allowed where a vessel has been illegally 
arrested (arts. 53, 58). 

An international maritime bureau, at which each of the signatory 
powers may be represented by a delegate, shall be established at 
Zanzibar in order to "centralize all documents and information of a 
nature to facilitate the repression of the slave trade in the maritime 
zone (arts. 74-80). 

r.. RESULT. 

It would seem that there has been an honest effort on the part of 
the great majority of the powers concerned to enforce the provisions 
of the Brussels conference, and that, as a consequence, the African 
slave trade is practically extinct or merely sporadic by sea, and on its 
way to extinction or at least greatly decreased on land. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

For the text of the general act of the Brussels conference, see Sup- 
plement to American Journal of International Law, Vol. Ill, 
pp. 29-01. 

For the various protocols and discussions at the conference, see 
Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres. Conference Internationale de 
Bruxelles. Protocols et Acte Final (Paris, Imprimerie Natiomle. 
1801). 



197 

For diplomatic correspondence, see Ministere des Affaires Etran- 
geres. Conference International et Commission de Brnxelles. Cor- 
respondence Diplomatique (Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1891). 

The main works on the slave trade and the Brussels conference are 
by Queneuil, H.. De la traite des noirs et l'esclavage. La conference 
de Brnxelles et ses resnltats (Paris. 1907) ; and Montardy. H. de, Le 
traite et le droit international (Paris, 1899). 

For discussions and analyses see especially: Lawrence, T. J. 
Principles of International Law (3d ed., Boston, Heath, 1900), pp. 
216-218; and Moore, J. B., Digest of International Law (Washing- 
ton, Govt. Printing Office), Vol. II, pp. 948-950. 

66. THE FORMATION OF THE DUAL ALLIANCE BETWEEN 
FRANCE AND RUSSIA, 1887-1893. 

1. FRENCH ISOLATION, 1871-18S7. 

The provocation of the Dual Alliance betAveen France and Russia 
came from Germany, though its formation was probably assisted 
by the differences which both France and Russia had with England. 
After the Franco-Prussian War, Germany, in the person of Bis- 
marck, dominated international politics in Europe and Bismarck's 
foreign policy was directed in the main toward keeping France 
isolated and weak. To that end he formed the so-called League of 
the Three Emperors in 1872 (See article, that title) with Russia and 
Austria -Hungary. Later, when Russia and Austria fell out over 
the Balkan question, he signed a defensive alliance with Austria 
(1879). enlarged in 1882, by the inclusion of Italy, into the famous 
Triple Alliance (See articles, The Formation of the Triple Alliance 
and The Renewals of the Triple Alliance). Russia was not a party 
to it, but by the secret treaties of 1881 and 1884 and the Reinsurance 
Treaty of 1887 Russia pledged herself to remain benevolently neutral 
in case Germany were attacked. (See article, Bismarck's Reinsur- 
ance Treaty.) Thus Bismarck isolated France from three of the four 
possible strong allies in Europe. The fourth, England, had many 
outstanding quarrels with France over African and Asiatic questions. 
Bismarck trusted to them to keep England and France apart. 

2. FRANCE AND RUSSIA, 1871-1887. 

Naturally France wished to escape from this isolation. The tra- 
dition of her diplomacy indicated an ally to the far side of Germany, 
namely, Russia. With Russia she had no quarrel and Russia shared 
her antipathy to England. French republicanism, of course, was 
distasteful to Russian autocracy and the Russian Czar was close- 
bound to the German Emperor both by treaty ties and by ties of 
kinship. Yet the Czar was plainly becoming dissatisfied with his 



198 

German ally, particularly as he found Bismarck more disposed to 

support Austria's policy in the Balkans than his own. He had more- 
over manifested his disinclination to acquiesce in German designs 
against France. lie had intervened when Germany threatened 
France in 1ST."). (See article. The Franco-Gentian War Scare of 
L875.) Two years later he seems to have refused to allow Germany 
a free hand against France in return for a free hand in the Balkans. 
Jn 1SST he moved troops toward the German frontier when Franco- 
German relation^ were critical. His whole attitude, in fact, invited 
French advances. 

3. ADVANCES TOWARD ALLIANCE, 1887-1891. 

These advances took form in 1887 in a project to float a Russian 
loan in Paris which was realized in December of 18S8. Other loans 
quickly followed and served to establish close financial relations be- 
tween France and Russia. A further step forward was taken in 
1889, when the Russian Government was allowed to purchase army 
rifles in Fiance. In the spring of 1890 a Russian grand duke visited 
Paris; in duly of 1891 a French fleet visited Kronsiadt and was roy- 
ally entertained. All these things paved the way for a protracted 
and delicate negotiation, the details of which were little known and 
much misunderstood until the publication in September, L918, of a 
French Yellow Book, which made public most of the correspondence 
and documents (Documents Diplomatiques L' Alliance Franco-Russe. 
In the remaining sections of this article the figures enclosed in 
brackets refer to the numbers of the documents in that collection."). 

4. DRAFTING OF THE MILITARY CONVENTION. 

Conversations looking; toward and alliance began as early as 
August, L890 (1). Progress at first was slow, though in March, 1891. 
the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs in a dispatch communicated 
to the French Government did speak of the "entente cordidle" be- 
tween France and Russia as "the best guarantee of peace" and as 
"necessary for the maintenance in Europe of a just balance of 
forces" (2). By July. 1892. the renewal of the Triple Alliance and 
the reported '" indirect accession of England" led the two govern- 
ments to consider whether "the new situation created by that event 
for France and Russia would not render desirable one step more in 
the way of entente" (3). In August an entente was reached (17 and 
annexe). A draft of a military convention was then drawn up, the 
form being adjusted only after much delicate negotiation. This was 
signed for more effective presentation to the Czar by the Russian 
Minister of War and bv General Boisdeifre for Fiance (71). It 



199 

was expressly understood that these signatures added nothing to the 
binding character of the entente already existing (71). 

5. SIGNING OF THE MILITARY CONVENTION. 

The French Government, apparently owing some hesitation on 
the part of Freycinet, the Prime Minister, sought to secure a number 
of changes in the convention (75). This may have had something 
to do with the failure to get promptly the signature of the Czar or 
of his Minister of Foreign Affairs. For some reason which the pub- 
lished documents do not fully disclose, the Czar at this point delayed 
action and apparently became anxious to postpone the signing of a 
definite instrument of alliance. More than a year passed during 
which the French Government, despite much effort, failed in every 
attempt to secure the formal signing of the convention. Finally on 
December 27, 1893, the convention was duly signed. Even then the 
French Government had to be content with an instrument which bore 
neither the signature of the Czar or of his Minister of Foreign Af- 
fairs. The latter, however, transmitted to the French Govermnent a 
letter marked " Tres secrete" (91 and annexe). It declared that the 
text attested in August, 1892, " can be considered as having been defi- 
nitively adopted in its actual form." No treaty of alliance was ever 
actually signed. There was an alliance, but it rested on the entente 
reached in August, 1892, and the military convention finally accepted 
by Russia in December, 1893. 

6. TERMS OF THE MHITARY CONVENTION. 

The military convention stipulated (71) : 

" If France it attacked by Germany or by Italy, supported by Ger- 
many, Russia will employ all its disposable forces to fight Germany. 

" If Russia is attacked by Germany or by Austria, supported by 
Germany, France will employ all its disposable forces to fight Ger- 
many." 

note. 

STATEMENTS MADE BY FRENCH MINISTERS IN THE FRENCH CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 
THROWING LIGHT UPON THE TERMS OF THE FRANCO-RUSSIAN ALLIANCE. 

1. On June 10, 1895, M. Hanotaux, minister of foreign affairs, 
made the following reference to the alliance : 

Deux grandes puissances, portees l'une vers l'autre par l'attraction de leurs 
sentiments et de leurs int6rets respectifs, se sont donnS la main. Elles ont 
nou6 une entente qui les rapproche naturellement dans le travail incessant 
de la politique courante, et qui, toujours pacifique, leur garantit une securit6 
reciproque. 



200 

2. On the same day, M. Ribot, the prime minister, made the 
following reference to the same subject: 

Oul, nous avons aiiie aux interets d'une grande nation les lntGrGts de la 
Franco; nons l'avons fait pour la sauvegarde de la paix et le malntien de 
l'equilibre de l'Europe. Et s'il n'y a rion de change" dans les aspirations, dans 
la direction sup&leure, dans le bat suprtale do notre politique, il y a pourtant 
quelque chose de change en Europe depuis 1S91. (Archives diploma tlques, 
second sorios. vol ~>4. pp. 357, 370.) 

3. On the 14th of June, 1912, M. Poincare, the prime minister, 
made the following statement: 

Notre alliance avec la Russle, consaoree non seulement par des accords 

positifs, mais par l'epreuve du temps, trouve son application sur tous les 
points du globe au benefice des deux nations. Elle n'a de pointe dirigee contre 
aucune puissance, mala elle pennet aux deux gouvernements allies de combiner 
leur action diplomatique pour la sauvegarde de leurs interets respectifs et de 
collaborer an malntien d«> la paix. (Ibid., third sorios, vol. 122, pp. 240-247.) 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

The most important source of information is Documents Diplo- 
matiques. L'Alliance Franco-Russe (Paris, Xmprimerie NfiHionale, 

1918). See above. 

Debidour, A. Histoire diplomatique de l'Europe depuis le Con- 
gres de Berlin jusqu'a nos jours. (2 vols., Paris, Alcan, 1916.) This 
is perhaps the best general account of modern French diplomatic 
history. It contains good bibliographies of French books. Volume 
I. chapters 5. 6, and 7 cover the history of the Franco-Russian al- 
liance. 

Tardieu, A. La France et les alliances. (Paris. Alcan. 190-1-.) 
English translation published under the title, France and the Al- 
liances. (London. Macmillan, 1908.) Tardieu's connection with the 
French foreign oflice gave him unusual facilities for obtaining infor- 
mation but also imposed upon him a certain obligation to defend the 
French position. The English translation of his book is probably 
the best account of the Franco-Russian alliance in English. 

Daudet, E. Souvenirs et revelations, histoire diplomatique de 
Palliance franco-russe, 1873-1893. (3rd ed., Paris, Ollendorff, 1894.) 
Suggestive but not always absolutely trustworthy. 

Hansen. J. J. L'Alliance franco-russe. (Paris, 1897.) Hansen 
was employed to assist in the negotiations for the military conven- 
tion of 1892. He was a newspaper correspondent of Danish origin 
and was unusually well informed. 

Ibid., Ambassade a Paris du baron de Mohrenheim. (Paris, Flan- 
marion, 1907.) Baron de Mohrenheim was the Russian ambassador 
at Paris while the negotiations for the alliance were in progress. 

Cyon. filie de. Histoire de Pentente franco-russe, 1886-1894 ; doc- 
uments et souvenirs. (3rd ed., Paris, Charles, 1S95.) Cyon was a 



201 

French man-of -letters very much interested in Russia and very well 
informed about Russian affairs. His book is largely an account of 
his own efforts and those of Katkof, a Russian man-of-letters to pro- 
mote the Franco-Russian alliance. It should be used with caution. 

Freycinet, C. de S. de. Souvenirs, 1878-93. (Paris, Delagrave, 
1913.) Throws a good deal of valuable light upon the negotiations 
of 1891 and 1892 by one of the French ministers most active in pro- 
moting the alliance. 

Gorloff, V. de. Origines et bases de 1'alliance franco-russe. (Paris, 
G russet, 1913.) Chiefly valuable for the history of Franco-Rus- 
sian relations before 1892. 

Coolidge, A. C. The Origins of the Triple Alliance. (New York, 
Scribner, 1917.) An excellent short account of Bismarck's diplo- 
macy from 1871 to 1882. Prints in an appendix, from official 
sources, the terms of the Austro-German alliance of 1879 and the 
terms, so far as they have been published, of the Triple Alliance. 

Seymour, C. The Diplomatic Background of the War, 1870-1914. 
(New Haven, Yale University Press, 1916.) Contains, in chapter 
3, a useful short account of the alliance in English. 

Vote. — Contemporary accounts of the public aspects of the Franco- 
Russian rapprochement will be found in L'Annec politique for the 
years 1888 to L894. Much valuable information on the alliance will 
also be ^ound in the accounts of the debates on foreign affairs in (!)<• 
French Chamber of Deputies printed in Archives diplomatiqucs, a 
bi-monthly review of diplomacy and history published in Paris. 

67. THE ZANZIBAR-HELIGOLAND TREATY OF 1890. 

1. THE PERIOD OP' BRITISH INFLUENCE, 187 5-1884. 

Though a treaty made between Great Britain and France in 1862 
recognized the "independence" of Zanzibar, British influence was 
supreme in Zanzibar during the period extending from 1875 to 1884. 
This was mainly due to the efforts of a single individual, John Kirk, 
British consul to Zanzibar for 20 years. His influence was so great 
that it was said he was more powerful than the Sultan. 

2. GERMAN ACTIVITY IN EAST AFRICA, 1865-1885. 

As early as 1865 a German by the name of Kersten had advocated 
the annexation of East Africa by Germany. Years before that Ham- 
burg trade had found a footing at Zanzibar. Again, in 1875, Vice- 
Admiral Lurniss had urged that Zanzibar be taken under German 
protection. But it was not until 1884 that suspicion of German 
intentions was aroused at the British Foreign Office. On November 28 
the British ambassador at Berlin obtained an assurance from Prince 



1*02 

Bismarck that "Germany was not endeavoring to obtain a protec- 
torate over Zanzibar.*' On January 14, 1885, Earl Granville sent a 
communication to Berlin, somewhat timidly drawing attention to 
the mission to Zanzibar of the German African explorer, Dr. Rohlifs, 
at the same time expressing a confident belief that Germany did not 
mean to annex Zanzibar. (British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 
77, pp. 1099-1100.) On February 25 Earl Granville was informed 
that Dr. Rohlffs, who had been appointed German consul-general at 
Zanzibar, was "commissioned to exert his influence" to secure free- 
dom of commerce in the Sultan's dominions. (Ibid., p. 1103.) The 
British Foreign Office professed itself satisfied with the vague as- 
surances from Berlin. 

At the same time Dr. Carl Peters was extremely active. (in 1884- 
1885) in founding a Societ}- of German Colonization and the Ger- 
men East African Co. In 1884, disguised as mechanics, Dr. Peters 
and Dr. Juhlke made their way to Zanzibar, and were soon at Avork 
making "treaties" with native chiefs and acquiring enormous 
stretches of territory in East Africa which was claimed by the 
Sultan of Zanzibar. ♦ 

3. ANGLO-GERMAN DIPLOMATIC AMENITIES. 

On May 25, 1885, Lord Granville assured Prince Bismarck that 
the British Government had no intention of offering any obstruc- 
tion to German projects, but welcomed Germany's cooperation in 
developing the resources of East Africa and in trying to suppress 
slavery. Consequently, the protests of the Sultan of Zanzibar were 
of no avail. 

When, in June. 1885, Lord Salisbury succeeded Earl Granville at 
the head of the British Foreign Office, he w T as quite as favorable as 
his predecessor to the adoption of a conciliatory policy in East 
Africa. 

4. THE ANGLO-GERMAN AGREEMENT OF 1886. 

On October 29 and November 1, 1886, the British and German 
Governments came to a definite agreement in respect to the terri- 
tory, which should be recognized as remaining under the sover- 
eignty of the Sultan of Zanzibar, to which agreement the Sultan 
gave his assent on December 1. According to this agreement, the 
domains of the Sultan were mainly restricted to a strip of main- 
land along the coast 10 miles in width and to the island of Zanzibar 
and Pemba, together with some smaller islands. The Sultan gave 
up all claims to Kilimanjaro, though the aspirations of the embryo 
British East African Co. were to some extent satisfied by the defini- 
tion of a boundary to the north of which Germany would not inter- 



203 

fere with their " sphere of influence." As a partial consolation for 
these losses of territory, Germany recognized the " independence " 
of the Sultan, as England and France had done in 1862. 

5. THE PERIOD BETWEEN 1886-1890. 

In 1886 there was formed the British East African Association 
which obtained various rights and concessions, and displayed con- 
siderable activity in the course of which they experienced consider- 
able difficulty with Dr. Peters and his friends. German methods of 
dealing with the natives had also brought on an insurrection which 
was suppressed with some difficulty with the aid and cooperation of 
England. 

0. THE ANGLO-GERMAX AGREEMENT OF 1890. 

There resulted from these various difficulties the famous Anglo- 
German agreement, signed on July 1, 1890. (See Appendix I, 38.) 
By this agreement the northern boundary of German East Africa 
was drawn from the mouth of the Umba to Victoria Nyanza in 1° S. 
latitude, keeping the snowy Kilimanjaro in the German sphere, 
but leaving Taveta to England. The line was then drawn straight 
across the lake and westward until it reached the boundary of the 
Congo Free State, only deflecting southward so far as to include 
Mount Mfumbiro within the British sphere (though its precise posi- 
tion remains doubtful). Witu, at the mouth of the Tana, was given 
to Fngland. On the south the German boundary line was drawn 
along the river Rovuma to Lake Nyassa. 

The islands of Zanzibar and Pemba were recognized as under 
British protection. 

The two powers engaged that " neither will interfere with any 
sphere of influence assigned to the other by Articles I to IV." (Art. 
VII.) They also agreed to " apply in all the portions of their respec- 
tive spheres, within the limits of the free zone, defined by the act of 
Berlin of 1885 (See article, The Berlin Conference of 1884-1885), the 
provisions relating to freedom of trade, the freedom of the naviga- 
tion of rivers, lakes, canals, and ports, etc., the prohibition of trade 
monopolies, transit dues, differential treatment as regards transport 
or coasting trade, etc." 

7. CESSION OF HELIGOLAND TO GERMANY. 

Article XII provided for the cession of the Island of Heligoland 
to Germany — a transaction scoffed at by Bismarck (then in retire- 
ment), and commonly regarded as a barren rock of little value to 
either England or Germany. At that time there seemed to be little 



204 

realization either in England or Germany of the immense strategic 
importance of this " rock " in any future maritime conflict between 
these two great sea powers. (See article, The Zanzibar-Heligoland 
Treaty of 1890.) 

S. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A BRITISH PROTECTORATE OVER ZANZIBAR. 

On November 4, 1890, the Sultanate proclaimed a British protec- 
torate over Zanzibar. By a Zanzibar order in council in 1906, the 
protectorate was limited to the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

The most interesting account of these matters is that given by 
Keltic, J. S., The Partition of Africa (London, Stanford, 1893), 
chs. 15 and 18, passim. See also Harris, N. D., Intervention and 
Colonization in Africa (Boston, Houghton, 1914), ch. 5. 

For the texts of the Anglo-German agreements of 1886 and 1890, 
see Hertslet, Map of Africa by Treaty (London, 1891), Vol. Ill, 
Nos. 264 and 270, pp. 882 ff., and 899 ff., and Map of Europe by 
Treaty (London, 1891), Vol. IV, pp. 3286 ff. * 

For the correspondence of 1885-1886 between the British and Ger- 
man governments, see British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 77, pp. 
1099-1139; for documents dealing- with the treaty of July 1, 1890, see 
Parliamentary Papers. Africa, Xos. 5 and 6 (1890). 

68. THE DREYFUS AFFAIR. 

1. INTRODUCTION. 

The Dreyfus affair, despite its close connection with the relations 
between France and Germany, entered immediately and directly into 
diplomatic history only in small measure. Its chief immediate sig- 
nificance was for the internal rather than the foreign a Hairs of 
France, though indirectly and at a somewhat later date the foreign 
policy of the country was affected by the defeat of the anti- 
Dreyfusards. The heterogeneous coalition which bitterly opposed 
the attempts to reexamine the verdict passed upon Dreyfus by the 
first court-martial finally came to include practically all the elements 
in the country hostile to the Third Republic. In the sequel, triumph 
over so powerful a coalition of enemies added much to the solidity 
of the Third Republic. Soon after the close of the agitation the 
strength thus gained helped enable it to enter upon a more vigorous 
and independent foreign policy. 

2. NEGOTIATIONS. 

It occasioned negotiations between France and Germany only 
in regard to charges made in French newspapers against the 
German ambassador, who was accused of having relations with 



205 

Dreyfus. In view of these charges the Kaiser in a personal message, 
sent through the chancellor and the German ambassador, informed 
the President of France that if there was proof that the German 
embassy was implicated in the affair the French Government should 
not hesitate to declare it. 

3. PUBLIC STATEMENT. 

In consequence of this dispatch a statement for the newspapers 
was drafted by the French Government and submitted before pub- 
lication to the German Government. This statement, published in 
all the newspapers on January 9, 1895, did not specifically mention 
the German embassy but announced in the form of a reference to an 
earlier communication to the press that charges against foreign 
embassies in newspaper articles on espionage were devoid of foun- 
dation. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

Reinach, Joseph. Histoire de l'affaire Dreyfus. (Paris, Librairie 
Charpentier et Fasquelle, 1901-1911.) 7 vols. Detailed and reliable, 
pro-Dreyfus. 

Debidour, A. Histoire diplomatique depuis le congres de Berlin 
jusqu'a nos jours. (Paris, Alcan, 1916.) 2 vols. Most recent author- 
itative French history of European diplomacy since 1878. 

69. RAILWAY CONCESSIONS IN TURKEY. 

1. INTRODUCTION. 

The construction of railways in Turkey has been influenced by 
political and strategic objects of the powers and by the desire to 
secure Turkish markets, at least as much, if not more, than the 
economic value of each particular road. As the Turkish government 
was unsuccessful in its attempts to build and operate railroads almost 
all the track in Turkey was built and at the outset of the World War 
mostly operated by foreigners; the one exception was the Hedjaz 
pilgrim railway. Capitalists and engineers who built and managed 
the roads used material from their own countries and the principal 
employees of the roads, usually of the nations whose citizens control 
them. " involuntarily act as agents for the introduction " of their 
national goods. The use of railroads in the international competi- 
tion for the Turkish market was particularly marked in the German 
railroad development after 1888, a development strongly backed by 
the diplomats of the Empire and by its great banks. Political con- 
siderations of another sort led Russia to block railroad building in 
Armenia, which bordered on her territory, except with her consent. 



206 

We nun Leave out of consideration the railroads of European Tur 
key, as that territory is now almost entirely in the bands of other 
nations. Tho Bagdad Line is also to be omitted (See article, The 
Bagdad Railway, L908 L904), though the Later history centers 

around it. 

FIRST PERIOD, PO I 888, 

Railroad history may be divided into four periods, t ho division 
being marked b\ the years L888, L908, L908, In the Bret, the English 
were dominant. As early as L888 there was m serious attempt t* 1 
work out routes to t ho Euphrates and the Persian Gulf, Leaving the 
seacoast either at Tripoli or at Haifa. The main object was the short 
route to India, Aftor the middle of the nineteenth century numerous 
plans were put forward to join the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf 
at Koweit : in L856, b concession with a six per rout guarantee on 
capita] invested, by the Turkish government, was obtained; but the 
financial returns were too doubtful, in view o\' the competition with 
Sues, to interest the necessary capital. The concession for t ho 

Smyrna and Aidin Railwav w:is given in L856 and was to expire in 
L985, The first section was opened in L866. The Turkish govern 
ment guaranteed six per cent on the cost o\' construction, but its paj 
ments foil in arrears; in ISSS. in a now convention, the arrears were 
cancelled, the guarantee abandoned for the future, and the conci 
sion extended to L9S5, when the government might exercise an option 
to purchase, but must pay, in addition to the purchase price, a large 
sum, as the agreed government debt to the company. The company, 
whoso line has boon extended up the Cayster and Afaender valle] . 
has since paid dividends to its stockholders without government aid. 
I\> the outbreak o( the war it remained in the hands o\' the British. 
The concession for the Smyrna-Cassaba Railroad was granted to 
English capitalists in L868 to expire in L891. In L872 it was ex 
tended to Aiashehr. At that time it made a Loan to the government 
and agreed to build and operate a Line to Soman for the government 
account. Another small road from Mersina to Adana. forty-two 
miles, was built in L888 by a Franco-English syndicate. In L888 the 
English interests won 1 bought out by tho French. The road had m> 
government aid and was not at first successful. 

Tho Turkish Government decided in L87] to take a hand in rail 
road construction and operation on its own account. In that year 
it began to build from Mudania to Brusa, but though the Line was 
only about twenty-six miles Loag, it was scarcely completed in L880 
and was not opened for traffic, until in L891 it was conceded to a 
French company. Operation began the next year, Tho company 
had no government aid, At the same time the Turkish Government 
began a Line from llaidar Pasha, opposite Constantinople, to Esmidt, 



07 

fid i miles, which, though of ea - coil truction, took three 

to complete and Turkish operation wai bo onsucceM ful that the line 
lea -'I to British subjects In 1880. 

i ' OJ D PBBIOD, ! v,::. 

The econd period opens with 1888, marked by the beginning of 
kilometer guarantee , L <•.. a tipulated net revenue for each kilo- 
meter of road operated, the entrance of the Germans, and the lo . 
of ilj<- English po ition to the French and German . The Hai< 
Pasha I mi'Ji, line wa taken away from the English conce iona 
on payment of compensation in L888 by exercise of the right of de- 
nunciation and sold to ■■> German syndicate beaded by the Deutsche 
Bank, the greai German financial institution for S<;n- Bast enter 
prises. The Anatolian Railroad Co., formed to operate the J i ri*-. got 
a concession to extend to Angora, three hundred and two mil 

th a libera] kilometric guarantee, that is, a guarantee that the 
gross returni should be so much per kilometer. The guarantee was 

ared on the tithe (agricultural tax) of the proi no tra ei ed 
i, the road, [n addition, the road wa to re< ntere t oi 

ded during con truction, and, a /)'•■• and important feature, a. I J 
mining rights for twenty kilometers on either side of the railway. 
In 1893, the line was farther extended by two branches, one to An- 
gora, the other to Konia. J he company in accepting this com 
agreed eventually to extend the line from Angora to Bagdad; but 
it) fact, because of Russian opposition to the route through Armeu 
the Konia branch be< ame the next link in the Bagdad y. 1 he <■ 

lini « re rapidly pushed to completion, the money being n>] 
sale of stock and bond ba ed on the Turkish kilometric guaranl 
also secured on the local tithes.* This company had strong German 
diplomatic support, in contrast to the attitude of the British Gov- 
ernment which, en the Smyrna Ca I protection 

hi i, the danger of being shut off from its natural sphere of pene- 
tration by the exten ion to Konia, replied that it was glad to 
the extension of German railroad activity. 

The hi lebl of the Turkish Governmeni to the 
saba company and in ill success induced the compi o ell the 
road to the French investor . the Nagelmacker interest who go( a 
new concession from the Government on satii fying the claims of the 
old company against the Government. Turkey 
annuity of 92,400 poi ear for ninei ear the life of 

the concession, secured by «li f - Government's share of the re 
of the railway and the agricultural tax on the province of Aidin. 
The Government ha the right to repur< n 1974 1 eaimii 

made the basi for an is ne of bonds, and to provide the bulk of 



JOS 

the capital for the new construction authorized, oihor Issues of 
bonds were to be based also on a kilometrie guarantee. The com- 
pany fell into German hands and a junction was made with the Ana- 
tolian railroad. 

The most important road of Syria, the Societe Ottomans du 
Chemins de Fer de Damas, llama, et Prolonguements, was based on 
a concession to a native and on a similar one to a Turkish subject 
for a tramway south from Damascus. The line was without guar 
anty, as was the Jaffa-Jerusalem road, based on a concession to a 
native in L888 and completed four years later. An English concern 
began a pretentious line from Haifa to Damascus and the Hauran 
I L891), but ran out of money after 21 miles of rail had been laid 
out of Haifa. A new railroad policy was struck out by Turkey in 
1900, when the Hejaz line was decreed. This was to be a pilgrim 
route, the money was Largely fco eome in contributions from the 
faithful throughout the world, the work was to be done by soldiers, 
and German engineers were permitted only in the non-sacred portion 
of the track. The lapsed road from Haifa and the French road 
south from Damascus were taken over and contact between Haifa 
and Damascus assured. 

4. THIRD PERIOD, 1008-1908. 

The third period is dominated by the Bagdad road. The Mersina- 
Adana road was secured by Germans in 1906 by purchase of stock, 
though Anglo-French directors were still retained. (See article, 
The Bagdad Railway.) On the other hand, the English were given 
permission in the same year to extend the Aidin road and the French 
received a concession for one from Heraclea on the Black Sea. where 
they operated coal mines. 

5. FOURTH PERIOD, 190S-1914. 

The entire railroad situation seemed passing into the hands of the 
Germans when, in 1908, the revolution broke out. At first many o( 
the Young Turks were strongly anti-German, few favored that 
country. The new T Government undertook an elaborate program 
of development, but the ministry of public works favored from the 
first the principle of balance of powers in railroads and an attempt 
was made to distribute favors impartially. Complaints were made 
in the Turkish Parliament against the high kilometrie guarantees 
given the Bagdad road, but German diplomacy was able to make 
friends with the Young Turks and the concession was not 
interfered with. Concerns of all sorts of character brought 
forward all sorts of plans. One, for example, an English scheme, 



209 

was that the road should go from Adrianople across the Bos- 
porus north of Constantinople, parallel but south of the Black 
Sea, and then to Persia and India. An American concern, the 
Ottoman-American Development Co. of New York, asked conces- 
sions which were variously given as Angora-Sivas-Harput-Van or 
Alcxandretta-Diarbekir-Van and Diarbekir-Suleimania on the Per- 
sian frontier. No kilometer guarantee was asked, but 4 per cent 
was to be given on the cost of construction and 1 per cent for amor- 
tization, based on the revenues (tithes) of the six Provinces through 
which it went. Also, the oil and mineral lands for 20 kilometers 
on each side of the track were to be given the company. The 
scheme was approved by the experts and accepted in principle by 
the minister of public wopkn. Special desire was felt by the 
Turkish Government that this should develop, as the United States 
was felt to be free from desire to secure political control, but for 
some reason the plan did not succeed. Sir Edward Pears says 
(Abdul Hamid, p. 158) that the failure of the plan was due to Ger- 
man opposition. 

In the period just before the war several important developments 
were put through or were in process of being organized. In South- 
west Arabia, the Yemen, the French secured a grant from Hodeideh 
to Sanaa, and began work. The English, represented by Willcocks, 
who had already begun the irrigation work in Babylonia, suggested 
roads from Port Said to Arish, Lydda, Nablus, Rayak, and from Haifa 
or Tripoli to Hit and Bagdad, but the French Damascus line secured 
the concession Tripoli-Horn s in 1910 and opened the branch the next 
year. The concession Rayak-Lydda was granted just before the war, 
but actual construction was completed by the Turks from the junction 
at Afuleh in the plain of Esdraelon with the Haifa line through 
Lydda to Beersheba after the war began. The Smyrna- Aidin road 
began extension to Egedir in 1908, and the next year opened the 
National Bank of Turkey to oppose the Deutsche Bank which had 
financed the Bagdad line and the Imperial Ottoman Bank, the 
French concern. Just before the war the French were given the 
concession Samsun-Sivas-Erzingan-Trebizond, in northeast Asiatic 
Turkey, for construction and exploitation, through the Regie 
Generale des Chemins de Fer Ottomans, against a loan of a half 
billion francs, as part of the consideration for France's consent to an 
increase of Turkish customs; the extension of the Soma line 
to the Dardanelles, and thence to the Anatolian road at Ismid; 
and from Maidos on the Gallipoli Peninsula to Mirathi on the 
Oriental Railways, the purpose of these last being purely strate- 
gic. In conclusion, we should mention the convention of Germany 
with Russia in 1911, giving her northeast Turkey as her sphere of 
53700—18 14 



210 

influence Mid the railways built by the British in their advanoe on 
Syria and Palestine ami on Babylonia. 

('.. OONCLT stON. 

The Turkish railways were a benefit to the population in spite of 
the burden of the tdlometric guarantees, which, especially for the 
Bagdad Railway, were very high, and an advantage to the Turkish 
Government in the resulting increase of revenue, particularly us a 
large part of the Turkish taxes were in the form of a percentage of 
the crop grown. Without railways to move surplus crops to market, 
and to move troops to quell disorder, no great economic progress >\:is 
possible. The kilometric guarantees had the effect of creating n sort 
of monopoly in the territory covered by the roads, since the govern- 
ment was interested in preventing competition which would lesson the 
income of a guaranteed road. This consideration, along with Ger- 
man diplomacy, is said to have had considerable influence on the 
attempts o( French and English capitalists to get a concession to par- 
allel the Bagdad road from Horns to Bagdad though without a 



guarantee. 



HlBI.lOC.i; .WHY. 



There is no good study and the material is unusually scattered. 
An introduction may be found in the Encyclopedia Hritannica, Tur- 
key, and in the Murray and Baedeker guide books. The books on 
the Bagdad road deal to a certain extent with these problems. Per- 
haps the best of these is that of E, Auble. Bagdad (Paris, M Editions 
et Libraire." 1917), whose map might well serve as map for this 
sketch. For the earlier building, cf. especially Chenut, Note stir 
Tctat actuel des Chemins de For de la Turquie d'Asie, in the Revue 
Generale des Chemins de Fer, 1892, 1. p. 216 tl*. ; the tiles contain much 
of interest. For the various projects, concessions, and financial 
statements, cf. the Railway Times of London, passim. American con- 
sular reports, especially since 1908, gi\e considerable detail as to 
railroad construction. Some facts as to the diplomatic conditions 
of railroad concessions are in the Archives Diplomatiques, but in 
general we may' say that the more technical publications neglect tho 
diplomatic side. These may be found, so far as they have general 
interest, in the periodicals which deal with political questions, or in 
the books on the eastern question as a whole. A good example of 
the latter is that of Rene Pinon, I/Europe et 1'Fmpire Ottoman 
(Paris, Perrin, 1013), with maps of railroad conditions. 

A good description of the railroads in Asiatic Turkey in L895 and 
their history to that date, with maps, is in Parliamentary Tapers, 
Turkey, No. 4 (1896), "Report on Railways in Asiatic Turkey," by 
Major E. F. Law. A good account, particularly of the lledja/. rail- 



213 

road, o tained in Sir' Edward Peai ' Abdul Hamid, pp. l ( ', : z L64 
(London. Con table, 1917). See also ftfuratet, Chemin de fer rjr- 
Bagdad (Aurillac, [mprimerie Moderne, L914); The Hedjaz raili 
in Petermann's Mitteilungen, roL 54 (1908), Erganzung . Heft L61. 
'The Near En a mo I aluable periodical for information on 

Turkish Railwa 

70. THE GRECO-TURKISH WAR, 1897. 

). 0BI0I9 01 THl •■ f. 

Thi war is only an incident in the long struggle of the Gr< 
against 'J arkey for Panhellenism, After the W-u of Lil mly 

a small pari of the Greek people deluded in the i boun- 

daries laid down for Greece by the power . In 1807 
volt, broke out in Crete, but because Turkey controlled the sea if 
able to crush the insurrection. At the Congree of Berlin, 1878, upon 
rhe insistence of France, steps were taken which ultimately brought it 
about that those portions of Thessaly and Epiru to be in- 

habited exclusively by ( >y<- are added to Greece, article, 

The Greco-Turkish Frontier Question, L878 1 ■-: The pro 
ions of this arrangement had not, been fully carried out by Tui 
1897. The three sources of friction at this time were Macedoi . I 

md Crete. In the latter a Mohammedan pa ha had roused the 
Christian popu to insurrection, in The M 

border warfare was chronic. The ma 

capita] of Crete, con ed the Greeks, and G ■ ■ Col. 

W. o landed in Crete in defiance of the earning by th< 'Coi 
of po 3ee article, 'I he Cretan ' The 

Greek Government I of aiding th< 

but in seems that it, used its influence for pa ion. By 

February 15, L897, < ret< in the hands of the Greek troo 

n mo e f'r liberation ntirely I. At the 

rebellion was taken in hand by the \><>- < ho hud assembled a fl< 
in the harbor of Canea. This allied fl< '.' I a block- 

ade of Crete so trial ipplies from Athens might reach ( ol. 

2. MILITARY OPEBATIO 

Public opinion in Greece and Turkey won reached the war heat. 
] roops were massed on the Thessalian and Macedonian front ... - . On 
the 9th of April armed Greek troop the frontier and on 

April IT Turkey announced a state of war. In sp the enthusi- 

asm exhibited by the Greek* they were unable to withstand the 
Turk . After a month of almo I continuous defeats th< ed the 

powers to intervene l\ should be .said that the Greek fleet took 
little part in the war. Premier Delyannfa of Greece was accused of 



.1 1 .> 

not pushing the war with vigor Mid was forced to resign. The 
Greeks were disappointed in the supply of second hand rifles from 
Prance and ammunition bought in Austria was refused at the last 
moment by the Government Russia at this time warned Turkey 
that Bulgaria would mobiliie if t ho Turks carried t lio war further 
and an armistice was concluded May L9, 

;:. THE \ r\ (HP M LOB, 

The ambassadors of the pov ers at Constantinople took up the w ork 
of making i treaty This \v as promulgated by the powers at Con- 
stantinople, December J. Turkey was given military preference 
along a rectified boundary line in Thessalv and Epirus, Greece was 
to pay an indemnity of 64,000,000 and submit its finances to the con 
trol oi a commission. Otherwise the status quo auto bellum was 
forced on the belligerents, 

nuuaouu why. 

The most important documents are in the British Parliamentary 
Papers, Turkej No. n (1897) and No. - (1898), ami in 'Mai-tons. 
Noureau Recueil Genera] des Traites, second series, vol. 28, pp. 
680 -788. 

Annual Register for L896, pp. 296 299; L897, pp. 807 818, 

[sambert, G. Le conflit greco-turc, Amulos des sciences politiques, 
vol. L8, pp. L49 L78 (Mar., L898), 

Greece and the Powers, Spectator, vol. 78, 224 (Fob. 18, L897) ; 
vol, 79, 860 (Sept is. 1897), 

Motive oi [ntervention in Crete, The Nation (Nev Fork), vol. 64, 
200 (March is. L897). 

Case against Greece, Fortnightly, vol. 07. 77-j; National Review, 
vol. 29, 525. Forum, vol. 28, 518 (July, 1897). 

Dilke, Charles W., and Botassi, D, N. "The Uprising; o( (uveee," 
in North American Review, vol. 164,458 161 (April, 1897). 

Williams, Charles. The War in Thessaly, in Fortnightly Review, 
vol. 61 (N. SA. 959 (June, L897). 

Norman, Henry. The Wreck of Greece (Scrihner's, October, 
1897), vol, 22, 899, 

Richardson, R, B., in the Independent, vol. 19, 180, 500, 688. 

71. THE CRETAN QUESTION, L868-1897, 

l. INTRODUCTION, 

There were in the Cretan question four important factors, all cos 
stantly interacting: 

(1) The racial and religious situation in Crete. 

(2) Turkish misgovernment there, as elsewhere, 



213 

(3) Cretan aspiration for union jrith Gree< 

(4) 'I he attitude of the European po 

The population of Crete was preponderantly Greek and Christian, 
wit.lj a Moslem minoritj large oi G origin and speaking 

Greek. 

2. J'f.C.J. J.l.iO 01 

From L866 to L868 Crete cc ttant insurrection I e of 

], 2. •; above, and demanded union jrith Greece. Mos( of the p< 

re m';Jjn'-'J to press the Porte to yield to Cretan <\<-ifr,n,<i .. B 
England ■■ opposed. Six-., however, urged the Sultan to m. 
reforms. Finally, on January JO. 1868, the Sultan promulgated the 
Organic Law of L868 (JJoJl;jn<J. Eastern Question, 77 :,<] the 

revolt vvus :.oon <:ru Jic/J. I fii:-. m-ask-A to provide some local elf- 
government, and some protection for Christians, but sati ified no oi 
I/, (urrection oon broke out again. Greece intervened and rejected a 
Turkish ultimatum presented December 11, L868. J' tiled a 

conference at Pari , January 8, L809, which sent a declaration to 
Greece demanding her acceptance of 'I orkisfa demand . Greece, tin 
prepared for war, yielded, leaving Crete to her fate. 

:;. SBTTLElfEOT 01 J 8 

In 1877 I: declaration of gainst Turk':/ caused 

citement in the Greek Provinces. A Cretan committee formed 

to promote Cretan autonom J Crete ap- 

pealed to the po 

By the Treat) oi San Stefano, article \-> Appendix I. 14), 

'J nrkey promised crupulou . application of the Organic Law of 18< 
Although at the Congret of Berlin Cretan annexation, as mak 
for European peaa nted by M. Delyannis, the - lit 

article 23 of the 'J of Berlin, an undertaking by Turkey to 

apply the Organic La to < suitable modifier 

Appendix I, 17.; The Cretans in despair requested that the 
be made a protectorate of Great Britain (Marriott, p. 338), ill 

supporting Turkey, refused. The Englij ml, ho induced 

Turkey to modify the Organic I- o f J the changi embodied in 

the Pact of Elalepa, October 12, L878 (Documents Diplomatique 
Affaires d'Orient. Affaire de Crete. Juin, 1894 I- ' 

"/.;. and later in the Firman of November, 1878 (B I For 

eigi Pa] . vol. 71, p. 759, et seq.). These coj 

brought momentary quiet. 

4. REVOI/1 Of ! 89. 

The Bulgarian Bevolutioi o.' ' : cle, that title), arousing 

the resentment of Greece, a of other Balkan State ( mob- 



•J14 

tgainst [\irkey, Crete took the opport unity to proclaim union 
with G ri\o powers blockaded Greece to prevent attack on 

Turkey See article, Che Blockade of Greece, l88tM England took 
the Lead, seeking 10 maintain Balkan and European peace, Rus 
■\\;is interested in peace and feared complications with England. 
Prance, naturally inclined toward Greece, did not take a decided 
stand. Greece yielded for the time being, but tins situation culmi 
nated in tl\e Cretan revolt oi 1888 i <<0 . when Greece, -till torn be 
tween her own desires, Cretan demands, and the powers, demanded 
from the powers warships or other help in maintaining order and ob 
g reform. Failing that, Greece declared for definite anion. 
The powers refused to disturb the peace and warned Greece against 
intervention at her own risk. In A.ugust, ISS9, Turkey declared t ho 
state of siege in Crete. England urged reform. The outcome was 
that on November 22, 18S9, a Firman (Hertslet, p. 3281 i prac 

t io:ril\ revoking the Halepa was issued, Greece, alarmed by tho 
powers, held back. 

European policy shifted somewhat during these years, England's 
increasing security in Egypt and Suei allowed greater insistence upon 
Cretan reforms, and loss hostility toward Greece (Driault, p, 268), 
although she still wished maintenance of peace, Austria, France, 
Germany, and Russia were loss sealous for reform. Germany, in 
creasingly influential at Constantinople, desired tho integrity o( 
Turkey for her own ends; Austria and Russia desired ii because of 
mutual suspicion (Andrews, 11. p. 840 84q.)\ while Russia, France, 
and Germany opposed England on colonial and commercial grounds. 
All. however, finally agreed on tho need for peace, and proceeded 
against Greece accordingly. 

In 1894 tho Cretan assembly demanded a Christian Vali, Tho 
powers uphold tho demand, and Caratheodory was sent, hut recalled 
in L895\ 

,->. CRETE ano nil' GRECO TI RKISH W vi; OF is;>:. 

In is;>t> civil war again broke out in Crete, excited by tho National 
Society oi Greece (Marriott, p. 386). On pressure from tho powers 
tho Sultan promised reform. Again there was delay, and in Febru- 
ary, 1897, Cretan Christians proclaimed union with Greece, (irook 

public opinion forced tho Government to prepare for intervention. 
The power- were alarmed. English public opinion favored tho 
Cretans, hut the Government decided \'ov the st<i?it,< quo. 

On February n. L897, Col. Vassos landed a Greek force at Canea 
and occupied Crete in tho name of Greece, Georgi Pacha, tho Chris 
tian Vali a, id last Turkish governor, left Crete upon a Russian war 
ship on tho same day. Tho next day tho admirals occupied Canea 
with a landing party. Vassos was holploss and tho insurgents, after 



215 

eat disorders, were finally overcome by the occupation oi other 
places and by the bombardmeni of it"-. Cretan cos 
of the powers. (See article. The Greco-Turkish War. 1897.) 

On March 2, L897, upon the Initiative of J' the powers, by 

i'J'-.nl i':;..l nol.<- . a I, A l\ ><■!>■ . and ConHtatttinopl't f Parliament ;h y Pap<-.n-;. 

Turkey, No. -1 (1807), p. L), announced thd Crete could not ander 
existing circumstance! be annexed to f - but that, bi of 

Turkeys delay in effecting reforms, Crete should enjoj autonomy 
under the suzerainty of the Sultan. Greea ummoned to with- 

draw her army and fleet; 'J urkey to concentrate i.roop-, in fortn-. ■/■.■■. 
in preparation for withdrawal* These terms shoti a c om prom 
between England and other powcj .. fcp \/> ward solution. Greece 
refused to withdraw her troops till a Cretan plebiscite be taken; 
\\\f, insurgents refused to lay down their arms; therefore the admirals 
declared that a blockade of Crete would begin March 21. Troub 
continuing, the admirals bombarded Malaxa and occupied the prin 
cipa] Cretan ports. 

On March 2, 1807, the powers, in i note to the Greek Government, 
formally declared Crete henceforth under European protection, with 
autonomy under fl<<- suzerainty of the Sultan guartmi<*-/.l. On-> 

oui<-. /'-'i at the dow. of it/, un iJ':o<-.:-.\ful war with 'lurk'-;,. Crete 

. thereby left in the hands of the powers already committed to 
the program of autonomy under Turkish suzerainty. (Ibid, pp. 2 '■>■) 

BJKMOOIfAI'IfY. 

OOCVMBfl AST MATKJUAI.. 

(British Parliamentary Papers, Turkey, Nos, 4 o. 8 (\K)1). Brit- 
ish and Foreign State Papers, yean J w ;o' 1908; Hertslet, Sii Ed 
ward C. B., Map of Europe by Treaty (London, Harrison, 1891), 
vol. 4: Holland, 'I. ft.. The European Concert in the ftaKtem Ques- 
tion (Oxford, Clarendon Pre . 1885). 

>.*. ;iy M>.7KKf>.r.. 
Cam bridge Modern History, Vol-.. XI and XII (New York. Mac* 

millan, 1906 L910); Marriott, J. A. P.. r I he Eastern Question, A 
Study in European Diplomacy (Oxford, Clarendon Iv-.v.. 1^17); 
Lavi e et Bambaud, Histoire Generate (Paris, Colin. 1899 & L901), 
vol.-. 11 & I2:: Debidour, A.. Histoire Diplomatique de I'Europe, 
1814 1878 (Paris, Alcan, 1891), 2 vol-.; Andrews, C. ML, The Histori- 
cal Development of Modern Europe from the Co - of Vienna 
to the Present Time (New fork, Putnam, 1898); Rose, J. EL, The 
Development of the European Nations. 1870 10M CSV// York. Put 
nam. 1916, 5th ed,) 2 rol in one; Driault, Edouard, La question 



216 

d*Orient depuis see Origines jusqu'ii dos jours (Paris, Aican, L917, 
7(h ed.) j Choublier, M., La question d'Orient depuis le Traits' de 
Berlin (Paris, L897); Eliot, Sir C. N. E, (Odysseus), Turkey Id 
Europe (London, Arnold, L908) ; Miller, Wm., The Ottoman Em 
pire, L901 L018 (1018); Edwards, 11. S., Sir \Y. White, Ajnbassador 
al Constantinople, 1886 L891 (1908); Berard, V. E., Lea Affaires 
de Crete (Paris, 2d ed., L800) ; Kerofilas, Dr. C, Eleutherioa Veni 
selos, English translation by B. Barstow. (London, Murray, L915.) 

72. THE ARMENIAN QUESTION, 1878-1897. 

i. ntBATDDS OP SAN STEFANO IND BERLIN, L8T8. 

The Armenian question may be said i" have arisen a ft or the olose 
of the Russo Turkish War of L877 L878. By artiele L6 of the Treaty 
of San Stefano, Turkey had agreed to "carry into effect, without 
further delay, the improvements and reforms made necessary by 
Local needs in the provinces inhabited by the Armenians, and to 
guarantee their security against the Kurds and Circassians." 

This provision was superseded by article 81 <>r the Treaty of Berlin, 
which stipulated in addition that the Sublime Porte should "give 
notice periodically of the measures taken t»> this end <<> the Powers, 
who will watch over their application." It should be noted par- 
ticularly that the obligation undertaken by Turkey :it Berlin was 
to the powers, whereas in the Treaty of San Stefano it had only been 
to Russia. 

Article 62 of the Treaty of Berlin declared: 

The Sublime Porte having expressed ti><> Intention t<> maintain iin> principle 
of religious liberty, and give It the widest scope, the contracting parties take 
ndte of tins spontaneous declaration, 

in no part of the Ottoman Bmpire shall difference of religion i>«< ttilogod 
against anj person as q ground Cor exclusion or Incapacity us regards < i>o Uis 
charge of civil and political rights, admission to the public employments, func- 
tions, and honors, or the exercise of iii« v various professions and industries. 

\u persons siiaii in> admitted withoul distinction of religion i<> give evidence 
before the tribunals, 

Tho tret'. unn and outward exercise of all forms of worship are assured to 
all, and no hindrance siinii be offered either to the hierarchical organisation of 
tiu> various communloni or to their relations with their spiritual chiefs. 

Though the Armenians are not specifically mentioned in this 
article, they were entitled to claim the benefit o\' its provisions. 

By tlu> Cyprus Convention o\' June 4, L878,the Suhau also promised 
Great Britain to introduce necessary reforms " for tlu> protection of 
the Christians and other subjects <d* the Porte" in the Turkish terri- 
tories in Asia. (See article, The English Protectorate over Cyprus, 
L878 L914.) 



217 

2, FAILURE 01 POLICY 01 ENFORCEMENT, 1871 ih^.2. 

ii oou became <-\ i<i<-nt. thai there was to be no attempt to carry out 
the prorii ion <>\ the treaties on the part of the Turkish Government. 
Jn April. 1879, Lord Salisbury laid it down that "the Sultan 
bound not only to promulgate new and better law but to actually 
introduce reforms." In November, L870, the English Government 
went the length of ordering an English squadron to the Archipelago 
for the purpose of a naval demonstration. This brought nothing, 

nut fair promj I 

On June IK 1880, an i<J<-.rii,K',;i,l note of the great power. demanded 
the execution of different clauses of the treaty of Berlin, including 
that of article 81. (British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 72, pp. 
4M 470.) The Ottoman Government replied in :i note of July 5, 
indicating certain so called executed or intended reforms. (Ibid., pp. 
L107 1200.; The powers replied in :jl collective note, dated Septem 
ber 7. 1880, severely censuring the so-called reforms and proposing 
others. (Ibid., pp. L201 I207j To this collective note of the p< 
the Sublime Porte did ooteven deign to reply; but assuming s haughty 
tone, merely notified the powei of what it intended to do in a note 
dated October '•'>, L880. 

In ;i circular of January 12. L881, Earl Granville instructed 
the British ambassadors at Paris, Berlin, etc*, to call the attention of 
\\\c Governments to which they were accredited to the state of af 
fairs in Armenia* He aid : 

'i ! in which the Porte i:. dealing v/it.d iti offer of r< uld ap 

pear to farniab food for remonetrauoe, and Her Majesty*! Government would 
be glad if the Qorernmenti would Inttruct their amba at Constantinople 

to Join with bli colleagnei in •■> repr< on to the :-:\i\>\)u><- Porte on the 

subject 

Austria declined to act in concert with the other j- , and Bis- 

;n:uok <;:<:\>r<y/.,<:<l i\><- opinion that it better for the powers to con- 
centrate on one question at a time. M When the Greek questioj 

er, it will be the moment to begin the Armenian question/' be said. 
France hid herself behind the refusal of Germany. Only [taly and 
!: •... - a conditional assent. D indeed, evident that the 

policy of enforcement by the powers was a failure. 

PERIOD 01 i.i,J:oij.\ • r-hii l i.i-i. :.<i.. 

There followed a period of European indifference to reform. in 
Armenia. The consequence of this indifference and neglect was the 

e of a nationalist movement in Armenia and the formation of r< 
Lutiom London center of propaganda, and the Sul- 

much alarmed. The Russian Government 



218 

alarmed lest the revolutionary aiul nationalistic movement spread to 
Russian Armenia. Daring this period Anglo-French rivalry in 
Egypt was intense, and France showed a disposition to support Rus- 
sian intrigue in the Near East, whereas Germany supported Austria. 
The foundation and rise o( German influence in Turkey, which eer- 
tainly did not favor the Armenians, can be traced bo this period. 

■l. PERIOD OF AGITATION IN ENGLAND, 1889 L898. 

Ill 1890 there was formed the Anglo- Armenian Association, and 
an increasing agitation in behalf of Armenia began to manifest 
itself in England. An active propaganda was also carried on in 

Turkish Armenia, hut was strongly opposed by the Armenian clergy 
and the American missionaries. 

5. MASSACRES or i 89 I I 896, 

In August-September, 1894, occurred the brutal Sassoun massacres, 
ill which Turkish soldiers took part. In November. L894, a Turkish 
commission of inquiry, accompanied by the consular delegates of 
Great Britain. France, and Russia, was sent to Armenia. Tt^elieited 
the fact that there had been no attempt at revolt to justify the action 
of the Turkish authorities. Throughuot (he year L894 the British 
Government, supported in lukewarm fashion by France and Russia, 
urged administrative reforms in Armenia. 

On May 11, 1895, Great Britain. France, and Russia presented io 
the Sultan a complicated scheme of reforms. Great Britain alone 
favored coercion. The Sultan delayed his reply, and finally appealed 
to France and Russia against England. 

While these negotiations had been going on. disturbances arose 
at Tarsus. Armenians were murdered, and the life of the patriarch 
threatened. On October 1. 1895, a riot occurred in Constantinople 
in which a number of Armenians and some Moslems were killed. 

The British ambassador now pressed the scheme of reforms upon 
the Sultan, who accepted it on October 17. Meanwhile there had been 
a massacre at Trebizond on October 8, in which armed men from 
Constantinople took part. Finding there was to be no coercion, the 
Sultan refused to publish the scheme of reform he had accepted, and 
organized massacre followed massacre until the summer of 1896. The 
number of those who perished in these massacres during this period 
has been variously estimated at from 20,000 to 50,000. Many were 
forced to embrace Mohammedanism. 

0. FINAL FAILURE OF TOE EUROPEAN CONCERT, 1896-1897. 

In August, 1890, the powers again demanded action by the Sultan 
and (on September 2) sent him a collective note reviewing the entire 
situation. On October 20 Lord Salisbury once more proposed a joint 



219 

reform program to be followed by coercive measures in case of re- 
fusal by the Sultan. On December 26, L896, a conference of ambassa- 
dors met at Constantinople to discuss matters. It ended on February 
10, 1897, without accomplishing any real result. By 1898, when the 
German Emperor dated Jerusalem and Damascus (Sec article, The 
Journeys of William II to the Near East), it had become evident 
that Germany was becoming the power behind the Sultan's throne 
and that so far at least as Armenia was concerned the treaties of 187^ 
had long been dead. if. indeed it may be claimed thai they were 
ever alive. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

For excellent Btudies of the Armenian question based on the docu- 
ments see Rolin-Jacquemyns, M. G., Armenia, the Armenians, and the 
Treaties. (London. 1891.) A translation from the Revue de droit 
international, T. XIX (1887), pp. 284-328, and T. XXI (1889), pp. 
29 1 353; and Leart, M., La question Armenienne. (Paris, 1913.) 

The following hooks deal generally with problems of the Near 
East and include accounts of the Armenian question : 

Ohoublier, M. La question d'Orient, depuis le traite de Berlin. 
(Rousseau, Paris, 1899. ) An excellenl survey. 

Marriott. J. A. li. The Eastern Question. (Oxford. Clarendon 
Press, 1917.) 

Driault, E. La question d'Orient depuis see origines jusqu'a nos 
jours. (Paris, Alcan, 1896.) A convenient manual. 

Berard, V. La politique du Sultan. (Paris, Colin, 1900.) A bril- 
liant attack on ibe diplomacy of tlv period. 

Pinon, B. L'Europe et l'Empire Ottoman. (Paris, Perrin, 1908.) 
An impartial survey. 

Pears, E. Forty Years in Constantinople. (X. Y. Appleton, 
L916.) Contains a first-hand view of Turkish methods of committing 
atrocities. See also his Life of Abdul Hamid (New York, Appleton. 
1917). 

Argyll, Duke of. Our Responsibility for Turkey. (London, Mur- 
ray, 1890.) An analysis of the situation by a. contemporary states- 
man. 

Engelhardt, E. La question armenienne. Revue generate de droit 
international public (1895). II. 296-306. 

For the treaty provisions, see Hertslet, Map of Europe by Treaty 
(London. 1891). Vol. IV. pp. 2080, 2723, 2790. 

For documents, see Schopff, A., Les reformes et la protection des 
Chretiens en Turquie, 1073-1904. (Paris, Plon-Xourrit, 1904.) For 
diplomatic correspondence. s<-e the numerous British Parliamentary 
Papers. 



220 
73. THE SERBIAN REVOLUTION OF 1903. 

1. MURDER OF THE KING AM) QIKUN. 

On June i(>. L908, King Alexander and Queen Draga of Serbia 
woe murdered in the royal palace at Belgrade by a band of officers 
of the Serbian Army. The assassination was followed by shocking 
indignities to the bodies of the dead and by the murder of two 
brothers of the Queen and of two ministers. The precise origin of 
the plot is not yet known. A charge lias been freely made and widely 
accepted that it was hatched under Russian auspices, but IT. W. 
Steed (Hapsburg Monarchy. 240-241) asserts that the Austro- 
Hungarian Government was fully informed of meetings held in 
Vienna by the conspirators. 

t 

•J. CAUSES FOR THE Ml I5DER. 

The murder was due to the long-continued misgovernment of the 
country under Kings Milan and Alexander ( 1 SOS -1003), to the fact 
that under the system of government maintained by King Alexander 
no political opponent of the King, his wife, or her brothers could 
count his life safe, and to the fear, apparently well founded, that 
almost any moment might witness further and more irremediable 
disgrace for the nation than had been its lot during recent unhappy 
years. "Political revolution was justified on every ground," says 
Temperley (History of Serbia, 280). It was one of Serbia's many 
misfortunes that revolution was accompanied by murder. King 
Peter who was tailed to the throne by the conspirators, though under 
no suspicion of personal complicity in the murder of his predecessor. 
was forced to begin his reign under exceptionally trying circum- 
stances. 

3. ACTION OF OTHER STATES. 

The murder of the royal pair was promptly followed by the with- 
drawal from Belgrade of the diplomatic representatives of all the 
European States, except Russia and Austria-Hungary. The min- 
isters of these 1 two States were present at King Peter's entrance into 
his capital on June 2 4. Later on even these were \n ithdrawn in order 
to signify the displeasure of the powers at King Peter's failure to 
dismiss from service and punish *he murderers of his predecessor. 
But during the year 1904 the States which had withdrawn their 
representatives at Belgrade, except Greal Britain, resumed diplomatic 
relations with Serbia. At the coronation of King Peter on Sep- 
tember 21, there were representatives present of all the powers ex- 
cept Great Britain. Resumption of diplomatic relations between 
Serbia and Great Britain did not take place until August 17, 100G. 



221 

4. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE REVOLUTION. 

The revolution of June, 1903, marked a turning point for Serbia 
and the change to which it led in that country reacted upon the whole 
course of events in the international relations of Europe. Under 
Milan and Alexander, Serbia had become practically a dependency of 
the Dual Monarchy. King Peter and the men who surrounded him 
soon began to show that they aspired to play a more independent 
role. Russian influence in large measure replaced Austrian influence. 
With emancipation from domination by its powerful neighbor and 
improved government in internal affairs Serin an national pride 
began to revive and the hopes of Serbian patriots began to dwell upon 
the glories of Serbia in the days before the Turkish Conquest. In 
that situation Serbia was in no mood to acquiesce without vigorous 
protest in any encroachment upon its rights or in any action which 
threatened to injure seriously its future development. It was this 
aspect of the matter which made the annexation of Bosnia-Herzo- 
govina by Austria-Hungary, October. 1908, so portentous an event. 
(See articles on the Annexation of Bosnia-Herzogovina and the 
Bosnian Crisis of 1908-1909.) 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

Annual Register for 1903-1906. 

Tcmperley, H. W. W. History of Serbia. (London, Bell, 1917.) 
Denis, E. La grande Serbie. 120-126. (Paris, Delagrave, 1915.) 
Mijatovich, C. A Royal Tragedy. (London, Nash, L906.) 
Sieed, H. W. Hapsburg Monarchy, 240-240. (London, Con- 
stable, 1914.) 

74. THE FRANCO-ITALIAN RAPPROCHEMENT, 1896-1902. 

1. INTRODUCTION. 

The long period of rather strained relations between France and 
Italy (See article. Franco-Italian Antagonism, 1886-1896) came to a 
close in 1896, following the retirement of Crispi, to whose influence 
it had been due in large measure. The next six years witnessed the 
gradual reestablishment of cordial relations between the two 
countries. 

2. STEPS IX RAPPROCHEMENT. 

The defeat of Italy at Adowa involving an early adjustment of its 
relations with Abyssinia removed one cause of strife, for in Italy 
France had been held largely responsible for the determined resist- 
ance of Menelek to Italian expansion at the expense of Abyssinia. 
Rudini, soon after succeeding Crispi, removed another obstacle to 



ooo 



friendship by adjusting Italy's grievances in connection with the 

French occupation of Tunis (September 28, 1896). Good commercial 
relations were reestablished by means of a new treaty of commerce, 
negotiated in L897 and ratified early in L899. The convention of 
1902, whereby Italy agreed to give France a tree hand in Morocco 
and France recognized the special position of Italy in Tripoli, com- 
pleted the process. (See article. Italy and the Morocco Question.) 
From that date Italy, though still a member of the Triple Alliance, 
stood in many respects closer to France than to its associates of the 
Triple Alliance. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

Debidour, A. Histoire diplomatique depuis le congres de Berlin 
jusqu'a QOS jours. 2 vols. (Paris. Alcan. 1916.) 1. pp. 241 248. 
279-281. 

Tardieu, A. France and the Alliances. (New York, Macmillan, 
1908.) pp. 86-95. 

Tardieu. Questions di^lomatiques de 1'annee 15)04, pp. 10-22. 
(Paris. Alcan. 1905.) 

All are good concise account- of the essential facts. 

75. RELATIONS BETWEEN ITALY AND ABYSSINIA, 

1893-1900. 

1. INTRODUCTION. 

Shortly after the French occupation of Tunis (See article, The 
Establishment of the French Protectorate over Tunis. 1881) Italy, 
who had hoped to obtain Tunis herself, sought consolation by en- 
deavoring to acquire a colony in the Red Sea region. Eer enterprise 
in that quarter soon brought her to a clash with Abyssinia. A con- 
flict was averted for a time by the Treaty of Ucciali, May 2, L889. 
(British and Foreign State Papers, vol. si. pp. 733-735.) This 
treaty, according to Italian interpretation, gave Italy a position of 
virtual domination over the affairs of Abyssinia and was well calcu- 
lated to facilitate the expansion of the Italian colony. 

Besides the opposition from Abyssinia Italy encountered two rivals 
in the Red Sea region. England and France. An adjustment of 
their respective spheres of influence was made by Italy and Eng- 
land in 1891 (Ibid., vol. 83, pp. 19-21). France, however, protested 
against this arrangement. 

Shortly afterwards the clearly foreshadowed conflict with Abys- 
sinia broke out. Kink Menelek repudiated the treaty of Ucciali, as- 
serting that article 17 in the Italian text, which secured for Italy 

CD ' 

control over the foreign relations of Abyssinia, read in an entirely 
different fashion from the corresponding article of the Arabic text. 



223 



2. ADOWA. 



The revolt of Bath Agos, who governed Oku hi Kusai on behalf of 
Italy, confirmed the Italian suspicions that the Abyssinian troops 
collected on the River Mareb were for use against Eritrea, and after 
an unanswered appeal to disband those forces, Baratieri attacked. 
Successes at Coatit and Senafe (Jan. 13-15, 1895) encouraged 
Crispi to demand the recognition of the Italian protectorate; and 
Tigre was formally annexed. But when Menelek gathered his hosts 
the Italians were defeated at Amba Alaghi, Makalle, and most de- 
cisively at Adowa (March 1, 1896). Crispi resigned. With some 
opposition, from the south of Italy especially, the Marchese di Rudini 
accepted a peace (October 26, 1890) which definitely annulled the 
Treaty of TJcciali. (Martens, Traites, second series, vol. 25, pp. 
59-01.) " Italy recognizes the independence, absolute and without re- 
serve, of the Ethiopian Empire as a sovereign and independent. State." 
A provisional frontier was fixed at the Mareb, Belessa, and Mouna. 
Italy was to dispose of none of her land except to Abyssinia. A 
separate agreement freed the Italian prisoners, and Italy later paid 
£400,000 for the expense of their support. The following year a 
treaty of commerce gave the Italians the right to trade and travel 
in Abyssinia and the benefit of the most favored nation clause. Ru- 
dini wished in 1897 to restrict the colony to the town of Massowah, 
but the boundaries finally agreed upon in 1900 followed the line 
Tomat-Todluc-Mareb-Belessa-Mouna. 

3. SINCE ISO 7. 

Since 1897 the relations between Italy and Abyssinia have been 
peaceful. Abyssinia has jealously preserved its independence, mak- 
ing use from time to time of the friendly influence of France, which 
has been a consistent friend of the African State. The British in- 
fluence has been somewhat distrusted as that of a powerful and per- 
haps dangerous neighbor and one that had been the <■< nf friend 
of Italy. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

The treaties are in British and Foreign State Papers and in Mar- 
tens, Xouveau Recueil General de Traites. 

Wyldc, Augustus B. Modern Abyssinia. (London, Methuen, 
1901.) A good chapter on history and much on the campaigns. . 

Despagnct, F. Le conflit entre lTtalie et l'Abyssinie. Revue gene- 
rale de droit international public (1897), IV, 5-61. 

Wallace, William Kay. Greater Italy. (New York, Scribner, 
1917.) Pro-Italian — " defeat not so disastrous as it seemed in Italy." 



224 

Berkeley, George F. H. The Abyssinian question and its history. 
In Nineteenth Century, 1903, vol. 53, pp. 79-97. 

Bent, J. Theodore. The Italians in Africa. In Fortnightly Re- 
view, 1896, vol. 66, pp. 363-372. 

Rouard de Card, E. La France et les autres Nations Latines en 
Afrique. (Paris, Pedone, 1903.) 

76. THE FASHODA AFFAIR, 1898-1899. 

1. INTRODUCTION. 

During 40 years (1857-1897) French explorers and travelers trav- 
ersed the vast distances of the Sahara and the Soudan, claiming the 
country for France, and it has been noticed that their operations 
again displayed the nice symmetry and vastness of design which dis- 
tinguished the work of the French explorers on the St. Lawrence and 
the Mississippi. From the Mediterranean and equatorial seas they 
gradually converged to Lake Chad; and if they could go farther to 
the east and north they would reach the Nile and have most of North 
Africa. (Cambridge Modern History, XII, pp. 812-813. > Mean- 
while the English, having taken over the administration of Egypt, 
had after a period of preparation reconquered the lost Egyptian 
Soudan. In 1898 the French moving across the continent encoun- 
tered the British advancing from north to south. The result was the 
affair of Fashoda. 

2. THE "GREAT DESIGN.'' 

This affair was the outcome of an ambitious project conceived by 
a group of French statesmen and colonial officials who belonged to 
or shared the ideas of the Colonial Party. The design was to send 
an expedition from the French possessions in the neighborhood of 
Lake Chad eastward to the upper waters of the Nile, where it was to 
be joined by another expedition coming westward from Obock. The 
authors of the project believed that by these expeditions a claim to 
the regions traversed could be established and thereby France would 
obtain control of an African territory stretching from the Atlantic 
to the Red Sea. Success would defeat the ambitions of Englishmen, 
such as Cecil Rhoades, who looked forward to the extension of the 
various British possessions in Eastern Africa until it would be pos- 
sible to build the much-discussed Cape-to-Cairo railroad entirely on 
British territory. Control over the upper waters of the Nile would 
enable France to force the reopening of the Egyptian question by 
bringing the matter before a congress of the powers and might com- 
pel the British to evacuate Egypt. 



225 

::. THE FRENCH EXPEDITION TO FA8HODA. 

In September Sir Herbert Kitchener, Hi'- British commander, ar 
rived at Khartoum. There he learned thai a mall party of Euro 
peana were ai Fashoda, on the Nile, 300 miles to the south. Pro 
ceeding thither, he Pound that Major Marchand had taken po e ion 
of the place for France. Despite peremptory protest, Marchand 
declined to withdraw, referring the matter to his governmenl ai 
Paris. (Ibid., p. 148.) 

I. I. '.'»i I, '.'I [Ol 

Delicate negotiations followed, [n the House of Common on 
March 28, 1895, Sir Edward <>v<y had declared in behalf of the 
Governmenl thai for France to i 'I expeditions to the Upper Nile 
ritory, in view of the Long-standing British claim to the region, 
"would I)" :ni unfriendly acl and would be so viewed by England." 
(Han ard' Debates, lib vol. 22, pp. W5 106.) On December 

JO. L897, the British Governmenl had explicitly laid claim to the 
country, declaring thai it did nol recognize the right of any other 
European power to occupj any part of the Nile Valley. (See A.p 
pendix I. t9.) lim the French had steadily refused to admil the e 
claims, and Hanotaux, minister of foreign affairs, in reply on 
December 24, had continued to reserve right <>\ d on. (See 

Appendix [,50.) Hanotaux had Long been an opponenl of England, 
hut in June, L898, Theophile Delca se had taken his place. From the 
start, (Sept. 8, ]HUH) ho had expressed desire to arrive at an tinder 
tanding with England. (See Appendix I. 58.) For a time both 
sides tood fast. The French took- the ground that the ri e of the 
Dervish power (See article, The Soudan Question, L881 L899) had 
<i< itroyed the title of Egypt to tin-, region; thai econque I 

due to the Kitchener and Marchand expedition; and thai the d 
po ition of the territory ought, therefore, to be adjusted by agi 
in' ni. The negotiations make clear that France hoped for a com- 
promise which would give her a part of the region, including an 
outlet on the White Nile England declared thai the temporary ! 
of control by the Egyptian Governmenl did riot in the least impair 
its title: ih;ii the Kitchener expedition had reconquered the, region; 
and that, no tion of compromise could he entertained. 

Throughout the controversy the ca e for France was much weak- 
ened by the fact that, on April 5, L895, Hanotaux had explicitly 
erted in the French Semite thai the Dervi h in urrection in the 
Soudan had not destroyed the Egyptian title (Parliamentary Pape 
Eg L898), pp. 20 21; arehiv, vol. 62, pp. 91-94). 

Public feelii g in both countries becam excited over the, con- 

53706 18 15 



226 

troversy. For :i few days there seemed to be real danger of war. 
Bin France was in no condition to oppose the overwhelming sen 
power of Great Britain, could not counl upon the supporl o\' Russia, 
and was, moreover, distracted by the Dreyfus trial. Accordingly she 
yielded. 

SETTLEMENT Bl DECLARATION OF MARCH 21, L899, 

Tin 1 declaration signed by Lord Salisbury and Paul Cambon, de 
limited the French and British spheres of influences in central 
Allien. France, abandoning her pretensions to the Egyptian 
Soudan, was debarred from the upper reaches of the Nile; on the 
other hand Greal Britain recognized her claims to extensive regions 
about Lake Chad, whieh in effect joined her Sahara dominions 

with those of the upper Congo. (See Appendix 1. 55.) In lliis 

manner was passed (lie most dangerous crisis which up to thai time 
had resulted from conflicting colonial ambitions in Africa. 

('.. DOCT MINTS. 

A convention delimiting possessions in north and central Africa 
between England and France had been signed June 11, L898. (Brit 

ish and Foreign State Papers, vol. 91, pp. 38 55. Appendix 1. 59.) 
An additional declaration. March 21, L899, contained the settlement 
of the Fashoda dispute (Ibid., pp. 55 .">7). It provided that "Her 
Britannic Majesty's Government engages not to acquire either terri 
tory or political influence to the west o( the line oi' frontier defined 
in the following paragraph, and the Government of the French Re 
public engages not to acquire either territory or political influence 

to the east of the same line." Paragraph two drew the line. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

Archives Diplomatiques, Recueil Mensuel International de Dip- 
lomatic et d'Histoire, second series (ed. Louis Renault, Paris). 
The negotiations and also the settlement are contained in volumes 
68, pp. 52 72; •'>!'. pp. 261-269; Parliamentary Papers. Egypt, No. 
•_' (1898) and No. :\ (1898), contain the documents published by 
the British Government during the course of the controversy. 

British and Foreign State Papers. The volume for L898 L899 con 

tains the conventions by which the matter was settled. This collec- 
tion is compiled by the librafian and keeper of the papers of the 
Foreign Office. 

(British) Parliamentary Debates. The volumes for L898 and L899 
(4th series) contain questions and answers in the Houses relative to 
the progress of the dispute. 



227 

Rose, •). II. The Development of the European Nations, 1870 
L91 I. 11,2^0 226. An admirably unbia ed horl account. 

White, A. S. The Expansion of Egypt, U8 123. (London, 
Methuen, L890.) 

Cambridge Modern History. (Macmillan, X. V.. 1910.) An ex- 
cellent account of the French explorations is contained in vol. XII. 

Holt, L. !>.. and ( ihilton, A. \V. The History of Europe from 1 362 
if. L914. (New Fork, Macmillan, L917.) pp.336 339. 

Seymour, Charles. The Diplomatic Background of the War, 
1870 L914. (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1916.) pp.119 L22. 

Lemonon, E. [/Europe e\ la politique britannique (1882 L909), 
] 17 1..I. (Paris, Alcan, L910.) 

Blrard, A. Vers Fashoda. Questions Diplomatique* el Colo- 
niales, XI. 293 301. March 1. L901. 

Berard, V. Lee accords anglo-frangais. Revue de Paris, nth 
year, vol. I. pp. 210 213. 

Hanotaux, G. Fachoda. (Paris, Flammarion, L909.) 

Caix, B. de. Fashoda. (Pan-. L899.) 

Debidour. L'Histoire Diplomatique de I'Europe, !-7- 1916. II. 
245 249. (Paris, Alcan, L916.) 

Blanchard, G. L'Affaire de Fashoda. Revue generate de droit 
international public 1 1899), VI, 380 t30. 

77. THE ATTEMPTED FRANCO-GERMAN ACCORD OF 1898. 

I. ORIGIN '-I i HE PROJEC1 . 

In the years just preceding flit- Fashoda crisis tin- rivalry between 
England :m<l France appeared to be almost as bitter as thai \><- 
tween France and Germany. During these years also Germa 
turned more and more away from England and associated herself 
with France and Russia. (Pinon, France <t Allemagne, p. 87.) 
With respect to France this was the easier since Hanotaux, minister 
for foreign affairs, waa notoriously opposed to England and in favor 
of an understanding with Germany; and there were some other 
Frenchmen who believed that Etaly and England were the near* 
and most dangerous foes. (Hohenlohe, Denkwiirdigkeiten, II. W)8.) 
Accordingly, the Kaiser attempted to arrange an understanding with 
France. II<- was on intimate terms with the French ambassador ;it 
Berlin, and during the winter of 1897-8 held with him convert 
tions which presently advanced so far that the matter was trans- 
ferred to Paris to be completed between Hanotaux and the German 
ambassador, Count Minister. (Albin, Le "Coup" d'Agadir, pp. 
I.i 



228 

2. NEGOTIATIONS. 

Just when the negotiations seemed to be going well, the attention 
of French statesmen was taken up with the Dreyfus case, and then 
came the Fashoda affair. (Fullerton, Problems of Power, p. 53.) 
June 19 Count Munster presented a memorandum, but a few days 
later Hanotaux toll from power, and the new cabinet carried the 
matter no farther. (Pinon, p. 98.) It is said that German diplomacy 
was thwarted partly by revelations oi' de Blowitz, who repeated his 
exploit o( lS7r>. (Fullerton, p. 54, note.) 

.:. PERMS. 

None of the official documents bearing upon the transaction have 
been published. The terms o[' the proposed entente are known only 
by inference. A number of qualified observers have supposed that 
France was to receive some satisfaction in Europe, but while this 
would have furnished the best foundation for a Franco-German 
accord, it i- doubtful and improbable. (Albin, pp. 83 84.) Fuller- 
ton and Several French writers declare thai the intended arrangement 
hail to do with drawing France and Germany closer together on the 
general basis of opposition to England, who was to be forced to yield 
to her opponents some of the colonial spoils of the world : and that in 
particular the accord concerned a division o( the Portuguese colonies 
in Africa, assistance for France in the valley of the Upper Nile, and 
for Germany in getting what she wanted in Central Africa, so as 
to block the ambitions of England there. (Fullerton, p. 53; Albin. 
pp. 83-84; Pinon, pp. 97-98.) 

4. WHY THE TROJECT FAILED. 

The projected accord was abandoned when Ilanotaux, its leading 
French advocate, resigned. There was probably never any real 
chance for the success of the project. Entrance into such an under 
standing on the part o\' France would have involved tacit, if net 
actual, acceptance of the Treaty of Frankfort as a permanent >eitle- 
ment. Though the French were anxious to maintain peace in Europe 
and recognized that the long continued animosity between France 
and Germany was perhaps the chief obstacle to the development 
among the European nations of a state of mind favorable to peace, 
France could not agree to leave the Alsatians under the dominion 
of Germany. In that fact is to be found the fundamental reason for 
the failure of the projected accord. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

Fullerton, W. M. Problems of Power: A Study of International 
Politics from Sadowa to Kirk-Kilisse. (Xew York. Scribuer. 1913.) 



Fullerton was Paris correspondent of the London Tim< . and a 
disciple of de Blow it/. 

Albin, P. Le "Coup" d'Agadir. (Paris, AJcan, L912.) 

Pinon, R. France et Allemagne, 1870-1913. (Pari ? Perrin, L913.) 
Apparently not hostile to such an under banding between Germany 
and France. 

Seymour, C. The Diplomatic Background of the War, L870 L9J \. 
(Vale University Press, New Haven, 1916. Pages 58 and 59 contain 
c good reference on this subject. 

Diplomaticu . The Foreign Policy of Greater Britain. Fort- 
nightly Review, vol. 77. pp. 385 387. March, 1902. 

78. THE KRUGER TELEGRAM, 1896. 

I. THE JAMESON i:.\N>. 1 895 l 00. 

On December 29, L895 < to January -z. L896). an evenl occurred which 
greatly embittered the Boers again I the British and Ditlandi 
'J lii was the Jameson Rail— a sudden invasion of the Tran vaa] by 
a few hundred troopers under Dr. Jameson, flic administrator of 
Rhodesia, with the evident purp supporting the Uitlanders, and 

probably of overthrowing the Kruger government. The raiders were 
i ptured and handed over to England. Cecil Rhod is universally 
regarded as the man really re ponsible for the movement, and I 
name was generally held in abhorrence by the Boers. 

■i. THE Ki;i GEB TELEGRAM, 1800. 

On January 3, 1896, the morrpw of the failure of the Jami 
Raid, tin' German Emperor sent the following telegram to Pr< 
dent Kruger: 

i <• to you my sincere congratulations that, without appealing to the 

help of friendly powers, you and your people hav< l<'<l In repelling with 

void- own forces the armed hands which had broken Into your countrj and in 
maintaining the independence of your country againsl foreign • ion. 

This m .a we now know, emanated from the Berlin Foreign 

Office rather than from the German Emperor personally (Sir V. 
Chirol. Quarterl} Review, vol. 221, p. t24.) According to the 
Pari- correspondent of the London Times (See Times for Oct. 
•j'k L918), Baron Marschal] von Bieberstein, German minister of 
foreign affairs, on the day prior to the Kruger telegram, called upon 
M. Herbette, the French ambassador at Berlin, to Inquire whether 
France would join Germany with a view of securing ilx-, integrity 
and independence of the Boer States. M. Herbette replied that 
France would like to know whether as a quid pro <|uo German sup- 
port in the Egyptian question would be rendered to her, and the 



280 

matter went no farther. Prince Biilow admitted in the Reichstag 
on December 12. 1901, that the telegram was a ballon d'essai and 
that he was disappointed by its reception in France. 

It is well established that there had been political intrigues be- 
tween Germany and the Transvaal ever since President Kruger's 
European tour which followed the signing of the London convention 
in 18S4. (See article. The International Status of the South African 
Republic, 1877-1884.) In a dispatch, dated February 1, L895, from 
Baron Marschall von Bieberstein to Count Hatzfeld, the German 
ambassador to London, the Baron stated that the beginning and end 
of German policy in the Transvaal was the protection of the ma- 
terial interests of Germany, which required the maintenance of the 
Transvaal as an independent State in the measure of the treaty of 
1N84, and the upholding of the status quo regarding the railways 
and the harbor at Delagoa Bay. Dr. Jameson's idea that Rhodesia 
would become the link of the commercial union, amalgamation, or 
federation of all South African States was antagonistic to German 
interests. 

There was perhaps nothing objectionable in the Kruger telegram 
as a mere protest against such an international misdemeanor as the 
Jameson Raid — an act which was promptly repudiated by thd 
British Government; but it was much more than such a protest. It 
intimated that the maintenance of the independence of the Boer 
Republic fell within the scope of German interests, and that Ger- 
many would not hesitate, under certain conditions, to interfere in 
South African affairs. 

::. SIGNIFICANCE AM) [MPORTANCE. 

It would be difficult to overestimate the importance of the Ivruger 
telegram in the history of Anglo-German relations after 1896. It 
contributed more, perhaps, than any other single event to the crea- 
tion of that widespread suspicion and apprehension of Germany on 
the part of the British public which marked the years from L896 to 
1914, and which was assumed by the German public to prove the 
existence of hostile and aggressive British designs against Germany. 
The effect of the Kruger telegram in England thereby helped pro- 
duce the German state of mind which led directly to the World War. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

For good accounts of the Jameson Raid, see The Times' History 
of the War in South Africa, 1<S!>9-1900 (London, 1900, ed. by L. S. 
Amery, in 4 vols.), Vol. I, ch. 7; and Cana, F. R., South Africa 
from the Great Trek to the Union (London, Chapman & Hall, 
1909), chs. 12-13. 



23 L 

On the Kruger telegram, see especially Schmitt, B. K.. England 
and Germany, 1740 L91 1 (Princeton, University Press, 1910). pp. 
145-146; and the Annual Register for L896 (London, Longmans, 
L897), pp. 2 3,273-275. 

79. THE SEIZURE OF GERMAN SHIPS DURING THE BOER 

WAR. 

1. INTRODUCTION. 

Near the end of the first year of the Boer War relations between 
Germany and England, already affected by manifest German sym- 
pathy with the Boers and apparent dislike of* England, were for a 
while made worse by an episode which aroused great indignation in 
Germany and occasioned brusque and peremptory diplomatic com- 
munications. 

2. SEIZURES. 

In the winter of IS!)!), when the German steamer Bwndesrath was 
at Aden, suspicion was aroused that she was carrying contraband of 
war and German officers and men to the Boers. About the same time 
also report came that the German steamship Herzog had left the Suez 
Canal with a considerable number of Germans and Dutch apparently 
intending to enter service in the Transvaal. In December a British 
warship brought into Durban the Bundesrath, which had been seized 
off Delagoa Bay. The Herzog was also detained soon after. Mean- 
while the General, of the German East African Line, was stopped at 
Alien. All of these vessels were held and searched. 

3. GERMAN PROTESTS AND ([.aims. 

Protest about the Bundesrath had been made at once, and on 
December 30 Count von Biilow sent for the British ambassador in 
Berlin, and declaring that the Hamburg-American Co. gave assur- 
ance that there was no contraband aboard, desired that the vessel be 
speedily released. Next day the German ambassador in London 
asserted that such wrongful seizure of mail steamers interfered with 
common interest. The German Government in pressing its demand 
that the vessels be given up, protested that no contraband was being 
carried,*but declared that in any event Great Britain had no right to 
seize and detain these ships, since they were proceeding from one 
neutral port to another, and that with respect to goods carried to 
Portuguese territory it "was for the Portuguese authorities to pre- 
vent them being sent to the Transvaal : " There can not be contraband 
of war in trade between neutral ports." 



232 



It was contended that such had been the view taken by the British 
authorities in 1863 in the ease of the Springbok against the judgment 
of an American prize court. January 7, von Billow asked for a 
reply to his complaint, desired prompt release, payment Tor losses 
sustained, and cessation of such practices in the future. The Mar- 
quis of Salisbury thought that the German communications were of 
a tone very unusual in diplomatic correspondence. 

I. RELEASE OF THE GERMAN VESSELS. 

Meanwhile search had been made as speedily as could be, though 
with unavoidable delay. Notwithstanding discoveries which seemed 
to confirm the British suspicions there was not what was deemed 
proof sufficient to warrant sending the vessels before a prize court. 
Accordingly, while Lord Salisbury replied that Germany had mis- 
stated the British position with respect to the Springbok, yet that 
the Herzog had been released after search, and the General because 
she was stopped so far from her destination, but that the Bwndesrath 
would be held for further action by a prize court. The tone of Ger- 
man communications was softened now: it was explained iliat the 
German contention was not pressed because there was hope for an 
amicable agreement. No more mail steamers were seized on sus- 
picion alone, and presently the Bwndesrath was released. 

5. SETTLEMENT. 

In subsequent negotiations the British Government agreed in prin- 
ciple to compensation for the detention of the vessels; it expressed 
regret, but did not accept the German contention that contraband 
must be interpreted merely as articles or persons "suited for war." 
Nor did it accept the German contention that there was no contra- 
band from one neutral port to another, a question which Germany 
reserved the right to raise at some future time. The matter was 
finally disposed of in September, 1900, when the joint commission 
appointed to settle the compensation agreed upon the sum of £70,503 
to be paid to German owners by the British Government, 

There is some account of the details in The Annual Register, 1900. 

The negotiations are in British and Foreign State Papers, (1900- 
1901), vol. 94, pp. !>7: , >-1007, and in Staatsarchiv, vol. 01, pp. 208-221. 

80. TREATY OF VEREENIGING, 1902. 

1. ANNEXATION OF SOUTH AFRICAN REPUBLICS. 

Great Britain proclaimed the annexation of the Orange Free 
State on May 28, 1900, and of the Transvaal on September 11, fol- 
lowing. After these annexations the British refused to negotiate 



233 

with the Boers on any basis except the surrender of their inde- 
pendence. 

2. OFFER OF MEDIATION BY THE NETHERLANDS. 

In January, 1902, the Government of Netherlands informally ten- 
dered its mediation, but Great Britain refused to negotiate except 
directly with the South African Republics. Lord Kitchener was 
instructed, however, to transmit copies of the correspondence re- 
garding the Dutch offer to the Boer leaders. These latter replied, 
almost immediately with a request for a conference on peace pro- 
posals to which the British agreed. 

3. CONFERENCE OF PRETORIA APRIL 12, 1902. 

At a conference held at Pretoria of Lords Milner and Kitchener 
representing the British Government with the Boer leaders, the Boers 
wished to negotiate on the basis of independence. They offered 
full political rights to the Outlanders, equality of English with 
Dutch in the schools, a customs union with' Great Britain, arbitra- 
tion of future disputes, and mutual amnesty. The British, however,, 
refused to "entertain any proposals which were based upon the 
former independence of the republics." The Boers then decided to 
refer the British ultimatum to a congress elected for the purpose. 

4. CONGRESS OF VEREENIGING. 

Thirty representatives from each of the Boer Republics met at 
Vereeniging to consider the terms of peace. The congress appointed 
commissioners who offered to surrender the conduct of foreign affairs 
to Great Britain, but asked internal autonomy under British super- 
vision. They also agreed to surrender a part of their territory. 
These terms were refused. The Boers then asked the British to 
name their terms. 

5. TREATY OF VEREENIGING. 

Milner and Kitchener formulated a set of articles based on the sur- 
render of Boer independence. These provided for the surrender of 
all arms, but the Boers were to be returned to their homes without loss 
of liberty or property. The Dutch language was to be permitted in 
courts and the schools. Civil government was to be reestablished and 
representative institutions set up as soon as possible. The Boers were 
not to pay any special tax on account of the war. Commissions were 
to be appointed to restore normal conditions and the British Govern- 
ment was to provide a fund of £3,000,000 for the relief of destitution 
due to the war. Notes and receipts issued by commanders in the field 
were to be accepted as evidence of "war losses." If additional sums 



234 

were needed the British Government agreed to make loans, the firsl 
two years to be without interest. Citizens of Natal and Cape Colony 
who fought Tor the Boers were to be dealt with according to the laws 
of their colonies, hut immunity was practically promised. Largely 
through the influence of Gen. Smuts, these terms were accepted, and 
the treaty was signed at Pretoria on May 31, L902. (See Appendix 
I. 66.) 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

Worsfold, William Basil. Lord Milner's Work in South Africa. 
(London, Murray, 190G.) pp. 551-583. Justifies the British policy. 

Revue Generale de Droit International Public (July, L902), vol. !), 
pp. 652-670. Anti-British. 

Franklin, W. H. La paix dans I'Afrique du Sud, in Questions dip- 
lomatiques et coloniales (15 June, L902), vol. L3, pp. 7:U 738. Argues 
for a league of Europe against Great Britain. 

Reede, H. The Treaty of Vereeniging. In the Westminster Re- 
view 7 for August, 1902, vol. 158, pp. 117-123. Summary of provisions. 

British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 95, pp. 146-162, contain 
the most important documents bearing on the negotiations; pp. 1(H)- 
L62 for text of the treaty. 

81. FRANCE AND MOROCCO, 1894-1904. 

1. INTRODUCTION. 

At the close of the last century Morocco was the last independent 
State of Africa Minor. A Mohammedan country, it was suhmerged 
in feudal anarchy, which was accentuated by the absence of geo- 
graphical unity and the lighting propensities of the various tribes. 
Down to 1894 the Sultan Mulai Hassan and after his death the grand 
vizier Ben Ilanied managed to protect such Europeans as settled in 
the country for purposes of commerce. But the weakness of the 
Government and the addiction of Sultan Abdul Assiz to costly 
refinements of European life brought on bankruptcy, and a tribal 
revolt in L903 made European intervention inevitable. With an area 
of 219,000 square miles and a population of only 5,000,000 Morocco 
could receive a large number of European settlers; the climate was 
salubrious; the agricultural possibilities were boundless; and the 
soil was rich in iron and other ores much in demand by industrial 
nations. 

2. WHY FRANCE BECAME INTERESTED IN MOROCCO. 

The power with the most vital interest in Morocco was France. 
Ever since Algeria became a French colony (1830-1847), the Moroc- 
can frontier had been a source of trouble. After the occupation of 






235 

the lasl Saharan oases in the nineties. Morocco came to be regarded 
as the necessary keystone of the French African Empire, and the 
colonial party in France openly expressed its desire for annexation 
or a protectorate. In the event of a war with Germany, the Republic 
might supply the deficiency in its own army from the fighting tribes- 
men; the position of France throughout Africa mighl be seriously 
compromised by Mohammedan agents in the pay of Germany operat- 
ing from an independent Morocco. 

.:. THE RIVALS OF FRANCE JX MOROCCO. 

Nevertheless the assertion of French control was no easy task. 
Spain, with four presidios on the Mediterranean littoral and a small 
settlement on the Atlantic coast, was not to be ignored. Germany 
was already in the field as a commerce-gatherer, a treaty of 1800 
having secured for her the most-favored-nation treatment; German 
travelers published numerous monographs about the country, and the 
expansionists wished to see Morocco, or a part of it. become a Ger- 
man colony. Italy was seeking revenge for the French occupation 
of Tunis, and in 1895, it appears, the British, German, and Italian 
ministers considered recommending an Italian protectorate. But 
the most serious opponent of French designs was Great Britain. She 
enjoyed the largest share of the trade, and she desired to preserve 
the independence and integrity of the country; her agents arid trad- 
ers practically controlled the Shereefian Government; her policy 
required that Tangier, opposite Gibraltar, should not pass into 
European occupation. 

). AGREEMENTS WITH ITALY AND SPAIN, 1902-1904. 

France undertook no aggressive campaign until the outbreak of 
the Boer War. M. Delcasse, the foreign minister, reached an agree- 
ment with Italy, L900 1902 (See article, Italy and the Morocco 
Question) by which the latter withdrew her pretensions in return for 
French recognition of her claims in Tripoli. Negotiations were 
opened with Spain, and in 1002 a secret treaty, negotiated but not 
ratified, provided for the partition of Morocco; the project was 
presently dropped by Spain, for fear of offending Great Britain, but 
the principle was established that Spain was an interested party. 
(See article, Spain and Morocco, 1894-1012.) M. Delcasse is said 
also to have negotiated with Germany, but this remains obscure. 

5. ANGLO-FRENCB CONVENTION OF 1904. 

After the Boer War the British Government inaugurated a policy 
of liquidating various disputes which might fetter its freedom of 
action ; a policy the more desirable, if indeed not necessary, in view 



236 

of a distinct unfriendliness recently displayed by Germany. The 
most important matter was the question of Egypt, where the French 
had systematically hindered the British- since their occupation in 
1882. In L903 M. Delcasse made overtures to Lord Lansdowne, 
the British foreign secretary, for a joint settlement of the Egyptian 
and Moroccan questions, for which the way had been prepared by 
the refusal of Lord Lansdowne, in June, 1901, to proclaim a British 
protectorate over Morocco, as desired by the Sultan. 

The result was the agreement of April 8, 1904. (See Appendix I, 
68, and article The Formation of the Entente Cordiale.) The pub- 
lished articles bound the two Governments not to "alter the political 
status" of cither Egypt or Morocco, but in secret articles, not pub- 
lished till 1911, they considered "the event of either Government 
rinding themselves constrained, by the force of circumstances, 
to modify their policy in respect to Egypt or Morocco," and they 
promised mutual assistance in seeking reforms in either country. 
(British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 101, pp. 1058-1060.) In 
other words. France had secured the diplomatic support of Great 
Britain in her Moroccan policy. As regards Spain, her ^interests 
on the Mediterranean littoral were recognized by the public declara- 
tion, and France was bidden to come to terms with her. By a 
public declaration of October :'>, 1904, France and Spain declared 
that they were " firmly attached to the integrity of the Moorish 
Empire under the sovereignty of the Sultan," but secretly they con- 
cluded a second treaty which was communicated to the British 
Government and which bound Spain never "to alienate or cede, in 
any form, even temporarily, the whole or any part of the territories 
awarded to her" — a precaution, perhaps, against a German pur- 
chase or lease. (See article. Spain and Morocco, 1894-1912.) 

6. FKENCH PACIFIC PENETRATION. 

France was now in a position to develop a more active policy, 
a policy foreshadowing, and, indeed, the compelling cause of the 
agreements with Great Britain and Spain. Since 1898 she had 
been complaining of Moroccan raids on the Algerian frontier and 
of the murder of several of her citizens. In May, 1901, a squadron 
appeared before Tangier, and on July 20 a treaty was signed in 
Paris, to be followed by others on April 20 and May 7, 1902. These 
instruments provided for a more satisfactory policing of the Alge- 
rian frontier and paved the way for penetration pacifique. A 
serious native rebellion hindered the execution of these agreements 
and so increased the financial difficulties of the Shereefian Gov- 
ernment that in June, 1904, a loan of 62,500,000 francs had to be 
raised in Paris. The apple seemed ready to fall into the French 



237 

lap, and so sure of victory was M. Delcasse that he delayed till Feb- 
ruary. 1905, to present a program of reforms which would have con- 
verted Morocco into a virtual French protectorate. 

Unfortunately for France, the battle of Mukden temporarily de- 
stroyed the military power of Russia. France's ally: the Kaiser 
dramatically intervened, thereby precipitating the crisis of 1905-0. 
(See article. The Morocco Crisis of 1905-1900.) 

7. APPRAISEMENT OP FRENCH POLICY. 

The policy pursued by France, though fully justified at most points 
in the light of subsequent events, exposed her to two criticisms: (1) 
That she had publicly committed herself to maintaining the integrity 
and independence of the Moorish Empire, but was. in effect, secretly 
preparing its partition and absorption. (2) That she had come to 
terms with Great Britain, Italy, and Spain, but had ignored Ger- 
many, even to the point of failing to communicate officially to 
Germany the convention of April 18, 1904. The French Govern- 
ment doubtless felt that Germany's interests in Morocco were only 
secondary and commercial. But the course which was followed 
failed to take sufficient account of the fact that the French Army 
and Navy were both in ill condition for war. and that Germany, 
with her powerful military machine, might take advantage of any 
special opportunity to attempt to force upon France the acceptance 
of such demands as Germany chose to bring forward. Russia's loss 
of military power soon offered that opportunity. Tt was out of this 
state of affairs that the crisis of 1905-1900 arose. (See article, The 
Morocco Crisis of 1905-1900.) 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

For bibliography see article. The Moroccan Crisis of 1911. 

82. THE ANNEXATION OF THE CONGO FREE STATE BY 

BELGIUM, 1889-1908. 

1. THE BEQUEST BY KING LEOPOLD OF THE CONGO FREE STATE TO BELGIUM, 

1889. 

The international status of the Congo Free State was from the first 
an anomalous one. (See article, The Formation of the Congo Free 
State. 1S70-1885.) The first step toward annexation by Belgium may 
be said to have been taken on August 2. 1889. when King Leopold 
bequeathed to Belgium "all our sovereign rights over the Independ- 
ent State of the Congo, as they are recognized by the declarations, 
conventions, and treaties concluded since 1884 between the foreign 
powers on the one side, the International Association of the Congo 



238 

and the Independent State of the Congo on the other, as well as all 
the benefits, rights, and advantages attached to that sovereignty." 
In July, 1890, Belgium acquired, by the terms of a loan to the Congo 
Free State, the option of annexing the State on the expiration of ten 
years and six months. 

2. PROJECTS OF ANNEXATION, 1895-1908. 

On January 9, 1895 the Belgian Government made a treaty with 
the King to take over the Free State with all its claims, possessions,, 
and obligations, as from the 1st of January of that year. A bill em- 
bodying these provisions was introduced into the Belgian Parlia- 
ment, but it was finally withdrawn after long delays and much oppo- 
sition. In 1901, another bill was introduced in favor of annexation, 
but upon this occasion it encountered the opposition of the Gov- 
ernment. 

:;. CHARGES ov MALADMINISTRATION. 

The discussions which took place on this subject of annexation 
were greatly embittered by the accusations of maladministration 
brought against the administration of the Congo State. After 1891, 
when the great wealth of the Congo region in rubber and ivory had 
become apparent, the character of the Congo administration appears 
to have undergone a complete change, About 1895 the Government 
of the Congo Free State became a trading monopoly practicing 
or permitting the most atrocious tj'ranny and merciless exploitation 
of the natives. The regulations laid down at the Berlin Conference 
(See article. The Berlin Conference of 1884-85) were completely 
• lisregarded. 

4. LANSDOWNE'S DISPATCH OF AUG. .;. 1903. 

The agitation against these abuses w T as particularly strong in 
Great Britain. On August 8, 1903, the Marquis of Lansdowne, 
British secretary of state for foreign affairs, issued a circular dis- 
patch to the British representatives at the courts of the powers which 
had signed the Berlin act of 188-1—85, calling attention to the al- 
leged cases of ill-treatment of natives and to the existence of trade 
monopolies in the Congo Free State, stating in conclusion that the 
British Government would " be glad to receive any suggestions 
which the Governments of the Signatory Powers might be disposed to 
make in reference to this important question, which might perhaps 
constitute, wholly or in part, the subject of a reference to the 
Tribunal at The Hague." (British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 
90, pp. 530-510.) 

Save from Turkey, this dispatch failed to evoke any response, but 
public agitation on the subject continued and even increased in vio- 



239 

lence, particularly after the publication in February, 1904, of a re- 
port by Mr. Roger Casement, then British consul at Boma. 

5. COMMISSION OF INQUIRY, 19 04-5. 

» 

In July, 1904, King Leopold appointed a commission of inquiry 
to investigate conditions in the Congo and, if necessary, recommend 
reforms. The report of the commission was published in November, 
1905. The existence of great abuses in the upper Congo was recog- 
nized by the report of the commission which also recommended cer- 
tain mild reforms. The principle of forced labor and the concessions 
system were, however, upheld. Certain reforms, adopted in 1906, 
proved illusory. 

6. TREATY OF CESSION AND FINAL ANNEXATION. 1908. 

The agitation for annexation was now renewed. On November 28, 
1907. a treaty of cession between Belgium and the Congo Free State 
was signed which stipulated for the maintenance of the rights, 
privileges, and profits of the Crown in the Congo. It was learned 
that these provisions stood no chance of acceptance by the Belgian 
Parliament or the British Government. Consequently negotiations 
between the Belgian King and the Belgian Premier were resumed. 
Great Britain let it be known that she could not approve any semi- 
transfer which left the controlling power in the Congo " in the hands 
of the present authorities." On March 5, 1908, an additional act was 
signed omitting the objectionable clauses in the treaty of cession. 
Finally in September, 1908, after a long debate which made it clear 
that the Belgian people did not desire colonial possessions but saw no 
other means of escape from an intolerable situation, the treaty of 
cession (as amended), the additional act, and a colonial law were 
accepted by the Belgian Parliament. The Congo Free State ceased 
to exist on November 14, 1908, its rights and obligations of sov- 
ereignty having passed over to Belgium. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

One of the best and most reliable books on the Congo abuses is 
that by Vermeersch, A., La question Congolaise (Bruxelles, 1906). 
See also Vandervelde, E., La Belgique et le Congo (Paris, Alcan, 
1911) ; Doyle, A. C, The Crime of the Congo (New York, Doubleday, 
1909) ; and Morel, E. D., The Congo Slave State (Liverpool, 1903). 

For a reply to the latter pamphlet, see Boulger, D. C, The Congo 
is Not a Slave State (London, 1903). 

On the Annexation of the Congo, see Brunet, R., L'annexation du 
Congo a la Belgique et le droit international (Bruxelles, 1911). 



240 

For a brief account, see Harris. X. D., Intervention and Coloniza- 
tion in Africa (Boston, Houghton, 1914), ch. 3. 

Delepech, J., and Marcoggi, A. Le transfert a la Belgique do 
l'Etat independent du Congo. Revue de droit international public 
(1911), XVIII, 105-163. 

Payen, E. Questions diplomatiques et coloniales, vol. 25, p. 409 If. 

For various official documents concerning the Congo, sec Supple- 
ment to American Journal of International Law for 1909. Vol. Ill, 
pp. 5-96. 

For diplomatic correspondence and much other documentary ma- 
terial, see British Parliamentary Papers, on Africa, published dur- 
ing the years ranging from 1903 to 1911. See also Senate Doc. No. 
147 on "Affairs in the Kongo" (Washington. Govt. Printing Office, 
1909). 

83. CHINO-JAPANESE RIVALRY IN KOREA, 1876-1894. 

1. THE RECOGNITION OF KOREAN INDEPENDENCE, 1876-1887. 

A new phase in the history of the Korean quest ion wgs begun 
with the recognition of Korean independence by Japan in 1876. In 
1882 a treaty of friendship and commerce was concluded between 
Korea and the United States. This was followed by similar treaties 
with Germany and Great Britain in 1883, with Russia and Italy in 
1884, with France in 1886-87, and with Austria-Hungary in 1892. 
These treaties in general provided for the opening to foreign trade 
of certain Korean ports and the grant to foreign consuls of extra- 
territorial jurisdiction. (See Appendix I, 21, 24, 25, 28. 32, 41.) 

2. CHINO-JAPANESE INTERVENTION, 1882-18S5. 

This " open door " policy was violently opposed by the " exclusion- 
ist' : faction in Korea, which in 1882, incited an insurrection directed 
mainly against the Japanese at Seoul. It resulted in the inter- 
vention of China and Japan and the stationing of Chinese and Japa- 
nese troops in Korea. In December, 1884, as the result of another in- 
tervention, incited by the pro-Japanese or "progressive" faction, 
China and Japan suddenly found themselves on the brink of war. 
But war was averted at the last moment by the conclusion of the 
treaty of Tientsin negotiated by Count Ito and Li-Hun-Chang in 
1885." 

.:. TREATY OF TIENTSIN, APRIL 18, 1885. 

Both China and Japan agreed to withdraw their troops from 
Korea. " In case of any disturbance of a grave nature occurring in 
Korea which might necessitate the respective countries or either of 






241 

them to send troops to Korea, it is hereby understood that they shall 
give, each to the other, previous notice in writing of their intention 
so to do, and that after the matter is settled they shall withdraw their 
troops and not further station them there." (Hertslet, China 
Treaties, I. 361-362.) 

4. THE PERIOD BETWEEN 1SS5 AND 1894. 

The Chino- Japanese treaty of 1885 paved the way for the Chino- 
Japanese war of 1894-1895. Yuan-Shi-Kai, the Chinese resident at 
Seoul, became the main support of the Korean throne. The nine 
years which followed (1885-1894) were marked by internal disorder 
in Korea and by intrigues between the various pro-Chinese, Japanese, 
and Russian factions. 

5. THIRD INSURRECTION OF 1894. 

In 1894, in consequence of a third insurrection, Japanese and 
Chinese troops once more faced each other in Korea. Japan, in- 
censed by the murder of her protege Kim-ok-Kim at Shanghai, was 
determined to solve the Korean question by means of certain reforms, 
as also by the suppression of the insurrection. China, on the other 
hand, opposed these reforms and, ignoring the Tientsin convention, 
reasserted her ancient rights of suzerainty. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

The best documented account of these diplomatic events is that 
given by Key, F., Chronique, in Revue Generale de droit international 
public (Paris, 1905). vol. 12, pp. 300 ff. A briefer account also based 
on the documents may be found in Hershey, A. S., The International 
Law and Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War (New York, Mac- 
millan, 1906), pp. 40 ff. See also Longford, G. H., The Story of 
Korea (New York, Scribner, 1911), ch. 15; and Hornbeck, S. T., 
Contemporary Politics in the Far East (New York, Appleton, 1916), 
ch. 11. 

For an English version of the text of the treaty of Tientsin, see 
Hertslet, China Treaties (London, 1908), I, No. 61, pp. 361 ff. For 
the various " peace and friendship " treaties with Korea concluded 
by Great Britain, the United States, etc., see Treaties and Conven- 
tions between Korea and Other Powers (Foreign Office, 1905). 

84. THE TREATY OF SHIMONOSEKI, 1895. 

MAIN PROVISIONS. 

This treaty was negotiated at the close of the Chino-Japanese war 
of 1894-1895 by Count Ito on behalf of Japan and Li-Hung-Chang, 
representing China, and was signed on April 17, 1895. (See 
53706—18 16 



242 

Appendix 1. II.) It provided, among other things, for the com- 
plete independence of Korea, the cession to Japan of the Liao-tung 
Peninsula (including Port Arthur), Formosa, and the Pescadores, as 
also (ho payment to Japan of an indemnity of 200,000,000 taels. 

At the instance of three of the great powers (Russia, Germany, 
•and France) Japan was not permitted to retain the Liao-tung Penin- 
sula; but was required within a few weeks to agree \^ the retrocession 
of the LiaO-tung Peninsula. (See article. The Retrocession of the 
Liao-tung Peninsula.) 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

For the text of the treaty, see llertslet, China Treaties (London, 
L908,) 1. No. 62, pp. 362 If. For a good brief account of its provisions 
and the negotiations, see Asakawa, K.. The Russo-Japanese Conflict 
(Boston, Houghton, 1904), p. To. 

85. RETROCESSION OF THE LIAO-TUNG PENINSULA BY 

JAPAN, NOVEMBER 8, 1895. 

1. TREATY OF SHIMONOSEKI, 1895. « 

By the Treaty of Shimonoseki (See article, that title), Japan 
had, among other things, exacted from China the cession of the 
Liao-tung Peninsula (including Port Arthur), which placed in 
Japan's hands, so to speak, the key to Peking, Manchuria, and Korea. 

•J. DIPLOMATIC [NTERCHANGE OK VIEWS BETWEEN THE POWERS. 

Naturally, the peace negotiations at Shimonoseki had been watched 
with the keenest interest by the leading European powers. Particu- 
larly alert was Russia, who realized the importance of the cession 
of Port Arthur from the standpoint of her own aims and ambitions. 
There followed an interchange of views between the foreign offices of 
St. Petersburg, Berlin, Paris, and London which has never been 
published. But it is well known that France readily acceded to the 
Russian desire for a joint intervention, and that Germany changed 
her former policy and allied herself with Russia and France in this 
new undertaking. Great Britain, on the other hand, veered over 
from the side of China to that of Japan and declined to participate 
in the proposed intervention. 

3. THE INTERVENTION OF RUSSIA, FRANCE, AM) GERMANY. 

On April 23, 1895, the representative's of Russia. France, and Ger- 
many at Tokio joined in a "friendly recommendation" to the Japa- 
nese Government declaring that the "contemplated possession of 
the Liao-tung Peninsula by Japan would not only constitute a con- 
stant menace to the capital of China, hut would also render the in- 



243 

dependence of Korea illusory, and ilms jeopardize the permanent 
peace of the Far East." Accordingly, " in a spirit of candid friend- 
ship for Japan," they advised the Japanese Government to "re- 
nounce the definite possession of the Liao-tung Peninsula." 

This " friendly advice" on the part of the three powers was rein- 
forced by an augmentation and concentration of their Far Eastern 
fleets, and by the preparation of the army contingents in the Amur 
region for quick mobilization on the part of Russia. 

I. JAPAN RECEDES THE LIAO-TUNG PENINSULA, MEAT, 1895, 

Consequently, the Japanese Government decided early in May 
1895, in consideration of an additional indemnity of 30,000,000 taels 
from China, to relinquish the whole, of the Liao-tung Peninsula. 
On May 10, 1895, the Mikado issued an Imperial Rescript, declining 
that "out of regard for peace," he had decided to accept the "advice 
of the friendly powers," and had commanded his Government to 
"negotiate with the Chinese Government respecting all arrange- 
ments for the return of the particular districts." In accordance with 
this rescript, a Chino-Japanese convention for the retrocession of 
the Liao-tung Peninsula was signed at Peking on November 8, 1895. 

5. IMPORTANCE OF THE RETROCESSION. 

The retrocession of the Liao-tung Peninsula by Japan to China 
marks a turning point in the history of Japan, more particularly in 
her relations with Russia. Japan became convinced that war with 
Russia was inevitable and that it would come at an early date. 
Though hardly a fundamental cause of the Russo-Japanese War, this 
belief probably hastened that day. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

The best documented account of this matter is given by Asakawa, 
The Russo-Japanese Conflict (Boston. Houghton, 1904), ch. 1. For 
;i briefer account, see also Hershey, A. S.. The International Law 
and Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese \Y;ir (New York. Macmillan, 
1900), pp. 6-9. 

For the text of the Treaty of Retrocession, see Hertslet, China 
Treaties (London, 1908), No. 63, pp. 370 ff. 

86. THE OPEN-DOOR POLICY IN CHINA, 1895-1904. 

1. INTRODUCTION. 

The name "open-door" has been popularly given to a policy 
proposed by Secretary John Hay in 1899 to the chanceries of the 
great powers suggesting an agreement to preserve equality of com- 
mercial opportunity among all nations trading with and in China. 



L'44 

The lirsl important step taken by the United States toward formal 
diplomatic relations with China is the act of Congress approved 
March 3, 1843, to " establish the future commercial relations between 
the United States and China on terms of nation equal reciprocity.'" 
This resulted in the embassy of Caleb Cushing to China and the 
conclusion there of a convention of peace July 3, 1844. In a covering 
letter transmitting his treaty Cushing recognized the obligations of 
all nations to Great Britain for opening China, and declared it the 
purpose of the United States to extend the accruing benefit to "all 
( Jhristiandom." (Senate Ex. Doc. 07. 28th Cong.. 2d Sess.). 

To this principle of equal participation of advantages in China 
was {\\w America's action, in association with England and France, 
at the time of the Arrow War of 1857-1800. when a plenipotentiary 
was sent to negotiate a treaty, not in alliance but in harmony with the 
aims of the two European powers involved in that conflict. This 
treaty (of Tientsin. 1858) added nothing directly to the evolution of 
the open-door idea, but some extension of it was implied in a dispatch 
of our minister, Anson Burlingame. to Seward. June 2, 1802. urging 
that if the treaty powers could agree 111110112; themselves on the neu- 
trality of China and together secure order in the treaty ports, the 
interests of humanity would be subserved. He had. therefore, in 
agreement with the other foreign ministers at Peking, instructed the 
consul general at Shanghai as to the "extent of the rights and duties 
of American citizens under the treaty." The purpose of these in- 
structions was to "substitute fair diplomatic action in China for 
force." The Government of the United States has adhered con- 
sistently to these purposes — reciprocity, integrity of Chinese terri- 
tory, and cooperation with other treaty powers — ever since that time. 

2. THE HAT DOCTRINE, 1899. 

Hay's denunciation of this policy was prompted by the acquisition 
of several strategic harbors in China by European powers soon 
after the defeat of China by Japan in 1805 (See articles, The Leasing 
of Kiaou-Chau, The Leasing of Port Arthur by "Russia. The Leasing 
of Wei-Hai-Wei by Great Britain), and by the delimitation of the 
Empire into "spheres of influence" for its exploitation and con- 
trol by their nationals and governments. II is declaration that the 
United States would insist that such ports and "spheres" must 
be open to the world on equal terms implied an objection on the 
part of the American Government to the appropriation by Euro- 
pean powers of Chinese territory at will. He asks (in his dispatch 
of September 0, 1899, to the American Embassy at Borlin) assur- 
ances from Germany and other powers that (1) each power within 



245 

its respective sphere of influence will in no way interfere with 
any treaty port or any vested interest it may have in China; 
(2) that the Chinese treaty tariff shall be applied within such 
spheres, unless they be free ports, and be collected by the Chinese 
Government; and (3) that no railway charges or dues on vessels 
higher than those exacted from its own nationals shall be levied in 
the sphere of any foreign power. (Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 1899, p. 129.) 

The so-called Burlingame treaty of 1808 with the United Stales 
especially guaranteed to China its rights respecting concessions and 
grants of land to foreigners, while it discouraged unnecessary dic- 
tation or interference in its internal affairs. As Hay was Lincoln's 
private secretary and personally acquainted with Seward's policy in 
Asia the inference is suggested that his proposals in this circular note 
of 1899 were based upon the declarations of our treaties and upon 
Burlingame's doctrine of " cooperation and fair play." These prin- 
ciples were accepted by France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, 
Japan, and Russia. (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1899. 
pp. 128-143.) The formal acknowledgment by Germany was in von 
Bulow's memorandum of February 19, 1900, to Mr. White: 

The Imperial Government has from the beginning not only asserted but 
also practically carried out to the fullest extent in its Chinese possessions 
absolute equality of treatment of all nations with regard to trade, navigation, 
and commerce. If therefore the other powers interested in the industrial 
development of the Chinese Empire are willing to recognize the same prin- 
ciples, this can only be desired by the Imperial Government, which in this 
case upon being requested will gladly be willing to participate with the United 
States of America and the other powers in an agreement made upon these lines,, 
by which the same rights are reciprocally secured. (Foreign Relations of the 
United States. 1899, p. 131.) 

Hay's circular of September, 1899, was due largely to economic 
motives — the desire to preserve a potential market. By asking each 
power separately, each was compelled to answer by itself, and thus 
assent was secured to a useful principle. No concrete agreement 
was concluded, but Hay notified the powers that he took their adher- 
ence to the principle proposed to be " final and definitive." (Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1899, pp. 142-143.) He thus accom- 
plished all that diplomacy could do by itself to prevent the " spheres " 
in China from passing from one power to another and perhaps 
prevented China from being entirely absorbed through complete 
economic domination. 

3. HAY'S CIRCULAR NOTE OF 1900. 

A crisis of the first magnitude confronted the sponsor for this 
doctrine when the Boxer uprising threatened the lives and property 
of all foreigners in China in the summer of 1900. (See article, The 



246 






Boxer Uprising.) While the legations in Pekin More still be- 
sieged a circular sent by Hay. July 3, 1900, to American rep- 
resentatives to the great powers announced the course of the 
United States after the restoration of order. It regarded the 

situation in Peking as one of virtual anarchy, and declared the 
purpose of the United States to act with other powers in restor- 
ing communication, protecting life and property, and prevent- 
ing the spread <>f disorder or a recurrence of such a disaster. Its 
policy in the premises was to seek such a solution as would bring 
peace, preserve China's territorial and administrative entity, and 
"safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trado 
with all parts of the Chinese Empire." (Foreign Relations of the 
United States. 1900, pp. 312 313.) 

When, during the military operations of 1900, the Europeans seized 
tracts in and about the city of Tientsin the American legation served 
notice upon the others that it might reoccupy a small tract which had 
formed the American concession there in 1869. The military neces- 
sity for this step having disappeared with the end of hostilities, the 
United States had no further desire to occupy the ground, especially 
when advised by the Viceroy Li that certain occupants of the land 
might involve Americans and Europeans in complications and litiga- 
tion. The project was relinquished in November, 1901, and the 
American Government remained — as it still does — without any ter- 
ritorial possession in China. (Foreign "Relations of the United 
States. 1901. 39.) 

4. Tin: ANGLO-GERMAN AGREEMENT OF 1900. 

The Anglo-German agreement of October 10. 1900, upholding the 
open-door principle, disclaimed territorial designs in China »on the 
part of the signatories, and indorsed the balance of power existing 
among Europeans located in China by ''reserving to themselves the 
right to come to a preliminary understanding " in case another power 
should make use of the existing complications to obtain territorial 
advantage. Japan agreed to the declaration October 29, as did the 
United States a little later, while expressing itself unconcerned with 
the threat implied in the concluding sentence. Kussia declined to 
recognize any new feature in the agreement. (British Parliamentary 
Papers, Treaty Series, No. 1, 1900.) 

.-,. RUSSIA AND THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR. 

Russia's acts in the Amur region and Manchuria, refusing to with- 
draw her troops from the latter in accord with repeated promises 
made to Japan between 1901 and 1904 (See articles on Russo-Japanese 
Rivalry in Korea, 1895-1904, and The Russian Advance into Man- 



247 

churia, 1895-1903), precipitated the conflict of 1904-1905, known 
as the Russo-Japanese War. It was, in fact, a refusal on her part 
to uphold the open-door principle in practice, though frequently 
avowed upon her own initiative in her correspondence with other 
States. The United States had no part in the war. On January 13, 
1905, Mr. Hay wrote to the representatives of the great powers dis- 
claiming any thoughts of reserving territorial rights or control in 
tin' ( Ihinese Empire, and inviting an expression of their views. (For- 
eign Relations of the United States. 1905, p. 1.) 

6. MEANING OF THE OPEN DOOR. 

The Open % Door is a declaration of policy, not an assertion of 
international law. It calls a halt to further extensions of own- 
ership or control, however disguised. It seeks to arrest a proci 
that has continued for fhree centuries almost unchallenged in 
various parts of Africa and Asia. The integrity of China is a corol- 
lary to which the United States i- committed not from sentiment only 
but to preserve for present and future use the access to China as 
a market. 

"The Open Door, which in principle has received the adhesion of 
the western community of nations, does not stand isolated, as an unre- 
lated doctrine, but is a positive and formulated attitude affecting, 
however unconsciously of its range, the general policy of contact 
between the East and the West." (A. T. Mahan, The Interest of 
America in International Conditions, pp. 184-185.) 

NOTES OK AGREEMENTS AS TO CHINA'S INTEGRITY, L899-1905. 

1 s!)9, September 6: Hay's circular note asking six powers to make 
a formal declaration approving an open-door policy in the terri- 
tories controlled by them in China. 

1900, March 20: Hay's announcement that, as all the powers had 
accepted the declaration suggested, he would consider the assent 
given as " final and definitive." 

1900, July 3: Hay's circular telegram to eleven powers of American 
desire to solve the complication in China so as to preserve her entity 
and safeguard principle of impartial and equal trade. 

1900. July 7: Lord Salisbury "emphatically concurs" with the 
above telegram and tells Commons (August 2) that the British 
Government " are opposed to any partition of China." 

1900, October 16: British-German Agreement to '"direct their 
policy toward maintaining undiminished the territorial condition 
of the Chinese Empire.** 

1900, October 29: Hay announces that eleven countries had signi- 
fied approval of principles stated in his telegram of July 3. 



248 

L902, January 30: Anglo-Japanese alliance treaty preamble de- 
claring the two Governments to be actuated by a desire to preserve 
peace and status quo and "specially interested in maintaining terri- 
torial integrity of China and Korea and securing equal opportunities 
in those countries." 

1905, January 13: Hay advises seven European powers of his de- 
sire to "strengthen and perpetuate the broad policy of maintaining 
the integrity of China and the open door in the Orient." Five 
powers at once declare their adhesion to the policy. 

1905, August 12: Anglo- Japanese alliance, first renewal, stipulates: 
insuring the independence and integrity of China and principle of 
equal opportunity. On September 6 Lord Salisbury transmits this 
instrument to the Russian Government, counting on the good will 
and support of all the powers in seeking to uphold the integrity and 
independence of China and the principle of equal opportunity. 

1905, September 5: Treaty of Portsmouth. Japan and Russia 
agree to restore to China all of Manchuria occupied by their troops 
excepting Liaotung, and engage not to obstruct China's measures for 
its development ''common to all countries." d 

1905, December 22: Chino-Japanese treaty confirming the Ports- 
mouth treaty. 

I 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

Cordier, H. Histoire des relations de la Chine avec les puissances 
occidentales. Vol. Ill, pp. 433-462. (Paris, Alcan, 1902.) 

Conant, C. A. The United States in the Orient. (Boston, Hough- 
ton, 1900.) 

Mahan. A. T. The Problem of Asia. (Boston, Little, 1900.) 

Mahan. A. T. Interest of America in International Conditions. 
(Boston, Little. 1910.) 

Moore. J. B. Digest of International Law, V, 533-559. (Wash- 
ington, Government Printing Office, 190G.) Well documented ac- 
count. 

Thomson, H. C. China and the Powers. (London, Longmans, 
1902.) 

Hornbeck, S. K. Contemporary Politics in the Far East, ch. 13. 
(New York, Appleton, 1916.) 

Foster, J. W. American Diplomacy in the Orient. (Boston, 
Houghton, 1903.) 

Asakawa, K. The Russo-Japanese Conflict. (Boston. Houghton, 
1904.) 

Millard, T. F. America and the Far Eastern Question. (New 
York, Moffat, 1909.) 

Williams, F. W. Anson Burlingame. (New York, Scribner, 1912.) 



249 

Satow, Sir E. Cambridge Modern History. Chap. 28, in Vol. 
XI. ( ( 'ambridge Press, 1909. ) 

Clements, P. H. The Boxer Rebellion. Columbia Studies in His- 
tory, etc. Vol. 66. (New York, 1915.) 

Duvall, E. The Open Door. In Atlantic Monthly, 1900. Vol. 

86, p. 382. 

Russia and the Open Door. In Contemporary Review, 1901, vol. 
79, p. 188. 

For Documents, see Rockhill, W. W., Treaties and Conventions 
with or concerning China and Korea, 1894-1904 (Washington, Govt. 
Print. Office. 1904) ; Hertslet, G. E. P.. Treaties, etc, between Great 
Britain and China, and between China and Foreign Powers in 
Force, 1908 (London. Harrison, 1908), 2 vols.: Foreign Relations of 
the United States, 1899-1904 (Washington) ; Parliamentary Papers, 
China, 1900 to 1905 (London). 

87. LEASING OF KIAO-CHAU BY GERMANY, MARCH 6, 1898. 

1. CIRCUMSTANCES. 

The occasion or pretext lor the seizure of the port of Tsingtau 
at the entrance to the Bay of Kiao-chau in November, 1S97. and the 
subsequent leasing on March 6. of Kiao-chau, was afforded by the 
murder on November 1, 1897, of two German Catholic priests. It 
seems probable from a statement made in the German Reichstag by 
von Biilow. minister of foreign affairs, on April 27, 1898 (Parlia- 
mentary Papers, China (No. 1), 1899, p. 07). that the German ( Govern- 
ment had concluded that China was about to be partitioned, and that 
Germany must have her share of the spoils. How Russia, which had 
manifested a particular interest in Kiao-chau (See article, The Cas- 
sini convention), was propitiated is not definitely known, though it 
may be readily inferred that no obstacles were placed upon the leas- 
ing of Port Arthur by Russia a few days later. (See article, The 
Leasing of Port Arthur by Russia, 1898.) 

However that may be, three German men-of-war appeared sud- 
denly, about November 17, at Kiao-chau and landed a number of 
marines, who seized the Chinese barracks of the port of Tsing : tau. 
The German Minister at Peking then presented six demands, includ- 
ing the preference for German capital and engineers in the future 
railway and mining enterprises in the Province of Shan-tung, but 
not including the lease of Kiao-chau. These demands having been 
accepted by the Chinese Government, a further demand for the lease 
of the bay and its surrounding territories was made and reinforced 
by the arrival of a German squadron under the command of Prince 
Henry. China yielded at once and a treaty with Germany was 
promptly signed on March 6, 1898. 



250 

2. PROVISIONS. 

By the terms of Section I of the treaty China " cedes to Germany 
on lease, provisionally for 99 years, both sides of the entrance to the 
Bay of Kiao-chau." China agreed that she would abstain from exer- 
cising rights of sovereignty in the ceded territory during the term 
of the lease, and conceded the exercise of the same to Germany. China 
also agreed, while reserving all rights of sovereignty, to permit the 
free passage of German troops and to abstain from taking any meas- 
ures or issuing any ordinances in a zone of 50 kilometers extent 
around Kiao-chau Bay. Chinese warships and merchant vessels 
would be placed upon the same basis as the ships of other nations 
on friendly terms with Germany, but no dues were to be demanded 
from them, " except those which may be levied upon other vessels 
for the purpose of maintaining the necessary harbor arrangements 
and quays." Germany agreed to protect the Chinese population in 
the ceded territory, "provided that the} 7 behave in conformity with 
law and order," and not to take their land, unless " required for other 
purposes," in which case compensation was to be made. Germany 
also agreed not to sublet the leased territory to another power. A ' 
special stipulation secured for Germany the right of exchanging 
its Kiao-chau territory for other Chinese territory more to its- 
liking. 

" Should Germany at some future time express the wish to return 
Kiao-chau Bay to China before the expiration of the lease, China 
engages to refund to Germany the expenditure she has incurred at 
Kiao-chau and to cede to Germany a more suitable place." 

The text of Sections II and III of the treaty have not been officially 
published, but the substance of these sections is known from unofficial 
publications, believed to be substantially correct. By them China 
agreed to permit a German-Chinese company to build two railway 
lines in the Province of Shantung. Germans were to be permitted 
to hold and develop mining property within a distance of 30 li (10 
miles) of these railroads. China also agreed that if, for any enter- 
prise in the Province of Shantung, foreign capital or assistance was 
invited the first opportunity should be offered to German merchants 
and manufacturers. There appear to have been expressions in the 
treaty asserting that the provisions in regard to railways and mines 
were conceived only in the interests of trade and had no other design. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

For the text of the German-Chinese treaty respecting the le,ise of 
Kiao-chau, in English, see Hertslet, China Treaties (London. 1908), 
I. No. 59, pp. 350-353. So far as known the sections relating to the 



251 . 

railway and mining concessions have never been officiallv made 
known, but a precis taken from a Parliamentary Paper on China, 
No. 1 (1899), p. 152, is published in Hertslet, op. cit., p. 353. Rock- 
hill, W. W., Treaties and Conventions with or concerning China 
and Korea. 1894-1904 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 
1904), pp. 45-51, gives the text of the convention and a map. Par- 
liamentary Papers, China, No. 1 (1899), contain some important 
documents, especially Nos. 63-66, 77. An excellent account of the 
leasing of Kiao-chau may be found in Asakawa, The Russo-Japanese 
Conflict (Boston, Houghton, 1904). ch. 3. See also Cordier, Histoire 
des relations de la Chine avec les puissances occidentales, III, 349-361 
(Paris, Alcan, 1902) ; Reventlow Deutschlands auswartige Politik, 
pp. 109-114 (Berlin, Mittler, 1916) ; and B. L. Putnam-Weale, Re- 
shaping of the Far East, I, 334-346 (London, Macmillan, 1905). 

88. THE CASSINI CONVENTION, 1896. 

1. INTRODUCTORY. 

This reputed secret agreement between Russia and China is sup- 
posed to have been negotiated by Count Cassini, the Russian minister 
at Peking in 1895. Its publication in the North China Daily News 
of October 28, 1896, created a sensation in the Far East and in the 
diplomatic world. Authorities on the Far East are divided in opin- 
ion as to its authenticity. Asakawa and Putnam-Weale believe that 
such a convention was negotiated and that the published document 
corresponds closely, if not completely, to the one which was signed. 
Cordier thinks the published document a compound of two separate 
agreements. The convention, if actually negotiated, was never rati- 
fied. The significance of the reputed convention lies in the fact 
that the published document, whether fully authentic or not, re- 
vealed substantially the terms of agreements which Cassini had 
obtained or was about to obtain. Disclosure contributed to the defeat 
of parts of the Russian program, e. g., that in regard to the Kiao- 
chau, while other parts were carried out through other agreements 
concluded between Russia and China. Among the most important 
of these was an open agreement (September 8, 1896) concluded be- 
tween the Chinese Government and the Russo-Chinese Bank which 
provided for the construction of a railway through Manchuria con- 
necting the Trans-Baikal and South Ussuri lines of the Siberian 
railway system. (See article, The Russian Advance in Manchuria.) 

2. TERMS. 

• The reputed convention conceded to Russia privileges of the most 
important nature "as a response to the loyal aid given by Russia in 
the retrocession of Liao-tung and its dependencies." These provisions 



252 

included : (a) The right to extend the Siberian Railway into Chinese 
territory across northern Manchuria to Vladivostok. The control 
of all railways built by Russia in northern Manchuria was to 
be placed in the hands of Russia for 30 years, at the end of 
which time China was to be allowed to redeem them, (b) The 
Russian railways in Manchuria were under "protection" of the 
Chinese authorities, but "owing to the fact that said railways will 
pass, for the greater pari, through barren and sparsely inhabited ter- 
ritory * * * Russia will be allowed to place special battalions 
of horse and foot soldiers at the various important stations for the 
better protection of the railway property." (c) Russians as well as 
Chinese were to be permitted to open and exploit any of the mines of 
northern Manchuria, (d) Since "Russia has never possessed a sea- 
port in Asia which is free from ice and open the year round," China 
declared herself willing to leave temporarily to Russia the port of 
Kiao-chau, the period of such lease being limited to 15 years. (This 
provision was. however, never executed, for it was made contingent 
upon the need of military operations.) (e) China was to fortify the 
ports of Port Arthur and Talien-wan (Dalny), in which task Rus- 
sia was to render all necessarjr assistance. China further bound her- 
self "never to cede them to another country," and in case military 
exigencies required it. "to allow Russia temporarily to concentrate 
her land and naval forces within the said ports." 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

Putnam- Weale, B. L.. The Re-Shaping of the Far East. Vol. II. 
App. C, p. 439 (New York, Mac'millan, 1905, 2 vols.) ; I, 174, 178, 
337-345; II, 263-265, 439-444; and Cordier, Histoire des relations 
de la Chine avec les puissances occidental. III, pp. 343-348 (Paris. 
Alcan, 1902) , give the text of the reputed convention and valuable dis- 
cussion; Asakawa, The Russo-Japanese Conflict, 85-100 (Boston, 
Houghton, 1904), has also valuable discussion. 

For the text of the Russo-Chinese Bank agreement of 1906, see 
Treaties and Conventions with or concerning China and Korea, 
1894-1904. ed. by Rockhill. W. W. (Washington, Govt. Printing 
Office, 1904), pp. 212-214. 

89. LEASING OF PORT ARTHUR BY RUSSIA, 
MARCH 27, 1898. 

1. CIRCUMSTANCES. 

Within a few days after the forcible leasing of Kiao-chau by Ger- 
many (See article, The Leasing of Kiao-chau by Germany, March 6, 
1898). on March 6. 1898. Russia on March 27. 1898. acquired from 



253 

China the lease for 25 years of Port Arthur and Talien-wan (Dalny), 
together with the adjacent waters. (See Appendix I, 53.) Russia 
had long since coveted an ice-free port, and she was now able to 
gratify her desire in this matter. On December 20, 1897, several 
Kussian warships arrived at Port Arthur — a step which was officially 
explained by Count Muravieff as " entirely a question of convenience 
for the ships " and having " absolutely no connection with the occu- 
pation of the Bay of Kiao-chau by Germany." 

2. .MAIN PROA ISIONS. 

No Chinese troops of any kind whatever were to be stationed 
within the boundary of the leased territory, all movements of forces, 
whether naval or military, were to be under the control of the Russian 
authority. Port Arthur was to be made a closed port, open only to 
Russian and Chinese warships, while Talien-wan (Dalny) was to 
be a trading port open to the merchantmen of all nations. 

As a means of " restoring the balance of power in the Gulf of 
Pe-chi-li," Great Britain on April 8 of the same year (1898) obtained 
the promise of the lease of Wei-Hai-Wei. (See article, Leasing of 
Wei-Hai-Wei by Great Britain, 1898.) France also obtained a lease 
of the Kwan-chau Bay on the southeastern coast of China. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

The English text of the Russo- Chinese agreement respecting the 
lease of Port Arthur and Talien-wan may be found in Hertslet, China 
Treaties (London, 1908), No. 88, pp. 50 ff. The best documented 
story of the transaction is that given by Asakawa. The Russo- 
Japanese Conflict (Boston, Houghton, 1904), ch. 4. 

90. LEASING OF WEI-HAI-WEI BY GREAT BRITAIN, 1898. 

1. CIRCUMSTANCES. 

Soon after Port Arthur had been leased to Russia (See article, The 
Leasing of Port Arthur by Russia) on March 27, 1898, Great Britain 
obtained the promise of the lease of Wei-Hai-Wei in the same year, 
though the lease was not actually signed until July 1. (Appendix 
I, 56.) 

2. PURPOSE. 

The expressed purpose of this lease, which appears to have had the 
approval of Japan, was to restore the balance of power in the Gulf 
of Pechili, which had been materially altered by the Russian acquisi- 
tion of Port Arthur. (Salisbury to MacDonald, British minister at 
Peking, March 25, 1898. Parliamentary Papers, China, No. I (1898), 



254 

p. 54.) The initiative in the matter appears to have been taken by 
the Chinese Government (MacDonald to Salisbury. February 25, 
1898, ibid.). The cordial cooperation of England and Japan in the 
matter of this lease seems to have helped prepare the way for the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902. (See article, that subject.) 

;;. TERMS. 

"Solo jurisdiction" was secured to Great Britain over the islands 
in the bay of Wei-Hai-Wei and a belt of land 10 miles wide, along the 
entire coast of the bay. In addition Great Britain obtained the 
right to erect fortifications, station troop-, and "take any other 
measures necessary for defensive purposes" over a somewhat larger 
adjacent region, the extent of which was carefully defined. China, 
however, was permitted to maintain troops, warships, and to exer- 
cise jurisdiction in the city of Wei-Hai-Wei, " except in so far as may 
be inconsistent with naval and military requirements." Expropria- 
tion or expulsion of the Chinese inhabitants were specifically for- 
bidden. Wei-Hai-Wei was to remain in the possession of JEngland 
so long as Port Arthur, which had been leased for 25 years, remained 
in the hands of Russia. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

On the lease of Wei-Hai-Wei, see especially Asakawa, K., The 
Russo-Japanese Conflict (Boston, Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1904), 
pp. 125-129; Cordier, Histoire des relations de la Chine avec les 
puissances occidentales, III, 366-368 (Paris, Alcan, 1902). For the 
text of the lease, see Hertslet, China Treaties. (London, 1908), No. 
25, pp. 122-123. The most important documents bearing on the 
transaction are in Parliamentary Papers, China No. I (1898) and 
No. I (1899). Rockhill, Treaties and Conventions with and Con- 
cerning China and Korea. 1894—1904, p. 45. has a map. 

91. THE BOXER UPRISING— NEGOTIATIONS AND 

SETTLEMENT. 

1. EUROPEAN ENCROACHMENTS IN CHINA. 1895.-1898. 

The Chino- Japanese War of 1894-5 revealed the weakness of 
China when pitted against an enemy employing the methods of 
Western civilization. Following the war the great powers entered 
upon a rivalry in the exploitation of the commercial resources of 
China. In 1898 Germany by force acquired the lease of Kiao-chau 
(See article, that title) for a period of 99 years. Russia a little later 
obtained control of Port Arthur and Talienwan for a period of 25 
3 T ears, the former to be open only to the vessels of Russia and China, 



255 

the latter to be in part only open to other nations. Great Britain 
the same year secured the lease of Wei-Hai-Wei for a naval station 
" for so long a period as Port Arthur shall remain in the occupation 
of Russia." (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1900, p. 384. ) ( 
France had during this time secured a 99-year lease of Kwangchau 
Bay and in addition valuable railway and mining concessions in the 
Provinces of Kiang-si and Yun-nan. 

2. hay's open-door policy. 

These proceedings were followed by the agreements or treaties 
between Russia and Great Britain and between Germany and Great 
Britain, as to what are termed " spheres of influence " in China, often 
without consulting the Government of that country or taking its 
wishes or interests into account." (Foster, American Diplomacy in 
the Orient, 415, and article, Spheres of Influence in China, 1897- 
1904.) The policy of the European powers in demanding "spheres 
of influence," with exclusive railway and mining privileges led to 
the " open-door " proposal by Secretary Hay which was either 
explicitly or tacitly accepted by all the powers interested in China. 
The principles to which Secretary Hay obtained adhesion were 
these: 

(1) That there should be no interference with any treaty port or 
any vested interest within any so-called " sphere of influence " or 
leased territory which a power might have in China. 

(2) That the Chinese treaty tariff should apply equally to all 
merchandise shipped to and from ports within the ; ' sphere of influ- 
ence " unless they were free ports and that such duties should be col- 
lected by the Chinese Government. 

(3) That no higher harbor dues or railway rates should be levied 
upon the vessels or goods of another nationality than are levied upon 
the vessels or goods of the country possessing the " sphere of influ- 
ence." (56th Cong. 18th Sess. House Doc. No. 547.) Such were 
the principles of the " open-door " policy which sought to protect 
the sovereignty and integrity of China by aligning the interests of 
all the powers including China itself against the selfish exclusiveness 
of any one powder. 

3. OUTBREAK OF THE REVOLT. 

A strong reaction occurred in China in 1898-99 against the foreign 
influences which were fast undermining the political, social, and reli- 
gious tenets of the country. This opposition made itself felt against 
all foreigners and in particular against the missionaries. It became 
an organized movement in connection with the Society of the Box- 
ers, which arose first in the Province of Shantung and rapidly 



2d6 

spread to the other provinces. Its avowed purpose was to drive out 
the foreigners and exterminate the Christians. The movement at- 
tained dangerous proportions in the fall of 1S90 and the American 
Minister Mr. Conger reported the condition to the American Gov- 
ernment. The American minister urged the Tsungli-Yamen to issue 
orders for the protection of American interests and native Chris 
tians. The Chinese authorities in the northern provinces were either 
unable or unwilling to maintain order. The revolt continued to gain 
headway and soon the legations in Peking were in danger. The 
American minister cabled home asking that instructions be given the 
American naval officers in Chinese waters to be ready to act in pro- 
tection of American lives and property. Conger received instruc- 
tions to cooperate with the representatives of the other powers in 
carrying out such measures n s might be necessary and proper for 
the protection of the legations and of American interests, but he wis 
authorized to "act independently in protection of American inter- 
ests when practicable, and concurrently with representatives of the 
other powers, if necessity arise." (Hay to Conger, June 8, L900, 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1900. p. 143.) 

While the powers were arranging to send larger forces to Peking 
to strengthen the legation guards an engagement took place between 
the foreign ships, all except the American, and the Chinese 'forts, at 
Taku. The forts were captured and marines landed who proceeded 
to the relief of the legations. Meantime the United States hurried a 
detachment from the American Army in the Philippines and the 
other powers detached forces from their nearest posts. 

4. THE AMERICAN POSITION AS TO INTERVENTION. 

In order to set forth clearly the position of the United States in its 
joint action in China. Secretary Hay addressed a circular note to 
the cooperating powers. In tliis note he stated as the purpose of 
the United States ''to act concurrently with the other powers, first, 
in opening up communication with Peking and rescuing the Ameri- 
can officials, missionaries and other Americans who are in danger; 
secondly, in affording all possible protection everywhere in China to 
American life and property; thirdly, in guarding and protecting all 
legitimate American interests: and fourthly, in aiding to prevent a 
spread of disorder to other provinces of the Empire and a recurrence 
of such disasters." (Circular note of July 3, 1900. to powers co- 
operating in China. Appendix. Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 1901, Affairs in China, p. 12.) Mr. Hay made the further 
statement of policy, viz : 

The policy of the Government of the United States is to seek a solu- 
tion which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve 
Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to 



257 

friendly powers i>y treaty and International Law, and safeguard for the world 
the principle of equal and Impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire. 
(Ibid.) 

This policy was hold steadily in view by the American Govern- 
ment throughout the negotiations and in general received the concur- 
rence of the other powers. 

.->. CHINA'S APPEAL FOR AMERICAN ASSISTANCE. 

The allied forces which finally marched to Peking, numbering 
about 20.000, succeeded in relieving the besieged legations August 14. 
Before this event the Chinese minister at Washington (July 20) had 
transmitted to the President a message from the Emperor of China 
requesting the friendly assistance of the United States in China's 
troubles. President McKinley replied, July 28, that the "friendly 
good offices" of the American Government would, with the assent of 
the other powers, be placed at the disposal of the Chinese Govern- 
ment upon the following conditions (Ibid., pp. 13-14) : 

(1) That assurance be given as to whether the foreign ministers 
were alive. 

(2) That if alive the diplomatic representatives be placed in 
communication with their Governments and that all danger to their 
lives be removed. 

(3) That the Chinese authorities cooperate with the relief ex- 
pedition. 

G. BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATIONS. 

Four days earlier, the President had appointed W. W. Rockhill as 
special commissioner to examine and report upon the situation in 
China. Rockhill reached Shanghai August 29, and later proceeded 
to Peking to act as advisor to Conger. Later when Conger was given 
leave of absence and returned to the United States, Rockhill con- 
ducted the negotiations with the powers. Rockhill was directed to 
be guided by the policy set forth in Hay's instructions of July 3, and 
as supplementary thereto Hay's note to the Chinese minister in Wash- 
ington and the President's letter to the Emperor of China, July 23. 
On the 8th of August by imperial edict Li Hung Chang was ap- 
pointed envoy plenipotentiary with instructions to propose imme- 
diate cessation of hostilities pending negotiations. The United States 
offered to enter upon negotiations provided a portion of the relief 
expedition should be allowed to enter Peking and to escort the for- 
eign ministers to Tientsin. Although this was not granted and the 
powers were obliged to use force to rescue the members of the lega- 
tions, the United States was still willing to entertain " any overtures 
for a truce, and invite the other powers to join when security is es- 
tablished in the Chinese capital and the Chinese Government shows 
5370G— 18 17 



258 

its ability and willingness to make on its part an effective suspen- 
sion of hostilities there and elsewhere in China." (Adee to Minister 
Wu, Aug. 22, 1900, Foreign Relations of the United Slates, 1900, 
p. 290.) 

An imperial edict of August 27 announced that Prince Ching had 
been invested with full discretionary power to act with Li Hung 
Chang in the negotiations. The Government of the United States 
accepted the authority of the Chinese plenipotentiaries and stated 
that it would authorize the American minister in Peking " to enter 
into relations with Earl Li and Prince Ching" as the immediate rep- 
resentatives of the Chinese Emperor. 

7. GERMAN AND AMERICAN PROPOSALS. 

The German Government proposed that as a preliminary condition 
to diplomatic negotiations the Chinese Government should be re- 
quired to deliver over the real responsible authors of the crimes 
committed in Peking against international law. (Foreign Re- 
lations of the United States, 1901. Appendix. Affairs u\ China. 
pp. 23-24.) The United States took the position that while 
the perpetrators of the crimes should be held to the utmost 
accountability, and that while punishment was necessary to 
" any effective settlement which shall prevent a recurrence of such 
outrages and bring about permanent safety and peace in China,'' no 
punitive measures could be so effective as to have the punishment 
carried out by the Government of China itself. This it was held 
was only just to China in order that she should be afforded an oppor- 
tunity to do this and thus rehabilitate herself before the world. The 
United States was not " disposed as a preliminary condition to en- 
tering into diplomatic negotiations with the Chinese Government to 
join in a demand that said Government surrender to the powers such 
persons as according to the determination of the powers themselves 
may be held to be the first and real perpetrators of those wrongs." 
(Foreign Relations of the United States. 1900, pp. 203, 341.) The 
view presented by Germany was accepted by Austria-Hungary. 
(Foreign Relations of the United States, 1900, pp. 306-7.) The 
position of the United States was sustained by Russia. (Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1900, pp. 375-6.) 

8. HOW COOPERATION AMONG THE POWERS WAS SECURED. 

Foster points out that "four important declarations had been made 
which had done much to bring the powers into cordial relations, re- 
moving suspicion and anxiety as to the possible action of any one 
power." (Foster, American Diplomacy in the Orient, p. 425.) These 
declarations were, first, the one made by Secretary Hay in his circular 



259 

note of July 3; the next was the statement by Russia of August 28 
that it had "no designs of territorial acquisitions in China;'' the 
third was the proposal on the part of Germany. September 18, that 
China should give over the leaders of the antiforeign movement to 
the allies for punishment and the answer of the United States; and 
the last of the four important declarations was the announcement of 
the agreement between Great Britain and Germany October 16 to 
uphold the " open-door " policy. 

9. THE FRENCH PROPOSALS. 

Before the formal negotiations were opened the French Govern- 
ment, October 4, proposed as a means to secure " appropriate repara- 
tion for the past and substantial guarantees for the future " the fol- 
lowing demands (Moore, International Law Digest, Vol. V, p. 499) : 

(1) Punishment of the principal guilty parties, to be designated bv 
the representatives of the powers at Peking. 

(2) Interdiction of importation of arms. 

(3) Indemnities for losses to Governments and individuals. 

(4) Permanent guard for the legations. 

(5) The forts at Taku to be dismantled. 

(6) Occupation of two or three military posts on the road between 
Tientsin and Peking. 

10. DEMANDS UPON CHINA BY THE POWERS. 

The French demands were agreed to in general by the other 
powers. The question arose as to the form in which the demands 
should be submitted to the Chinese plenipotentiaries, whether in 
separate notes or in a joint note signed by all the representatives. 
The American minister advocated a joint note on the ground that 
the question was w T orldrwide, that the demands would be strength- 
ened by unanimity, and that it would hasten a final settlement by 
being more effective than identic notes. (Foster, American Diplo- 
macy in the Orient, p. 427.) The American method was pursued and 
the note was signed and delivered to the Chinese representatives 
December 24. The note as finally drawn up contained 12 demands 
(Moore, International Law Digest, Vol. V, pp. 515-16) : 

(1) Mission to be sent to Berlin expressing regret for the murder 
of the German minister and erection of monument on spot of the 
murder. 

(2) Condign punishment to be inflicted, upon the guilty and 
suspension of official examinations for five years in towns where 
foreigners had been ill treated. 

(3) Reparation to Japan for the murder of the chancellor of the 
Japanese legation. 



260 

(4) Expiatory monument to be erected by the Chinese Govern- 
ment in each of the foreign cemeteries desecrated. 

(5) Interdiction of importation of arms. 

(6) Indemnities for losses to public and private organizations 
and individuals. 

(7) Permanent guard for each legation. 

(8) The Taku and other ports between Peking and the sea to be 
dismantled. 

(9) Military occupation of certain points to be agreed upon for 
keeping open communication between the capital and the sea. 

(10) Perpetual prohibition of membership in antiforeign societies. 

(11) Chinese commercial treaties to be amended. 

(12) Reform of office of foreign affairs and modification of court 
ceremonials. 

On January 16 the Chinese plenipotentiaries gave notice of their 
acceptance of the 12 demands. 

11. PUNISHMENTS AND INDEMNITY. 

Two important points remained as subjects of negotiations — the 
question of punishments and the question of amount and manner of 
payment of indemnities. The foreign representatives prepared a list 
of a number of officials whose execution was demanded. The Rus- 
sian and American ministers objected to the list. Through their in- 
fluence and that of the Japanese minister the death penalty was con- 
fined to four, apart from those already punished by China, and lesser 
punishments were inflicted upon about 50 others. (Foster, American 
Diplomacy in the Orient, p. 429.) In regard to indemnity the 
United States favored a lump sum, instead of itemized individual and 
governmental claims. This point was finally gained. The amount of 
the lump sum was then debated. Sir Robert Hart, advisor of China 
and the allies, showed that China could not pay more than $250,- 
000,000 to $300,000,000. Rockhill, the American representative, pro- 
posed that the lump sum should not exceed China's ability to pay 
and that the claims should be scaled down to that amount and that 
this amount should be divided equitably among the powers, the ap- 
portionment question if necessary to be submitted to The Hague 
Court (Ibid., p. 427). The American propositions were opposed, 
Russia and Japan alone agreeing to the reference to The Hague and 
Japan alone supporting the scaling down of the claims. The posi- 
tion of Germany on the question of indemnity was the most uncom- 
promising of any of the powers. She insisted on being paid to the 
last cent. (Rockhill to Hay. May 25, 1901. Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1901, Appendix. Affairs in China, p. 175.) The 
amount of indemnities was finally fixed at 450.000,000 taels (about 
$333,000,000), payable in gold at the rate of exchange fixed in the 



261 

protocol, with interest at 4 per cent, to be paid in 39 years in semi- 
annual payments (Ibid., p. 176-182). 

The peace agreement was not signed until September 7, 1901. 
The other important provisions have been stated in general in con- 
nection with the enumeration of the 12 demands; additional stipula- 
tions were: River navigation to Tientsin and Shanghai to be im- 
proved; the Tsungli-Yamen to be abolished and succeeded by ;i 
new hoard, the Wai-Wu-Pu, which should take precedence over 
other ministers. 

12. INFLUENCE 0E THE UNITED STATES IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. 

The influence of the United States was strong in the negotiations 
for moderating extreme measures in punishment and modifying in- 
demnity claims. It supported measures needful to punish the guilty 
parties and to guarantee the protection of American citizens and in- 
terests for the future. It also strove to further "the interests of 
the whole world in the cause of equal and impartial trade with all 
parts of the Chinese Empire." (Rockhill to Hay. November 30, 
1901. Moore, International Law Digest, Vol. V, p. 529.) The 
United States was desirous that China should not be impaired in 
territorial integrity, nor be weakened in its ability to maintain a 
stable government. For this reason it was necessary to act with the 
other powers in order to modify their action. (Foster, American 
Diplomacy in the Orient. 432.) 

13. PAYMENT OF THE INDEMNITY. 

In 1902 the first installment of the indemnities was paid by China. 
The depreciation of silver, the monetary standard of China, subse- 
quent to the signing of the protocol made the payment in gold very 
burdensome to China. She accordingly asked to be allowed to pay 
the installment at the rate of exchange when the agreement was 
made. The United States alone signified its willingness to grant the 
i' [uest. In 1907 the United States further manifested its generosi 
in the treatment of China by remitting a large part of the inde 
nity due the United States from China.. The amount originally 
fixed was $24,440,778.81. All above $11,655,492.69 was remitted. 
(Foreign Relations of the United States. L907, Part I, p. 174.) 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

DO' 

Foreign Relations of the United States. 1898, i 32 244. 
Foreign Relations of the United States. 1900, China, pp. 77-:;'."). 
Communications regarding the Chinese uprisings; American in- 
structions, joint diplomatic negotiations and final settlement. 



262 

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1901, Appendix, Affairs 
in China, pp. 1 382. Report of W. W. Rockhill, commissioner to 
China, with documents covering the negotiations o( the powers with 

China. 

House Document No. M7. 56th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 1-17. Open- 
door policy in China, containing report of the Secretary of State. 
March 26, 1900, with copies of correspondence with the various Gov- 
ernments concerning American commercial rights in China and the 
maintenance of the integrity of China. 

Foreign Relations of the United States. 1904, 177 184. Payment 
of claims and indemnities against China. 

Parliamentary Papers. 1910, China. Nos, 3, 4, and 5. 

Secretary of War Annual Reports, 1900, I, pt. 1. 

Staatsarchiv, vol. 64, pp. 266-298, contains the reports of the Ger- 
man embassy at Peking. Vol. 65, pp. 166 280, reprints the British 
Blue Book. 

ONDAKY. 

Moore, J. B. Digest of International Law, sees. 808-810. Judicial 
and well documented account. 

Foster. J. W. American Diplomacy in the Orient (Boston, 
Houghton, 1903.) Pp. 407-435. Interesting brief account. 

Latane, J. H. America as a World Power. (New Fork, Harper, 
1007.) Pp. 100 11.°.. Account based upon the most important docu- 
ment--. <_roi>d interpretation. 

Smith. A. H. China in Convulsion. (New York. Revell, 1901.) 
Chaps. X-XTIT. 

Martin, W. A. P. The Siege in Peking. (New York. Revell, 
1900.) Chap. IV. 

Thomson. II. China and the Powers. (London. Longmans, 1902.) 
Chaps. I and XIII. 

Clements. P. II. The Boxer Rebellion. Columbia Studies in His- 
tory, etc. Vol. 66. (New York, 1915.) 

Cordier, II. Histoire des relations de la Chine avec les puissances 
occidentals, 1860-1902, vol. 8. eh. -J 1. (Paris. Alcan, 1902.) 

92. THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE, 1902. 

1. INTRODUCTION. 

At the close of the Chino-Japanese War of 1894 95, Russia, 
France, and Germany, acting in concert, deprived Japan of most of 
the fruits of victory. (See article. The Treaty of Shimonoseki.) 
There followed a general scramble for Chinese territory ami "spheres 
of influence." Germany, for example, seized Kiao-chau and asserted 
her claim over much of the Shantung Province (See article. Leasing 









263 

of Kiao-Chau by Germany, March 6, L898), while Russia adopted an 
aggressive policy in Manchuria and virtually annexed the Liao- 
Tung Peninsula, including much coveted Porl Arthur. (See article, 
Leasing of Port Arthur by Russia, March 27. 1898.) Japan and 
Great Britain did not stand entirely aloof from the scramble, but, 
in general with the United States, they endeavored to preserve the 
territorial integrity of China and maintain the '•open door." On 
January -'50. 1902, at a time when Russia was pressing China for 
concessions in Manchuria, Great Britain and Japan concluded a 
treaty of alliance. (See Appendix I. 64.) It was made public 
February LI, L902. 

2. NEGOTIATIONS. 

The treaty was negotiated at London by Lord Lansdowne and 
Baron Hayashi. According to the account left by the latter in his 
Secret Memoir- the first suggestion for the treaty came through Baron 
Eckardstein, of the Gorman Lmbassy. who in March or April, L901, 
expressed to Hayashi the opinion that a triple alliance between 
Germany, England, and Japan would be the most effective means for 
the maintenance of peace in the Far East (pp. 110-120). On April 
17. 1901. Hayashi firs! broached the matter to Lord Lansdowne 
(p. 121). Tn the negotiations which proceeded from lime to time 
iluring the next nine months Hayashi was much embarrassed by the 
de-ire of some Japanese statesmen to carry on at the same time 
negotiations for a Russo-Japanese convention (pp. 204-205). Mar- 
quis Ito visited St. Petersburg, where he had some conversation 
with officials of the Russian Government on the subject. Whether 
the negotiations with Russia was for the purpose of putting pressure 
on England or whether Japanese statesmen wen- divided in opinion 
is uncertain. 

The idea of including Germany in the proposed alliance seems to 
have been dropped temporarily soon after negotiations began be- 
tween England and Japan. Toward the close of the negotiation- 
the question of including Germany was discussed (pp. L89-191). 
Both Governments agreed that Ocrmany, if informed of the nego- 
tiation-, would be likely to use the knowledge to obtain some special 
advantage for herself. It was. therefore, decided that the whole 
matter should be kept secret until after arrangements for the treaty 
had been concluded. Shortly before the signing of the treaty the 
Japanese Government brought up the question again (pp. 191- 
192). Prince von Bulow had just made a speech in the Reichstag 
attacking Joseph Chamberlain and using derogatory language in 
regard to the British Army. Public opinion in England at the 
moment was much irritated at the comments of the German press 
upon the Boer War (pp. 192-193). The time did not seem auspicious 



264 

for approaching Germany. In view of the charge that the British 
and Japanese Governments "of malice prepense excluded German) 
from participation" (p. 206), it should be noted that Hayashi 
asserts (p. 206) " that if Germany had wanted to go join the alliance 
she would have been admitted. From the outset, however, nothing 
was proposed by Germany nor was any wish to join expressed 
by her." It seems probable that Germany never seriously desired 
to be included in the alliance, but was at the time seeking closer 
relations with Kussia. Hayashi sums up the question of the pro- 
posal to include Germany in the treaty as follows (p. 195) : "On 
account of the strained relations between Great Britain and Germany 
we certainly took no special steps to induce her to join the alliance, 
but on the other hand, if Germany had been really sincere in her 
earlier overtures and had proposed to come into the alliance, a triple 
alliance might easily have been concluded. It is not reasonable to 
suppose that Germany was purposely excluded by Great Britain and 
Japan." 

3. TERMS. 4 

The contracting powers declared themselves to be "actuated solely 
by a desire to maintain the status quo and general peace in the ex- 
treme East, being moreover specially interested in maintaining the 
independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of Korea, and 
in securing equal opportunities in these countries for the commerce 
and industry of all nations." They disavowed aggressive tendencies 
in China and Korea, but recognized the right of either ally to take 
such measures as might be indispensable to safeguard its existing 
interests. In case either, in defense of such interests, should become 
involved in war with a third power, the other contracting parfrj 
was to maintain strict neutrality and endeavor to. prevent other pow- 
ers from joining in hostilities against its ally. In case any power or 
powers should attack the ally engaged in the war, the other ally 
must them come to its assistance. The treaty was to go into effect 
immediately after the date of signing and was to remain in force 
for at least five years. 

4. CONCLUSION. 

The treaty was publicly announced on February 12, and a month 
later (March 17) Kussia and France issued a joint statement pro- 
fessing to find in the treaty the fundamental principles that formed 
the basis of their policy. (Revue generate de droit international 
public, vol. 9, d. 11.) The alliance did not suffice to prevent the 
Russo-Japanese War, but it probably helped to localize the conflict. 



265 



BIBLIOGRAPHY. 



Hayashi, T. Secret Memoirs. (New York, Putnam, 1915.) 

Hershey, A. S. The International Law and Diplomacy of the 
Russo-Japanese War. (New York, Macmillan, 1906.) 

Bushby, H. N. G. The Agreement between Great Britain and 
Japan. In the Nineteenth Century and After (March, 1902), vol. 
51, pp. 369-382. 

Dolliver, A. P. Significance of the Anglo- Japanese Alliance. In 
the North American Review (May, 1902), vol. 174. pp. 594-605. 

Low, A. Maurice. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance. In The Forum 
(April, 1902), vol. 33, pp. 196-206. 

Stead, A. The Anglo-Japanese agreement from the Japanese point 
of view. In the Contemporary Review (March, 1902), vol. 81. pp. 
437-445. 

Weale, B. L. P. The Truce in the East and its Aftermath. (New 
York and London, Macmillan, 1907.) 

The text of the treaty is given in British Parliamentary Papers, 
Treaty Series, No. 3, 1902; in Hershey's The International Law 
and Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War. pp. 26-27. 

93. RUSSO-JAPANESE RIVALRY IN KOREA, 1895-1904. 

1. THE MURDER OF THE KOREAN QUEEN, 1895. 

In Korea, immediately after the close of the Chino-Japanese War 
of 1894-1895, Russian and Japanese influences entered into sharp 
competition for ascendancy in the country. In October, 1895, the 
Korean Queen and her advisers, who were hostile to Japanese in- 
fluence, planned a coup d' etat for the purpose of disbanding the 
soldiers who had been trained by Japanese officers and of replacing 
the pro- Japanese members of the cabinet by her " exclusionist " 
friends. The result was a counter pro-Japanese movement to obtain 
complete control of the Korean Government through the seizure of 
the King and Queen. In the course of the execution of this design 
the Queen was murdered by Japanese and Korean ruffians. 

2. THE RUSSIAN COUP d'eTAT, 1897. 

This revolting crime reacted upon its perpetrators and was speedily 
followed by another equally discreditable, by means of which 
Russia obtained control of the Government of Korea for a time. On 
February 10, 1896. 127 Russian marines landed at Chemulpo and 
immediately entered Seoul, the Korean capital. The day following 
the King and his entourage fled in disguise to the Russian legation, 
where he remained until February 20, 1897. As a result of a royal 



266 

edict there issued, the Korean prime minister and two other cabinet 
ministers were murdered, while others tied to Japan. 

.'.. PERIOD OF RUSSIAN ASCENDENCY, 1896-1897. 

A brief period of Russian ascendency over Korea now followed. 
Among other special privileges, the Russians obtained a valuable tim- 
ber concession in the Yaln Valley ami a mining concession along the 
Tninen River. 

4. THE YAMAGATA-LOBANOFF PROTOCOL, 1896. 

In the summer of 180(> Japan changed her policy toward Korea 
and decided to seek- the cooperation of Russia. On June 1(> of this 
year there was concluded at St. Petersburg what is known as the 
Yamagata-Lobanoff protocol (Asakawa, 264). The two powers 
agreed to cooperate along various lines in Korea, and particularly 
engaged to try to abandon to Korea herself the maintenance o( armed 
forces and native police. 

But the protocol of June. 1896, was no sooner signed tlutn it was 
violated by Russia. During the same month in which it was signed, 
Russia tried to gain control of the Korean Army. During the fol- 
lowing year she tried to secure control of Korean finances. 

5. THE NISHI-ROSEN PROTOCOL, 1898. 

The suspicions and opposition of the Koreans as well as the Jap- 
anese having been aroused by these measures. Russia deemed it ad- 
visable to try to conciliate Japan. Accordingly, there was con- 
eluded on April -J."). L898, what is known as the Xishi-Rosen protocol 
( Asakawa. 271). Both powers definitely recognized the " sovereignty 
and entire independence o( Korea." and mutually agreed to "abstain 
from all direct interference in the internal affairs of that country." 
They also engaged, " in case Korea should have recourse to the counsel 
and assistance of either Japan or Russia, not to take any measure 
regarding the nomination of military instructors and financial ad- 
visers, without having previously arrived at a mutual accord on the 
subject." Russia also declared that she would not " obstruct the 
development of the commercial and industrial relations between 
Japan and Korea." 

6. RUSSO-JAPANESE RIVALRY, 1899-1904. 

But in spite of the above agreement the rivalry between Japan and 
Russia in Korea continued during the next five years (1800-1004). 
In most cases Russia appears as the aggressor, having repeatedly 
violated the protocols of 180C> and 1808. Japan seems to have con- 
fined herself mainly to commercial and industrial development. 



267 

7. THE ATTEMPTED LEASE OF MASAMI'O BY RUSSIA, 1899-1001. 

During 1899-1901, for example, the main efforts of Russia were 

lirected toward the acquiring of certain leases at Masampo on the 

southern coast of Korea with a view of transforming this valuable 

harbor into a naval base. But Japan succeeded in checkmating this 

design of Russia. 

8. THE SEOUL-WIJU RAILWAY, 1894-1903. 

Another bone of contention between Japan, on the one side, and 
Russia and France on the other was the question of the construe) ion 
of the Seoul-Wiju Railway. In 1894 Korea had granted to Japan 
priority of rights in the construction of railways between Fusan and 
Seoul. In 1898 Japan had obtained control of the short railway 
line between Seoul and Chemulpo, an American concession, and in 
the same year Japan had obtained a definite concession from the 
Korean Government for the construction of the Fusan-Seoul line. 
Russia seems to have failed in her attempts to secure railway con- 
cessions. 

9. RUSSIAN ENCROACHMENTS IN NORTHERN KOREA, 1903. 

But it was the threatened Russian encroachments in northern 
Korea that caused the greatest anxiety to Japan. In 1896 Russia 
obtained valuable mining concessions in two districts at the mouth 
of the Tuinen River, and later sought to extend her influence in that 
region. 

Still more menacing, however, to the interests of Japan were the 
attempts of Russia to obtain an actual foothold on Korean territory 
at Yong-am-po, on the Korean side of the Yalu River. On April 13, 
1903, the Korean Government was suddenly notified that the Russian 
timber syndicate (in which Russian grand dukes and leading mem- 
bers of the Romanoff family are said to have been directly inter- 
ested ) would at once begin the cutting of timber on the Yalu. Early 
in May. Russian soldiers in civilian garb were reputed to have 
occupied Yong-am-po. At the same time Russian troops seemed to 
be mobilizing on the northern side of the Yalu. In view of the events 
which had been transpiring in Manchuria, as well as Korea. Japan 
decided to attempt direct negotiations with the Russian Government 
at St. Petersburg. (See article. The Negotiations preceding the 
Russo-Japanese War.) 

BIBLIOGRAPIIV. 

The best documented account of these diplomatic events is that 
given by Rey, F., Chronkjue. in Revue Generale de droit international 
public (Paris. 1905), T. XII, pp. 306 ff. A briefer account, also 



268 

based on the documents, may be found in Hershey, A. S., Interna- 
tional Law and Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War (New York, 
Macmillan, 190(5), pp. 43-52. 

See also Asakawa, K., The Russo-Japanese Conflict (Boston. 
Houghton, 1904), eh. 17; Longford, The Story of Korea (New York, 
Scribner, 1911), ch. 15; and Hornbeck, S. K., Contemporary Politics 
in the Far East (New York, Appleton, 1916) , ch. 11. 

The texts of the various Russo-Japanese protocols are contained in 
Asakawa, op. cit. 

94. THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE INTO MANCHURIA, 

1895-1903. 

1. INTRODUCTION". 

The Russian advance into Manchuria may be said to have begun 
with the construction of the great Trans-Siberian Railroad of which 
the Czarevitch cut the first sod near Vladivostok in 1891. The route 
from Lake Baikal through the Amur Province north of the Amur 
River proving almost impossible, a more direct and practicable route 
through Manchuria was determined upon. 

By her successful intervention at the close of the Chino-Japanese 
War (See article, The Treaty of Shimonoseki) Russia had placed 
China under a debt of fear and gratitude — a debt which was further 
increase* 1 by the guarantee of a Russian loan to China on very liberal 
terms. Ostensibly to facilitate the execution of this loan, but really 
to promote Russian political as well as commercial designs in Eastern 
Asia, there was organized, in 1895, the Russo-Chinese Bank which 
soon obtained from China valuable railway concessions and other 
privileges. (See article. The Cassini Convention.) 

2. THE BUILDING OF THE MANCHURIAN RAILWAY, 1S9 7-190 2. 

The necessary concessions having thus been obtained, the Chinese- 
Eastern or Manchurian Railway was begun in 1897. But Russia 
longed for a port which is ice free the entire year. This was not 
the case with Vladivostok. An opportunity for securing such a 
port and at the same time strengthening Russia's strategic position 
on the Pacific soon presented itself. 

3. THE LEASING OF PORT ARTHUR BY RUSSIA, 1898. 

The German seizure of Tsing-tao in November, 1897, and the 
subsequent leasing of Kiao-chau (See article, The Leasing of Kiao- 
chau by Germany) in March, 1898, furnished a precedent or pretext 
that tended to palliate, though hardly to justify, a similar act on 






269 

the part of Russia, which demanded and obtained a lease of Port 
Arthur and Dalny on March 27, 1898. (See article, The Leasing of 
Port Arthur by Russia.) Great Britain followed by securing the 
lease of Wei-Hai-Wei on July 1, 1898 (See article, The Leasing of 
Wei-Hai-Wei by Great Britain), as a means of restoring the balance 
of power in the Gulf of Pe-chi-li. 

4. THE SOUTH MANCHURIAN RAILWAY, 1S9S-1902. 

The southern branch of the Chinese-Eastern or Trans-Manchurian 
Railway connecting Port Arthur with the main line at Harbin was 
now begun, but the work was interrupted by the Boxer Rebellion. 
(See article, The Boxer Uprising of 1900.) 

5., OCCUPATION OF MANCHURIA, 1900-1904. 

One of the results of this momentous rebellion was the Russian 
occupation of Manchuria, which contributed so much toward the 
outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War (See article, Negotiations pre- 
ceding the Russo-Japanese War) in 1904. In order to allay the 
apprehensions of the powers, the Russian Government issued a 
circular note on August 28, 1900 (Parliamentary Papers, China, No. 
I (1901). p. 113), in which it was explained that the occupation of 
Manchuria was only "temporary" and "had been dictated solely by 
the absolute necessity of repelling the aggressions of the Chinese 
rebels, and not with interested motives, which are absolutely foreign 
to the policy of the Imperial Government." Russia furthermore 
promised that she would not fail to withdraw her troops from 
Chinese territory, "provided that the action of the other powers 
does not place any obstacle in the way of such a measure." 

In spite of these assurances Russia remained in military occupa- 
tion of Manchuria, and a strong military force of railway guards 
was stationed there for the protection of the Manchurian railways. 
February 6, 1901, Count Lamsdorff, the Russian minister of foreign 
affairs, denied that Russia had concluded, or was engaged in conclud- 
ing, with China a convention or permanent arrangement which would 
give Russia new rights and a virtual protectorate in Southern Man- 
churia, though he admitted that the Russian military authorities 
had been engaged in the temporary occupation and pacification of 
that province. (Staatsarchiv, vol. 66. pp. 142-143.) 

Within a few weeks, however, after these official assurances it was 
learned that the Russian Government was pressing China hard to 
agree to the so-called Lamsdorff- Yang-yu convention. According to 
the sup] >osed terms of this agreement, Russia was willing to " restore " 
to China the whole of Manchuria, but upon such conditions as would 
hare rendered the so-called "restoration" wholly illusory. (No 



270 

authentic text of this convention has been made public. The sub- 
stance of it was published in The Times (London), February 28, 
1901.) Supported by the protests of Great Britain and Japan. 
China refused to ratify this convention. 

It was not long, however, before Russia was found to be making 
fresh demands upon China as conditions for evacuation. Finally, 
as a result of the publication of the terms of the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance of 1902 (See article, The Formation of the Anglo- Japanese 
Alliance), Russia agreed to sign the convention of evacuation of the 
same year. (See article, The Russo-Chinese Convention for the 
Evacuation of Manchuria, April 8, 1902, and Appendix I, 65.) 

6. THE "EVACUATION" OF MANCHURIA BY RUSSIA, 1902. 

The so-called evacuation of Manchuria by Russia was actually 
begun. By October 18, 1902, six months after the conclusion of 
the convention of evacuation, Russia had actually handed over 
the Chinese-Eastern Railway to the Chinese Government and with- 
drawn her troops from the southwestern portion of the ^>heng- 
King or Mukden Province as far as the Liao River. But a consider- 
able number of these troops appear merely to have been transferred 
to other parts of Manchuria, where they were transformed into rail- 
way guards. 

By April 8, 1903, the date set for the evacuation of the Provinces 
of Mukden and Kiriu, it was evident from the disposition of Russian 
forces in Manchuria that not even a nominal withdrawal from the 
Provinces was intended. Early in April, 1903, seven new Russian 
demands were made upon China. (Staatsarchiv. vol. 69, No. 13,079.) 
These demands, which were rejected, included stringent measures 
for closing Manchuria against economic enterprises undertaken by 
all foreigners who were not Russian, and they practically forbade 
the opening of new treaty ports in Manchuria without the consent 
of Russia. It is not surprising that Japan, Great Britain, and the 
United States made strong protests. 

By October 8, 1903, the date set in the Russo-Chinese convention 
for the final evacuation of the Province of Heilung-chang, Russia was 
still in possession of nearly the whole of Manchuria. She still re- 
tained control of Xiuchwang, and had even " reoccupied " Mukden, 
of which there appears to have been a sham evacuation. It had, 
indeed, become increasingly and conclusively evident that Russia in- 
tended to remain in permanent occupation of Manchuria. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

The most valuable and detailed documented accounts of the Rus- 
sian advance into Manchuria are probably those given by Asakawa, 



271 

K., The Russo-Japanese Conflict (Boston, Houghton, 1904), and 
Rey, F., Chronique, in Revue de droit international public for 1905, 
vol. 12, pp. 218 ff. 

For a brief account, based also on documentary sources, see Her- 
shey, A. S., International Law and Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese 
War (New York, Macmillan Co., 1906). 

For the main documents see Parliamentary Papers on China, 
British and Foreign State Papers, and the various volumes dealing 
with the foreign relations of the United States published as House 
Documents. Staatsarchiv, vol. 66, pp. 129-182, and vol. 69, pp. 37- 
112, reprint the British Blue Books, China, Nos. 1 and 5 (1901), and 
No. 2 (1901), containing many of the most important documents. 

95. THE RUSSO-CHINESE CONVENTION FOR THE EVACUA- 
TION OF MANCHURIA, APRIL 8, 1902. 

MAIN PROVISIONS. 

This famous convention (See Appendix I, 65), providing for the 
gradual evacuation of the whole of Manchuria within 18 months 
from the date of signature, was concluded on April 8, 1902. By its 
terms Russia agreed to the " reestablishment of the authority of the 
Chinese Government in that region" (Manchuria) on the following 
conditions: (a) That China "observe strictly the stipulations of the 
contract concluded- with the Chinese Bank on the 27th of August, 
1896"; (5) "assumes the obligation to use all means to protect the 
railway and the persons in its employ, and binds itself also to secure 
within the boundaries of Manchuria the safety of all Russian sub- 
jects in general and the undertakings established by them." 

On these conditions and " provided that no disturbances arise 
and that the action of other powers should not prevent it," the Rus- 
sian Government agreed to evacuate Manchuria within 18 months in 
three successive withdrawals, separated by intervals of six months 
each. 

Though actually begun, the Russian evacuation even of Sheng- 
King, or the Southern Manchurian Province, was never carried out 
and the convention was never executed. (See article, The Russian 
Advance into Manchuria.) 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

For the text of this treaty (in English) see Hertslet, China 
Treaties (London, 1908), II, No. 90, pp. 509-512. For the French 
text see Parliamentary Papers, China, No. 2 (1901), No. 51. Both 
the French and English texts are reprinted in Asakawa, The Russo- 
Japanese Conflict (Boston, Houghton, 1901), ch. 13. 



272 

96. NEGOTIATIONS PRECEDING THE RUSSO-JAPANESE 

WAR, 1903-1904. 

1. INTRODUCTION. 

In view of the overwhelming evidence of aggressive Russian de- 
signs afforded bv the Russian advance in Manchuria and Russian 
encroachments in Korea (See articles, The Russian Advance in Man- 
churia, 1895-1903, and Russo-Japanese rivalry in Korea, 1895-1904), 
Japan decided to institute direct negotiations at St. Petersburg with 
a view of arriving, if possible, at a definite understanding or solution 
of the Korean and Manchurian questions. 

2. THE FIRST JAPANESE PROPOSALS, 1903. 

On August 3. 1903. the Japanese Government proposed as a basis 
for any understanding between Japan and Russia (Staatsarchiv, 
vol. 69, pp. 212-214) : (a) A mutual engagement to respect the inde- 
pendence and territorial integrity of the Chinese and Korean Em- 
pire^ and to maintain the "open door" in these countries; (b) a 
reciprocal recognition of Japan's preponderating interests in Korea 
and of Russia's special interests in railway enterprises in Man- 
churia. These demands were never materially altered by Japan 
during the negotiations, and their persistent rejection by Russia, to- 
gether with the latter's delay in replying and her continued prepara- 
tions for war, may be said to have finally precipitated the struggle. 

3. THE FIRST RUSSIAN COUNTERPROPOSALS. 

After a delay of nearly eight weeks, Russia presented her first 
counterproposals to the Japanese Government, on October 5, 1903 
(Ibid, p. 221). Russia not only offered less than Japan demanded 
respecting Korea, but imposed new conditions upon Japan in that 
country. Most significant of all, Russia ignored the Japanese pro- 
posal for a mutual agreement to respect the independence and terri- 
torial integrity of the Chinese Empire and to maintain the " open 
door" in China and Korea. Russia not only refused to make any 
declarations regarding her future policy in China or Manchuria, but 
required Japan expressly to recognize Manchuria as "in all respe. t- 
outside her sphere of interest." 

4. RUSSIAN SIX DEMANDS ON CHINA. 

In the meantime Russian military activity was increasing both in 
Manchuria and Korea. On August 13, 1903, Admiral Alexietf, 
whose policy was a forward one, was appointed to the position of 
" Viceroy of the Far East." On September 6 Russia presented six 



273 

new demands on China as conditions for the final evacuation of 
Niuchwang and Manchuria, which were refused by the Chinese 
Government, acting probably at the instigation of Japan and Great 
Britain ( Asakawa, pp. 315-317). The conduct of the Russians on the 
Korean frontier became more aggravating and aggressive than ever. 

5. japan's SECOND proposals. 

The Japanese statesmen having agreed upon an " irreducible mini- 
mum," Japan, in her second set of proposals, on October 30 made 
several important concessions (Staatsarchiv, vol. 69, pp. 224—225). 
These included the guarantee of the freedom of the Korean Straits, 
the establishment of a neutral zone extending 50 kilometers on each 
side of the Korean-Manchurian frontier, a " mutual engagement not 
to impede the connection of the Korean Railway and the Chinese 
Eastern Railway when these railways shall have been eventually 
extended to the Yalu," a reciprocal engagement not to interfere with 
each other's treaty rights in Korea and China, and a " recognition by 
Japan that Manchuria is outside her sphere of special interests and 
recognition by Russia that Korea is outside her sphere of special 
interest." 

6. Russia's second counterreply. 

In her counter-reply (Ibid, pp. 231-232), which was delayed until 
December 11, 1903, Russia repeated her former counterproposals, 
with the omission of the clause regarding Manchuria and the in- 
sertion of the Japanese proposal relating to the connection of the 
Korean and Chinese Eastern Railways. 

7. japan's third overture. 

On December 21, 1903, Japan made a third overture to Russia 
(Ibid, pp. 232-233). Baron Komura proposed several slight amend- 
ments to the Russian counterproposals respecting Korea and the total 
suppression of the article providing for a neutral zone in northern 

Korea. 

8. Russia's third reply. 

In the third reply of Russia (Ibid, pp. 234-235), which reached 
Tokio on January 6, 1904, not only was there no mention of the terri- 
torial integrity of China in Manchuria, but Russia again insisted upon 
the recognition by Japan of Manchuria and its littoral as being out- 
side her sphere of influence. Russia, having agreed to insert a clause 
to the effect that she would " not impede Japan nor other powers in 
the enjoyment of the rights and privileges acquired by them under 
existing treaties with China, exclusive of the establishment of settle- 
ments," on condition that Japan agree not to use any part of the terri- 
53706—18 18 



274 

tory of Korea for strategical purposes, and that she agree to the 

establishment of a neutral zone in northern Korea. 

9. FOURTH JAPANESE PROPOSALS. 

On January L3, L904, Japan made a fourth set of proposals. 
(Ibid., pp. 235-236.) These included: 

(1) Suppression (in the Russian counterproposals) of the clause 
requiring Japan not to use any part of Korea for strategical pur- 
1 >oses. 

(2) Suppression of the article relating to the establishment of a 
neutral zone. 

i'-\) Recognition by Japan of Manchuria and its littoral as being 
outside her (Japan's) sphere of interest, provided Russia engage: 

(a) To respect the territorial integrity of China and Manchuria; 

(b) to recognize the treaty rights, including those of settlement, of 
Japan and other powers in Manchuria: and (o) to recognize Korea 
and its littoral as being outside her (Russia's) sphere of interest. 

(4) Recognition by Japan of Russia's special interests in Man- 
churia and of the right of Russia to take measures necessary for the 
protection of those interests. 

io. Russia's fourth reply. 

An early reply to these fourth Japanese proposals was repeatedly 
requested, but Russia's answer, which was a virtual reiteration of 
her previous counterproposals, did not reach Tokyo until February 
7. L904, or the day following the severance of diplomatic relations 
between Japan and Russia on February G. 

n. japan's severance of diplomatic relations. 

On February 6. 1004. Japan notified the Russian Government she 
has " no other alternative than to terminate these futile negotiations." 

BIBI/IOGRAPHT. 

The most important documents are reprinted from the Japan 
Times in Staatsarchiv, vol. GO, pp. 210-24i\ 

The best account of these negotiations, together with the texts 
of the various proposals and counterproposals is contained in Asa- 
kawa. K., The Russo-Japanese Conflict (Houghton Mifflin & Co., 
Boston. 1004), ch. 10. A briefer documented account may be found 
in Hershey, A. S., the International Law and Diplomacy of the 
Russo-Japanese War (New York, Macmillan, 1006), pp. 52-61. See 
also Japan, Foreign Office Correspondence Regarding the Negotia- 
tions between Japan and Russia (1003-1004). 



275 

97. THE ABROGATION OF THE JAPANESE EXTRATERRI- 
TORIALITY TREATIES, 1872-1894. 

I. .Hi: TREATIES GRANTING EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION, L858 18G9. 

When the Western nations entered into treaty relations with Japan 
they secured, by the terms of the treaties, rights of jurisdiction for 

their consuls. 

The provisions of (he American-Japanese treaty of 1858 governing 
consular jurisdiction were incorporated in similar treaties with other 
western powers, 1858 L869. These conventions, subject to revision in 
1872, extended exclusive consular jurisdiction, in civil matters, to 

ease.-; in which a citizen of a treaty power was liable to (1) a Jap- 
anese subject, (2) a fellow citizen. {■',) a citizen of another treaty 
power; in criminal matters to offense- by a citizen of a treaty 
power against CI) a Japanese subject, (2) a fellow or foreign citizen, 
(3) treaty provisions and trade regulations. 

The exercise of consular jurisdiction in Japan by the represi nta- 
tives of foreign nations frequently caused friction lei ween the con- 
suls and the Japanese authorities. Japan also re ented it as an 
offense to her national pride. Abolition of consular jurisdiction. 
therefore, became a fundamental object of Japanese diplomacy from 
1872 to 1894-99, when success was finally attained. 

2. THE JAPANESE MISSION TO THE WEST, 1872. 

Tn 1872 Japan dispatched five of her most eminent statesmen, 
headed by Prince Iwakura, to observe the institutions of western 
powers and to approach them on the subject of treaty revision. The 
United States Government received the mission cordially and ex- 
pressed a willingness to undertake such revision; but the European 
State- declined to relinquish their jurisdictional privileges without 
an approximation of Japanese jurisprudence to western ideas and 
practices. Italy did negotiate a treaty recognizing Japan's judicial 
autonomy, to a certain extent, but withheld ratification owing to the 
protests of European powers, led by England and France. 

:;. REFORM OK JAPANESE .1' STICE, 1871-1882. 

This situation made a reform of the Japanese system of justice 
imperative. A criminal code had been promulgated in L871 con- 
taining an infusion of European principles. To aid in the intro- 
duction of western jurisprudence, a number of European jurists 
weie 'united to Japan, [n L872 a department of justice independent 
of other branches of the Government was organized, and courts 
were established with judges who performed no other functions. 
Torture was abolished in 187i>; the following year the regulations 



276 



nd 



applying to legal practitioners and evidence were improved a 

modernized. Codes of criminal law and procedure, revised in accord 

with French models, were promulgated in L878 and came into opera- 
tion in L882. 

4. JOINT CONFERENCE AT TOKYO, 1ST I AND IS82. 

The attempted revision of the treaties by a "joint conference" of 
the representatives of the treaty powers at Tokyo (1874) ended in 
failure. To obviate the difficulty of obtaining unanimous consent to 
revision, the Japanese foreign office negotiated separately (1878) 
with the powers concerned. The United States expressed its sym- 
pathy with Japanese efforts by the negotiation of a commercial con- 
vention (1ST8) establishing Japan's exclusive right to regulate its 
tariff and coasting trade, but contingent upon the conclusion of 
similar agreements with the other poAvers. Bui Japan was not able 
to oegotiate such treaties, largely owing to the position taken by 
England. 

In 1882 the Japanese foreign minister again undertook treaty 
revision by means of a joint conference at Tokyo. Nothing definite 
was accomplished until 1880. when agreement seemed possible on the 
compromise "Anglo-German project." li bound Japan to accept the 
establishment of mixed courts, as in Egypt, with prosecuting attor- 
neys of foreign birth. Upon the publication of this project public 
(pinion loudly denounced the foreign minister. Count Inouye. and 
forced the adjournment of the conference, sine die. on July 20. L887. 
Meanwhile, the United States promulgated its extradition treaty 
with Japan (1886), declaring that one reason for its conclusion was 
the support it would give Japan in her efforts toward judicial author- 
ity and complete sovereignty. 

5. ABOKTIVF. TREATIES WITH THE UNITED STATES, RUSSIA. AND GERMANY^ 

issT-i 889. 

The new foreign minister, Count Okuma, reverted to the policy 

of individual negotiation with the great powers. He secured a treaty 
with Mexico (1887) fully recognizing Japan's judicial and fiscal 
competence, the first treaty with a western country on terms of perfect 
equality. Conventions with the United States. Kussia, and Germany 
(1888-89), provided that (1) Japan should open the entire country 
lo foreigners wholly submitting to Japanese jurisdiction and con- 
cede to them the right of holding real and personal property; (2) 
consular jurisdiction in the treaty ports should be abolished five 
years after the exchange of ratifications. Accompanying draft notes 
engaged Japan to appoint competent foreign judges to sit with her 
supreme court in cases involving a foreigner and to promulgate a 



277 

new civil code, based on approved western model-, three years before 
the abrogation of consular jurisdiction in the treaty settlements. 
Similar proposals were made to England. An irate public, which 
demanded unqualified recognition of Japan as the e<jual of western 
stales, compelled the Japanese Government to ask indefinite post- 
ponement of the operation of these treaties. 

Viscount Aoki, who succeeded Count Okuma, proposed the abso- 
lute recognition of Japan's judicial autonomy, but adhered to the 
concession of the foreigners' right to own real estate after the cessa- 
tion of consular jurisdiction. The cabinet crisis in 1891 rendered 
Aoki's efforts abortive. 

Addressing the upper house of Parliament in May, 1892. Viscount 
Enomotto, the foreign minister, said: " Is it not imperative that these 
codes — our indispensable weapon of offense, so to speak, against 
these hated consular courts — should be duly carried into operation 
beginning next year?' ; His plea was unavailing, for Parliament 
postponed the operation of the civil and commercial codes until 
December 31, 189G, again delaying the prospeel of treaty revision. 
When Portugal temporarily withdrew her consuls from Japan an 
imperial ordinance of July 17, 1892, denounced all treaty provisions 
witli Portugal relating to consular jurisdiction. 

6. TREATY WITH ENGLAND, 1894. 

( onscious of the large influence which England exercised in this 
matter, Mr. Mutsu, the next head of the foreign office, concluded thai 
no satisfactory treaty revision could be achieved without England's 
cooperation. Accordingly, in August, 1893. he instructed the Japan* 
minister at London to open negotiations with England. The Earl of 
Kimbefley called the latter's attention to statement of Count Ito 
and Mr. Mutsu which seemed to imply that Japan would resort to 
repudiation of her treaty engagements should her overtures for revi- 
sion be rejected, and announced that the British Government adhered 
to the principles respecting the sanctity of treaties recorded in 
protocol No. 1 of the London conference of January 17, 1871. (See 
article, The Black Sea Question, 1870-1871.) Negotiations moved 
smoothly, following a prompt disavowal by the Imperial Government 
of any intention to repudiate its treaty obligations (April, 1894). 
Japan pointed to her statutory and constitutional guarantees of 
competent and independent courts, with jurisdiction defined by law ; 
to the codes of criminal and civil procedure revised in 1891 ; and the 
model codes of civil and commercial law, wholly effective on Decem- 
ber 31. 1896. On July 16, 1894, a treaty of commerce and 
navigation was signed, to take effect five years later. It assured 
to the subjects of each contracting power the enjoyment in 



278 

the other's dominions of freedom of travel, residence, commerce, 
navigation, religion, and access to the courts;, abolished extraterri- 
toriality and merged the foreign settlements into the general mu- 
nicipal system of Japan. While England was the first power to 
waive her right of extraterritoriality, everybody concerned appre- 
ciated the importance of American support in the consummation of 
Japan's treaty revision. 

7. TREATIES Willi OTHEE POWERS, 1894-1898. 

Treaties with other powers, all based on the Anglo-Japanese pact 
and to take effect in July and August. 1800. followed in quick suc- 
cession: United States and Italy. 1804; Russia. Denmark, and Peru, 
L895; Germany, Sweden and Norway, Belgium, France, the Xether- 
lands, and Switzerland, 1896; Spain, Portugal, Austria-Hungary, 
and Siam, 1808. Ratification of these treaties was completed in 
L898. The treaty with Mexico (1887) needed no revision. 

After a diplomatic struggle of over '20 years Japan had recovered 
her complete sovereignty and attained full membership in*the family 
of nations. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

Moore, J. P>. Digest of International Law. sees. 847-851 (Wash- 
ington, Government Printing Office, 1006). Accurate, well-docu- 
mented account, with special attention to the part of the United 
States. 

Foster, J. W. American Diplomacy in the Orient. (Houghton 
Mifflin Co.. New York, 1003.) Contains a summary account of the 
progress of revisionist diplomacy. 

Hishida, S. G. The International Position of Japan as a Great 
Power, ch. 6. (Columbia University Studies, New York, 1905.) An 
admirable, concise account of the system and of the negotiations for 
its abolition. 

Lippmann, Karl. Die Konsularjurisdiktion im Orient, pp. 164- 
17!. (Verlag von Yeit and Comp., Leipzig, 1898.) Gives docu- 
mentary references to all treaties governing consular jurisdiction, 
a to the treaties of 1804-18!»8. 
Dubois, J. La codification an Japan et la revision des traites. 
Revue generale de droit international public (1804), II, 111-118. 
Siebold, Alexander von. Japan's Accession to the Comity of Na- 
ns. Translated from (he German by Charles Lowe. (London, 
Kegan Paul. 1001.) Valuable especially for changes in Japan with 
special reference to the termination of extraterritoriality treaties. 

Annual Register, 1889. Contains a sketch of Japanese negotia- 
tions for treaty revision in 1888-1880. 



279 



DOCUMENTS. 



Parliamentary Papers, vol 96, Japan, No. 1 (1894) are valuable 
for development of Japanese law and courts, and trace in detail 
English negotiations with Japan, 1888-1894. 

See also Foreign Relations of the United States, 1871-1898 ; British 
and Foreign State Papers, vols. 48, 79; Treaties and Conventions 
between United States and other Powers since 1776 (1871) ; Compi- 
lation of United States Treaties in Force (1904). 

98. THE FIRST HAGUE CONFERENCE, 1899. 

1. PURPOSE. 

The first Hague peace conference was called by Czar Nicholas II 
of Russia, primarily for the purpose of "seeking, by means of inter- 
national discussion, the most effectual means of insuring to all peo- 
ples the benefits of a real and durable peace, and above all, of put- 
ting an end to the progressive development of the present arma- 
ments." 

The conference which met at The Hague on May 18, 1899, soon 
realized that even a limitation of the increase of military and naval 
expenditure was impracticable at that time, and therefore devoted 
its chief energies to the secondary purpose for which it was called, 
namely, to devise means of securing the maintenance of a real and 
durable peace. 

2. RESULTS. 

Owing mainly to the opposition of Germany, the Russian plan of 
inclusive and limited compulsory arbitration was rejected. But the 
Anglo-American plan of a so-called permanent court of arbitration 
was adopted in spite of the objections of the German Government, 
and arbitration was recommended in questions of a juridical char- 
acter, and especially regarding the interpretation of treaties. A 
code of arbitral procedure intended to facilitate arbitration was also 
adopted and recommended. 

The convention for pacific settlement of disputes also strongly 
recommended the use of the good offices and mediation of friendly 
powers in case of international disputes, and even urged a new method 
of settling such controversies in case of "differences of an inter- 
national nature, involving neither honor nor vital interests, and aris- 
ing from a difference of opinion on points of fact." This was to be 
done by the creation of international commissions of inquiry intended 
to facilitate a solution of such differences by an elucidation of the 
facts by means of an impartial and conscientious investigation. 



280 

In addition to the convention for the pacific settlement of inter- 
national disputes, The Hague conference o( L899 also agreed i<> two 
other conventions, three declarations, and expressed several wishes 
(voeux). Mosi important was the convention regulating the Laws 
and customs of land warfare, based on the work of the Brussels con- 
ference oi' L874. 

The conference also adapted the principles of the Geneva con- 
vention of L864 to maritime warfare. Ii agreed to three declarations 
against (a) the Launching of projectiles and explosives from balloons 
for five years; (6) the use of projectiles the only object of which is 
the diffusion o( asphyxiating or deleterious gages; and (<?) the use of 

" dumdum " bullets. 
The conference also expressed a series of six wishes in favor of 

considering, at a subsequent conference, questions relating to the 

right and duties of neutrals; the inviolability i>\' private (enemy) 

property in naval warfare: and the bombardment of ports, towns. 

and villages by a naval force. It even wenl so far as to express 

a wish that the Governments might "examine the possibility of an 

agreement as to the limitation of armed forces by land and se&, and 

of war budgets," 

For bibliography, see article. The Second Hague Conference. 

99. THE ANGLO-FRENCH ARBITRATION TREATY OF 1903. 

i. PROA [SIONS. 

The Anglo-French arbitration treaty of October M, L903 (See 
Appendix I. 07). pro\ ided that questions of a Legal nature or " relat- 
ing to the interpretation of treaties existing between the two Con- 
tracting Parties, and which it may not have been possible to settle 
by diplomacy " shall he submitted to the conn ol' arbitration provided 
for in The Hague Convention of L899. The agreement went on to 
declare that "neither (he vital interests nor the independence or 
honor of the two contracting parties" nor the interests id' a third 
State would he considered as coming under its provisions. It was 
provided also that before "addressing themselves" to The Hague 
the two parties should draw up an agreement "determining clearly 
the subject of dispute, the extent of the arbitral powers" and the 
constitution of the court and its procedure. The convention auto 
matically terminated at the end of five years. 

2. IMPORTANCE. 

This convention was the (irst application of article 19 of The Hague 
Convention o( L899, which provided for supplementary arbitral 

agreements. It was the model for most of the arbitration treaties of 
the next live years. Delcasse persistently urged it, and the French 



281 

foreign office pronounced ii the "first step" in the "rapprochement" 
of tlic two countries. It was broughl about largely through the 
persistent efforts of Sir Thomas Barclay, aided by numerous French 
and British organizations. During the next few months Great 
Britain and France strengthened the solidarity of western Europe 
by negotiating identical treaties with JtaJy and Spain. 

.:. PI BLIC OPINION REGARDING THE CONVENTION. 

In both France and England the treaty received general approval. 
J n the former country some public men began to look toward the 
e tablishment of a Quadruple Alliance (England, France, Russia, 
and Italy) to counterbalance the solidarity of the German powei 
In the hitter the chief criticisms were directed against its limited 
application, Tor there was a strong feeling among business and Labor 
opinion thai arbitration ought to include broader questions. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

Archives Diplomatiques, third 3eries, vol. 88, pp. 49 53. 

Barclay, Sir T. Thirty Years' Anglo-French Reminiscences, chs. 
19-20. (Boston, Houghton, 1914.) 

Jaray, L. J. La Politique Franco- Anglaise el ['Arbitrage Inter- 
nationale (Paris, Peri'in, 1901). 

Saint-Charles, F. de, "Les accords internationaux relatifs a l'ar- 
bitrage (1903-1904)," in Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique for 1904, 
No. 18, \>\>. 237 251. Emphasizes the significance of the convention 
for France. 

Annual Register for 1903, London, L904, pp. 216-217. A sum- 
mary of English opinions of the convention. 

France, Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres. Les Progres de 1' Ar- 
bitrage Obligatoire de 1903 a 1908. Without date. A chart. 

Maignhac, A. Le traite d'arbitrage franco-anglaise du 14 octo- 
bre 1903. Revue generale de droit international public. November- 
December, 1903. Vol. 10, pp. 799-812. 






SECTION IV.— 190-1-UUl. 



100. THE FORMATION OF THE ENTENTE CORDIALE. 

1. FACTORS IN THE GENERAL [NTERNATION \\. SITUATION, 1898-1901. 

The salient features of the international situation, L898 -1901, wore: 

(a) The disappointment in France as to the possible result of the 
Franco-Russian alliance, when the plan for the First Hague Confer- 
ence was launched by Russia. August. ISOS, for such a plan seemed to 
block any chance Eor recovery of Alsace-Lorraine. (Fullerton, Prob- 
lems of Power, p. -21.) . 

(M The increasingly aggressive economic and military policy of 
Russia in the Far Easl decreased the vigor of the Franco-Russian 
alliance in European affairs, as Russian interest and influence in 
KMitral and western European affairs Lessened. (Von Biilow, Im- 
perial Germany, pp. 68-69.) 

(c) The Anglo-German official relations seemed to be steadily im- 
proving in spite of popular clamor as to the Boer War. Indications 
of this may be found in the following: 

(1) Anglo-German treaty of L890 which had. by implication at 
least, recognized England in Egypt, was now followed in 1898 by 
treaty (never published) relating to possible purchase and division 
of Portuguese African colonies. (Schmitt, England and Germany, 
p. 111.) 

(2) Salisbury at Guildhall, November 9, L899, speaking of new 
Anglo-German treaty as to Samoa, referred to Germany as Eng- 
land's closest continental friend. (The Times. Nov. 10, L899.) 

(■">) Chamberlain had conference with Von lb'ilow and (hive days 
later, November 30, spoke of necessity of alliance of Teutonic pen- 
pie-. (The Times. De< . 1. L899; Schmitt. op. cit, p. 1 1:».) 

I I ) Rosebery, February C>. L900, declared England had urged 
alliance on Germany in December preceding. (The Times. Feb. 16, 
1900. Cf. de Caix in Questions actuelles, pp. 30 32.) 

(5) An Anglo-German agreement for the Open Poor and the in- 
tegrity of China and joint Far Eastern policy was signed October 
L6, 1900. (Hornbeck, Contemporary Politics in Far Fast, p. 237.) 

C282) 



283 

(6) In the spring of L901 and Inter the possible share of Ger- 
many in Anglo-Japanese negotiations was discussed. (Hayashi, 
Secret Memoirs, p, 11!), and article, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 
L902.) A more extensive Anglo-German alliance as to European 
and American matters was :>!so discussed. (Chirol, "Origins of 
Present War," in Quarterly Review, October. l'Jll: Thayer's John 
Hay, II. p. 285.) 

(d) The si mined Anglo-French relations prevailing. This con- 
dition of affairs was due chiefly to: 

(1) Disputes as to French fishing rights in Newfoundland. 

(2) Spheres of influence on the borders of Siam. 

(3) Control of natives in New Hebrides. 

(4) Boundaries in West and Central Africa. 

None of these alone was serious enough to provoke war, but taken 
together they had been the cause of friction, and England spoke of 
t he French " policy of pin prick ." 

(5) Rivalry in Egypt (See articles, The Dual Control over Egyp- 
tian Finances, The British Occupation of Egypt, L882 191 I. and The 
Soudan Question, 1881 1899) which was based on historical, financial, 
political, and moral grounds, flared out in the Fashoda incideni in 
L898. (See article, thai title.) (Ministere des affaires etrang&res — 
Documents diplomat iques- France el Angleterre, L887-1904, passim ; 
Cf. Pressens£, " England and France" in Nineteenth Century, vol. 
39, p. L94; Simon, " France and England," in Contemporary Review, 
vol. 67, p. 783.) 

(6) The severe rebuff to French policy following the Fashoda in- 
cident, :is shown by treaty of March 21, L899, forced by danger of 
war with England. ( Documents diploma! iques, ( Jorrespondence rela- 
tif a hi convention franco-anglaise (1898), and Declaration addi- 
tionelle (Mar. 21, L899). Barclay, Thirty Fears, p. I'll: Debidour, 
Histoire diplomatique, L878 -1910. I. p. 248; Despa<_niet. Diplomatic de 

hi troisieme repiiblnjne. p. 741.) 

(r) During the South African \V:n- ;i suggested diplomatic com- 
bination with Russia and Germany directed against England revealed 
to France that the price of German cooperation was a French guar- 
anty of German territory, including Alsace-Lorraine — a price no 
French Government could afford to pay. (Debidour. op. cit., p. '204.) 

(/) The South African War showed England's unpopularity, and 
her occupation of Egypt (and the Anglo-Egyptian Soudan since 
1898) lacked international authority ami legal basis. (Egerton 
British Foreign Policy, p. 349; Cromer, Modern Egypt, vol. 2. Parts 
V and VII.) 

(<l) The policy of France in M rocco required free field for de- 
velopment. (See the series of articles dealing with \\\^ Morocco 
question.) Hence the Franco-Italian understanding as to the Medi- 



284 

Lerranean and North Africa (1902) and a projected agreement with 
Spain of like character. (Gourdin, Politique franchise au Maroc, p. 
154, L69.) Neither entente was o\' sufficient form and strength to 
warrant France in assuming direction in Morocoo in spite o( Ger- 
many's declaration of Indifference. 

•J. NEW ELEM] NTS. I 900 1003. 

The chief new factors in this period were: 

{a) New persons wen- in positions <A' authority and influence: 
(1) Delcasse" as French foreign secretary, L898 L905, was anxious to 
settle matters with England. (2) Paul Cambon, as new ambassador 
at London, L898, was friendly ami wise. v ;'>) Lansdowne succeeded 
Salisbury a- foreign secretary in L900, and Salisbury died in L902. 
His policy Tor many years had involved agreements with Germany. 
(•I) The death of Victoria, L901, was a relief to many Englishmen 
(Gwynn, Dilke, vol. 2, p. 502), as she was supposed to be pro-< rerman. 
Edward Vll was desirous o( peace (Bernstein, Willy-Nicky corre- 
spondence, p. L7) and friendly to France, but it is a mistake to*$up- 
pose (hat prior to L905 the Bong was more than an able, sympathetic 
assistant in relations with France. His alleged " authorship " of the 
entente is decidedly questionable. (Cf. Sidney Lee's article on Ed- 
ward Y 1 1 in Dictionary o( National Biography.) 

{/>) Anglo-German relations became less friendly and England re- 
jected the possibility of a German alliance. The chief causes were: 
(1) The German naval law of L900, which was a source of alarm to 
England. (2) The German trade competition became sharper, and 
the English tariff reform movement took advantage id' this in its 
propaganda. (3) The German press attacked England more bitterly 
and public opinion on both sides was increasingly aroused on Anglo- 
(ierman rivalry. (Cf. Tardieu. France and the Alliances, ch. •_' ; 
Jaray, La politique franco-ariglaise, p. 11; B6rard, Questions ex- 
terienres. p. 387; Schmitt, England and Germany, p. 96 ; Lemonon, 
Politique britannique, ch. 7: Dennis, Tendencies in British Foreign 
Policy, in Proceedings American Political Science Association, L909.) 
(I) England found that agreements with Germany were either un- 
stable, as in the case of China, where von Billow soon declared that 
the treaty of L900 did not extend to Manchuria (Reventlow, Deutsch- 
lands Auswartige Politik, p. L68) , or awkward and unpopular, as in 
the case of the joint Venezuelan blockade. (Ibid., p. 207; Thayer, 
John Hay, IT, pp. 285 286.) (5) The Bagdad Railway plan 
proposed in 1899 did not gain English support in L903, and Koweit, 
at the head of the Persian Gulf, was by English action (1901) pro- 
tected against German influence under cover of Turkey's flag. 
(Lemonon, Politique britannique, p. "234.) 



285 

(c) The Ajiglo-Japanese alliance and the Franco-Russian declara- 
tion regarding the Far Easl (1902) made clear to England ;ind 
France the danger of friction and the difficulty of maintaining their 
neutrality should Japan and Russia go to war. (Hornbeck, op. fit., 
p. 248.) Yet both France and England wished to be neutral and 
unhampered in Europe. (Tardieu, Questions diplomatiques de 1004, 
p, 31.) All (his w;is further emphasized by the outbreak of the 
Russo-Japanese War, February, lf)04. 

(il) The Triple Alliance was formally renewed dune. 1002, show- 
ing the solidarity of central Europe continued. 

(c) A general movement in favor of arbitration had gained 
ground since 1800 and many such treaties were being negotiated. A 
campaign for Anglo French arbitration had begun. (Barclay, op. 
cit., passim; Jaray, op. cit., passim; Despagnet, op. cit., p. 787.) 

(/') The important work of Sir Thomas Barclay in connection 
with the Paris Exposition of L900, the resolutions of numero 
chambers of commerce, and international visits stimulated general 
rapprochement. (Barclay; op. cit., ch. LVIL) 

(ff) Sir Charles Dilke renewed his reasoned appeal- for Anglo- 
French understanding. (Gwynn, Dilke, II, ch. LVTI.) 

::. ENTENTE CORDIALE, L903 l. 

The striking visit to Paris of Edward VT1 (1903) cleared l he air 
and caughl the imagination of Paris. A return visil of President 
Loubet to London was equally successful. Negotiations for a con- 
vention began duly, 1003, and a treaty of arbitration of October 14, 
1903 (See article,, that title), aided the progress of the negotiation. 
Under cover of these negotiations political questions wen" discussed 
until March, 1904. Meantime Franco- Spanish conversations were 
taking place. On April 8. 1001. a general agreement was signed. It 
consisted of four documents: (1) A declaration respecting Egypt 
and Morocco; (2) a convention in regard to the Newfoundland fish- 
eries; (3) a declaration concerning Siam, Madagascar, and the New 
Hebrides; (1) secret articles. The whole group are commonly called 
the Convention of April 8. 1901. 

4. ANGLO-FRENCH CONVENTIONS OF APRIL 8, L904. 

These agreements provided (See Appendix I. 68) : 
(e) The surrender by France of rights on the shore of New- 
foundland, but retention of fishing rights, in consideration of 
pecuniary compensation and territorial cessions near French Gambia 
and east of the Niger. 

(I>) Delimitation of spheres of influence on the border of Siam, 
settlement of the customs dispute in Madagascar and adjustment of 
the New Hebrides matter. 



286 

(c) France accepted England's occupation of Egypt, and England 
agreed to development of French interests in Morocco, with com- 
mercial liberty, equality of taxes, customs, and railway rates guar- 
anteed in both dependencies, their political status unchanged and 
necessary reforms to be introduced. England to make effective the 
treaty of 1888 as to the free navigation of the Suez Canal, and 
France to receive guarantees as to Egyptian debt by a decree of the 
Khedive, thus leaving England a free hand in the administration of 
Egyptian revenues. Spain was to receive special treatment and a 
promise of no fortification opposite Gibraltar Avas given. A pledge 
of diplomatic support was also included. (Affaires Etrangeres, 
documents diplomatiques. Accords conclus entre France et l'Angle- 
terre, 1904.) 

(d) Secret articles (first published November, 1911, British and 
Foreign State Papers, vol. 101, pp. 1058-10f)9), provided for possi- 
bility of change of policy in Egypt and Morocco without destruction 
of the treaty and the possibility of Spanish acquisition of territory 

in Morocco under pledge not to alienate it. 

•» 

5. GENERAL COMMENTS. 

France and England now chose to be friendly ; old scores were 
cleared off and possible quarrels were avoided. Each rejected the 
more or less vague possibility of exclusive accommodation with Ger- 
many. Both agreed to disregard the hegemony of Germany, but 
each w T as free to negotiate independently. The Entente stood the 
tests of the Dogger Bank incident, the Morocco crisis of 190."). 
the Algeciras conference, the Agadir crisis, and the Morocco crisis 
of 1911 (See articles dealing with each of these matters). It cleared 
the way for the Anglo-Russian Entente and helped toward common 
action in the Near East in 1908, 1911, and 1912-13. The attempts to 
secure a formal alliance were defeated, but common military and 
naval policies were in effect before 1910 and their significance defined 
by letters of Grey and Cambon of November, 1912, which were re- 
vealed in 1914. (See article. Naval and Military Conversations be- 
tween France and England, 1905-1912.) To break up the Entente 
became one of the great purposes of German policy from 1905 on. 
The Entente, however, did not become an alliance until after the out- 
break of the World War in 1914. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

DOCUMENTS. 

The most important documents have been published by the British 
Government in Parliamentary Papers, France, No. 1 (1904), and 
by the French Government, Minis! ere des Affairs Etrangeres, Docu- 



287 

ments Diplomatiques, Accords conclus le 8 avril 1904 entre la France 
et l'Angleterre. (Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1904.) 

NARRATIVES AND COMMENTARIES. 

Tardieu, A. France and the Alliances. (New York, Macmillan, 
1908.) Brilliant broad survey. 

Schmitt, B. E. England and Germany, 1740-1914. (Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 1916.) Fine general survey. 

Seymour, C. Diplomatic Background of the War. (New Haven, 
Yale Press, 1916.) 

Debidour, A. L'Histoire diplomatique de l'Europe, 1878-1916, 
2 vols. (Paris, Alcan, 1916.) Standard manual. 

Fullerton, W. M. Problems of Power. (New York, Scribner, 
1913.) Badly arranged, vigorous defense of France by American 
correspondent in Paris of the London Times. 

Lemonon, E. L'Europe et la politique britannique, 1882-1910. 
(Paris, Alcan, 1910.) Excellent general survey. 

Barclay, Sir Thomas. Thirty Years' Anglo-French Reminis- 
cences, 1876-1906. (London, Constable, 1914.) Important for early 
stages. 

Esher, Viscount. The Influence of King Edward, pp. 49-60. Val- 
uable for part pla} T ed by Edward VII. 

Gourdin, A. La politique francaise au Maroc. (Paris, Rous- 
seau, 1906.) Brief, impartial, historical. 

The Revue de droit international public (1904), XI, 621-765, has 
a series of important articles by leading French authorities on in- 
ternational affairs. The convention of April 8, 1904, is discussed in 
all of its various aspects. 

Charmes, F., and others. Les questions actuelles politiques 

etrangeres en Europe. (Paris, Alcan, 1907.) Clever lectures by 

important journalists and public men. 

Berard, V. Questions exterieures, 1901-1902. (Paris, Colin, 
1902.) Uneven essays. 

Cromer, Earl. Modern Egypt. (New York, Macmillan, 1908.) 
2 vols. Fundamental for Egypt. 

Millet, R. Notre politique exterieure de 1898-1905. (Paris, 
Juven, 1905.) Vigorous attack on Delcasse. 

Reventlow, E. zu. Deutschlands auswartige politik, 1888-1914. 
(Berlin, Mittler, 1915.) Pan-German partisan. 

Morel, E. Morocco in Diplomacy. (London, 1912.) Bitterly 
hostile to Anglo-French policy. Well documented. 

Hayashi. Secret Memoirs of Count Tadasu Hayashi. Edited by 
A. M. Pooley. (New York, Putnam, 1915.) Important; prejudiced 
introduction by Pooley. 



288 

Perris, G. H. Our Foreign Policy and Sir Edward Grey's Failure. 
(London, Melrose, 1912.) Liberal attack on policy of the Ententes. 

Murray, G. The Foreign Policy of Sir Edward Grey. (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1915.) Defence of Grey. 

101. SECRET NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE KAISER AND 

THE CZAR IN 1904-1905. 

1. INTRODUCTION. 

The formation of the Entente Cordiale between France and Ens- 
land (See article, that title), 1904, immediately affected the balance of 
power in Europe. The Triple Alliance (See article, The Formation 
of the Triple Alliance) which Bismarck had formed with Austria 
and Italy had been weakened through the irrepressible conflict of 
interests between Austria and Italy over frontiers. Albania, and the 
Adriatic, and by the series of political and economic treaties which 
Italy had recently made with France. The Dual Alliance between 
France and Russia had been greatly strengthened by the Entente 
Cordiale between France and England. England had also made a 
defensive alliance with Japan in 1902. In these circumstances the 
Kaiser felt he must win back waning diplomatic prestige by dis- 
rupting or weakening the new Entente Cordiale before it should 
solidify into a definite alliance. Two methods were attempted by 
him. One was the now well-known method of attempting to use the 
Morocco question as in 1905-6. (See article, The Morocco Crisis of 
1905-1906.) The other method was virtually unknown until the 
publication of the so-called " Willy-Nicky Correspondence " in Sep- 
tember, 1917. It consisted in secret personal negotiations between 
the Kaiser and the Czar, in which the Kaiser's purpose was to secure 
from the Czar an alliance between Germany and Russia. The main 
points in these negotiations follow. 

2. NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN ALLIANCE IN 1904. 

On June 29, 1901, on the very day of exchanging most friendly and 
pacific public utterances at Kiel with King Edward VII, the Kaiser 
sent the first of the " Willy-Nicky " telegrams, by which he carried 
on the secret negotiations with the Czar. This first message of 
friendly assurances and sympathy for the losses which Russia was 
suffering in the Russo-Japanese war was followed by others of in- 
creasing warmth and solicitude, in which he gave the Czar military 
and naval advice. Finally, on October 27, 1904, when Russian and 
English public opinion were greatly excited against one another on 
account of the Dogger Bank affair (See article, that title), the 
Kaiser gave the Czar the first definite hint of an alliance between 
Germany and Russia, which France might be forced to ioin: 






289 

For some time English press has been threatening Germany on no account 
to allow coals to be sent to Baltic ileet now on its way out. It is not impossi- 
ble that the Japanese and British Governments may lodge a joint protest 
against our coaling your ships, coupled with a " summation " to stop further 
work. The result aimed at by such a threat of war would be the absolute 
immobility of your fleet and inability to proceed to its destination from want 
of fuel. This new danger would have to be faced in community by Russia 
and Germany together, who would both have to remind your ally, France, of 
obligations that she has taken over in the treaty of dual alliance with you, 
the " casus foederis." It is out of the question that France, on such an invita- 
tion, would try to shirk her implicit duty toward her ally. Though Delcasse 
is an anglophile " enrage." he will be wise enough to understand that the 
British fleet is utterly unable to save Paris. In this way a powerful combina- 
tion of three of the strongest Continent Powers would be formed, to attack 
whom the Anglo-Japanese group would think twice before acting. (Willy- 
Nicky Correspondence, pp. 68-70.) 

The Czar easily fell into the snare, replying immediately. 

I agree fully with your complaints about England's behavior concerning the 
•coaling of our ships by German steamers, whereas she understands the rules 
of keeping neutrality in her own fashion. It is certainly high time to put a 
stop to this. The only way. as you say, would be that Germany, Russia, and 
France should at once unite upon an agreement to abolish Anglo-Japanese 
arrogance and insolence. AVould you like to lay down and frame the outlines 
of such a treaty and let me know it? As soon as accepted by us France is 
bound to join her ally. This combination has often come to my mind ; it will 
mean peace and rest for the world. (Ibid, 74—75.) 

The Kaiser lost no time in supplying the draft of the treaty which 
he himself so much desired, and tried to frighten the Czar into a 
hasty acceptance of it, but this time he failed. Nicholas II wished 
honestly to show the text of the treaty to his loyal ally, France, be- 
fore signing it. To this, the Kaiser objected, on November 26, 1904: 

It is my firm conviction that it would be absolutely dangerous to inform 
France before we both have signed the treaty. It would have an effect dia- 
metrically opposed to our wishes. It is only the absolute sure knowledge that 
we are both bound by treaty to lend each other mutual help that will bring the 
French to press upon England to remain quiet and keep the peace for fear of 
France's position being jeopardized. Should, however, France know that a 
Russian-German treaty is only projected, but still unsigned, she will imme- 
diately give short notice to her friend (if not secret ally) England, with whom 
she is bound by "entente cordiale," and inform her immediately. The outcome 
of such information would doubtless be an instantaneous attack by the two 
allied Powers, England and Japan, on Germany in Europe as well as in Asia. 
Their enormous maritime superiority would soon make short work of my small 
fleet and Germany would be temporarily crippled. This would upset the scales 
of the equilibrium of the world to our mutual harm, and, later on, when you 
begin your peace negotiations, throw 7 you alone on the tender mercies of Japan 
and her jubilant and overwhelming friends. It was my special wish- — and, as I 
understand, your intention, too — to maintain and strengthen this endangered 
equilibrium of the world through expressly the agreement between Russia, 
Germany, and France * * *. A previous information of France will lead to 
a catastrophe. Should you, notwithstanding, think it impossible for you to con- 

53706—18 19 



290 

elude a treaty with ine without the previous consent of Prance, then it would be 
a far safer alternative t<> abstain Prom concluding any treaty at all. {Ibid., 
85 7.) 

3. FAILURE OF THE PROPOSED ALLIANCE OF L904. 

Bui the Czar was not at this time to be convinced or frightened 
into an alliance with Germany. The nel result of the negotiations in 
HUM was a coaling agreement The German Government should con- 
tinue to facilitate the delivery of coal to Rodjestvensky's fleet, which 
was then proceeding from the Baltic to the Far Bast; and in rase 
Japan regarded such deliveries of coal as a breach of neutrality and 
declared war on Qermany, then the Russian Government would 
"stand by Germany with all moans at its disposal" even though 
England should take up anus to assist her Japanese ally. (This 
agreement was embodied in notes exchanged at Petrograd, December 
11 and L2, 1904. These are not in the " Willy-Nicky correspondence^" 
but were first made known by the German Government in the semi- 
official Norddeutsch Allgemeim Zeitung of September L2, L917.) 
As, however, Port Arthur fell a few daj*s after this coaling agreement 
was signed, and the outlook for German colliers accompanying Rod- 
jestvensky's fleet, and for the fleet itself, began to look very dubious, 
the Kaiser no longer wanted to live up to the agreement. Owing to 
this a coolness developed between the Kaiser and the Czar, and the 
" Willy-Nicky " secret telegraphic negotiations ceased for five months. 

A. THE BJORKO INTERVIEW, JULY 24, 1905. 

In July, 1905, however, the opening of peace negotiations to end 
the Russo-Japanese war. the diplomatic victory which Germany 
seemed to have secured in forcing Delcasse^s resignation, and the 
separation of Norway from Sweden, suggested to the Kaiser the de- 
sirability of making a new attempt to win the Czar into an alliance. 
On July 1 ( .». L905, while on a cruise on the imperial yacht Hohen- 
aollem, the Kaiser telegraphed to the Czar suggesting an informal 
personal meeting between themselves. The Czar was "delighted," 
and on his yacht sailed to Bjorko, south of Viborg. Here at 
Bjorko, on July '24, L905, took place an interview at which only the 
two monarchs were present. (There is. of course, no narrative of 
the interview in the "Willy-Nicky correspondence." but a fairly ac- 
curate account of what took place may be pieced together from: 
(a) Kaiser's telgram to Von Bulow sent the next day and published 
in the Norddeutsche AttgemeiGe Zeitung, Sept, L3, 1017; {/>) Kaiser's 
telegram to the Czar, A.ug. 2, L905, of conversations in Copenhagen 
a week later, printed in the "Willy-Nicky correspondence," pp, 
117-121; (c) Izvolsky's recollections, published in the Paris Matin, 
Sept. L5, L917; and (<h the text of the Bjorko treaty itself, pub- 






291 

lished by the Bolsheviki in the Russian [zvestiia, Dec. 29, L917.) 
They began by discussing candidates for the new throne of Norway. 
Turning to the question of Denmark they were agreed that "in case 
of win- and impending attack on the Baltic from ;i foreign power 
[meaning England] Russia and Germany will immediately take 
steps to safeguard their interests by laying hands on Denmark and 
occupying it during the war." And finally the Kaiser produced, and 
secured the Czar's signature to the Long-desired alliance. Witnes 
were then called in to add their signatures to :i document which they 
probably did not read. 

6. THE TREA1 V OJ BJOBKO, L905. 

The treaty was in the following terms: 

Their imperial Majesties, the Emperor of All the Russias on the one side 
and the Emperor <>f Germany on tli" other, In order to Insure the peace of 
Europe have placed themselves In accord on the following points of the herein 
treaty relative to ;i defensive alliance: 

Article I. If any European State attacks one of the two Empires, the allied 
party engages i<> aid the other contracting party with ;.li his military and 
naval forces. 

Abt. II. The high contracting parties engage ool to conclude with any com- 
mon enemy a separate peace. 

Abt. III. The present treaty will become effective from the moment <>f the 
conclusion of the peace between Etussja and Japan and may be denounced with 
;i year's previous notification. 

Akt. i V. When this treaty ins become effective, Russia will undertake the 
necessary steps to inform France of it and to propose to the latter to adl 
to it as an ally. 

(Signed.) Nicholas. 

Wiixiam. 
(Countersigned. ) 

Von Tschibschky. * 

< 'or.\T Bekkkndobf. 
Naval .Minister BlBILEV. 

Such was the Treaty of Bjorko. It was not suddenly improvised 

on July 24, 1905. It was the culmination of plans which the Kaiser 
had in view ever since the Kiel regatta in June, 1904. It was what 
he had aimed to secure in the fall of 1904 after the Dogger Bank 
episode, bui being then unsuccessful, he had accepted, fautc. <!<■ mu ><■<■. 
the Com ling Agreement. The Bjorko treaty was in form a defensive 
alliance, but, taken in connection with the understanding in regard 
to Denmark, was obviously directed against England. It was in 
conflict with the spirit of the Dual Alliance and would consequently 
have overthrown the foundation on which Russian foreign polic 
had rested since 1891. The specious provision for the adhesion of 
France was incapable of execution as the situation then was. France, 
suddenly confronted by the united force of a Russo-German alii- 



392 

ance, would have been compelled to choose between two alternatives: 
Either she would have to subordinate herself as an impotent third 
party to a combination of two great empires, both dominated in fact 
by the Kriser; or she would have been forced to give up the Dual 
Alliance and stand isolated except so far as England offered support 
before the Kaiser's menacing power. To the Kaiser it would have 
made little difference which alternative France chose. In either case 
he would have extricated Germany from that position, far less favor- 
able than in the days of Bismarck, into which his own unwise policy 
had brought him: he would have an ally in case of war with Eng- 
land; ami Germany would again have weakened and humiliated 
France. 

6. FAILURE OF THE PEOPOSEO ALLIANCE OV 1905. 

When the Czar some weeks later showed this treaty to Count 
Lamsdorf, Russian minister of foreign affairs, the latter "could not 
believe his eyes or his ears." He instantly saw the danger for France 
and the necessity of nullifying the treaty. He was authorized by 
the Czar to intrust the Russian ambassador at Berlin, Count von 
Osten-Sacken, with the disagreeable but necessary task of informing 
the Kaiser that the treaty of Bjorko was incompatible with Russia's 
obligations to France, and therefore could not be executed. The 
Kaiser, however, refused to regard this communication as final and 
sent the Czar strongly worded telegrams in quick succession (Oct. 
12 and 15. 190.")). arguing (hat the Bjorko treaty did not collide with 
the Dual Alliance, and anyway " your ally has notoriouslv left yon in 
the lurch during the whole war. whereas Germany helped you in 
every way as far as it could without infringing the laws of neutrality. 
That puts Russia morally under obligations to us: do ut des. 
We joined hands and signed before Cod. who heard our 
vows. T therefore think that the treaty can well come into exist- 
ence * * *. What is signed is signed and Cod is our testator." 

Nevertheless the C/ar. now that his eyes had been opened by Lams- 
dorf, stood firm. With Lamsdorf's assistance he dispatched a Letter 
to William II supported by instructions which Osten-Sacken was to 
communicate to the German foreign office, making in unmistakable 
terms that the Treaty of Bjorko could not under existing circum- 
stances come into operation. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

The telegrams between the Kaiser and the Czar have been pub- 
lished by Herman Bernstein. The Willy-Nicky correspondence 
(Xew York, Knopf, 1918). 

For a full account of these secret negotiations in 1904-5 see 8. B. 
Fay, "The Kaiser's Secret Negotiations with the Czar, 1904-5," in 



203 

the American Historical Review. October, 1918, where the other 
items of bibliographical information are indicated. 

102. THE SEIZURE OF NEUTRAL SHIPS BY RUSSIA DUR- 
ING THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR, 1904-1905. 

1. EARLY SEIZURES. 

A few cases of unwarranted detention and seizure of neutral ves- 
sels by Russian warships were reported during the early stages of the 
Russo-Japanese war. Thus, during the second week of the war, 
three neutral colliers laden with steam coal (probably destined for 
Japan) were seized in the Red Sea and brought as prize- into the 
Gulf of Suez within Egyptian territorial waters. Hen; they wen' 
detained for about four days while these waters were being used as 
a base of anchorage from which neutral vessels were overhauled, in 
spite of the protests of the Egyptian Government. In response to a 
telegraphic order from the Czar, the colliers were soon released, 
however, on the ground that these captures had been made before 
the Russian Government had formally declared coal contraband of 
war. 

L\ CASE OF THE AU.WTOX. 

But it» was not before midsummer of 1904 that interference with 
neutral trade began in earnest. The firsl case to excite serious con- 
troversy was the capture, on June L6, of the British collier Allanton 
in the straits of Korea on her return voyage from a Japanese port 
to Singapore. One of the grounds on which this vessel was con- 
demned by the Vladivostok prize court was that she had carried con I 
to Japan on her outward voyage. Her condemnation was a mani- 
fest violation of Anglo-Saxon principles of maritime law (See, 
e. g., the decision of Lord Stowell in the case of the Imma, '■> Rob. 
168). The AUanton was subsequently released by the Admiralty 
Council of St. Petersburg. 

3. THE ARABIA AND THE CALCHAS. 

Other important cases of seizure and confiscation of neutral ves- 
sels and their contraband cargoes were those of the Arabia and the 
Calchas in the latter part of July, 1904. 

The Arabia was a German vessel with a cargo of American flour, 
machinery, and railway material consigned mainly to Hongkong 
and Japanese ports. The cargo was shipped in the ordinary com e 
of trade from Portland, Oregon. The United States Government' at 
slice asked for the release of the vessel and its cargo, but the Russian 
prize court at Vladivostok condemned such portions of the cargo as 



294 

had been consigned to Japanese ports. The vessel, together with the 
remainder of the cargo, was released. 

The Calchas was a British steamer, largely laden with an American 
cargo of flour, raw cotton, lumber, etc., shipped from Taeoma and 
consigned to various eastern and European ports. The decision of 
the Vladivostok prize court was the same as Ln the case of the Arabia. 

Both the British and United States Governments strongly pro- 
tested against the Russian view of contraband as indicated by these 
and other actions and decisions. 

4. CASK OK THE KNIGHT COMMANDER. 

There were many cases of the sinking and destruction by Russian 
warships of neutral as well as enemy merchantmen during the Russo- 
Japanese War. (For a Long lisl of such vessels see Takahashi. pp. 
•_'.:> 283.) The most interesting ami important of these cases was, 
perhaps that ^i' the Knight Commander. This was a British steamer 
with a general cargo from New York consigned to various eastern 
port<. She was sunk by the Vladivostok squadron on July 23, ami 
afterwards condemned by the Vladivostok prize court. 

The sinking of the Knight Commander created a storm of indig- 
nation in England and the British Government entered a vigorous 
protest. Consequently the decision of the Vladivostok court was sub- 
sequently reversed, and an indemnity paid by the Russian to the Brit- 
ish Government. 

:.. THE MALACCA AM) THE PRINZ HEINRICH. 

Another das- id' Russian seizures of neutral vessels involved the 
circumstances under which the righl of visit and search may be ex- 
orcised. In July. 1904, the two cruisers, the Peterburg and the 
Smolensk, belonging to the Russian volunteer Meet in the Black Sea. 
made their way out of the Straits of Constantinople into the Mediter- 
ranean in the guise of merchantmen, passed through the Suez Canal, 
and engaged in searching and seizing neutral (mainly British) ves- 
sels in the Red Sea. A fierce storm of anger was aroused in England 
when it was learned that the Peninsula and Orient liner Malacca, 
bound for far eastern ports, had been brought as a prize into Port 
Said through the Suez Canal on the charge of carrying contraband. 
Germany also resented the stoppage of the Prms Heinrich and the 
confiscation of a portion of her mail. 

Both the British and German Governments entered vigorous pro- 
test-. The German Government claimed that, while "the exercise 
of the droit de visite in the case of mail steamers may perhaps be 
justifiable, the confiscation of mail hairs directly contravene.-, the 






2.95 

provisions of international law." The Russian Government promptly 
disavowed this action, agreed to return the confiscated mail bags, and 
promised better behavior in the future. 

In addition to a demand for the immediate release of the Malacca, 
the British Government issued \\\\',\\ appears to have been a sort of 
ultimatum. The Russian Government was placed in the following 
dilemma: Either il had violated a long line of international treaties 
by sending commissioned warships through the Bosphorus and the 
Dardanelles in the guise of merchantmen, or it had violated one of 
the most cardinal principles of international law by permitting or 
authorizing merchantmen to exercise the belligerent rights of visit, 
search and capture on the high seas. 

The controversy with Great Britain was finally adjusted by the 
release of the Malacca, after a pro forma examination of the cargo 
and upon the formal assurance of the British Government thai the 
munitions of war on hoard the vessel were British Government stores. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

soi Ri 

Foreign Relations of the United Stales. House Documents for 
L904-1905, Vol. I, pp. 410-440. 708-777. 

British Parliamentary Papers. 1905, vol. 10)5. pp. 451-484. Corre- 
spondence respecting contraband of war in connection with the hos- 
tilities between Russia and Japan. 

Staatsarchiv, vol. 72, pp. 32-51. 

The Times (London;, especially duly 16 and August 26, 29 and 30. 

The New York Timeg. 

SECONDARY ACCOUN1 8. 

Hershey, A. S., International Law and Diplomacy of the Ru? 
Japanese War. (New York. Macmillan, L906.) Pp. L36-18T. 

Takahashi, S., International Law Applied to the Russo-Japanese 
War. (New York Banks, 1908.) Pp. 310-336. 

Smith. F. E. and Sibley. X. W., International Law as Interpreted 
during the Eusso-Japanese War. (Boston, The Boston Book Co., 
1905.) 

Holland. T. R., Les devoirs des neutres dans la guerre maritime et 
les evenenents recents. Revue de droit international (1900), vol. 37, 
pp. 359-377. 

Xagaoka, H., Etude sur la guerre Russo-Japonaise au point de vue 
du droit international. Revue generate de droit international public 
(1905) vol. 12, pp. 603-636. 



296 
103. THE DOGGER BANK INCIDENT, 1904. 

1. Till'. INCIDENT, 

On the evening of October 23, L904, several British steam trawlers 

arrived at Hull, England, and reported that early in the morning 
of October 22 nearly M) small fishing vessels had been suddenly 
attacked and fired upon on the high seas by warships belonging to 
the Russian Baltic squadron, then on its ill-fated voyage to the Far 
East. The Russian vessels continued on their voyage without making 
the slightest attempt to save life or ascertain what damage they had 
done. It was soon learned that one trawler had been sunk and five 
others more or less damaged. Several lives were lost. 

2. Tin: GOOD OFFICES OV PRANCE. 

British feeling was stirred to a high pitch of excitement by this 
event, which was regarded as the culmination of a series of Russian 
"outrages." "War between England and Russia seemed a possibility, 
when France tendered her good offices to bring about a settlement. 

.:. I 111'. DECLARATION OV ST. PETERSBURG, NOVEMBER 25, L904. 

After considerable negotiation, it was finally agreed, on Novem- 
ber 25, L904j that an international commission of inquiry should 
be appointed, consisting of live members o^ high naval rank, three 
of them in the service of other countries. The commission was em- 
powered to draw up its own form of procedure. 

It was further agreed that "the commission shall inquire into and 
report on all circumstances relative to the North Sea incident, and 
particularly on the question as to where the responsibility lies and the 
degree of blame attaching to the subjects of the two high contracting 
parties or of other countries in case their responsibility shall be 
established by the inquiry. (Art. •_> of the declaration of St. Peters- 
burg. For the English text of this declaration, see British Parlia- 
mentary Papers, Russia, No. 2 (1905), Appendix.) 

4. THE NORTH SEA COMMISSION, JANUARY-FEBRUARY, 1905. 

The North Sea commission met in Paris on January 9, 1905, and 
rendered its verdict on February 25. The majority held in effect 
that the Russian Admiral Rojestvensky was responsible for the ac- 
tion and results of the firing upon the fishing fleet, but that he was 
not personally to blame, i. e., though responsible for the firing and 
not justified in fact, there was an apparent justification for what he 
did, and he Avas not subject to trial and punishment. (For the Eng- 
lish text of the report of the commission, see Smith and Sibley. Inter- 
national Law during the Russcy Japanese War, Appendix I, p. 452.) 



297 

There can be little doubt thai the firing was due to ;i state of panic 
among the Russian officers of the fleet, induced by a fear or belief 
that they were in great danger of attack by Japanese torpedo boats. 
The Russian Government recognized its responsibility by the pay- 
ment of £65,000 as indemnity due the Hull fishermen. 

.-,. aj'I'I:.\ismi:.\t. 

"The institution of the North Sea Commission and its successful 
working under such trying circumstances must be pronounced a great 
victory for the principle of international arbitration. Although 
nominally called an International Commission of Inquiry, analogous 
to those provided for by Articles 9-14 of the first Hague Conven- 
tion, it really combined the functions of an International Court or 
Tribunal of Justice with those of a Commission of Inquiry, and. in 
accordance with the purposes for which it was organized, it passed 
upon the questions of 'responsibility' and 'degree of blame.' as well 
as inquired into and reported upon the facts or circumstances of 
the case. It was in fact an arbitration mi generis, of a kind new 
and unprecedented in the history of international relations; for it 
was not only applied, at a time of great excitement, to a question 
affecting the national honor and vital interests of both parties to the 
dispute, but it introduced into our administration of international 
justice a new T method of procedure in eases of alleged violation- of 
the law of nations. It has set a precedent for the establishment of 
tribunals combining the functions of an Internal tonal ( lourt of Arbi- 
t ration with those of a Court of Inquiry for the investigation and 
trial before the bar of the public opinion of the w T orld, of those 
charged with international crimes and misdemeanors or serious vio- 
lations of international law 7 . It is true that the accused in this case, 
if found guilty, were to have been punished by a national penal 
sanction; but the power of imposing an international censure was 
vested in the North Sea Commission by the Declaration of St. Peters- 
burg; and, although the organization and procedure of the Commis- 
sion may be open to criticism in matters of detail, there is no valid 
reason why the principles involved in this case should not be given 
even a more extended application." (Hershey, International Law 
and Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War. ^10-241.) 

Though this mode of settling international disputes appears to be 
without precedent, there have been many serious controversies to 
which it might have been applied with good hope of success. A 
number of international incidents exhibiting more or less analogy 
to the Dogger Bank incident are cited by Smith and Sibley, op. cit., 
•1 90-319. 



298 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

Oil the Dogger Hank incident see especially Ilershey. A. S., Inter- 
national law and diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War (New York, 
Macmillan. L906), ch. s. pp. 217-&45; Higgins, A. P., The Hague 
Peace Conferences (London, 1909); Mandelstam, A.. "La Commis- 
sion Internationale d'enquSte sur I'incident de mer du Nord," in Revue 
generale de droit international public for 1905, Vol. 12, pp. 351- 
415; Penha, De la. La commission Internationale d'enquete sur I'in- 
cident Anglo-Russe de la Mer du Nord (Paris, 1905); and Smith. 
F. E., and Sibley, N. W., International Law as Interpreted during 
the Russo-Japanese War (Boston, Boston Book Co., L905), pp 275- 
319, 446-R.s. 

For documents ami diplomatic correspondence, see British Parlia- 
mentary Papers on Russia. Nos. l' and 3 (1905), Cd. 2350; and 
Archives Diplomatiques, third series, vol. 94, pp. 450-495. 

104. THE TREATY OF PORTSMOUTH. 

!. INTRODUCTION, ♦ 

The Russo-Japanese War was terminated by a treaty signed at 
Portsmouth. X. H., U. S. A., on September 5, L905. (For the text 
see Foreign Relations of the Lnited States. L905, pp. S-J-! S-JS: Ameri- 
can Journal of International Law. Supplement, I, pp. 17-22.) The 
envoys who signed the treaty. Baron Iutaro Komura and Mr. Kogoro 
Takahira lor Japan, and Mr. Sergius Witte and Baron Rosen for 
Russia, were formally received by President Theodore Roosevelt 
upon the Mayflower at Oyster Bay on August 5. Thence they were 
taken upon the Mayflower and Dolphin to Portsmouth, where their 
negotiations proceeded. 

•J. PRELIMINARIES OF THE NEGOTIATION. 

The peace conference was instituted upon the invitation of Presi- 
dent Roosevelt, who, on -June 8, L905, had directed identical notes to 
the belligerents, urging that they "open direct negotiations of peace 
with one another." offering to perform any service necessary thereto. 
and asserting that his sole purpose was "to bring about a meeting 
which the whole civilized world will pray may result in peace." 
< Foreign Relations of the United States. 1905, pp. 807-808.) 

Before directing the identical notes President Roosevelt had 
sounded the belligerents. " From the end of March," says M. Andre 
Cheradame (in Le Monde et la Guerre Russo-Japonaise, Paris. 1906, 
p. 200), "people were saying that M. Roosevelt was to be the medi- 
ator * * * and from dav to dav the rumors took on solidity." 



299 

Says Mr. Roosevelt (in An Autobiography, New York, 1914, p. 555), 
•• I first satisfied myself that each side wished me to act, but that, 
naturally and properly, each side was exceedingly anxious that the 
other side should not believe that the action was taken on its initia- 
tive.'.' Because of this delicacy in the situation the published docu 
ments do not show the precise nature of the preliminary inquiries. 
On June 2, however, it is known that the President had with Count 
Cassini "nominally a friendly talk," which The Nation (June 3, 
L905, p. 417) thought "must he regarded as a tentative proffer of 
good offices," and five days later, June 7, he discussed with the 
Japanese minister, Takahira, the probable attitude of the Japanese 
Government toward such overtures. (Griscom to Secretary of State, 
June 10. 1905, No. 274, quoting Baron Komura, in Foreign Relations 
of the United States. 1905, p. 809.) 

The identical notes were accepted without delay at Tokio ami St. 
Petersburg. At the former capital "the willingness of .Japan to 
treat for peace has been made clear for months past.'" (Outlook, 
June 17. 1005. p. 399.) "Those who know the real circumstam 
recognize that at the time the negotiations were in progress it was 
absolutely necessary for us to make peace," wrote Count Hayashi 
in his memoirs. (The Secret Memoirs of Count Tadasu Hayashi, 
edited by A. M. Pooley, New York, 1915, p. 230.) But the President, 
as John Hay wrote in his diary after dining at the White House on 
June 19, " was struck with the vacillation and weakness of purpo 
shown by Russia." (W. R. Thayer, John Hay, New York. L915, 

11. p. fc06.) Simultaneously with the acceptance of the negotia- 
tion by Russia the generals in command of her Manchurian armies, 
Linievitch and others, protested against the act (Cheradame, p. 288) : 
while Japan proceeded at once to overrun the island of Saghalien in 
order that it might he in her hands when t he envoys should convene. 

:;. THE NEGOTIATION. 

The negotiations at Portsmouth seem not to have been published 
by cither nation, and are revealed only through the surmises of the 
press. In this the Russian delegation had the advantage, for M. 
Witte talked freely through Dr. E. J. Dillon and won friends 
among the American correspondents, whereas the severe reticence of 
the Japanese tended to estrange the correspondents. (Hayashi, p. 
233.) This was of the greater consequence because American opin- 
ion throughout the war had been strongly pro-Japanese. The occu- 
pation of Saghalien and the conclusion of a renewal of her alliance 
with Great Britain (at London, by Landsdowne and Hayashi. August 

12, 1905. American Journal of International Law. I. Supplement, p. 
!.">: V, p. 105) gave to Japan a firmer foundation for her diplomacy. 



300 

In Russia the meeting of the Zemstvos congress and the recasting 
of her constitution tended to disturb her counsels. 

At the start Japan presented a long series of demands, to some 
of which Russia objected categorically. In particular, her demand 
for a money indemnity and the cession of Saghalien (Roosevelt. An 
Autobiography, p. 557), for cession of certain interned Russian ships, 
and for a limitation of Russian naval armament in the Far East 
threatened to break up the conference. Toward the end of August 
President Roosevelt intervened (Cheradame, p. 293), suggesting to 
the Russians a compromise based upon the surrender of part of 
Saghalien and the waiving by Japan of her claim for indemnity. 
Upon this basis the peace was signed September 5, 1905. 

4. TERMS. 

In addition to provisions for the restoration of peace, resumption 
of commercial relations on the ante-bellum basis, release of prisoner-, 
ratification, and signature (articles 1, 12-15), the Treaty of Ports- 
mouth made provision for three important matters: 

(1) Korea. Russia, •'recognizing that Japan has predominant 
political, military, and economic interests in Korea," agreed " not 
to interfere or place obstacles in the way of any measure of direction, 
protection, and supervision which " Japan " may deem necessary to 
adopt in Korea" (article 2). 

(2) Manchuria. Both countries agreed "to completely and simul- 
taneously evacuate Manchuria.'" except Port Arthur and the portion 
of the Liaotung Peninsula covered by the Russian lease (See article, 
The Leasing of Port Arthur by Russia, 1898), which was transferred 
from Russia to Japan, and to restore it " to the exclusive administra- 
tion of China." Withdrawal of both Russian and Japanese troops 
was to begin "simultaneously and immediately" after ratification of 
the treaty and was to be completed within 18 months (additional 
article 1). Russia declared that it had "no territorial advantages 
or preferential or exclusive concessions in Manchuria of such a 
nature as to impair the sovereignty of China, or which are incom- 
patable with the principle of equal opportunity" (article 3). Both 
countries mutually pledged themselves not to place any obstacles in 
the way of general measures which apply equally to all nations and 
which China might adopt for the development of commerce and 
industry in Manchuria " (article 4). Russia transferred to Japan its 
coal mines and railroads in Manchuria (article 6). 

(3) Saghalin. Russia ceded to Japan its share of Saghalin and 
the adjacent islands (article 9). 

.-,. CONCLUSION. 

The ratifications of the Treaty of Portsmouth were exchanged at 
St. Petersburg and Tokio on October 15, 1905. Russia regarded the 



301 

treaty as a diplomatic victory. In Japan it caused rioting and min- 
isterial disturbance. It is not likely, as Prof. T. S. Woolsey has ob- 
served, " that we yet know the full truth as to the reasons underlying 
the Portsmouth treaty." He believed that " this was far from being 
a diplomatic victory for Russia * * * [nor] would it be sur- 
prising if the future should reveal that Japan in her inscrutable way 
saw that the psychological moment had come, persuaded Mr. Roose- 
velt to initiate negotiations in her behalf * * * and won as 
great a victory in diplomacy as she had done in war." (American 
Historical Review, April, 1907. p. 654.) 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

Hershey, A. S., International Law and Diplomacy of the Russo- 
Japanese War (New York, Macmillan, 1906), pp. 310-360; Chera- 
dame. Andre, Le Monde et la Guerre Russo-Japanese (Paris, 
Plon, 1906), pp. 288-293; Roosevelt, Theodore, Autobiography 
(New York, Macmillan, 1913), pp. 155; Stead, A., Peace in the Far 
East, in Fortnightly Review for October, 1915, vol. 81, pp. 593-603; 
De Martens, F., " Portsmouth Peace Conference " in North Ameri- 
can Review for November, 1905, vol. 181, pp. 641-618; Dillon, E. J., 
Story of the Peace Negotiations, in Contemporary Review for Octo- 
ber, 1905, vol. 88, pp. 457-488; Dillon, E. J., The Eclipse of Russia 
(New York, Doran, 1918) ; Text of Treaty of Portsmouth, in For- 
eign Relations of the United States, 1905 (Washington. 1900), pp. 
824-828. 

105. THE RENEWALS OF THE ANGLO-JAPANESE 
ALLIANCE, 1905 AND 1911. 

1. NEGOTIATIONS. 

As no other country joined Russia in her war against Japan in 
1904-05, Great Britain did not find it necessary under the terms of 
the Anglo- Japanese alliance to enter the conflict. (See article. The 
Anglo- Japanese Alliance of 1902.) It was felt in both Great Britain 
and Japan, however, that the terms of the treaty of 1902 were too 
restricted, and on August 12, 1905, while the peace conference was 
still in session at Portsmouth, a new treaty was signed in London, 
though the fact was not announced until after peace had been agreed 
upon. 

2. TERMS OF TREATY. 

The Treaty of 1905 (See Appendix I, 72) differed from that of 
1902 in two significant points: 

First. It applied to India as well as the Far East. The earlier 
treaty had applied only to the Far East. 



302 

Second. By the treaty of 1902 each party could remain neutral if 
ihe other party were attacked by only one enemy. It was in virtue 
of this feature that England was able to remain neutral during the 
Russo-Japanese War. The treaty of 1905, however, stipulated 
(article 2) that ''if 1^ reason of unprovoked or aggressive action 
wherever arising, on the part of any other power or powers, either 
contracting party should be involved in war in defense of its terri- 
torial rights Or special interests mentioned in the preamble of this 
agreement [i. e.. "the regions of Eastern Asia and of India''], the 
other contracting party will at once come to the assistance of its 
ally." The alliance was. therefore, essentially defensive in character, 
and limited in scope to India and the Ear East. The paramount 
lights of Japan in Korea were recognized, provided that the meas- 
ures adopted by her for " guidance, control, and protection in Korea '" 
were not inconsistent with the principle of the open door. The 
treaty was to remain in force at least 10 years. 

3. RENEWAL OF 1911. * 

On June 13, 1911, the alliance was again renewed (See Appendix 
T, 98) for a term of 10 years. The most important modification was 
the following clause: 

Should either high contracting party ('(include a treaty of general arbitration 
with a third power, it is agreed thai nothing in tie's agremenl shall entail 
upon such contract inn' party an obligation to go to war with the power with 
whom such treaty of arbitration is in force. 

This clause was inserted because an arbitration treaty (subse- 
quently concluded) was then pending between Great Britain and the 
United States. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

H. Paul, The New Alliance. In the Nineteenth Century and After, 
October. 1905; vol. 58, pp. 513-5-23. 

A. S. Hershey, The International Law and Diplomacy of the Russo- 
Japanese War. (New York, Macmillan, 190G.) 

Annual Register. 1905, pp. -217-218; 1911, p. 159. 

B. L. P. Weale, The Truce in the Far East and Its Aftermath. 
(New York. Macmillan, 1907.) 

Anglo-Japanese Treaty. In Independent. July 20, 1911, vol. 71. 
pp. 120-121. 

The text of the two renewal treaties, as well as that of the alliance 
of 1902, may be found in convenient form in The Japan Year Book 
for 1912 (Tokio, Japan Year Book Office, 1912) 110-413. 



303 
106. THE OPEN DOOR POLICY IN CHINA, 1904-1914. 

1. EFFECTS OE THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR. 

The genera] disposition of the great powers to abide by the Hay 
doctrine (See article, The Open-Door Policy in China. 1895-1904) 
as affording the greatest margin of safety in Far Eastern affairs 
was disturbed by the outcome of the Russo-Japanese War. The 
political equilibrium was upset. England's fear of Russia was so far 
modified that she willingly recognized the hitter's predominant posi- 
tion in Central Asia and Mongolia, and entered into an understand- 
ing with her in regard to Persia, Afghanistan, and Thibet (See 
articles. The Formation of the Triple Entente, and The Persian 
Question, 1906— 1D1 t ) . The Anglo-Japanese alliance was so far ex- 
tended as to include Japan in a defense of India. (See article, The 
Renewals of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. 1905 and 1911.) 

Secretary Taft ? s visit to Japan after the Russo-Japanese War was 
followed by announcement of a verbal understanding to preserve 
the integrity of China and maintain the Open Door. A formal 
agreement guaranteeing this policy immediately followed the trip 
of the White Squadron around the world. (Foreign Relations of 
the United States, 1908. pp. 510-512.) 

■J. CONDITIONS IN CHINA. 

After the war of 1904—5 Manchuria remained a region of clashing 
interests which was likely to breed political suspicion and antagonism 
even if peace could be maintained. China, a vastly larger and more 
populous area, while politically backward and inert, has certain 
basic characteristics, a homogeneous people, a common language, and 
culture with ancient traditions, that may in time restore her to a 
position as a political force in the world. It could not be a matter of 
indifference to the United States whether or not China's integrity 
I e preserved during the slow process of reformation and adjust- 
ment. The "open door,"' which involves political equilibrium 
amongst the nations chiefly interested, had been threatened by 
Russia. On this account the popular sentiment of America sided 
strongly with Japan until the end of the war brought ruin to Russian 
presi ige in the East. After the Treaty of Portsmouth. Japan showed 
a disposition to recoup at least a part of her military outlay by 
monopolizing economic advantages in Korea and by playing the 
former role of Russia in Manchuria. To meet the threatened tran- 
ter of all her profitable trade in that province, the United States was 
confronted with the necessity of entering upon a partnership with 
one or more of the nations involved to secure a determined share of 
its exploitation or of renewing her attempt to unite all the powers in 



304 

a self-denying agreement to maintain the equality of opportunity 
promised in the Portsmouth treaty. The first would have been 
directly contrary to her traditions, her sentiment, and her repeated 
professions; the other was attempted when Russia and Japan began 
disputes about the Manchurian railways under the following oireum,- 
stances. 

3. JAPAN AND RUSSIA EN MANCHURIA. 

Complaints as to Japan's violating the spirit of the "open door" 
in Manchuria began immediately after the. peace in 1905. A secret 
protocol attached to the Komura treaty with China, December 22, 
L905, gave Japan a new and special privilege when China promised 
not to construct any railway lines parallel to and competing with 
the South Manchurian railways. (See summary of the protocol in 
Millard, Our Eastern Question. 480-433.) When China tried with 
British funds to build an extension to the North China Railway 
from Hsimintiin to Fakumen, both Japan and Russia signified 
disapproval. The construction of the line was forbidden. To 
protect the rights of all nations which seemed thus to be* threat- 
ened. Mr. Knox, the Secretary of State, submitted a scheme that the 
powers, including Japan and Russia, should loan China enough money 
to buy all the railways in Manchuria and construct others, placing 
all under the administrative control of an interested commission. 
(Telegram — Paraphrase. Knox to Reid, November 6, 1909. For- 
eign Relations of the United States, 1910, pp. '234-235.) Secretary 
Knox advocated his plan for the Manchurian railways on the ground 
that "perhaps the most effective way to preserve the undisturbed 
enjoyment by China of all political rights in Manchuria and to pro- 
mote the development of those Provinces under a practical applica- 
tion of the policy of the open door and equal commercial opportunity 
would be to bring the Manchurian highways, the railroads, under 
an economic, scientific, and impartial administration by some plan 
vesting in China the ownership of the railroads through funds fur-' 
nished for that purpose by the interested powers willing to par- 
ticipate." (Ibid. p. 234.) Russia and Japan not only announced 
their disapproval of the scheme. \)\\i on July !. 1910. concluded a 
convention stipulating for the maintenance of the status quo in 
Manchuria (Archives Diplomatiques, third series, vol. 116, p. 60). 
Japan then proceeded to construe! other lines and secure control of 
coal mines near Mukden. 

The outcome of this pooling of Russian and Japanese interests in 
Manchuria was a partial return to the "spheres of influence" idea, 
which slowlv gathered momentum after the revolution, when Russia 
strengthened her hold upon the entire frontier marching with her 
boundaries, and Japan added to her industrial investments in both 
China and Manchuria. 



305 

4. THE ATTITUDE! OF THE I MTKI) STATES. 

All the political activities of the United States in regard to eastern 
Asia have steadily kept in view the integrity of China and the 
principle of equal opportunity for all nations trading there. Its 
Government has been credited by others with humanitarian senti- 
ments rather than a deaf perception of the disintegrating forces at 
work. 

NOTES ON AGREEMENTS AS TO cm\.\"s [NTEGBITI AFTEB THE PORTS- 
MOUTH TREATY. 

(Based on Hornbeck, Contemporary Politics in the Far East, 444- 
450. ) 

li)07. June 10: Franco-Japanese convention. The two Govern- 
ments agreed to "respect the independence and integrity of China 
as well as the principle of equal treatment in that country." (Amer 
ican Journal of International Law. I. Supplement, p. 396.) 

L907, July 30: Russo-Japanese convention. The contracting 
parties " recognize the independi nee and territorial integrity of 
China and the principle of equal opportunity * * and engage 

to defend the status quo and respect for this principle by all the. 
pacific means within their reach." (British and Foreign State 

1'apers. vol. 101, pp. L62 163.) 

L908, November 30: Root-Takahira agreement. Japan and the 

United States exchange notes recording their wish to "preserve the 
common interests of all powers in China by supporting by all pacific 

means at their disposal the independence and integrity of China and 

the principle of equal opportunity of all nations in that empire." 
(Foreign Relations of the United States. L908, pp. 510-512.) 

1010, July 4: Russo-Japanese convention reiterates attachment to 
principles established by the convention concluded July 30, P>07, 
and engages to maintain the status quo in Manchuria. (British and 
Foreign State Paper-, vol. 10:5. p. 586.) 

ion. July 13: Anglo-Japanese alliance, second renewal. De- 
clares objeel to preserve the common interests of all powers in China. 
by insuring the independence and integrity of China and the prin- 
ciple of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all 
nation- in China. (British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 104. pp. 
IT:; 171.) 

11>17. November 2: Lansing-Ishii agreement. Provides, among 
other things, for the independence and territorial integrity of China, 
and recognizes special interests of Japan in China based on her terri- 
torial propinquity. Treaty Series |of the United States] No. 630, 
pp.3 l (Washington, -Gov'1 Printing Office, 1917). 
.-.: 5700—18 1*0 



306 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

Bland, J. 0. 1'., Koeent K\ cuts and Present Policies in China (Lon- 
don, Heinemann, L912 ); pp. 297-370. 

Ibid., The Future of China, in Edinburgh Review, Oct., L914, pp. 
427-451. 

Millard. T. F., Our Eastern Question (New York, Century Co., 
L916). 

Hornbeck, S. K.. Contemporary Politics in the Far East (New 
York. A.ppleton, L916). 

Putnam-Weale (B. L. Simpson'). The Fighl for the Republic in 
China (Now York, Do,dd, 1917), pp. 893 480. 

McCormick, F., The Monaco of Japan (Boston, Little, 1917). 

For documents, see Foreign Relations of the United States, L905 
1914, and British and Foreign State Papers, rols. L01 KM. 

107. SPHERES OF INFLUENCE IN CHINA, 1897-1904. 

1. [NTRODl CTION. * 

A "sphere of influence," as distinguished from a territory defi- 
nitely transferred, or Leased for a term ol' years, or in which a 
settlement or concession has boon permitted or granted by treatj 
between China and some foreign power, denotes that portion of the 

territory of China within which some power or powers claim cer- 
tain exclusive privileges as against another or other foreign powers. 
'The so-called "spheres of influence" in China were lirst sought to 
be established by the various foreign powers as a consequence of the 
military weakness revealed by (ho Chinese Government in its war 
with Japan of L894 and L895. Creation o\' such spheres proceeded 
so rapidly that within the period of L897 to 1904 almost all of China 
was claimed for some "'sphere ol' influence" controlled by a foreign 
power. The provinces claimed as special spheres of interest 
were usually those adjoining the possessions of the particular 
powers and were based on strategic and political considerations. 
'The claims involved, however, not merely a deprivation of 
Chinese power to alienate the territory in question, bill also sought 
to impress a prior claim upon it in favor of the particular foreign 
power for railway or mining concessions or both. The spheres were 
in some eases created by a unilateral declaration on (he part of China 
made at the request of the foreign power; in others it took the form 
of an exchange of notes between the Chinese foreign office and the, 
minister of the foreign government; while, finally, it was not infre- 
quently embodied in a formal treaty signed by both China and the 
foreign power, or in a loan agreement between some ministry of (he 
Chinese Government and the foreign concessionaire. 



307 

The various foreign powers, in cases where their interesl con 
flicted, entered into agreements among themselves delimiting and 
defining their respective spheres. These agreement while not con- 
sidered a binding upon China, were however intended as rrotice to 
third powers to refrain from seeking conce ions in the sphere so 
defined. 

A brief indication of the Location of the various pher< and of the 
manner of their creat ion folio? 

2. SHANTUNG PB01 l '■< E, GEE MAN. 

By the terms of the convention between the German Empire and 
China respecting the lea e of Kiao-chau 3igned March 6, L898, the 
Chinese Government bound itself in all ca *es where foreign assistai 
in persons, capital, or material might be needed for any purpose what 
ever within the Province of Shantung, to offer the said work or 
supplying materials in the firs! instance to German manufacturers 
and merchants engaged in undertakings of the kind in question." 
(See Appendix I. 52. See also article. The Lea ing of Kiao-chau 
b; Germany, L898.) 

On April 1!). L898, the British Government made the following 
declaration respecting Wei-Hai-Wei : 

[and formally declares to Germany thai In establ! lilng heraelf al Wei- 
Hai-Wel she haa no Intention of Injuring or coi g the right* and Inten 

of Germany In the Province of Shantung, or of creating difficulties t'<n- ber In 
thai Province. li ecially understood thai England will nol conatri 

railroad communication from We\ Bai-Wel and the distrid leased therewith 
Into the interior of the Province of Shantung. (See Appendix t. 54.) 

By agreement of September 2, L898, at London, the British and 
German spheres i'<<r railway construction were defined. (Appendix 
I. 57.) 

:;. II KEEN, .1 

On April 24, 1898, the Japanese minister to China requested a 
declaration from the Government of China thai it would not cede or 
lease to any other power any portion of it - territory within the Prov.- 

:e of Fnkien (Kockhill, 1894 L904, p. L81 I. [n its reply of April 
26, 1898, the Chinese Government declared that "the Province of 
Fukien, with all the territory in the interior and along the sea coast 

thin it- limits, which is an important part of China, China will 
er cede or lea e to any Power whatsoever (Ibid, p. \-j.~>)."' 

Ii, 1903 mining conces ion in this province were granted by the 
Chinese Government to a French company. 

1. 1 UK Y.WO'l/.l. KEGI03 . I'lM'l [SH. 

On February 11. L89S (See Appendix I. 51), the 1 li Yamen, 

in reply to a request from the British minister for "a definite assur- 



308 

ance that China will never alienate any territory in the provinces 
adjoining the Yangtze to any other Power, whether under lease, 
mortgage, or any other designation," replied that "the Yangtze re- 
gion is of the greatest importance as concerning the whole position 
(or interests) of China, and it is ont of the question that territory 
(in it) should be mortgaged, leased, or ceded to another Power.'" 

While not specifying the provinces otherwise than as those '"ad- 
joining the Yangtze," this would include the following: Kiangsu. 
Anhui, Kiangsi, Hupeb, Hunan, Szechuan, Kweichou, and Yunnan. 

On April 28, 1890, by an exchange of notes between the British 
ambassador at St. Petersburg and the Russian minister for foreign 
affairs, " Russia, on her pari, engages not to seek for her own account. 
or on behalf of Russian subjects or of others, any railway conees- 
sioi.s in the basin of the Yangtze and not to obstruct, directly or in- 
directly, applications for railway concessions in that region sup- 
ported by the British Government." (See Appendix I, (10.) 

:>. KWANG-TUNG A>'D KUANG-SI, FRENCH. ♦ 

In the exchange of notes of June 12, 1897, between the Chinese 
foreign office and the French minister at Peking, the second formula 
stated " It is understood, in compliance with Article V of the Com- 
plementary Commercial Convention of June 20, 1895, that in the 
three southern border provinces, Kwang-tung, Kuang-si and Yunnan, 
the Chinese Government may call upon French engineers and manu- 
f acurers for working mines." The article referred to provided : 

II is understood that China, for the exploitation <>!' its mines in the provinces 
of Yunnan. Kuang-si and Kuang-tung, may call upon, in the first instance, 
French manufacturers and engineers, the exploitation remaining, nevertheless, 
subject to the rules proclaimed, by the Imperial Government as regarding 
nationai industries. 

It is agreed thai railways, either these already in existence, or those projected 
in Annain may, after mutual agreement and under conditions to be defined, be 
continued on Chinese territory. (Rockhlll, 1 894-1 <)04, p. 23.) 

In addition to the provision contained in the exchange of notes 
of June 12. 1897, regarding mines in Kwang-tung, in June, 1898, 
and December, 1899, the French Government secured certain ex- 
clusive railway and mining concessions in Kwang-tung. 

On March 15, 1897, the Chinese foreign office, in reply to a despatch 
from the French minister at Peking, replied : " Our Yamen con- 
siders Kiung-Chou (the island of Hainan) as belonging to the terri- 
tory of China, which consequently exercises over it right of sover- 
eignty. How could it cede it to foreign nations? " (Appendix I. 
47.) This island is under the jurisdiction of the Government of 
Kwang-tung province. 



309 



(i. YUNNAN, BRITISH AND FEENCH. 



The Province of Yunnan is claimed both by Great Britain and 
France as a sphere of influence, the former by reason of geographical 
propinquity to Burma, and the latter by reason of propinquity to 
Tongking. 

Great Britain, by the conventions of March 1, 1894, and February 
4, 1897 (See Appendix I. >'■'>. t6), secured commercial privileges, 
mining and railway concessions. 

I France, by the convention of June "20, 1895, reaffirmed in the ex- 
change of notes of June 12. ls'.>7, received mining and railway con- 
cessions. (Appendix I, 48.) 
By a joint declaration made at London on January 15, 1896, by 
Great Britain and France "The two Governments agree that all 
commercial and other privileges and advantages conceded in the 
two Chinese Provinces of Yunnan and Szechuen, either to Great 
Britain or France, in virtue of their respective conventions with 
China of the 1st of March, 1894, and the 20th of June. 1895, and all 
privileges and advantages of any nature which may in the future be 
conceded in these two Chinese provinces, either to Great Britain or 
France, shall, as far as rests with them, be extended and rendered 
common to both Powers and to their nationals and dependents, and 
they engage to use their influence and good offices with the Chinese 
Government for this purpose." (British and Foreign State Papers. 
vol. 88, p. 15.) 



SZUCHUAN, BRITISH AND FRENCH. 



An agreement by the Huayi Co., established by the Szuchuan Min- 
ing Bureau, and Mr. Morgan, an English merchant, signed April 14. 
1899, provided for the working of mines in Szuchuan. 

According to a "Memorandum on railway and mining concession - 
secured by France, and French companies in China," as published in 
the French Yellow Book of 1900 (See Appendix I, 02), the French 
consulate at Chungking, in July, 1899, secured from the mining 
bureau of Szuchuan concessions for the working of certain mines. 

According to the joint declaration made at London on January 
15, 1890, by Great Britain and France, all privileges conceded to 
either powfer in Szuchuan as in Yunnan shall be extended and ren- 
dered common to both powers and to their national. (Ibid.) 

8. EASTERN INNER MONGOLIA, JAPANESE. 

Japan has recently asserted a claim to special interests in that 
portion of Mongolia lying north of the Great Wall and adjacent to 
Southern Manchuria, known as Eastern Inner Mongolia. This did 
not, however, receive formal recognition on the part of China until 
the exchange of notes of May 25, 1915. 



310 

9. THE TERRITORY WITHIN THE GREAT WALL (CHIHLI), BRITISH. 

By an agreement signed at Peking on April 29, 1902, between the 
British minister and the Chinese Government it was agreed "that 
the construction of any new railway within a distance of 80 miles 
of any portion of the existing lines shall be undertaken by the 
administrations general of the Imperial Northern Railways." The 
original loan agreement of June 7, 1898, for the construction of this 
railway also provided for the rights of mining coal and iron on each 
side of the proposed lines. (Rockhill, 1891-1901, pp. 317-319.) 

12. THE REGION NORTH OF THE GREAT WALL NORTH MANCHURIA, 

OUTER MONGOLIA. 

On April 28, 1899. by an exchange of notes between the British 
ambassador at St. Petersburg and the Russian minister for foreign 
affairs. "Great Britain engages not to seek for her own account, or 
on behalf of British subjects or of others, any railway concessions 
to the north of the Great Wall of China, and not to obstruct, di- 
rectly or indirectly, applications for railway concessions* in that 
region supported by the Russian Government." (Parliamentary 
Papers. China. No. 2 (1899), pp. 87-89.) 

On June 1, 1899, the Chinese foreign office sent a note to the 
Russian minister at Peking stating that "if railways are in future 
built ' from Peking to the north or to the northeast toward the 
Russian border," China reserves the right to construct such roads, 
but that if it is proposed to have such construction undertaken by 
another nation, the proposal shall be first made to the Russian 
Government." The Russian minister in his reply of June 17, 1899, 
acknowledging the receipt of the foregoing, referred to its as agree- 
ing that if railways are in future built from Peking to the north or 
to the northeast toward the Russian border, no matter in what di- 
rection " Russia should be given the preference." 

13. CONCLUSION. 

The notes sent by Secretary Hay in 1899 to the various powers in 
regard to the maintenance of the "open door" in China (See Appen- 
dix I, 61), and to which formal assent was given by all the powers, 
related to "spheres of whatever influence" and was not intended to 
be restricted in its operation to leased ports. The subsequent agree- 
ments concluded by Russia with China providing for exclusive priv- 
ileges in Manchuria were considered by Secretary Hay as violations 
of the pledges made to the United States. The policy was seriously 
threatened at the time of the Boxer Rebellion (See article, The Boxer 
Uprising), when, as a consequence of the military expedition under- 
taken by the powers and the occupation of Chinese territory by for- 



311 

eign troops, it was feared that advantage might be taken of the 
occasion to seek the extension or addition of spheres of influence. 
This was, however, forestalled by the Anglo-German agreement of 
11)00, to which the other powers adhered. (Appendix 1, 03.) 

The Russo-Japanese War of 1904—5 resulted in a shifting of 
the spheres of influence of the respective powers in Manchuria and 
Mongolia, while as a result of the military operations conducted by 
Japan against Germany, following the outbreak of the European War 
in 1914, there resulted a replacing of German influence by that of 
Japanese in the Province of Shantung. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

Rockhill, W. W. " Treaties and Conventions with or concerning 
China and Korea, 1894-1904." (Washington, Government Print- 
ing Office, 1904.) Supplement to the foregoing, containing treaties, 
etc., concluded between October. 1904, and January, 1908. Published 
by the Department of State, Division of Far Eastern Affairs as In- 
formation Series No. 4-A, and printed at the Government Printing 
Office, Washington, 1908. A third volume, bringing the agreements 
down to date, is now in preparation, compiled by W. V. MacMurray, 
of the Department of State, and which will shortly be published by 
the Carnegie Institute at Washington, D. C. 

Hertslet. China Treaties. (London, 1908.) 

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1897-1910. 

Millard, T. F. " Our Eastern Question." (New York, The Cen- 
tury Co., 1916.) Appendix contains the text of diplomatic docu- 
ments respecting China. Map, p. 381, shows the division of China 
into spheres of influence. 

Moore, J. B. Internationa] Law Digest. (Washington, Govern- 
ment Printing Office, 1906.) Vol. V, pp. 533-552. 

Westlake, J. International Law. (Cambridge, University Press, 
1910.) Part I, pp. 130-136. 

Tvau, T. Z. The Legal Obligations Arising Out of Treaty Rela- 
tions Between China and Other States. (Shanghai, Commercial 
Press, 1917.) 

Gowen, H. H. An Outline History of China. (Boston, Sherman, 
1913.) 

108. RAILWAY CONCESSIONS IN CHINA, 1863-1914. 

1. INTRODUCTION. 

The history of railway development in China prior to 1914 may be 
divided into three periods. In the first or experimental stage, 1863- 
1894, the opening years were characterized by attempts to persuade 
the Chinese to permit the building of railways, and the closing years 



312 

by efforts on the part of the Chinese to construct a railway net with- 
out the aid of foreigners. The second was the so-called "battle of 
concessions" period, 1895-1905. In the third, 190(5-1911, China at- 
tempted to formulate a national policy in regard to railroads. 

•2. THE WOOSUNG RAILWAY, 1876. 

China's railway history began with the Woosung Railway, of 
2 feet 6 inches guage, built by foreign enterprise and formally 
opened on June 30, 187(5. It was subsequently " redeemed '' by the 
Chinese, and in 1877, the rails were torn up and shipped to Formosa. 
Ten years later, however, a railway was in operation between Long- 
shan and Tientsin — the nucleus of the present Peking-Mukden Kail- 
way — and in L897 the section from Peking to Tientsin was opened. 

This article deals mainly with the second of these periods. Con- 
cessions authorizing the construction of railways were sought for as 
part of the mechanism by which spheres of influence might be estab- 
lished (See article, Spheres of Influence in China, 1897-1901), terri- 
tory acquired by lease for a definite term of years, and commercial, 
financial, mining, and even strategic rights and privileges exploited. 
A very complicated situation was thus developed, involving China 
in disputes with the powers and the powers with each other. 

.;. THE SCRAMBLE FOR RAILWAY CONCESSIONS, 1895-1905. 

The scramble for concessions began in 1895, when France and 
Russia claimed from the Chinese Government some compensation for 
the services rendered in connection with the retrocession to China of 
the Liaotung Peninsula, which had been ceded to Japan by the Treaty 
of Shimonoseki. (See article. The Treaty of Shimonoscki.) In 
treaties signed on June 8, 1895,. France, in addition to a rectification 
of the frontiers between China and Indo-China and the grant of 
mining rights in Yunnan Province, obtained the right to extend the 
military railways already built, and those in prospect, in Indo- 
China, into Chinese territory (Archives Diplomatique?, second series, 
vol. 56, pp. 340-343). Russia in 1896 (See Article, The Cassini con- 
vention) obtained the right to construct a railway across the Man- 
churia from a point near Stretensk. on the main line of the Trans- 
Siberian Railway, to Vladivostok, a distance of some 1,400 miles, 960 
of which were to be in Chinese territory. This concession was ex- 
tended two years later, March 27, 1898 (Rockhill, Treaties, China, 
and Korea, 1*94-1904, pp. 51-52). permitting Russia to construct a 
line from a point on the road mentioned above (Harbin) to Port 
Arthur, approximately 400 miles. 

In 1897 (Convention of February 4, 1896, Rockhill, Treaties, 
China and Korea, 1891-1904, pp. 40-44) Great Britain obtained a 



:U3 

concession to connect Burmah and Yunnan Province by rail, and 
what was still more significant, perhaps, a guarantee from China 
that she would not alienate to any other power any part of the 
Yangtsze Valley. In this same year Germany seized Kiao-chau Bay. 
and in March of 1898, in a formal convention, obtained among other 
things the right to construct a triangular system of railways in 
Shantung Province. (See article. The Leasing of Kiao-chau by 
Germany, 1898.) 

As a result of these concessions, China permitted the establishment 
of four systems of railways, three of them designed to bring her 
neighbors by rail to her doors, the Russians on the north and the 
French and British from the south and west, the fourth establishing 
Germany on the borders of the metropolitan province. Without 
any doubt these concessions were mainly for strategic purposes. 

4. RAILWAYS CONSTRUCTED OH CONTROLLED BY CHINA. 

In an altogether different category from the four systems men- 
tioned above are several railway enteprises which were initiated 
more or loss by China. Their construction was undertaken for com- 
mercial purposes, though even in these cases political considerations 
were of some importance. First, the Peking-Hankow line, a trunk 
line of some (550 or 700 miles in length, was granted to a Franco- 
Belgian syndicate in May, 1907. The concession involved the build- 
ing of the road only. (Roekhill, Treaties, 1891-1901, pp. 225-230.) 
Construction was begun in 1898 and the road was opened to traffic in 
December, 1905. It was built from a loan of £1,500,000 from Franco- 
Belgian capitalists, which was redeemed in 1908 from a loan of 
£5,000,000 from Anglo-French capitalists secured upon sundry taxes. 
The railway reverted to Chinese control on January 1, 1909. 

In 1898 the British obtained a number of concessions for the con- 
struction of railways in the Yangtsze Valley and in south and south- 
western China (Ibid., pp. 281-304). The British and Germans 
together obtained the right to build a line from Tientsin to Pukow, 
opposite Nanking. The construction of the northern (German) sec- 
tion of this line was begun on July 1, 1908, and it was formally 
completed on March 31. 1913. The construction of the southern 
(British) section line was begun in February, 1909, and opened to 
traffic in June, 1912. The Peking Syndicate, an Anglo-Italian com- 
bination, obtained mining and railway concessions in the Provinces 
of Shansi and Honan north of the Yellow River (Ibid., pp. 305-308). 
The Russo-Chinese Bank secured the right to build a line from 
Chengting, on the Peking-Hankow road, to Taiyuan, the capital city 
of Shansi Province (Ibid., pp. 309-310). French capitalists in Sep- 
tember. 1899. signed an agreement by the terms of which thejr ob- 
tained the right to construct the Lungchow-Xanking road. 



314 

... THE ATTEMPT TO FORMULATE A NATIONAL RAILWAY POLICY, 1S9S. 

This period of concession grabbing was brought to an end by the 
action of the Chinese Government in creating in August, 1898, the 
board of mines and railways, which along with the Tsung-li Yamen. 
memoralized the throne to the effect that "with the exception of 
the trunk and branch lines already arranged for and sanctioned, the 
construction of which will be proceeded with in order, no other lines 
shall be undertaken for the present." The memorial was approved 
by the throne and its contents notified to the powers. 

About the time this decree was issued the British minister in 
Peking in a dispatch, subsequently printed in the Blue Book, 
"Affairs of China" (No. 1, (1889)* pp. 341-317) summarized the 
concessions granted to all nations up to November 23, 1898. The total 
length of line represented was approximately 6,420 miles, divided 
according to the nationality of the concessionaries as follows: 
British. 2,800 miles in 9 different concessions: Russian, 1,530 miles 
in 3 different concessions; German, 720 miles in 2 different conces- 
sions: Belgian. 750 miles in 1 concession; French. 120 miles in 3 
different concessions: and American, 300 miles in 1 concession. 

SITUATION IN 1910. 

In 1916 China possessed 6,167 miles of railways, with 2,300 miles 
more under construction. An imperial edict of May 9, 1911, ordered 
that all trunk lines, under construction or projected, were to be taken 
over by the government, while branch railways were to be allowed 
to be undertaken by the people according to their ability. This order, 
which contributed greatly to the unrest that resulted in the revolution 
of 1911, had special reference to the Szeclman-Hupeb Railway and 
the Canton-Hankow Railway. Under the Republic there has been a 
deeper sense of the advantages of a national system, and steps have 
been taken to nationalize railway expansion in China. China has 
in mind a vast program of railway expansion, but lacks the financial 
resources to carry it out. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 
SOURCES. 

British Parliamentary Papers, Chinese Affairs, volumes for the 
years 1891-1901. 

French Documents Diplomatiques, China, volumes for the years 
1894-1901. 

Rockhill, vV. W. Treaties and Conventions with and concerning 
China and Korea (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1901). 
Contains nearly all of the important concessions. 



315 



SECONDARY COOKS. 



Anderson, G. E. Eailway Situation in China. Special Consular 
Reports. (No. 48, Washington, D. C, 1911.) 

Hornbeck, S. K. Contemporary Politics in the Far East. (New 
York, Appleton, 1916.) Chaps. XII and XVII. 

Hsu, M. C. Railway Problems in China. (New York, Columbia 
University, 1915.) A doctoral dissertation which contains (Chap. 
Ill) a brief account of the subject under consideration. 

Kent, P. H. Railway Enterprise in China. (London, Edward 
Arnold, 1907.) In the appendices to this book are printed a num- 
ber of agreements between China and the concessionaries. It also 
contains a series of excellent maps. 

109. CHINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS, 1905-1914. 

1. INTRODUCTION. 

Some of the most important Chino- Japanese relations during 1905- 
1914 are covered by the article. The Question of South Manchuria. 
1904-1914. But there remain some considerations of general policy 
and a few particular incidents illustrating that policy which should 
be considered. 

2. TREATY OF PEKING, 1905, AND SECRET PROTOCOLS. 

The limitations imposed upon Chinese activities in Manchuria by 
Japan in the Treaty of Peking, signed on December 22, 1905. and 
more especially in the secret protocols of the same date (Rockhill, 
Treaties Relating to China and Korea, 1904-1908, pp. 131-140), were 
not relished by the Chinese. This was particularly true of article 3 of 
the secret protocols (See Millard, T. F.. Our Eastern Question, 
p. 431), which bound the Chinese Government, "for the purpose of 
protecting the interests of the South Manchurian Railway, not to 
construct, prior to the recovery by them of said railway, any main 
line in the neighborhood of and parallel to that railway, or any 
branch line which might be prejudicial to the interest of the above- 
mentioned railway." 

3. CHINESE POLICY OF OBSTRUCTION. 

Consequently China followed a policy of obstruction to Japanese- 
plans, more particularly in connection with the Fakumen Railway 
scheme (See article. The Question of South Manchuria. 1904-1914) 
and the Antung Railway controversy. 

This policy was later abandoned to a certain extent, more espe- 
cially after the Russo-Japanese entente of 1910 (See article. The 



316 

Question of South Manchuria); but Chinese susceptibilities were fre- 
quently outraged by Japan's conduct apropos of certain incidents 

which occurred from time to time and which were calculated to dis- 
turb the harmony of Chino- Japanese relations, had such harmony 

existed. 

I. Till' (HANOI, I AFFAIR, 1911. 

There were many such incidents, but only a lew of them attained 
wide publicity. One of these was 1 he Changli affair. On September 
11, 1911, some Japanese soldiers at the railway station in Changli 
(just outside of Manchuria) filched some fruit from a Chinese ped 

dler. A Chinese policeman who delected them in the act. compelled 

them to restore the stolen goods. Thai nighl the soldiers returned 
and provoked a quarrel with another peddler. The policeman again 

interfered when 40 armed Japanese soldiers appeared and, surround- 
ing the station, demanded from (he Chinese officer at the station the 
surrender of the policeman. Upon being asked to return the 
next day, the enraged Japanese not only killed the Chinese officer, 
but fired into a group of Chinese policemen and civilians with the 
result that four policemen and one civilian were killed. After Loot- 
ing the railway station the Japanese soldiers also Looted the Chinese 
police station. When a Chinese magistrate arrived on the scene, 
he was seized by the Japanese, taken to their barracks, and threat- 
ened with death unless ho signed a report of the proceedings which 
they had written. 

There being a divergence in the Chinese and Japanese version of 
the facts in the ease, both sides appointed members of a commission 
which, after an investigation, confirmed the Chinese version. China 
then made four moderate demands for compensation, but these were 
ignored until nearly a year later, when the Japanese Government 
agreed to pay $13,000 (in Mexican currency) to the families of the 
five murdered policemen and to order their railway guards to apolo- 
gize to the Chinese magistrate at Changli. 

5. THE NANKING AFFAIR, 1913. 

Another of these incidents was the Nanking affair. When Nanking 
was surrendered by the rebels on September ;> >. L913, there followed 
several days of riot and looting. Among others two Japanese bar- 
bers and two shopkeepers were killed. The Japanese Government 
at once made the following six demands: 

(1) The execution in the presence of the Japanese consul of the 
soldiers who killed the Japanese and looted the Japanese shops, as 
also the execution or severe punishment of their superior officers. 

( k J) That (Jen. Chang Hsun and his officers be severely repri- 
manded immediately after the execution. 



317 

(3) That Gen. Chang proceed in person to the Japanese consulate, 
and express his regrets, 

(4) That an indemnity be paid to the families of the dead and 
to the proprietors of the shops that were looted. 

(5) That the entire regiment to which the guilty soldiers belonged 
should march to the Japanese consulate and salute with their arms. 

(6) That the Chinese Government apologize to the Japanese Gov- 
ernment. 

These demands were accepted by the Chinese Government and an 
indemnity of $641,845 (Mexican) was paid. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

On Chino-Japanese relations during this period see especially: 
Hornbeck, S. K., Contemporary Politics in the Far East (New 
York; Applcton. L916), chs. II & L5; Millard, T. F., America and 
the Far Eastern Question (New York, Moffat, L909), passim: Law- 
ton, L., Empires of the Far Fast (in 2 vols., London. Richards, 1912), 
Vol. [I, Book VII, passim; Millard, T. F., Our Eastern Question 
(New York, Century Co., 1916), ch. 1; and various works by B. L. 
Putnam Weale. 

For an account of the Changli and Nanking incidents see ('row, C, 
Japan and America (New York, McBride, 1916), pp. -211-247. 

110. JAPAN'S RELATIONS WITH KOREA, 1904-1910. 

1. TREATY OF 1804. 

On February 23, 1904, within a few weeks after the outbreak of the 
Russo-Japanese War, Japan negotiated a protocol with the Korean 
Government in which she guaranteed the "independence and terri- 
torial integrity of the Korean Empire," and agreed to protect Korea 
against the "aggressions of a third power or internal disturbances.' 1 
In return the Korean Government undertook to "place full confi- 
dence in the Imperial Government of Japan, and adopt the advice 
of the latter regarding improvements in administration." It also 
gave to Japan the right to "occupy, when circumstances require it, 
such places as may be necessary from the strategical point of view." 
(British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 98, p. 842.) 

2. THE PROTOCOL OF 1904. 

On August 22, 1904, a new agreement was signed. By the third 
article Korea agreed: "When concluding any treaty with a foreign 
power or other important transaction in the nature of agreements 
granting special rights to individual foreigners, and so forth, the 
Korean Government will consult the Government of Japan." Korea 



318 

also agreed to engage two officials recommended by the Japanese 
Government. One was to act as financial adviser. His advice was to 
be " sought and followed in all financial matters." The other was to 
serve as diplomatic adviser. His advice was to be " sought ami fol- 
lowed in all international questions of an important nature." (Ibid., 
vol. 98, p. 843.) 

.-,. CONVENTION OF 1905. 

On November 17, 1905, Marquis Ito. acting for Japan at Seoul, 
secured the signing of a convention which gave Japan complete con- 
trol over the external affairs of Korea. The Government of Korea 
agreed "'not to conclude hereafter any act or engagement having an 
international character except through the medium of the Govern- 
ment of Japan.'' A Japanese resident general was to reside at Seoul 
"primarily for the purpose of taking charge of and directing matters 
relating to diplomatic affairs/' (Ibid., vol. 98. pp. 1139-1140.) 

4. CONVENTION OF 190 7. 

* 

Three Koreans, who claimed to act by the authority of the Em- 
peror of Korea, appeared at the Hague during the Peace Conference 
of 1907 and issued an appeal to the delegates. Their action, if author- 
ized, was a violation of the convention of 1905. The incident led 
directly to a situation which resulted in the abdication of the Em- 
peror of Korea m favor of the Crown Prince on July 19 and the con- 
clusion on July 24 of a new convention which gave Japan control over 
the internal affairs of Korea. By the terms of this instrument Korea 
agreed to " act under the guidance of the Resident-General in respect 
to reforms in administration;" "not to enact any laws, ordinances. 
or regulations, nor to take any important measures of administration 
without the previous assent of the Resident-General ; " that appoint- 
ment and dismissal of all high officials should be made upon the con- 
currence of the Resident-General. Korea also agreed to " appoint as 
Korean officials Japanese subjects recommended by the Resident- 
General " and that no foreigners should be engaged without his con- 
sent. (Ibid. vol. 101, p. 280.) 

5. THE TREATY OF ANNEXATION, AUGUST 2 2, 1910. 

The attempt to govern Korea indirectly by a Resident-General en- 
countered internal disturbances and difficulties. In 1909 Marquis 
Ito, who had recently retired from the office of Resident-General, wa • 
assassinated and an attempt was made shortly afterward to kill the 
Korean prime minister. This condition of affairs led to the treaty of 
August 22, 1910. by which Korea was formally annexed to Japan. 
(See Appendix I, 96.) 



319 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

There does not appear to be any thoroughly impartial secondary 
account of Japan's diplomatic relations with Korea during the years 
1904-1910. Hurlbert, Homer B., The Passing of Korea (New York, 
Doubleday, Page & Co., 1906), has given an account with a strong 
anti- Japanese bias; and Ladd, G. T., In Korea with Marquis Ito 
(Xew York, Scribners, 1908), with an equally strong pro-Japanese 
bias. 

For an excellent article on "La situation internanonale de la 
Coree," see Rey, F., in Revue generale de droit international pub- 
lic " (1906), vol. 13, pp. 40-58. 

Rene Terriou, Le Status international de la Coree anterieurement 
au 29 aout 1910 (Paris, Giard, 1911) ; B. L. Putnam- Weale, The 
Truce in the East, chapter 3 (Xew York, Macmillan, 1907) ; Maurice 
Courant in La Vie politique dans les deux mondes, vol. I, pp. 457- 
462; vol. IV, pp. 433~441, and Perrinjaquet in Revue generale de 
droit international public, vol. 17, pp. 532 - 548 (1910), write from a 
pronounced anti-Japanese point of view. 

For the texts of the various treaties and conventions, see British 
and Foreign State Papers, vols. 98, 101, 103. For the Treaty of 
Annexation, see Japan Year Book for 1912 (Tokio, 1912), pp. 630- 
'631. The Annual Reports on Reform and Progress in Chosen 
(Korea) for the years 1907 to 1911, issued by the Japanese Govern- 
ment-General (Seoul, 1908-1911), furnish valuable data on condi- 
tions and events in Korea. 

111. CHINA AND THE SIX POWER LOAN SYNDICATE, 

1908-1913. 

1. THE CHINESE RAILWAY LOAN, 19 09. 

American financiers first showed an interest in Chinese develop- 
ment in connection with the Canton-Hankow Railway enterprise in 
1898, when the American China Development Co. was formed. In 
1909 China was planning to complete the Canton-Hankow Railway, 
and English, French, and German banking groups were ready to 
advance to China the necessary funds. 

With the support of the Administration, an American financial 
group was formed which asked to be permitted to participate in 
this loan to China. (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1910, 
pp. 243-245.) The European groups objecting, the State De- 
partment took up the matter directly with the Chinese Government, 
which promptly recognized the justice of the American request and 
decided that the American group must be included in the negotia- 
tions of the four power loan for the Hankow Railway (Ibid.). This 



320 

loan agreement was concluded in May, 1010 (Ibid., -281-28-2). (See 
article. The Open-Door Policy in China, 100-1-1014.) 

2. THE REORGANIZATION LOAN, 1911-1913. 

After Yuan Shi-kai had succeeded in mastering the Revolution of 
1011 and had been selected as temporary President of the new Chinese 
Republic, he planned to make a large loan from the powers for his 
schemes of so-called "reorganization. 1 ' Russia and Japan, though 
debtor nations, forced their way into the four power loan group or 
syndicate, which thus became a six power group. The negotiations 
for this loan lasted two years. The six power loan syndicate un- 
doubtedly aimed at a monopoly of loans to China. (Hornbeck. 
p. 303.) ' 

There was much opposition to this syndicate in China and much 
jealousy and wrangling between the powers. But by the spring of 
1013 matters had become pretty well adjusted, and a revised proposal 
was submitted to the Chinese Government, only to be rejected be- 
cause of the evident attempt to exercise political control indirectly 
through financial means. 

3. PRESIDENT WILSON'S DECLARATION, 1913. 

Such were conditions in China when President Wilson and Mr. 
Bryan succeeded Mr. Taft and Mr. Knox. Within a few weeks after 
his inauguration in March, 1013, President Wilson declared: 

The conditions of the loan seem to us to touch very nearly the administra- 
tive independence of China itself, and this administration does not feel that it 
ought, even by Implication, to be a party to those conditions. The responsibil- 
ity on iis part which would !>e Implied in requesting the bankers to undertake 
die loan might conceivably go the length in some unhappy contingency of 
forcible interference in the financial and even the political affairs of that .ureal 
Oriental Stale just now awakening to a consciousness of its power and its 
Obligations to its people. (American Journal of International Law, VII, 338.) 

Upon this announcement the American group promptly with- 
drew from the six power syndicate. Though the remaining five 
powers continued their negotiations with China and finally made 
her a loan of $125,000,000, the defection of the United States marked 
the beginning of the dissolution of the group. The British Govern- 
ment stood for a time by its pledges to the group, but finally yielded 
to the pressure of British public opinion and lifted the embargo on 
the independent investment of British capital in China. The loan 
power syndicate was at an end. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

Most of the documents are in Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 1000 and 1010. Hornbeck, S. K.. Contemporary Politics in 



321 

the Far East (New York, Appleton, 1916), pp. 391-396, gives a 
clear, concise account. For details see The Far Eastern Review since 
1904 (Shanghai, G. B. Rea). 

112. THE QUESTION OF SOUTH MANCHURIA, 1905-1914. 

1. THE TREATY OF PORTSMOUTH, 1905 (SEE APPENDIX I, 73). 

By the Portsmouth treaty of September 5, 1905, Russia recognized 
Japan's paramount interest in Korea and engaged not to interfere 
with measures which Japan might find it necessary to take there. 
Russia transferred to Japan the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula 
and Port Arthur, the railway line south of Chang-chun and appur- 
tenant coal mines — that is to say, all Russian interests and special 
rights in South Manchuria. The two countries agreed to withdraw 
their troops completely within 18 months, reserving the right to 
maintain guards along the railways. They engaged to restore to 
China the administration of the places evacuated. Russia disavowed 
the possession in Manchuria of " any territorial advantages or prefer- 
ential or exclusive concessions to the impairment of China's sover- 
eignty or inconsistent with the principle of equal opportunity." 
Both powers promised " not to obstruct any general measure common 
to all countries which China may take for the development of the 
commerce and industries of Manchuria " ; and to use " their respective 
railways in Manchuria exclusively for commercial and industrial 
purposes and in no way for strategic purposes," except in the Liao- 
tung Peninsula (See article, The Treaty of Portsmouth, 1905). 

2. THE PEKING ("kOMURA") TREATY, 1905. 

On December 22, 1905, Baron Komura (who had represented Japan 
at Portsmouth) secured at Peking a treaty (See Appendix I, 75) 
wherein China confirmed Japan's new position. China consented to 
the transfer of rights, which Russia had made in respect to Man- 
churia, to Japan. The Japanese engaged in regard to the leased 
territory and the construction and exploitation of railways, " so far 
as circumstances permit, [to] conform to the original agreements 
concluded between Russia and China." China promised to open 16 
new towns in Manchuria " for international residence and trade." 
China agreed that Japan might " improve " the railway line which 
she had constructed from Antung to Mukden during the war. Each 
country guaranteed the other most-favored-nation treatment on the 
Manchuria-Korea frontier. 
53706—18 21 



322 



3. THE SECRET PROTOCOLS. 



In connection with the Peking treaty of 1905, there was also framed 
and signed a set of secret protocols (Ibid). The most important 
article was the following : 

The Chinese Government engages, for the purpose of protecting the interests 
of the South Manchurian Railway, not to construct prior to the recovery by 
them of the said railway, any main line in the neighborhood of and parallel to 
that railway, or any branch line which might be prejudicial to the interest of 
the above mentioned railway. 

This engagement was destined to have a telling and disastrous 
effect upon China's subsequent efforts to hold her own in Manchuria 
and upon the endeavors of foreign competitors to avail themselves 
of the existence of the supposed rights of " equal opportunity " in 
South Manchuria. 

Another of the articles, No. 9, provided that : 

If no objection be offered on the part of Russia respecting the navigation of 
the Sungari (by Japanese vessels), China shall consent to such navigation 

after negotiations. 

-» 

This is the key to a portion of the Russo-Japanese agreement of 
1916. 

4. JAPAN'S POSITION IN MANCHURIA, 190 5. 

Japan had declared both at the beginning and at the end of the 
war that she was saving Manchuria for China. Japan evicted Russia, 
not from Manchuria, but from South Manchuria; she took Russia's 
place in South Manchuria, leaving Russia in North Manchuria. 

During the Russo-Japanese War the Japanese people had come 
to expect a huge cash indemnity from Russia. There developed 
among them now the impression that the United States had pre- 
vented their diplomats from securing this at Portsmouth. Marquis 
Ito had arranged tentatively with Mr. Harriman for the sale of the 
railway lines in South Manchuria to the latter. Baron Komura 
vetoed this arrangement and elaborated among Japanese statesmen 
the policy whereby Japan should secure in Manchuria the indemnifi- 
cation which she had not been able to secure by negotiation. 

Japan had actually secured through the war and the Portsmouth 
treat}' great gains. By the treaty she escaped the necessity of 
taking the chance of a further conflict; she gained a free hand in 
Korea, a free hand in the Liaotung Peninsula for at least the next 
18 years, exclusive rights in the zone of the South Manchurian Rail- 
way for the next 34 years at least, the sweeping pledges of the secret 
protocols with China. And while the Portsmouth negotiations were 
in progress, she had secured the amendment of the Anglo-Japanese 
agreement which made the alliance both defensive and offensive and 



323 

assured her the future support of Great Britain. (See article. The 
Renewals of the Anglo- Japanese Alliance, 1905 and 1911.) 

5. CONSTRUCTION OF THE PORTSMOUTH TREATY. 

When at various times since 1905, it has been complained that 
Japan has interpreted the Portsmouth treaty very broadly, the reply 
has been forthcoming that the Portsmouth treaty is an instrument 
whose construction is to be determined by and between the contract- 
ing parties, Japan and Russia — and in so far as it was ratified by 
her, China, and that it is not the concern of other powers. This 
is correct only in so far as the construction put upon the clauses of 
that treaty or of the treaties accessory thereto does not interfere 
with the principles of the open door and equality of opportunity to 
which both Russia and Japan have subscribed in pledges which are 
essentially international in character. 

6. JAPAN'S RIGHTS IN MANCHURIA. 

By the Portsmouth treaty Japan came into possession in Man- 
churia of 700 miles of railway, 7,054 square miles of railway zone, 
certain mines, and 1,300 square miles of land in the leased territory. 
Russia retained 1,000 miles of railway lines and 513.63 square miles 
of land. The possession of railway lines means possession of the 
strategic and economic keys to Manchuria. 

The main points of disagreement between the Japanese and 
Chinese Governments have been with regard to: (1) Railway con- 
struction; (2) mines and timber concessions; (3) certain adminis- 
trative and territorial matters. 

7. THE SOUTH MANCHURIAN RAILWAY COMPANY. 

By imperial ordinance of June 7, 1906, the Japanese Government 
organized the South Manchurian Railway Co. Nominally an in- 
dependent company, the South Manchurian Railway has been in 
fact an instrument of the Japanese Government. This became clear 
in 1913. The South Manchurian Railway Co. was given very wide 
powers. By imperial ordinance of July 31, 1906, the government 
general of Kwantung (the leased territory) was organized. This 
was amended January 10, 1908. The Kwantung government and 
South Manchurian Railway Co. have between them performed, 
most of the functions of a colonial railway administration. 

8. THE ANTUNG-MUKDEN RAILWAY. 

China agreed in the treaty of December 22, 1905, that Japan might 
" improve " the Antung-Mukden railway, the work to be begun 
within one year and to be completed within two years thereafter, the 



324 

whole line to be purchased by China at the end of 15 years after 
completion. This would coincide with the year of the expiration 
of the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula, 1923. The Japanese did 
nothing toward the improving of the line until three years later. 
They then set about a complete reconstruction. This occasioned 
diplomatic controversies with China, during which Japan threw 
soldiers into the region and proceeded with the construction. On 
August f>, 1909, Japan delivered to China an ultimation. The 
Chinese then signed the agreement which Japan proposed (August 
19, 1909). Japan constructed a first-class broad gauge line which 
connects the Korean Trunk Line with the Manchurian trunk lines 
and the Trans-Siberian. Along this line iron and coal mines are 
being developed. 

9. BRANCH RAILWAY LINE TO YINGKOW (NEWCHWANG) . 

After some controversy concerning rights based on Article III of 
the Eusso-Chinese railway agreement of June 24, 1898, Japan and 
China arrived at an agreement in Article II of the Manchurian con- 
vention of September 4, 1909. (Appendix I, 92.) The Tashichao- 
Yingkow branch of the South Manchurian railway line was to be 
held by Japan and to be delivered up to China at the expiration of 
the term of the concession of the South Manchurian line. This made 
Newchwang another base for Japan's commercial operations. There 
is at Newchwang a Japanese " concession " and a Japanese " railway 
settlement." 

10. THE HSINMINTUN-FAKUMA RAILWAY SCHEME. 

On November 8, 1907, an agreement was concluded between the 
British firm of railway constructors, Pauling & Co., and the British 
and Chinese corporation on the one side, and the Chinese Govern- 
ment on the other, providing for the construction of a railway from 
Hsinmintun to Fakumen. This was to be a 50-mile extension of the 
imperial railways of North China. China had contemplated this 
extension for several years and tentative agreements of date as early 
as 1898 had a bearing on the question. In the 1907 project, British- 
business interests and the Chinese Government were concerned. In 
October, 1907, and in January, 1908, Japan protested; the protests 
were based on article 3 of the secret protocols to the Komura treaty 
of 1905 and on provisions of the Eusso-Chinese treaty of April 8, 
1902. From whatever point of view the controversy is considered, 
Article VIII of the Eusso-Chinese convention of March 27, 1898, 
should be kept in mind: 

This railway concession [the original South Manchurian] is never to be 
used as a pretext for encroachment on Chinese territory, nor to be allowed to 
interfere with Chinese authority or interests. (Hertslet, China Treaties, I, 
208.) 



325 

The dispute was settled, temporarily at least, by the signing of 
the Manchurian convention of September 4, 1909, between China 
and Japan. (See Appendix I, 92.) There, by Article I, " The Gov- 
ernment of China engages that in the event of its undertaking to 
construct a railway between Hsinmintun and Fakumen it shall 
arrange previously with the Government of Japan." 

11. THE KNOX " NEUTRALIZATION " SCHEME. 

In 1909, Mr. Knox, then Secretary of State, resolved to submit to 
the consideration of the powers a scheme for the neutralization of 
the railways built and to be built in Manchuria. This he regarded 
as a logical following up of the efforts which Mr. Hay, as Sec- 
retary of State, had made on behalf of the " open-door " policy. 
Mr. Knox proposed that the powers, especially the United States, 
Great Britain, Japan, Russia, Germany, and France should together 
loan China the money which would be necessary to purchase the 
interests of Japan and Russia and to construct further railway lines 
in Manchuria. To China would be left all her sovereign rights in 
Manchuria. China's right to buy back the existing lines in 1913 
was to be anticipated. (See article, The Open Door in China, 1904- 
1914.) For the time being the lines were to be placed under inter- 
national control. 

It appears that the Knox proposals were deliberately made public 
in St. Petersburg while still in the stage of confidential diplomatic 
suggestions. The Russian and the Japanese press denounced both 
the project and the proposer. The Japanese Government had long 
since committed itself to the Komura and Katsura policy of Man- 
churian exploitation, and the Japanese people looked upon Man- 
churia as theirs by right of conquest. In January, 1910, both Japan 
and Russia officially announced their disapproval of the Knox pro- 
posals. (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1910, pp. 245-251.) 

12. MINES AND TIMBER CONCESSIONS. 

In the summer of 1907 the Chinese asked for the restoration of a 
part of the Fushun mines and some others. The matter was disposed 
of in the Manchurian agreement of September 4, 1909, Articles III 
and IV. (Appendix I, 92.) The net result is that Japan works and 
controls the coal mines in South Manchuria. 

A dispute between China and Japan with regard to the Chientao 
region on the Korean-Manchurian boundary was disposed of in part 
by the " Chientao convention " of September 4, 1909. (Albin, Grands 
Traites, 501-503.) 

The dispute concerning the operation of the Yalu timber conces- 
sion was settled by a compromise in an agreement signed on May 
14, 1908. 



326 

13. REDUCTION OF CUSTOMS DUTY AT TALU RIVER. 

When the Antung-Mukden Railway was completed in October, 
1911, the Japanese Government made representations to the Chinese 
Government asking that Japan be given the benefit at Antung of 
reduced, customs rates such as Russia enjoyed on the Russia-China 
frontier. (France and Great Britain enjoyed similar privileges on 
other frontiers.) The Japanese claim was based on the most- 
favored-nation provision in the Japan-China treaty of December 22, 
1905, article 11. The Japanese request was granted, and went into 
effect on June 2. 1913. As a consequence, goods entering South Man- 
churia, at Antung. by rail from Korean points other than New Wiju, 
enjoy a reduction by one-third of the customs duties. 

14. RUSSO-JAPANESE CONVENTION OF JULY 4, 1910. 

The Russian Government confirmed practically everything that 
Japan had acquired and accomplished in South Manchuria, as well 
as Japan's position with regard to the Knox neutralization scheme, 
in the Russo-Japanese convention of July 4, 1910. In this by Article 
II : " Each * * * engages to maintain and respect the status quo 
in Manchuria, resulting from the treaties, conventions, and other 
arrangements concluded up to this day between Japan and Russia, 
or between either of these two powers and China." (Albin, 504.) 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

For the fullest treatment of these matters, see Millard, T. E., The 
New Far East (New York, Scribner, 1906) ; Ibid, America and the 
Far East (New York, Moffat, 1909) ; Ibid, Our Eastern Question 
(New York, The Century Co., 1916) ; Lawton, L., The Empires of 
the Far East (London, 1912, in 2 vols.) Vol. II, Bk. 7, pp. 1109-1358; 
Putnam-Weale, B. L., The Truce in the East (New York, Mac- 
millan, 1907), passim (See index-Manchuria, Japan in). 

For a good brief account of " Japan in South Manchuria," see 
Hornbeck, S. K., Contemporary Politics in the Far East (New York, 
Appleton, 1916), ch. 15. 

For texts of treaties and documents, see Rockhill, W. W., Treaties, 
Conventions, Agreements, Ordinances, etc., relating to China and 
Korea (Oct., 1904-Jan., 1908), (Washington, Govt. Printing Office, 
1908) ; Traites et conventions entre l'Empire du Japon et les puis- 
sances etrangeres, Ministere des affaires etrangeres (Tokio, 1908) ; 
Millard, T. E., Our Eastern Question (New York, Century Co., 
1916), Appendices, pp. 393 ff.; Putnam-Weale, B. L., The Fight for 
the Republic (New York, Dodd, 1917), Appendices; The Japan Year 



327 

Books (Tokio, 1906-1917), since 1906 (See chapters on "Diplo- 
macy"; and The Far-Eastern Review (Manila, P. I., Shanghai, and 
Yokohama) since 1904 (See especially for Railway concessions). 

113. THE THIBET QUESTION, 1880-1914. 

1. POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH CHINA. 

It is important to understand that the territory occupied by 
Thibetans and popularly known as Thibet is divided, generally 
speaking, into 

First: Indefinite districts on the Chinese frontier bordering the 
Chinese provinces of Kansu and Szechuen, controlled by small 
Chinese military forces and recognizing no secular allegiance to the 
Dalai Lama. They are under local kings or chiefs and comprise a 
number of ecclesiastical fiefs. 

Second : The much greater extent of territory governed by the 
secular and religious head of the Lama Buddhists, known as the 
Dalai Lama, who resides at the city of Lhasa. (The Tashi Lama, 
head of the monastery at Tashilhunpo, is recognized by some wor- 
shipers to have superior religious rank.) 

The political relations described below pertain to the Lhasa Gov- 
ernment, that of the Dalai Lama or grand lama, the Chinese re- 
gions of Thibet coming under the authority and administration of 
Peking. 

From 1720 to the present day Thibet has been a State varying in 
extent of autonomy, but always subject to China, and paying, for- 
merly real, but for many years nominal and insignificant, tribute 
to Peking. It is a very unproductive farming and cattle raising 
country of miserable poverty, ignorant and backward. Its military 
force is almost nothing. 

2. RUSSIAN INTRIGUE. 

In 1880, at a time when Great Britain feared the aggressive de- 
signs of Russia in various parts of the world, a buriat lama named 
Dorjieff went down to Lhasa, became intimate with the Dalai Lama 
and remained with him for a number of years. Dorjieff proposed a 
Russian protectorate, encouraged hostility to Great Britain and in- 
vited the Dalai Lama to visit St. Petersburg. Both the Chinese resi- 
dent at Lhasa (called an ambban) and the British authorities in 
India looked with suspicion on developments resulting from Dor- 
jieff's intrigue. A few arms were imported from Russia, and Thi- 
betan encroachments took place on the Indian frontier State of 
Sikkim. 



328 

3. THE BRITISH EXPEDITION OF 1904. 

In 1004 ;i British military mission under Col. (later Sir) F. E. 
Younghusband, marched with unimportant opposition to Lhasa, 
whence the Dalai Lama fled with Dorjieif to Urga in northern Mon- 
golia near the borders of Siberia. With those high lamas who re- 
mained behind Young-husband negotiated a treaty (See Appendix 
I, 09) stipulating that frontiers were to be respected; marts to be 
established at three towns — Gartok, Gyantse, and Yatung; Thibet 
was to pay an indemnity of £r>00,000 (subsequently reduced to a 
third of that sum) : that no part of the territory of Thibet would be 
alienated to a foreign power; and no power was to receive any eon- 
cession in Thibet, territorial or mercantile, or to concern itself with 
the government of Thibet, without the consent of the British Gov- 
ernment. The indemnity was to be paid in 75 annual installments, 
and the Chumbe Valley was to be occupied by the British until pay- 
ment had been made. 

In 1900 a ratifying convention (See Appendix I, 09) was signed be- 
tween China and Great Britain approving the Lhasa agreement. 
Britain engaged to annex no Thibetan territory and not to interfere 
in the administration of Thibet. China undertook to permit no 
other foreign state to interfere with the territory or internal ad- 
ministration of Thibet. 

4. THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN CONVENTION OF 1907. 

The Anglo-Russian convention of August 31, 1907 (See Appendix 
I, 81, and article, The Formation of the Triple Entente), recognized 
the suzerain rights of China in Thibet, agreed that neither Britain 
nor Russian should seek concessions there, and that neither should 
retain an official representative at Lhasa. 

5. CHINO-THIBETAN RELATIONS, 1910-1911. 

In 1910, after a dispute between the Chinese Government and the 
Dalai Lama, the latter fled to India because the Chinese sent troops 
into Lhasa. He was followed to the frontier by the Chinese troops 
and was deposed by an imperial decree of the Manchu court. He 
appealed to the British for support, which they declined to give, 
though they notified the Chinese Government that they expected 
the Chinese troops to respect the frontiers of the North Indian 
States of Butan and Sikkim. 

Within a year the anti-Manchu revolt so disorganized Chinese 
power that the Chinese troops withdrew. The Dalai Lama was able 
to return to Lhasa and immediately proclaimed his independence of 
China, and many of the Thibetans made preparations for fighting 



•> 



29 



Chinese troops. In some regions conflicts actually occurred. The 
British Government in 1911 informed the Peking Government that 
they would not permit China again to send military forces into 
Thibet — meaning evidently that portion of Thibet governed by the 
Dalai Lama. But this is not taken to mean that the British deny the 
protection of a sufficient bodyguard to the Chinese Amban. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

Thibet, and our relations with it. Quarterly Review, vol. 214, pp. 
45-00 (1911). 

Payen, E. Les Anglais au Thibet. Annales des sciences politiques, 
vol. 19, pp. 569-580 (1904). 

For the British Expedition of 1904, see Loudon, P., The Unveiling 
of Lhasa (London, 1905). On Anglo-Thibetan Relations, see British 
Parliamentary Papers, East India (Tibet), Cd. 5240 (1910). 

For the texts of the conventions of 1904 and 1906 between Great 
Britain and Thibet, see Hertslet, China Treaties (London, 1908), 
Vol. I, No. 32, pp. 202-208. 

114. THE MONGOLIAN QUESTION, 1881-1915. 

1. INTRODUCTION . 

The vast stretch of territory in Central Asia known as Outer 
Mongolia has been tributary to China since 1G91 A. D., though the 
Chinese appear to have admitted the right of the Mongols to local 
autonomy or self-government. 

2. THE RUSSO- CHINESE TREATY OF 1881. 

The Russo-Chinese treaty of 1881 (Hertslet, China Treaties, I, 
483-491), which, among other things, included articles relative to 
Mongolia, gave to Russia the right to place consuls in certain cities 
of Turkestan and Mongolia, as also the right to trade free of all 
duties. Furthermore, Russian merchants were permitted to buy 
ground and build houses, shops, and warehouses in cities where 
Russian consulates should be established. In addition to these 
privileges, a zone was established along the Russo-Chinese frontier 
within which all imports and exports to or from either county 
should be entirely free of duty. 

The treaty of 1881 was renewed in 1891 and 1901, and was again 
due for renewal on August 20, 1911. 

In 1910 Russia repeatedly called the attention of the Chinese 
foreign office to alleged infractions of the treaty by Chinese officers, 
and there were other differences which clearly showed that the terms 
of the treaty were not interpreted in the same way by the two 
governments. 



330 

3. THE CONFERENCE AT URG \. 1 9 1 1 . 

In July, 1011, owing to the penetration of numerous Chinese 
colonists into Mongolia in quest of bind and trade, a number of 

Mongol princes and lamas held a conference at Urga to consider the 
situation. They decided to send a deputation to St. Petersburg to 
ask for Russian aid and protection. Russia appears to have agreed 
to use her good offices with China, and. accordingly, made certain, 
representations in favor of the Mongols at Peking, which do not 
seem to have home immediate fruit. 

4. THE MONGOLS DECLARE THEIR INDEPENDENCE, 1911. 

Taking advantage of the opportunity afforded by the outbreak of 
the Chinese Revolution of 1011. the Mongols held a second confer- 
ence in the latter part of 1911, and formally declared Outer Mon- 
golia independent of China. The Hutukhtu of Urga was chosen 
Emperor and crowned with great ceremony on December 28, 1011. 
The independence of Mongolia received no recognition except by 
Thibet 

5. THE RUSSO-MONGOLIAN AGREEMENT OF 1912. 

On November 3, 1012 (See Appendix I, 106), an agreement be- 
tween Russia and Mongolia was signed in which Russia pledged her 
aid in the maintenance of Mongolia's autonomy and the right to 
have her own army, as also to exclude Chinese colonists and troops 
from her soil. -In return for this aid and protection, Mongolia 
granted to Russians certain rights and privileges, such as the right 
of free trade, to lease and own real property, of fishing, lumbering, 
mining, etc. 

6. THE RUSSO-CHINESE DECLARATION OF 1913. 

The Chinese were considerably stirred by these events and there 
was some talk of war at Peking, but a serious crisis was averted by 
the Russo-Chinese declaration signed on November 5, 1013. (See 
Appendix I, 111). By the terms of this declaration, Russia recog- 
nized the suzerainty of China over Outer Mongolia, and China, on 
her part, acknowledged its autonomy. The convention expressly 
agreed to the principles set forth in the Russo-Mongolian agreement 
of 1012 and assented to the stipulations regarding Russian commer- 
cial privileges set forth in the protocol to that agreement. 

7. THE RUSSO-MONGOLIAN RAILWAY AGREEMENT OF 1914. 

On September 30, 1014 (See Appendix 1, 112) , Russia entered into a 
railway agreement with Mongolia by the terms of which she ob- 



331 

tained the right to advise Outer Mongblia in deciding what railway 
lines were to be built in thai region, thus practically assuring Rus- 
sian control over any future Mongolian railway lines. 

8. THE TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT OP L915 BETWEEN RUSSIA, CHINA, AND 

MONGOLIA. 

The keystone of this whole structure was to have been the tri- 
partite agreement between Russia, China, and Mongolia which was 
signed on June 7, 1915. (See Appendix I, 114.) This agreement in- 
cludes the following provisions: 

(1) Outer Mongolia recognized the Chino-Russian convention of 
1913, which acknowledged China's suzerainty over her, and ex- 
pressly engages not to negotiate treaties with foreign powers re- 
specting political and territorial matters, although treaties respect- 
ing commercial and industrial matters are permissible. 

(2) Both Russia and China recognize the autonomy of Outer 
Mongolia and agree to abstain from all interference with the in- 
ternal administration of Outer Mongolia. 

(3) Chinese imports into Outer Mongolia are to be free of all 
duties and Russia's right to free trade in Outer Mongolia is con- 
firmed. 

(4) Chinese jurisdiction over Chinese residents of Outer Mon- 
golia is retained, but Chinese-Mongol mixed cases are to be adjudi- 
cated, Chinese and Mongol authorities acting conjointly. In Russo- 
Chinese mixed cases the Russian authorities may take part in de- 
ciding and drafting the judgment, even in actions heard in the 
Chinese court, and in which a Chinese is defendant. 

9. China is bound to consult Russia and Outer Mongolia in regard 
to all questions of a political or territorial nature. Thus, while 
China is nominally recognized as suzerain, Outer Mongolia is prac- 
tically under the joint protection of Russia and China according to 
the terms of this agreement. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

An excellent article on " The Relations between China, Russia, 
and Mongolia," by E. T. Williams is published in The American 
Journal of International Law for 1916, Vol. X, pp. T98-808. There 
is also a good account in The China Year Book for 1916 (New York, 
Dalton, 1916), pp. 571 ff. 

For the texts of the various agreements of 1912-1915, see Supple- 
ment to American Journal of International Law for 1915, Vol. X, 
pp. 239-258. For the text of the Russo-Chinese Treaty of 1881, see 
Hertslet. China Treaties (London, 1908), No. 85, pp. 483-91. 



332 
115. THE MOROCCO CRISIS OF 1905-1906. 

1. THE GERMAN EMPEROR AT TANGIER, MARCH 31, 1905. 

On March 31, 1905, the German Emperor appeared dramatically at 
Tangier, Morocco, and said : 

It is to the Sultan in his position as an independent sovereign that I am 
paying my visit to-day. I hope that under the sovereignty of the Sultan a free 
Morocco will remain, open to the peaceful rivalry of all nations, without 
monopoly or annexation, on the basis of absolute equality. The object of my 
visit to Tangier is to make it known that I am determined to do all in my 
power to safeguard efficaciously the interests of Germany in Morocco, for I look 
upon the Sultan as an absolutely independent sovereign. (Staatsarchiv, vol. 73, 
p. 117.) 

It should be recalled that when this challenge to France and Eng- 
land was delivered, the Russian Army had just been defeated at 
Mukden (in February, 1905). The speech itself was a denial of 
that principle of the Anglo-French convention of 1904 (See article, 
The Formation of the Entente Cordials), which had declared that 
it appertained to France to preserve order in Morocco and ft) " pro- 
vide assistance for the purpose of all administrative, economic, finan- 
cial, and military reforms which it may require." (British and For- 
eign State Papers, vol. 97, p. 39.) In short, Germany demanded that 
Morocco be placed under international instead of French control, and 
a reversal of French policy which almost necessarily involved the 
dismissal of M. Delcasse, the main French architect of the Entente 
Cordiale. (See article. The Resignation of Delcasse, 1905.) 

2. THE CONFERENCE AT ALGECTRAS, 1906. 

After long negotiations between France and Germany during the 
summer of 1905, it was finally arranged that the conference for the 
consideration of the Moroccan question should meet at Algeciras, 
opposite Gibraltar, in southern Spain, in January, 1906. 

The conference which consisted of delegates from France, Ger- 
many, Morocco, Great Britain, the United States, Austria, Belgium, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal. Russia, and Sweden, met on Janu- 
ary 6 and continued in session until April 7 when the final act was 
signed. Throughout its sessions, Great Britain gave her hearty 
support to France, who may, in general, be said to have enjoyed the 
support of Russia, Italy, the United States, and the smaller States. 
In fact, it can hardly be said that Germany received any hearty 
or sympathetic support except from Austria. 

3. THE ACT OF ALGECIRAS. 

The Act of Algeciras (See Appendix I, 77), consisting of 123 
articles, laid down the " threefold principle of the sovereignty and 



333 

independence of His Majesty the Sultan, the integrity of his domin- 
ions, and economic liberty without any inequality." Apart from 
regulations for the suppression of the traffic in arms and the better 
collection of taxes, the main provisions concerned the organization 
of a police force and a State bank. The organization of the police 
was entrusted to French and Spanish officers. The capital of the 
bank was divided into 14 equal shares, of which one share was 
allotted to each of the 12 signatory powers and the other two to 
interested French banks. Thus, while France and Spain were to act 
as the mandatories of the powers in the matters of banking and the 
police force, in reality they were given a privileged position. 

4. APPRAISEMENT. 

The speech of the Kaiser at Tangier was not an impulsive personal 
utterance, but was delivered in pursuance of the advice of the German 
Imperial Chancellor, Prince von Billow. (See Biilow, Imperial Ger- 
many, p. 81.) German action in the matter, Billow subsequently 
declared, was due to the fact that Germany " was not inclined to 
recognize the new situation created without her consent by the Anglo- 
French Moroccan treaty and the action of France in that country." 
(Ibid.) Germany sought, according to Biilow. to substitute an in- 
ternational agreement for the joint arrangement made by France and 
England in 1904. (Ibid. See article. The Formation of the Entente 
Cordiale.) Though the entire German aim in the Morocco crisis of 
1905-1906 can not be ascertained and established by indisputable evi- 
dence, since many of the documents have not yet been published, 
there seems no reason to doubt that the main purpose of the German 
Government was to break up the recently established Entente Cor- 
diale between France and England. German statesmen appear to 
have believed that the danger of a general European war, created by 
the Kaiser's speech, would frighten the British public, that conse- 
quently the British Government would leave France in the lurch, and 
that in the exasperation which would follow the Entente Cordiale 
would disappear. The course of events showed that these calcula- 
tions rested upon a false premise. The Entente Cordiale emerged 
from the crisis strengthened, instead of destroyed. By the action 
of Germany a strong impulse was given toward the formation of 
the Triple Entente. (See article, that title.) 

For other phases of the Morocco question see articles listed in the 
table of contents under sections three and four. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

The most complete study of this phase of the Moroccan Question 
is by Tardieu, A., La Conference d'Algeciras (Paris, 1908). See also 
Maurice, L., La politique marocaine de l'Allemagne (Paris, 1916), 



334 

chs. 1-2; Diercks, G., Die Marokkofrage unci die Konferenz von 
Algeciras (Berlin, 1906). ch. 8; Closs, H., West-Marokko deutsch 
(1911) ; Wirth, A., Die Entscheidung iiber Marokko (1911) ; Bernard 
A., Le Maroc (Paris, 1913) ; Morel, G. D., Morocco in Diplomacy 
(Smith, Elder & Co.. London, 1912) or (same book under new title) 
Ten Years of Secret Diplomacy (London. 1915). The latter writer 
must be read with eaution, as he is undoubtedly strongly biased 
against France and extremely critical of British policy. 

For documents dealing with the Congress of Algeciras and the 
negotiations leading up to it, see General Act of International Con- 
ference at Algeciras and an additional protocol. By the President 
of the U. S. A., A Proclamation (Washington. Govt. Printing 
Office, 1907) ; Deloncle, L., Statut International elu Maroc (Paris, 
1912, 2d eel.) pp. 55 ff. ; Tardieu, La Conference d'Algeciras (Paris, 

1908). Appendices: Ministere des affaires etrangeres, documents 
diplomatiques, Affaires du Maroc (Imprimerie nationale, Paris, 

1905) ; and Staatsarchiv, vol. 73, pp. 1-306. See also Morel, E. D., 

Morocco in Diplomacy (London, 1912), Appendices. Prince von 

Biilow, Imperial Germany, pp. 77-85 (London, Cassell, 1913), gives 

in brief form an authoritative account of the German official version 

of the crisis. 

116. THE RESIGNATION OF M. DELCASSE, 1905. 

1. INTRODUCTION. 

The occasion of M. Delcasse's resignation, June 6, 1905. was his 
opposition to the demand of Germany that the Moroccan question be 
settled not by France and England alone, but by a general confer- 
ence of European powers. The French Government decided to ac- 
quiesce in the demand of Germany and M. Delcasse resigned. 

2. STEPS LEADING TO THE RESIGNATION. 

The convention between France and England of April 8, 1904 
(See article, The Formation of the Entente Cordiale), which was 
brought about largely by the efforts of M. Delcasse, gave to France 
a free hand in Morocco and immensely strengthened her position in 
Europe. The convention having laid the foundation, the structure 
of the Entente Cordiale was quickly erected. This could not fail 
to be displeasing to Berlin, but at first it was treated with some 
indifference. (See the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung of March 
25. 1904, and the speech of Count von Biilow in the Reichstag on 
April 12, 1901. Affaires du Maroc. 1901-1905.) 

A year later, however, Germany showed open and determined 
opposition by the visit of the Kaiser to Tangier (See article, The 
Morocco Crisis of 1905-1906). It is significant to note that this 



335 

visit took place but a few weeks after the decisive defeat of 
Russia, the ally of France, by Japan at Mukden. Germany 
now made it plain that there was to be no more " Tunisification " of 
Morocco. In the address which the Kaiser gave on that occasion he 
asserted the independence and sovereignty of Morocco in unequivo- 
cal language. " The demands of Germany to be consulted about 
Moroccan affairs" writes Count von Billow (Imperial Germany, p. 
98) " were thus announced to the world. * * * Our object was 
to substitute an international settlement by the signatory powers of 
the treaty of Madrid for the one-sided arrangement between England 
and France." 

The German Government not only objected to the arrangement it- 
self, but complained that Germany had received no formal notifica- 
tion of it. (Comte de Cherisey, charge d'affaires de la Republique 
francaise a M. Delcasse, Tangier, February 11, 1905. In Affaires du 
Maroc, 1901-1905, p. 196.) In answer M. Delcasse, while admitting 
that he had failed to make immediate formal notification, reminded 
the German Government that even before the signature of the agree- 
ment with England he had informed the German ambassador to 
France of its tenor, and that as its terms had been made public by 
British authorities immediately after its signature, he had not. thought 
it necessary to send to the German Government information which it 
already possessed. (M. Delcasse, Ministre des affaires etrangeres a. 
M. Bihourd, Ambassadeur de la Republique franchise a Berlin, Paris, 
14 avril, 1905. Affaires du Maroc, 1901-1905, p. 211.) 

Germany now declared that she was supporting the desire of the 
Sultan in demanding a general conference, but according to France 
there was a suspicious connection between the arrival of a German 
agent at Fez and the expression of this desire. (M. Saint-Rene- 
Taillandier, Ministre de la Republique franchise en mission a Fez a 
M. Delcasse, May 13, May 27, May 30. Affaires de Maroc, 1901-1905, 
pp. 221, 223, 225.) Meanwhile Germany's demands for a general 
conference became more and more insistent. The chief obstacle to 
the holding of such a conference was M. Delcasse, who continued an 
unwavering opposition. On June 6. 1905, he resigned. 

3. REASONS FOR M. DELCASSe's RESIGNATION. 

From what has preceded it is a natural inference that his resigna- 
tion was due in part at least to German pressure but there was like- 
wise opposition to him from within France. Accounts differ in the 
stress which they lay on the various factors involved. 

A. Opposition from within. — This was chiefly from two sources. 

(1) From the socialists and pacifists. — So great was their hostility 
that on April 20. M. Delcasse offered his resignation but subsequently 



336 

withdrew it. (See Journal offieiel. April 1, and April 7, 1905. Also 
Debidour, Histoire Diplomatique, II. 19.) This hostility, according 
to one of the pacifists, was due not to dislike of the entente with 
England, but to the use which M. Delcasse was making of it and to 
the war which such use was likely to bring about. (Pressense, Eng- 
land. France. Germany and the peace of the world. In Contem- 
pory, August 1905. 88: 152-162.) The extent of this opposition has 
been much exaggerated by German writers. Oncken (Events which 
led up to a world war in Germany in relation to the World War, pp. 
4-65-466) asserts that M. Dclcasse's attitude aroused the indignation 
of all conscientious Frenchmen. 

(2) From French financiers who wanted peace. — This was voiced 
by M. Eouvier, the president of the conseil who, it is said, was per- 
sonally jealous of M. Delcasse. (See Debidour II, 19, also Blenner- 
hassett, " French and German relations," in Fortnightly Review. 
August, 1905, 81: 236-243.) It seems, too, that the Government 
feared that France was not ready for war. 

B. Opposition from without. — Besides the general German oppo- 
sition to M. Delcasse involved in opposition to his policy, tlfere was 
at least one attempt to bring about his resignation by direct pressure 
on French public opinion. This was an interview with Prince 
Henckel de Donnersmarck published by Le Gaulois on June — , 1905. 
(See Appendix I, 71.) While documentary proof that this interview 
was inspired by the German Government can not be adduced, the in- 
ference that it was so inspired is so clear as to leave scarcely any 
doubt about the matter. The closing words of this famous interview, 
taken in connection with the whole tone of the utterance, show" how 
direct and menacing was this virtual demand for the retirement of 
M. Delcasse. 

" Believe the word of the German who has alwavs had great svm- 
pathies with you. Give up the minister whose only aspiration is to 
trouble the peace of Europe, and adopt with regard to Germany a 
loyal and open policy, the only one which is worthy of a great na- 
tion like yours, if you wish to preserve the peace of the world." 

There is much difference of opinion as to how large a share this in- 
terview had in bringing about the retirement of M. Delcasse. 

4. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF M. DELCASSe's RESIGNATION. 

At all events, on June 6 at a meeting of the Cabinet at which he 
defended his position, M. Delcasse found that the Government would 
not support him and promptly resigned. This time his resignation 
was accepted. It was thus made clear that in accepting his resigna- 
tion the French Government, rather than risk a war with Germany, 
acquiesced in her demand for a general conference. 



337 

Immediately after the retirement of M. Delcasse two very com- 
petent observers commented: 

If we may judge by the present temper of the French Chamber, henceforth 
no Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs will be tolerated in France whose 
policy or power is disagreeable to the German Kaiser, the German Chancellor, 
or the German war party. (E. J. Dillon, " Foreign affairs," in Contemporary 
Review, July, 1905, 88:147.) 

The fall of M. Delcasse 1 is the most important event in European politics since 
the conclusion of the Dual Alliance. It is the first patent result of the collapse 
of Russia's power in Europe, and opens a new chapter in French politics. 
(A. F. Harrison, " Germany and Morocco," in Nineteenth Century, July, 1905, 
58: 35.) 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

I. DOCUMENTS AND NEWSPAPERS. 

Ministere des affaires etrangeres. Documents diplomatiques, Af- 
faires du Maroc, 1901-1905. (Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1905.) 
This work is popularly referred to as Le Livre jaune and is the most 
valuable source for the correspondence of France with her agents in 
Morocco and with Germany. 

Le Livre blanc. A translation by le Comite de l'Afrique frangaise 
of a German work analogous to le Livre jaune. See above. 

Journal officiel. Senat. Debats parlernentaries. Compte rendu. 

1 avril, 1905. 

Journal officiel. Chambre des deputes. Debats parlementaires. 
Compte rendu. 7 avril, 1905. 

Le Gaulois, juin, 1905. 

Le Temps, 6, 7, 8 avril, 1905. 

Die Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, March 25, 1904. 

Deloncle, L. Collection Diplomatique. Statut International du 
Maroc. Second edition. (Paris, Lechevalier, 1912.) 

Convention collection of the most important treaties and conven- 
tions. 

II. SECONDARY SOURCES. 

Tardieu, A. La Conference d'Algesiras, histoire diplomatique de 
la crise marocaine. (Paris, Alcan, 1917.) A scholarly work, well 
documented. The author is honoraiy first secretary in the French 
diplomatic service. 

Tardieu, A. France and the Alliances. The struggle for the bal- 
ance of power. (New York, Macmillan, 1908.) A more popular 
work than the preceding. Pages 170-185 deal with the resignation 
of M. Delcasse. The author criticizes M. Delcasse for not having 
taken more energetic action in regard to Morocco directly after the 
convention of 1904 with England. 
53706—18 22 



338 

Debidour, A. Histoire diplomatique de l'Europe depuis le Con- 
gres de Berlin jusqu' a nos jours. (Paris, Alcan, 1917. 2 vols.) A 
scholarly work well documented. 

Berard, V. L'AfFairc marocaine. (Paris, Colin, 1906.) Has a 
chapter on Le Disaccord franco-allemand in which the documents 
are analyzed with care. 

Billow, Prince Bernard von. Imperial Germany. Translated by 
Marie Lewenz. (New York, Dodd, 1914.) Supports with vehemence 
the stand of Germany. 

Modern Germany in relation to the great war. By various Ger- 
man writers, translated by W. W. Whitelock. (New York, Ken- 
nerley, 1916.) 

Diercks, G. Die Marokkofrage und die Konferenz von Algeciras, 
1906. 

Reventlow, Ernst Graf zu. Deutschlands auswartige Politik. 
(Berlin, Mittler. Dritte Autlage. 1888-1914. 1916.) Pan-German 
view. 

MAGAZINE ARTICLES. 

Pressense, F. de. Collapse of Russia, Fall of M. Delcasse and the 
Anglo-French "Entente." In Nineteenth Century, July, 1905, vol. 
58, pp. 22-33. 

Pressense, F. de. England, France, Germany, and the peace of 
the world. In Contemporary Review, Aug. 1905, 88 : 152-162. This 
and the preceding are an arraignment of Delcasse from the point of 
view of a pacifist. 

Blennerhassett. R. French and German Relations. In Fort- 
nightly Review, vol. 84, pp. 236-243 (Aug., 1905). Financial reasons 
for the fall of M. Delcasse stressed. 

Dillon. E. J. Delcasse. In Contemporary, July, 1905, 88 : 145- 
147. Criticises France for having submitted to Germany. 

Harrison, A. F. Collapse of Russia (Germany and Morocco). In 
Nineteenth Century. July, 1905, 58:34-42. Connects the Moroccan 
situation with the defeat of Russia. 

117. ITALY AND MOROCCO. 

1. INTRODUCTION. 

Shortly after the adjustment of the Fashoda affair, France, under 
the leadership of M. Delcasse, Minister of Foreign Affairs, began 
to seek understandings with countries whose good will and support 
she might hope to obtain for her aspirations in regard to Morocco. 
There were three such countries, Italy, Spain, and England. The 
direct interest of Italy in Morocco was very small. But as a Medi- 



339 

terranean power she was in a position to cause serious embarrassment 
for France if she should choose to exert her influence for that 
purpose. 

2. THE AGREEMENTS OF 1000 AND 1902. 

The general rapprochement between France and Italy, 1898-1902 
(See article, that title), facilitated the negotiation of an understand- 
ing in regard to Morocco. The arrangement which was made 
appears to have been embodied in two conventions or agreements con- 
cluded in 1900 and 1902. As the documents have not been pub- 
lished, the precise terms of the understanding can not be definitely 
stated. It appears, from ministerial statements in the French and 
Italian chambers and from interviews and obviously inspired news- 
paper articles, that Italy agreed to give its support for securing to 
France a free hand in Morocco, while France recognized Italy's 
claims in regard to Tripoli. The conclusion of this understanding 
left France free to arrange understandings with England and Spain, 
whose interests in Morocco were larger and more direct (See articles, 
The Formation of the Entente Cordiale and Spain and Morocco). 

BIBLIOGRAPHV. 

See bibliographes of articles. The Morocco Crisis of 1905-1906 
and The Morocco Crisis of 1911. 

118. SPAIN AND MOROCCO. 

1. INTRODUCTION. 

At the opening of the present century Spain alone among Eu- 
ropean countries possessed a direct territorial interest in Morocco. 
The two cities of Ceuta and Tetuan, opposite Gibraltar and Melilla, 
135 miles to the east, on the Mediterranean, the three island pre- 
sidios lying off that coast, and the settlement at the Rio del Oro on 
the Atlantic coast, constituted the sole remnant of the former world- 
wide colonial empire of Spain. These holdings in Morocco had never 
been of any real value to Spain, owing to the intense mutual hatred 
of Spaniard and Moor; their commerce was slight and the inhabi- 
tants of the hinterland, the Riff, rigorously set upon any Spaniard 
who ventured beyond the walls of any town. 

2. FRANCO-SPANISH AGREEMENT OF 1902. 

After the disastrous American war of 1898, Spanish opinion be- 
gan to dream of a forward policy in Morocco, and conversations 
were opened betwen Madrid and Paris. In 1902 a secret Franco- 
Spanish treaty was made which provided that " if through the weak* 



340 

ness of the Moi i Government, through ; ts impotence to secure 

order and security, or for any other reason, the maintenance of the 
status quo becomes impossible" the limits within which each coun- 
try should have the right to reestablish tranquillity should be de- 
nned according to the plan outlined in the convention in detail. 
( American Journal of International Law. vol. 8 5 pp. 869-871.) The 
arrangement virtually provided for a contingent partition of 
Morocco. A.s the British Government had not yet reached an un- 
derstanding with France this convention was not made public and 
no action under it was taken. 

3. ANGLO-FRENCH MOROCCO AGREEMENT OF 1904. 

On April 8, 1904. France and England reached an understanding 
in regard to Morocco. (See article. The Formation of the Entente 
Cordiale.) Article 8 of the Morocco-Egypt declaration declared that 
the two governments would " take into special consideration the inter- 
ests which that country [Spain] derives from her geographical posi- 
tion and from her territorial possessions on the Moorish coast of the 
Mediterranean," and in article 3 of the secret articles, published in 
1911, it was agreed that "a certain extent of Moorish territory ad- 
jacent to Melilla, Cent a. and other presidios should, whenever the 
Sultan ceased to exercise authority over it. come within the sphere of 
influence of Spain; that the administration of the coast from Melilla 
as far as, but not including the heights on the right bank of the 
Sebou shall be intrusted to Spain." In return for these concessions 
Spain was to accept the principle of the open door in Morocco for 30 
years, she was not to erect any fortifications or strategic works be- 
tween Melilla and the heights commanding the right bank of the 
Sebou (article 7), and she must " undertake not to alienate the whole, 
or a part, of the territories placed under her authority or in her 
sphere of influence" (article 3 of the secret articles). (For the 
Morocco-Egypt declaration, together with the secret articles, see 
British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 101. pp. 1053-1059.) 

4. FRANCO-SPANISH AGREEMENT OF 1904. 

Armed with this agreement France proceeded to negotiate with 
Spain. The public Franco-Spanish declaration of October 3, 1904, 
obliged both Governments to uphold " the independence and integ- 
rity of the Moorish Empire, under the sovereignty of the Sultan," 
and a secret convention of the same date provided a contingent plan 
for its partition (Revue generale de droit international public, vol. 
19, pp. 19-24 d). Spain was accorded the entire Moroccan littoral 
on the Mediterranean, with the hinterland stretching beyond the 



341 

mountains of the Kiff and including the part 01 Elkazar on the 
Atlantic, the Rio del Oro was extended northward and eastward to 
the watershed between the Wadi Draa and the Wadi Sus, including 
a section of the French Sahara (map in Statesmen's Year Book. 
1912. plate 3). Within her zone Spain was to enjoy all the rights 
recognized for France by the Anglo-French agreement of April 8, 
1904, for 15 years. Spain, moreover, agreed to take no action with- 
out the consent of France, unless the continuance of the political 
status quo became impossible or the Moroccan Government should 
be unable to maintain order, in which case Spain might exercise her 
right of action without regard to France. 

5. TANGIER, 1905. 

It has been asserted, but without adequate proof, that a knowledge 
of this agreement, communicated in some way to Berlin, led the 
German Government to make the dramatic intervention signalized 
by the presence of William II at Tangier, where on March 31. 1905, 
he publicly declared for the maintenance of the integrity of Morocco 
and independence of the Sultan. Out of this grew the critical situa- 
tion of June to September. 1905, which ended only when France 
agreed to submit the Morocco question to an international conference 
(See article, The Morocco Crisis of 1905-6). 

0. ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE, 1906. 

Before entering the conference of Algeciras. France and Spain 
concluded a secret agreement on September 1. 1905 for common ac- 
tion and for the policing of certain ports within the zones allotted 
to each and for the regulation of certain economic matters (De- 
loncle, Statut International du Maroc, p. 360). France later con- 
ceded that Casablanca, which lay in the French zone, should be 
policed jointly by French and Spanish agents. At Algeciras the 
duty of organizing an international police in Morocco and the crea- 
tion of a State bank were intrusted to the French and Spanish 
Governments. The Spanish were to control the police at Tetuan 
and Laraiche and to share the control with the French at Tangier 
and Casablanca; in the matter of the bank Spain was allowed to 
contribute only one-fourteenth of the capital, as opposed to three- 
fourteenths allotted to the French. In May, 1907 conventions were 
signed by Spain with France in regard to preserving the status quo 
in the Mediterranean, which, together with the restrictions of the 
act of Algeciras, seemed to postpone indefinitely any actual parti- 
tion of Morocco. 



342 

7. SPANISH AND FRENCH OPERATIONS IN MOROCCO, 1907-1911. 

So far the harmony of France and Spain had been maintained. 
But when in 1907 the French commenced military operation at Casa- 
blanca, though not until after they had requested Spanish collabora- 
tion, Spanish opinion began to grow restive, and the Franco-Ger- 
man convention of February 8, 1909 (See article. The Morocco Con- 
vention of 1909), which was concluded without reference to Spain, 
made the tension between Paris and Madrid acute. When disturb- 
ances broke out around Melilla in July. 1909, Spain assumed that 
she also enjoyed liberty of action and sent a military force to the 
Riff. The operations dragged out so long and so large a force 
(50,000 men) had to be employed that France became distinctly 
suspicious. Nor was the situation improved when in 1911, follow- 
ing the French expedition to Fez. the Spanish occupied Laraiche 
and Elkazar. without previous consultation with France. Finally, 
however, in July, 1911, a modus vivendi was reached by which Spain 
agreed to withhold her hand until the conclusion of the negotiations 
then in progress between Germany and France (See article. The 
Morocco Crisis of 1911). 

S. FRANCO-SPANISH AGREEMENT, 1912. 

When the treaty of November 4, 1911, secured German recognition 
for the French protectorate in Morocco, negotiations were resumed 
between France and Spain. The Spanish Government was disposed 
to insist upon the letter of the convention of October 30. 1904, but 
the French contended that as France had paid dearly to Germany 
for the settlement of November, 1911, Spain should make some com- 
pensation to France. In the end Spain obtained by the convention 
of November 27,1912 (Revue generale de droit international public, 
vol. 20, p. 9d), somewhat less territory than she had been promised 
in 1904 (map in Statesmen's Yearbook, 1913, p. 8). Within her' 
zone Spain received practically a free hand. As France was respon- 
sible, under the act of Algeciras, for the services of Government 
loans, it was agreed that Spain, Avhile collecting the customs within 
her zone, should pay over to France 7.95 per cent of the total customs 
collected in the previous year (about $100,000). Tangier, at the 
demand of Great Britain, was placed under international control. 
From that town to Fez a railroad was to be constructed by a single 
company, the French supplying 56 per cent of the capital, Spain 36 
per cent, and other countries 8 per cent, if they desired. 

The partition of Morocco was thus finally effected. Spain was. on 
the whole, very liberally treated, and doubtless it was the recognition 
of this fact which led to a distinct political reapproachment between 



343 

France and Spain in the autumn of 1913, a rapprochement which 
proved to be of inestimable value to France when the World War 
broke upon her in 1914. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

See the bibliography of article, The Morocco Crisis of 1911. 

Pinon, Rene. L'Empire de la Mediterranee (Paris, Perrin, 1904). 

Rouard de Card, E. Les Relations de l'Espagne et Maroc (Paris, 
Pedone, 1905). Written without knowledge of the secret treaties 
of 1904 and 1905. 

Tardieu, A. France et Espagne. Revue des Deux Mondes, Decem- 
ber, 1, 1912. Important narrative. 

Andrews, G. F. Spanish interests in Morocco. American Politi- 
cal Science Reviev. November, 1911. Written without knowledge 
of the secret treaties. 

London Times, passim, especially November 28 and December 18, 
1912. 

Jaray, G. Les accords franco-espagnols de 1902 a 1912. Revue 
des Sciences Politiques, Jan.-Feb., 1913. pp. 90-102. 

Basdenant, J. Le traite franco-espagnol du 27 novembre 1912. 
Revue generale de droit international public, vol. 22, pp. 433-464 
(1915). 

Maura, G. La Question du Maroc au point de vue espagnol. 
Translated from the Spanish. (Paris, Challamel, 1911.) Valuable 
study by a member of the Spanish Cortes. 

Vidal E. La Politique de l'Espagne an Maroc (Montpelliei. 
Firmin, 1913). Important study. Contains texts of the most im- 
portant of the secret agreements. 

Deloncle, L. Collection Diplomatique. Statut International du 
Maroc. Second edition. (Paris, Lechevalier, 1912.) Contains texts 
of the important documents. 

119. THE RED SEA CONVENTION OF DECEMBER 13, 1906. 

1. EUROPEAN INTERESTS IN RED SEA REGION. 

After the construction of the Suez Canal there developed among 
the European powers serious rivalry for control of the country bor- 
dering on the Red Sea. Through this region lay the road to the 
British possession in the Orient and to the French island of Mada- 
gascar. Italy chose this as the field for her colonizing activities, and 
in 1905 Germany sought and obtained commercial and economic con- 
cessions from King Menelek. French, British, and Italian terri- 
tories, surrounding Abyssinia were the occasion for a rivalry, often 



844 

bitter, but the friendly feeling which prevailed between the three 
countries after about 1902 led them to seek amicable agreements re- 
garding their claims. 

2. THE RED SEA CONVENTION. 

The Red Sea convention, sometimes known as the Agreement re- 
specting Abyssinia, was signed by Italy, France, and Great Britain 
on December 13. 1906. It followed the usual lines of such agree- 
ments (See Appendix I, 79), stipulating Cor the maintenance of tS re 
" political and territorial status quo in Ethiopia as determined by 
the stale of affairs at present existing" and as established by past 
agreements of the signatory powers with each other and with the na- 
tive tribes and states. No one of the contracting parties was to seek 
concessions in the regions included in the agreement that might injure 
either of the other parties. They agreed to abstain from intervention 
in the internal a flairs of Abyssinia, and to endeavor to maintain its 
integrity. They pledged themselves to act together for the mainte- 
nance of each other's territorial possessions in East Africa. Pro 
vision was also made for a division of railway concessions. At the 
same time provision was made to stop the unauthorized shipment of 
arms into any of the territories controlled by the three powers, in 
Ethiopia, along the Red Sea littoral, the (iulf of Aden, and tin- In- 
dian Ocean. 

:;. ABYSSINIA A PARTY TO Till'. CONVENTION. 

The arrangements were all made during the summer of 1906, but 
the signing of the convention was delayed until the approval of 
King Menelek could be obtained. He favored the settlement which 
was finally signed at London on December L3. Since then, with the 
cooperation of the Abyssinian Government, the Red Sea regions 
have been peaceful, and railway construction especially has been 
greatly expanded. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

La Vie Politique dans les deux Mondes, 1906-1907, vol. 1 (Paris, 
Alcan, 1908), pp. 429-432. A good brief discussion. 

Vincent, Ernest, " Le Port d'Aden et les Interets Francais dans 
la Mer Rouge/" in Bulletin du Comite de L'Asie Franchise for Jan- 
uary, 1906 (Paris, 1906), pp. 14-18. A good presentation of French 
interests. 

Annual register for 1906 (London, Longmans, 1907), pp. 317-318. 
Summary. 

Text in Albin, Pierre, Les Grands Traites Politiques . . . 
depuis 1815 jusqu'a nos jours (Paris, Alcan, 1912), *pp. 408-414, and 
in American Journal of International Law, I, Supplement, 226-231. 



345 
120. THE PERSIAN QUESTION, 1906-1914. 

I. PERSIA IN 1 900. 

Persia is aboul equal in size to the Spanish Peninsula, France, and 
Germany, but its area is occupied largely by mountains ;ni<l desert-. 
The present boundaries are well adjusted, on the whole, to < he habitat 
of the Persian people, who. numbering aboul nine millions,* are 
marked off by physical appearance, Language, and a special form of 
(he Mohammedan religion, from their neighbors, as well as from the 
million of Turks, Armenians, Arabs, and others who dwell among 
I hem. Increasingly conscious of their nationality, which looks hack 
over some 2,500 years of chequered participation, active or passive, in 
the great affairs of the world, the Persians developed bet ween 1890 
and L906 a movement to obtain for the people a greater share in their 
own government. Persian constitutionalism from the first appealed 
to the sentiment of Americans because of its double struggle for do- 
mestic liberty and national independence. Many Europeans, how- 
ever, despaired of the possibility of self-government in Persia, or of 
the establishment of internal order except under foreign control. 

At the beginning of 1906 the Shah was ruling in traditional fashion, 
a despot aided \>y a group of ministers chosen and removable by 
himself, themselves part of a larger group of nobles and favorites 
from whom he selected also his governors of provinces. This form of 
government, never long effective of good results, had undergone 
decay to the point where it is hard to discern in either the Shah, his 
ministers, or governors, anything like patriotism or public responsi- 
bility, but only the desire to lead as luxurious lives as possible and 
to accumulate personal wealth and influence. There was no proper 
law, justice, police, army, or tax system; roads were unsafe; and life, 
personal liberty, and property most insecure. Looking without, 
Persians saw all of the four neighboring States, Russia, Britain, 
Turkey, and Afghanistan, holding great territories once owned by 
Persia, and the first three were strongly suspected of ardent designs 
upon what was left. See Parliamentary Papers of British Parlia- 
ment for 1909 (Cd. 4581), vol. 105, p. 1-6. Summary of events for 
the year 1906. Also Sykes, P. M., History of Persia, II, 487^99.) 

2. THE INAUGURATION OF PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT, JANUARY, 1906, 

TO OCTOBER 7, 1907. 

The defeat of Russia by Japan and the revolutionary movement in 
progress in the Czar's dominions perhaps brought to a head the agi- 
tation in Persia against misgovernment and the mortgaging of the 
country's resources for money to be squandered. Toward the close of 
1905 a number of prominent merchants and Moslem clergymen took 



34G 

sanctuary (bast) in the principal mosque of Teheran, and refused to 
come out until reforms wore granted. (E. (i. Browne, The Persian 
Revolution of L905-1909, Cambridge, L910, pp. L12 ff.) This pecu- 
liarly Persian weapon was so effective that about January 21 the 
Shah promised, among other things, to dismiss an obnoxious min- 
ister and assemble an elected "House of Justice." The refugees 
came out, but as happened often thereafter with similar royal 
promises, the Shah neglected to take action. After further agi- 
tation and some bloody repression, the method of Sanctuary was 
again used, this time with success. Late in July about 1l\000 of 
the prominent men of Persia took up residence in the summer 
garden of the British legation, and demanded a constitution and a 
representative assembly. The Shah yielded to all the demands <>f 
August ■*>. 1906. (The text of the Shah's Firman is given by Browne. 
E. (J., op. <■>'/., 353 354. British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 101. 
p. 526.) An electorial law was published on September '.). (The text 
in Browne. E. (!.. op. dt., 355-361.) Elections were held, and the 
first Persian Mejlis, or parliament, assembled on October 7. Thi: 
body promptly refused to sanction a new loan from Russia and Eng 
land, and its leaders rapidly drew up a constitution. The Shah 
signed this on December 30, a few days before his death, and his 
successor, Mohammed Ali. though at heart opposed to limiting his 
powers, also signed. 

The original Persian constitution (text in Browne, E. (}.. op. cit., 
362 371 ; Hamilton. A.. Problems of the Middle East, 393-403; Brit- 
ish and Foreign State Papers, vol. 101, pp. 527-534), in 51 articles, 
dealt with the establishment of the assembly and its duties, limita- 
tions, rights, and methods of doing business, and proposed a senate. 
Full ministerial responsibility was not granted, but extensive finan- 
cial control was provided. 

The new assembly came into action but slowly, being without ex- 
perience and party organization, and hindered by the opposition of 
the Shah and his ministers. It procured the dismissal of the un- 
popular Belgian director of customs, M. Nans, and voted to seek a 
French financial adviser. It tried unsuccessfully to erect a national 
bank with Persian capital. On October 1 the leaders of the con- 
servatives, wearied with continued disorder, joined forces with the 
constitutionalists, lea vino- the Shah almost alone in opposition. As 
a consequence, he accepted on October 7 the supplementary consti- 
tutional laws (Browne. E. G.. op. c'/t.. 372—384 : Hamilton, op. <'/t.. 
403 434; British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 101. pp. 534-542), 
which in 107 articles defined much more clearly (he organization of 
the. government, including full ministerial responsibility to the two 
chambers. On November 12 he appeared before the assembly and 
took the oath demanded of him by article 39 of the supplementary 



347 

laws, "to preserve the independence of Persia, safeguard and protect 
the frontiers of my kingdom and the rights of my people, observe the 
fundamental laws of the Persian constitution," etc. 

3. THE ANGL0-BUS8IAN CONVENTION OF L907. 

Meantime, on August 31, 1907, the British and Russian govern- 
ments had signed the famous convention regarding the affairs of 
Afghanistan, Thibet, and Persia. (See article, The Formation of 
the Triple Entente. The text of the convention is in British and For- 
eign State Papers, vol. 100, pp. 555-500. The debates in the House of 
Lords on February 6 and 10, 1908, and in the House of Commons on 
February 17 are of great interest.) England had been interested in 
Persian trade for three centuries, and for at least one century had 
claimed special interests in the Persian Gulf. Russia had first seized 
Persian territory two hundred years before, had greatly increased her 
influence there in the nineteenth century, and with the loans and the 
new tariff of 1900 to 1903 had obtained a considerable hold upon 
Persian financial affairs. Russia's defeat by Japan, and the success 
of the Anglo-French Entente, together with England's desire to se- 
cure the peace of the world more firmly, especially against the grow- 
ing ambitions of Germany, Led to negotiations of which something 
was known some time before their termination. (Browne, E. G., 
op. cit., 175 says for " more than two years." A question was asked 
in the British Parliament about pending negotiations with Russia on 
March 29. 1906: Parliamentary Debates, 4th series, vol. 154, p. 1534.) 

The agreement provided for amicable relations between England 
and Russia, who had been suspicious rivals almost constantly for 
nearly a century. Two spheres of influence were marked off in Per- 
sia. Russia's sphere in the north of Persia contained 48 per cent of 
the area, 72 per cent of the population, 11 of the 12 largest cities, and 
7 of the 11 principal trade routes. (See Statesman's Year Book, year 
1916, p. 1221, and Lord Curzon's speech in the House of Lords, Feb- 
ruary 6, 1908. Parliamentary Debates, 4th Series, vol. 183, pp. 999- 
1024, esp. pp. 1004-1010.) Britain's sphere was in the desert country 
of the southeast, containing 22 per cent of the area, 7 per cent of the 
population, 1 of the 12 largest cities, and 1 of the 11 chief trade 
routes. There remained a third zone which contained 30 per cent 
of the area, and 21 per cent of the population. British trade inter- 
ests were slight in the British sphere, extensive in the unallotted 
sphere, and predominant over the Russian in Yezd and Ispahan of 
the Russian sphere. Article 5 proposed joint action in case of default 
in payment of debts to the two countries. Both in the convention 
and the public announcements of the time it was strongly affirmed 
that the independence and integrity of Persia were to be maintained. 



348 

(See the official statement to the Persian Government, Sept. 11, 1907, 
in Parliamentary Papers, 1909 (Cd. 4581), p. 48, and 1912 (Cd. 
6077), p. 1.) 

The exact sense in which these assurances were intended to be un- 
derstood has since been the subject of much controversy. On the 
one hand they have been interpreted, especially by critics of Sir Ed- 
ward Grey's foreign policy, as constituting a pledge that the free 
action of the Persian Government would suffer no material abridg- 
ment and that neither Russia nor Great Britain would seek to estab- 
lish a permanent controlling power in any pari of Persia. On the 
other hand it has been held that the article of the convention relating 
to the independence and integrity of Persia should not be interpreted 
in such a way as to destroy or materially restrict the operation of 
the articles which create the spheres of influence and that these arti- 
cles clearly look forward to political control and possibly to annex 
ation. Subsequent events indicate that the latter was the Russian, 
but perhaps not the British view. The debates in Parliament ishow 
that Russia was not willing to enter into the convention for less 
than the surprisingly large area conceded to her and that England 
was so eager to come to an agreement with Russia that she made a 
willing sacrifice. 

Quite apart from the controversy over the correct interpretation 
there has been and probably will long continue to be much difference 
of opinion in regard to the fairness and wisdom of the convention 
of 1907. England, acting in her own interest and in the interest of 
the Persian people, doubtless hoped to restrain Russia from gaining 
control over Persia, and during four years succeeded to a consider- 
able extent. But as will be seen, when the crisis of 1911 came (See 
article. The Morocco Crisis of 1911) England Avas driven by the exi 
gencies of the international situation and the implication of the 
convention of 1907 into the support of Russia in a series of acts 
which materially infringed the integrity and independence of Per 
sia and left among the Persian peoples a hatred of both empires. 
Seriously threatened by the growth of German ambitions and bound 
by the convention of 1907 liberal Britain was forced into a position 
of alliance with autocratic Russia in a course of action which 
amounted to a virtual dismemberment of the country and was 
largely, if not chiefly, responsible for the failure of the movement 
for the establishment of a constitutional government. 

The Persians declined to take notice of this agreement about their 
country to which they had been in no sense a party^, and only recog- 
nized it four years later under force majeure. Their reply of Nov. 
7, 1907 (Parliamentary Papers, 1909 (Cd. 4581), p. 73), contains 
the following words : " The above-mentioned agreement having been 



349 

concluded between the British and Russian Governments, therefore 
its provisions will concern the aforementioned Governments who 
have signed the agreement." March 20, 1912, the following state- 
ment was made : " The Persian Government will take care to conform 
their policy with the principles of the convention of 1907, and they 
take note of the assurances contained in the preamble of that con- 
vention." (Parliamentary Papers, 1912-13 (Cd. 6103), p. 4.) 

4. THE STRUGGLE OF THE CONSTITUTIONALISTS WITH SHAH MOHAMMED 
ALI TO THE DATE OF HIS ABDICATION, JULY 16, 19 09. 



It was soon evident that a solemn oath meant nothing to Mo- 
hammed Ali. On December 15. 1907, he arrested and imprisoned the 
Prime Minister, and attempted a general coup d'etat. He lacked 
sufficient organization and military force, however, and the Mejlis 
speedily obtained the upper hand. The country continued to be in 
disorder, and the Turks, wishing their share of Persia, violated the 
western frontier. In February, 1908, an attempt was made upon 
the Shah's life. The new nationalist press continued virulently to 
attack the Shah and his supporters. On June 1 he was compelled to 
dismiss from office a number of his friends. On the 12th of the 
month the Russian Government, which seemed at times to possess an 
uncanny foreknowledge of events, proposed to the British to sup- 
port the Shah against the Nationalists. (Parliamentary Papers, 
1909 (Cd. 4581), p. 124.) Sir Edward Grey refused, but a new force 
of Russian troops was brought to Julfa. The Shah had already left 
Teheran for a palace outside and was gathering forces. On June 23 
the Shah's troops, of whom the nucleus was the Persian Cossack 
regiment commanded by the Russian Col. LiakhofF, bombarded and 
destroyed the Parliament House and won the city. (E. G. Browne 
quotes letters to show that Col. Liakhoff was under Russian orders, 
and was complimented by the Tsar for his part in this coup d'etat. 
Op cit, 221-225; 432-436 (Russian text).) Patrols were placed, 
even about the British Legation. Col. Liakhoff became military gov- 
ernor of Teheran and rigidly enforced the Shah's will. The consti- 
tution was hustled out of sight. But the rest of Persia was not con- 
tent with this subversion of popular participation in the Govern- 
ment. Tabriz, the most important city of western Persia and the 
second in size, raised a standard of resistance which probably saved 
Constitutionalism in Persia. This example was followed in many 
places, and when the spring of 1909 came, although 'the Russians 
occupied Tabriz in April on the pretext of protecting foreigners, 
forces gathered from many quarters and proceeded to march toward 
the capital. The Russian consulates and legations, supported by the 
British, vainly attempted to turn back the Constitutionalists. (Ibid., 



350 

I'h. x, gives an account of this revolution. Sec also Parliamentary 
Papers. L909 (Cd. 4733), pp. 35 ad finem; L910 (Cd. 5120), pp. L-69.) 
They had also pressed the Shah on April L ;, J to restore constitutional 
government. On May .'>, alarmed for his throne, and bearing in mind 
no doubt the recent deposition of Abdul Hamid 11, he yielded, and 
promised 1*> summon a second Me j lis. It was too late: the Constitu- 
tionalists had had enough of him. They continued their advance on 
the capital. Though additional Russian troops were brought to 
Resht, ready to come to Teheran, the Constitutionalists anticipated 
them, and on July L6 the Shah took sanctuary with his friends, the 
Russians, an act of abdication, 

.".. THE SECOND I" \KI I A M F.N'l . 

The ex-Shah was pensioned oil' (Parliamentary Papers, L910 (Cd. 
.M-_M>). p. L28. The negotiations give an interesting example of Ori- 
ental bargaining; see this and previous dispatches) and the Regency 
for the new Shah, his 13-year-old son, Ahmad Mirza, was given to 
the head of the royal Kajar tribe. The actual control for some 
weeks was in the hands of a self-appointed committee, called the 
National Council, which appointed ;i cabinet and arranged for the 
election of the new Mejlis. (Browne. E. G., op. cil.. 322, 327.) The 
latter body met November L5, L909, and was in session slightly over 
two years. 

During most of this time progress in the direction of reform was 
slow. There were difficulties between the cabinets and the parlia- 
ment. Internal disorder continued, so that in October, L910, the 
British Government gave notice that if in three months the southern 
roads were not made secure. British troops would be sent in. (Par- 
liamentary Papers, 1911 (Cd. 5656), p. 97 (Oct. 14)). 

The problem of reorganization seems to have depended on finance; 
(See answer of Persian Government, Ibid., pp. 106-9; and elsewhere 
in dispatches.) The Government Lived from hand to mouth, with- 
out money to organize police or military forces for restoring order. 
Taxes had fallen off, and the customs receipts were heavily pledged 
to the support of the foreign Loans. The French financial adviser, 
M. Bizot, was regarded with suspicion from the first, (lie arrived 
in April, 1901s. and complained that no one would give him informa- 
tion. Parliamentary Papers. 1909 (Vd. 4581), p 118.) PCngland 
and Russia were willing, almost anxious, to lend money, even a 
large Loan, but the Nationalists steadily refused the suggested con- 
ditions, which involved control of the expenditure of the money 
loaned, and thereby foreign interference in the internal affairs of 
Persia. (Jan. 6. 1910, the Russian foreign minister suggested that 
a large loan be made so " that Russia and England will be in a posi- 



351 

tion to insist on the institution of an effective financial control.'*) 
Continual suspicion and irritation arose from the prolonged ores 
ence of Russian troops in Tabriz. Kazvin. and Ardebil. In May, 
1910, il was resolved to employ foreign advisers. Russians. French, 
and Belgians were feared. Sweden was invited to lend officers to or- 
ganize a gendarmerie, and in September it was suggested that the 
United States be asked to supply a treasurer-general. (This pro 
posal was made in the assembly, Sept. 6, 1910. The cabinet objected 
for reasons that they could not state publicly. The majority in the 
assembly favored it at once, showing confidence in Americans. Par- 
liamentary Papers, 1911 (Cd. 5656), p. 94.) This measure was ap- 
proved, and in February, 1911, Mr. Morgan Shuster was appointed 
to the new position, with four American assistants. Negotiations 
were now completed for a loan, which would give the new foreign 
advisers the means wherewith to work. (See Loan contract, ibid., 
pp. 60-62. The interest rate was 5 per cent.) 

6. MR. SHUSTEB IX PERSIA AND THE RUSSIAN INTERVENTION, 

TO JANUARY 7, 191 2. 

It is hard to pronounce upon the Shuster episode and sustain every 
interpretation with unimpeachable documentary evidence. The fol- 
lowing account seeks to approach the truth. (It is based on a fairly 
wide reading ad hoc, in th.e British Blue Book. The Parliamentary 
Debates. Mr. Shuster's own writings, periodical and journalistic 
articles, etc. See the bibliography. It is not possible in the space 
available to give numerous references.) 

Mr. Shuster was an honest and capable business man. He as- 
sumed that Persia was an independent nation whose finances were 
in a bad way. and planned to restore them in the shortest possible 
time by the best methods and the most suitable agents. The British 
Government would have been pleased to hare him do exactly this, 
but the Russian Government felt differently. Mr. Sinister made a 
remarkable beginning in the eight months of his residence, and there 
can be little doubt that, had he been allowed to remain, Persian 
financial affairs would now be vastly transformed for the better. 

He arrived May 12, 1911. and promptly won the complete confi- 
dence of the Persian Government and assembly. On May 30 and 
June 13 laws were passed giving the finances of Persia completely 
into his hands. An unpleasantness occurred with M. Mornard, In- 
spector of Customs, a Belgian supposed to be under Russian influ- 
ence, who objected to being placed under Mr. Shuster. This diffi- 
culty was accommodated. Mr. Shuster decided that there was need 
of a treasury gendarmerie to police the collecting of taxes. He 
found Major Stokes, military attache of the British legation at 



352 

Teheran, to be the man best lit tod for tho headship of this force. 
Major Stokes wished to accept the position, and the British Govern- 
ment was not at first adverse, provided he would resign his commis- 
sion in th* 1 Indian army. (Sir Edward Grey's telegram <>i' July 21 
says: " Before Major Stokes accepts command lie will have t«> resign 
his commission in the Indian army. Yon may tell Treasurer-general 
this." (Parliamentary Papers. L912-13 (Cd. G104), p. 100.) 

This gave Russia an entering wedge. She objected that Major 
Stokes would have authority in north Persia, and demanded either 
the appointment of a citizen of a small European country, or some 
compensation by the appointment of a Russian officer to a similar 
command. Mr. Sinister was linn in refusing to obey suggestions 

from outside, and Russian anger arose. 

On July is the ex-Shah passed through Russian territory from his 
residence in Odessa and landed in Persia. Though denials were 
made, it is inconceivable that in a country as carefully policed as 
Knssia he could have done this without ollicial knowledge. ^Sir Ed- 
ward Grey endeavored to have the Russian Government bring him 
back, but Knssia refused, appealing to the principle of noninterfer- 
ence, with which she henceforth played last and loose. (Parliamen- 
tary Papers, 1012-13 (Cd. CIO I). p. 98. Ibid. (Cd. 6105), p. 46.) The 
Agadir incident was up (See article, The Morocco Crisis of 1011) 
and probably in order to retain Russian support against Germany 
the British Government swung around to the Russian point of view, 
until in the final crises of 1011 Russia dictated her terms and Eng- 
land advised Persia to accept them. In the process the self-determi- 
nation of Persia received grievous impairment. 

Russia's intentions in Persia and the possibility of her shifting to 
the German side were illustrated by the "Potsdam Accord " of 1910- 
11. (See article, that title.) (Text in American Journal of Inter- 
national Law, vi, supplement 120-2, April, 1012. Russia's interven- 
tion in Persia (her ultimatum was given Nov. 11) came immediately 
after the conclusion of the Moroccan agreement, Nov. 4. In the 
St. Petersburg Agreement, which embodied the results of the Pots- 
dam Accord. Russia declares that she " intends to obtain from the 
Persian ( rovemment a concession with a view to creating a network of 
railways in northern Persia." Russia also promised Germany that 
she would ask for a concession from Teheran to Khanikin, to join a 
branch of the Bagdad railway. Liberal terms were promised Ger- 
many, and Russia was not to oppose the Bagdad railway. In the 
light of this agreement it is evident that if England, by refusing to 
follow Russia in November, 1011, had broken the A nglo-Rnssian 
understanding, the Triple Entente might have been broken up by 
the transfer of Russia to the German side. 



353 

Mr. Shuster, feeling the growing opposition of the Russian Gov- 
ernment, supported by the Britii h, wrote in response to an attack of 
the London Times upon him a letter to the Times which was more 
truthful than diplomatic. (London Times, Nov. 9, 10, 1911.) This 
letter was later translated and circulated in Persia, with his knowl- 
edge, bill not, by his orders. (Parliamentary Papers, 1912-13 (Cd. 
6105), p. 88, Dec. 2. ) Sir Edward Grey said thi letter made 

the situation " impos ible." (Parliamentary Debates, 1911, 5th . 
tics, vol. 32, p. L56; Parliamentary Papers, L912-13 (Cd. 6105), p. 
82.) As ;i matter of fact, it was the Russian interpretation of the 
convention of 1907 which made Mr. Shuster's whole plan to restore 
Persia impossible. More tactful behavior on hi part might have de- 
layed, hut could hardly have influenced the outcome. 

In November Mr. Shuster appointed some British subjects to 
treasury positions in the Russian sphere of influence. Thi: action, 
when ;i<Ii|c<1 to i he appointmenl of Maj. Stol hich si ill hung fire. 

gave the Russians ground for charging the British Government with 
breaking (he Anglo-Russian convention. Then came an episode 
which allowed the Rus inns an excuse for raging— a scuffle between 
Persian Cossacks tinder Rus ian orders and treasury gendam 
under Mr. Shuster' instructions, for the custody of confiscated real 
(•stale thai was mortgaged to Hie Ru sian Bank. (As a mailer of fact 
this epii ode look place on October 9 and 10. The Rui inger was 

deferred until November 11. after the general political situation 
became opportune. (See above; also Parliamentary Papers, L912 -13 
(Cd. 6105), 32-3.) The Russians hail no real ease, hut they 
'■I I ho machinery of war in action. Troops were sent to march 
on Teheran, and ultimatums were delivered, with increa re- 

quirements. The British Government kepi trying on the one hand 
to hold Russia back, and on the other to pursuade Persia to accepl the 
Russian demands. Two requests of Sir Edward Grey run like; a re- 
frain through his correspondence with Rus ia : That the Russia 
withdraw their troops from Persia, and that they tell theex-Shah they 
will never recognize him. The first request was never granted, up to 
theRussian collapse of 1917-18. Indeed, Tabriz was cruelly punished 
in .January, 1912, and most of the Nationalist leaders there ■ re 'lone 
away with, either by the Russians or the reactionary Persian gov- 
ernor whom the Russians set up. Ardebil and Resht suffered only 
less heavily. (There is reason to suspect that the Russians pro- 
voked the disturbances which tiny quelled in blood: Browne. E. G., 
in Contemporary Review, vol. 102. 633 (Nov.. 1912).) The result 
of the second request was that the ex-Shah, defeated and expelhd in 
the autumn of 1911, returned in the winter, and Russia did not dare 
restore him to the throne, on penally of losing completely the 
53706—18 23 



354 

seriously-strained friendship oi* England. (Mohammed AH was 
again pensioned off at the expense of Persia. His attempts had 
caused much confusion and loss, and the withdrawal of troops from 
the south in order to oppose him had made the situation there worse. 
Two of his brothers, moreover, had raised standards of revolt.) 

When the situation cleared, Mr. Sinister had been dismissed and 
replaced by a Russian candidate, M. Mornard; Major Stokes and 
niosi of the American helpers of Mr. Sinister had gone; a Persian 
cabinet submissive to Russia and England had been set up; the 
second Mejlis had been sent home, with no order for new elections; a 
large number of Russian troops were solidly established in several 
cities of north Persia: a few British troops were in tin 1 south: the 
Persian Government hail recognized the Anglo-Russian convention 
o( 1907, had agreed to consult the two powers about the appointment 
of all foreign advisers, and had promised to pay Russia's expenses 
for the troops she had sent in. British liberal opinion had been 
greatly aroused against Russia. Quite a body of Liberals severely 
criticized the course taken by the British Government. While the 
American Government took no action beyond requesting the Persian 
Government on Dec. 1. 1911, to protect Mr. Shuster's person and 
property and fulfill their contract with him (which they did 
promptly and generously). American popular opinion was some- 
what against both Russia and Britain. The German championing 
of the Persian side was naturally suspected of having a political 
basis. 

7. PERSIA I Xi)KK RUSSIAN AM) ENGLISH CONTROL, I 93 - L914. 

With the dismissal of Parliament and t be expulsion of Mr. Shuster 
Persia practically passed under Anglo-Russian control. But the 
pressure of Britain and the general political situation (in which at- 
tention was turning to the Balkans, with an impending strain on 
the relations of Russia with Austria and Germany) led Russia (o 
take no further aggressive action. Affairs settled down to dull and 
almost hopeless continuation of the old ways. Some small bans 
were made by the two powers and a larger on* 1 was talked of. 
Swedish officers, hampered by lack of money, organized a small force 
of gendarmerie. (This force was disbanded in September. L915, foi 
lack of money.) The Persian cabinets, however weak, were opposed 
to the extension of foreign control. Without such extension Russia 
was opposed to lending money, and obtained railway concessions in 
exchange for a small advance in May, 1913. (Parliamentary Papers. 
L913 (Cd. 6807), p. -".OS (concession of Julfa-Tabriz Railway) : [bid., 
1914 (Cd. 7280), p. 49 (navigation on Lake Urumiah). England at 
the same time obtained a concession for a line from Mohammerah to 
Khoremmabad.) The new regent, Nasr-ul-Mulk. who had taken 



35.0 

office in March, L911, absented himself from the country from June, 
1912, until September, 1913. in September, L912, Sir Edward Grey 
an*! M. Sazonoff met at Balmoral Castle. Though expected in somc> 
quarters, no revision of the convention of 1007, in the direction of 
dividing the unallotted zone, was made. Sir Edward contented him- 
self with suggesting that recent changes in Persia had not been to 
Britain's advantage, and there was therefore more reason why "they 
should be sure of the south and of their commercial interests in the 
central /one." (Parliamentary Papers, 1913 (Cd. 6807), p. 173, 
Sept. 25, 1912.) 

On December 30, L913, a call for an election to a third Mejlis was 
issued. Elections were carried through but slowly. On July 21, 
1!)1 i. the young Shah, now 16 years old, was solemnly recognized to 
be of age and the regency was terminated. As yet a majority of 
the new .'m ■ jli had not reached Teheran, and he took the constitu- 
tional oath before as many as could be assembled of the members of 
the second Mejlis. 

Persia thus arrived at the threshold of the World War with the 
constitutional regime nominally in force. Order in finances, road 
control, and city government had improved a little, but were -till 
vei-y imperfect. Russia was still in firm occupancy of the north, and 
was building a railway from Julfa to Tabriz (opened Maj -. 1916). 
M. Mornard, who had succeeded to Mr. Shuster's office but nol to his 
place in Persian confidence, resigned September 1, 19] 1. and another 
Belgian, M. Heynssens, was appointed. Britain had continued to 
press gently for the summoning of the new assembly, the policing of 
the roads, and the withdrawal of the Russian troops. Russia had 
been inactive since the crisis of 1911. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL. 

List of works in the New York Public Library relating to Per 
(History, Muhammadan Period, pp. 32- 15.) X. V.. 191i 

do 

British and Foreign State Papers: Vol. 100. pp. 555-00. The 
Anglo-Russian Convention, Aug. 31, 1907: vol. 101, p. 526, Shah's 
rescript establishing the Assembly, Aug. 1, 1900: pp. 527-534, Per- 
sian Constitution, December 30, 1900: pp. 5-34-542. Persian Constitu- 
tional Lav-, Oct. 8. 1907; vol. 102. p. 900-7, Anglo-Russian Note, 
Sept. 11, 1907: vol. 103. pp. 644-974, Correspondence respecting the 
affairs of Persia, 1907-10. 

British Parliamentan- Papers. 



356 



Correspondence respecting the affairs of Persia, December, L906, 
to November, L908. L909 (Cd. 1:581), v. L05. 

Further correspondence respecting the affairs of Persia: L909 
(Cd. 4733), \. LOS; L910 (Cd. 5120), v. L12; l'.'ll (Cd. 5656), v. 
L03; L912 L3 (Cd. 6104), v. L22; L912 13 (Cd. 6105), v. Li 
L912-13 (Cd. 6264), v. L22; L913 (Cd. 6807), v. 81; L914 (Cd. 
7280), v. 101. This series o( White Papers gives a continuous his- 
tory (subjeel to probable omission of some documents) of A.nglo- 
Russo-Persian relations from L906 to L913. See also, L912 L8 (Cd. 
6077) and (Cd. 6103), v. L22, and L914 (Cd, 7053), v. 101. 

Parliamentary Debates. The A.nglo-Russian Contention of Au- 
gust 31, 1 ( .M)7. was debated in the House of Lords on February 6 and 
10. L908, and in the House of Commons on February 17. (See 4th 
Series, v. L83.) Questions on the Persian situation were numerous 
thereafter. A Long debate on Sir Edward Grey's foreign policy in- 
volving much incidental discussion of the Persia question, was held 
in the House of Commons November 29 and December 1 1. 1911. 



HOOKS. 



Sykes, P. M., Lieut. Col. A History of Persia. 2 vols. (London. 
Methuen, L915.) Vol. 2 contains (in pocket) a map of Persia. 37 by 
;>1 inches, on a scale of 1 inch to 40 miles. (Marked S. D. O. 1912.) 
The historical narrative runs only to 1906. Bibliography, pp. 513- 
5 1 8. 

Curzon, George N. (now Earl Curzon of Kedleston). Persia and 
the Persian question. 2 vols., London, L892. Map. end of v. 1, Persia, 
Afghanistan, and Baluchistan, 26 by 22 inches, 1 inch to (50 miles. 
Turner and Shawe, London. Several detail maps. A work of very 
high repute, based on extensive travel and study, all done with 
special reference to the political situation. 

Jackson, Prof. .V. Y. W., Persia, past and present. (New York, 
L906.) Map of Persia ?, 24 by 20 inches. I inch to 68 miles. 

by W. and A. K. Johnston, Edinburgh. The hook is of great value 
for history, archaeology, geography, etc.. hut avoids politics. 

The Times History of the War. London. Published weekly. 
Part 139: Persia and the War, v. 11. pp. 317 356. Reviews the pre- 
vious history. 

Chirol, Sir Valentine. The middle eastern question. (London. 
190:').) Map, p. 500, of Persia and adjoining countries, 20 by 10 
inches, 1 inch to 7 ( .> miles. 

Whigham, II. J.. The Persian problem. (New York, 1903.) Five 
small maps, with special reference to roads, ports, and railways. The 
author believed Russia was gaining rapidly on Britain in Persian 
a Hairs. 



- 



357 

Desmorgny, G. Lit Question persane et la guerre (Paris, Sirey, 
L916). By a French scholar, formerly in tl ice of the Persian 

government. 

Browne, E. (>.. The Persian revolution of 1905-1909. Cambridge, 
1910. Map, 11 by 9 inches, showing- spheres of influence in Persia. 
Appendix A contains "The bases of the Persian Constitution," in- 
cluding The Farmdn of August 5, 190G ; Electoral Law. September 9, 
L906; Fundamental Laws, December 30, 1906; Supplementary Fun- 
damental Laws, October 7, 1907; New Electoral Law, July 1, 1909. 
Prof. Browne is an ardent friend of the Nationalist cause in Persia. 

Hamilton. Angus. Problems of the Middle East. London, 1909. 
Anglo-Russian Convention, pp. 187-228. Persia and the Powers, 
pp. ('»_' 155. Appendices contain the Persian articles of the Anglo- 
Russian Convention of 1907, and the Persian Constitution, includ- 
ing Electoral Law, September 9, 1906, Fundamental Laws, December 
30, 1906, and Supplementary Fundamental Laws, October 7, 1907. 

Berard, Victor, Revolutions de la Perse. Paris, 1910. 1 map. 
(See also articles in Revue de Paris, 1909.) M. Berard is a French 
publicist of great knowledge and ability. 

Fraser, David. Persia and Turkey in revolt. Edinburgh. 1910. 

Shuster, W. M., The Strangling of Persia. New York. 1912. See 
also "Shuster's own story." in Hearst's magazine for 1912. Mr. 
Shuster sets forth frankly and fearlessly his view, that Russia and 
England in their own interests deliberately crushed down the na- 
tionalist aspirations of the Persians. 

PERIODICAL ARTICLES (ARRANGED CHRONOLOGICALLY). 

Dillon, Dr. E. J., in a number of sections on foreign affairs in 
Contemporary Review, gives an excellent idea of the Russian 
view gards Persia, of which view he was an ardent supporter. 

London Spectator. A number of well-written editorials from 1907 
on take the attitude that the peace of the world is England'- great- 
est interest, and that Persia is incapable of self-government, and 
her destruction is of small importance. 

Calchas (pseud.). The Anglo-Russian Agreement. Fortnightly 
Review, v. 88, pp. 535-50. November, 1907. Approves. Believed 
weak nations should be divided up. 

Wanderer (pseud.). The reform movement in Persia. Contem- 
porary Review, v. 94, pp; 97-105. July, 1908. A balanced discus- 
sion, bringing out especially well the religious aspect of the move- 
ment. 

Hamilton, Angus, The Persian crisis. Fortnightly Review, v. 
90, pp. 201-211. August, 1908; The prosped in Persia. Fortnightly 
Review, v. 93, pp. 102-112. January. 1910. A friend of Persia who 
believes the country incapable at present of self-government. 



358 

Blake, Maurice B., Our weak policy in Persia, Nineteenth Cen- 
fury, v. 67, pp. 544-9. March, 1910. England should stand firmly 
against the Russian attacks on the independence of Persia. 

Morrell, Philip, Our Persian policy. Nineteenth Century, v. 71. 
pp. 40-47. January, 1912. A discussion, sympathetic to Persian in- 
dependence, of the Sinister crisis. 

Fraser, Lovat, The Problem of Persia. Edinburgh Review, v. 216, 
pp. 489-512. October, 1912. Review of Shuster's book and Parlia- 
mentary Papers, 1909-12. Mr. Fraser believes that the Persian Na- 
tionalists caused their own downfall and that Sinister failed be- 
cause he relied only on them as represented in the Mejlis. He de- 
nies al] influence of Russian interference and looks, forward to a 
partition of Persia. 

Browne, E. G., The present situation in Persia. Contemporary Re- 
view, v. 102, pp. 631-642. November, 1912. Friendly to the Na- 
tionalists. 

Wilson, S. G., The Russian occupation of northern Persia. Mos- 
lem World, v. 3, pp. 339-349. October, 1913. Favorable to Russian 
ownership as allowing greater opportunity for Christianity. 

Eastern problems and British interests. Quarterly Review, v. 219, 
pp. 284-90. July. 1913. Discusses the proposed Trans-Persian rail- 
way. Desires Persian autonomy. 

Lawton, L., The situation in Persia. Dublin Review, v. 155, pp. 
138-145. July, 1914. Shows Russian penetration of northern Per- 
sia by growth of trade, financial control, land purchase, settlement of 
peasants, etc. 

MAPS. 

See references in connection with books above. 

Provisional Edition of International Map, compiled by Royal 
Geographical Society for Geographical Section of General Staff. 
Scale 1 to 1,000,000; 1 inch to 15.78 miles. Five Persian sections have 
been completed (July, 1918) : Tabriz, Resht, Teheran, etc. 

Preliminary draft of map being prepared by American Geograph- 
ical Society showing Western Asia on a scale of 1 to 9,000,000. Per- 
sia appears in the middle of the map. 

121. THE FORMATION OF THE TRIPLE ENTENTE. 

1. INTRODUCTION. 

The Triple Entente was a somewhat loosely joined combination, 
consisting of Russia, France, and England, which existed from 1907 
to 1914. Within the combination France and Russia were bound to- 
gether by a close alliance (See article. The Formation of the Dual 
Alliance between France and Russia, 1887-1894). England had no 



359 

alliance with either country, but had understandings with France, 
through the Entente Cordiale (See article, The Formation of the 
Entente Cordiale), and with Russia through the convention of 
August 31, 1007. 

German historians and publicists assert that the creation of the 
Triple Entente was inspired by hostility toward the German Empire, 
and that the purpose of its organizers was to bring about the "En- 
circlement of Germany," i. e.. to surround Germany with a circle of 
enemies who were united to thwart every effort for the extension of 
German influence in the world, and were only awaiting a favorable 
opportunity to destroy Germany by direct attack. The theory has 
never been supported by adequate documentary evidence or by any 
argument which will bear critical examination. The conception rests 
wholly upon distorted inferences. 

In fact, the Triple Entente was organized for the purpose of pre- 
serving the peace of Europe by the creation of an effective balance of 
power. It was a strictly defensive combination intended to serve as 
a counterpoise to the tremendous and aggressive power exercised by 
Germany in virtue of its military strength and its domination over 
the Triple Alliance, consisting of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and 
Italy. 

2. CONDITIONS LEADING TO THE ENTENTE CORDIALE. 

A growing uneasiness in regard to Germany's aggressive intentions 
in 1904 led to the formation of the Entente Cordiale (See article, that 
title). Other contributing factors were: 

(a) A desire on the part of France to concentrate her colonial 
interests and to be rid of various causes of petty troubles with Great 
Britain, notably in the policy of M. Delcasse, as Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, 1898-1905. 

(/->) A reaction in Great Britain against her recent Germanophile 
policy and her bickerings with France and a wish to abandon her po- 
sition of "splendid isolation." (See article, The Formation of the 
Entente Cordiale.) 

3. TERMS OF THE ENTENTE CORDIALE. 

The most important features of the convention which led directly 
to the Entente Cordiale were: 

(1) The public agn < ment. — Relates chiefly to Egypt and Morocco, 
each Government giving the other free hand, but disavowing an 
intention to change the political status of these countries, and each 
agreeing to respect the rights of the other under existing treaties. 
The. two Governments will give one another diplomatic support in 
order to carry out the agreement. 



860 

[ !) /'//<■ sttcrri articles, [f either Government is compelled l>y 
ticos "to modify their polioy in regard i<> Egypt «>r M«> 
i occo " the engagements in regard to freodom of 1 rade, to the pa; sago 
of the Sue Canal, and to the fori i Meat ions <>f the Straits of Gibr alter 
are to remain intaot, If legislative reforms prove neces n\ In either 
coUntrj ither Government will refuse to examine the propo nils of 
the other, i 'omponsal i»>n [a t » » bo made i<> Spain, 

i . NEGOTIATION OK Til K \ \<.i t ' i.t IAN CONVENTIONS 01 I HOT, 

The continued existence <>f the chief impelling motive which had 
led to the formation of the Entente Cordiale and especially the ox 
perienco of Europe during the Morocco cri is of 1908 100(1 | rti 

tic that title) induced Russia and (J real Britain i" seek i" adjust 
their outstanding differences, with lli«' further aim of bringing about 
:• relation between them which, in conjunction with the Dual Alliance 
between Franco and Russia (See article, thai title) and the Rntente 
Cordiale betweon Prance and England, would virtually create a 
combination con run." of France, Russia, and England, ropre 
sonting sufficient power to counterbalance iln> Triple Alliance, domi 
nated bj Germany, and thoroby (•> preserve ilu> peace of Europe. 
The suggestion for such an agreement <mi the pari of responsible 
public officials seems («» have come up originally among the British 
and Rui inn diplomatists assembled :ii the Algoeiras Conference in 
L906, bul the idea «>l' an A.nglo Russian accord had long been advo 
cated bj somo British public ally the seri< tide 

1\\ Calchn i in the Fortnightly Review for 1900 1901 and n il 
of the by Ren6 Henry in A.nnalcs de Sciences Politiqnes, vol. 

L7, pp, il- 168, March, I'.M'M. Negotiation began soon afterwan 

freemen! was reached and a convention signed on AugusI 31, 1907, 

i i i; m N 1 1 1 i i : i CONVENTION ( A l'PKN DIX I, 8 1 ) , 

The mosl importanl features of the convention were: 
(1) /', Tlu- British and Russian spheres in Persia are 

marked <>ii(. The revenues of Persia are to be devoted l<> tlu> same 
purposes as in tin* past. 1 1' changes are necessary in (l>o control 
of the revenue, the Governments i<> a friondly exchange of 

idoas with a view to an agreement. (See article, The Persian Ques 

lion, L90Q IIM t.) 

I \ fijluni:'- Great l^rit a in has no intention of changing the 

political status of Afghanistan and will not encourage anj measures 
there against Russia. Ru ree thai Afghanistan is outside 

her sphere of influence Rnd will conduct all relation with Afghan 
•11 tin . I he Bril nent. ( Ireal Britn i II not 

interfere in the internal government of Afghanistan nor annex anv 



80 

I--., i of it. pro idi 'I i he .'■ rneei fulfil i his 

( ><> k Hi-, agri '■ to equalil of commercial oppoi I 

A r,"li;ini tan, 

Thiht i 'I h< i ■■<> ( "> • i i .1' . i I- oi 

China and will re pec( the territorial inte/ ofThibi ill 

with Thibet only through the Chini c Govemmenl 
I] Bend > repri to Lhasa ; ' 

noi an pledge of th< re • nues of 'I hibet. - le 'I be 'I hi 

Qu«sti< i,. I [91 I ) 

BllihUXl i- 

mour, Chai The Diplomatic Bad 'I of th< 

i rfl 101 i. - ' II- i n, 1 ale Uni Pr< . 1016 I ( h 

VII, "The Diplomatic Revolution," is the best briei i I of the 
cau* . leading to the formation of the Triple Entente, and of the 
formal ion and it /<• a] 

imitt, B, E England and Germa (Princeton I 

Pre . 1916.) < \>- pter I •"■ dmirable accoui 

reference to A.nglo-Gcrman relal o 

dieu, A ri'lr*'. I A Hi. I oi : 'I < 

Macmillan ( o . L0O I.) A more full and vt 

Mui/;. Gilbert. The Foreign Poli< oi Edward { > 

1006 ' >rd, 'I I/ Clarendon Press, L915.) 

he !'•■' ind cl< ■ e of the Ei gl 

Blancard, \*. S. \'. L'accord Anglo Ku Be du 31 aoftt 1007. 
Annale d< polil 3, pp. 36 

ed, M. \V. 'J he Hapsburg Anarch 
ble, 1014). Gi 

d and I ! 
D 
The I ( !oi d a le Pub i -74 

'77. 'I lie 
\,\,. 211 2 

Mo '1:1; D ( 

don Press, 'I he E 

lie A rticle) . pp. 11. . pp. 1 5. 'I 

15. 
E ( '.' - Di p - of the War ( B< 

1015.) 'I le. Pub P i 544 . 

n. Th 

'I l/<- A nglo-B on of ' g 31, l'> r ' 

of I.'. I JO. 1908, :in<J in the H' 



362 

vol. L83, pp. 999 L047, L306 L353; vol. L8i, pp. 160 564. The Blue 
Hook, submitted to Parliament by the Government (Parliamentary 
Papers, Russia, No. L, L907), docs not throw any light upon the 
negot iation of the convention. 

The debate in the House of Commons on relations with Germanj 
on November 27, L911, reported in Hansard, 5th series, vol. 32, pp. 
1 1 liii'.. is very inst ructive. 

122. THE SEPARATION OF NORWAY FROM SWEDEN. 

I. I NH'N (IT W0RWA1 AM) SWEDEN. 

k 

'1'hc Riksakt of L815 provided for the voluntary union of the 
Crowns of Sweden and Norway and for the equality of the two 
countries. Il contained no clear ami specific provision, however, for 
the conduct oi' foreign a Hairs, and this omission was utilized by 
Sweden to secure control of that department of government and with 
it t he consular service. 

•J. RIVALRY. 

Norwegian commerce developed rapidly and finally far surpassed 
thai of Sweden. Norway favored free trade; Sweden maintained 
a protective tariff and the two countries regarded themselves as com- 
mercial rivals. Norwegians began to feel that Sweden was managing 
the consular service in her own interest alone and to the detriment of 
Norwegian commerce. This feeling soon led to a demand for a 
separate consular system. In L892 the Norwegian Storthing passed 
a resolution for such a service, but Norway did not make much 
progress toward getting it until L903. Announcement that an un- 
derstanding for separate consular systems had been reached by rep- 
resentatives of the two kingdoms was then made in the communique 
of March 24. 

.:. COMMUNIQUE OF MARCH 24, L903. 

This agreement (Nordlund, 7;'. 7.'>) stipulated for the establish- 
ment of separate consular services, but provided that '"The relations 
of the separate consuls to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and to 

the Embassies hall be regulated by laws of the same wording which 
can not. be altered nor abolished without the consent of the authori- 
ties oi both Kingdoms." In reality nothing was arranged, for the 
two countries found it impossible to agree on the terms of these 
identical laws. Sweden wished to keep the Norwegian consular 
service under control of the foreign office; Norway insisted upon an 
independent administration. 



363 

4. NORWAT ANNULS THE CTNION. 

King Oscar was firm in his opposition to the Norwegian consular 
legislation, but no Norwegian ministry would assume responsibility 
for his action by remaining in office. He finally admitted his inability 
lo form a government and the Storthing proclaimed that the King 
has ceased to act as King of Norway. This meant the dissolution of 
the union. Sweden, after sonic hesitation, agreed under conditions 
formulated in the protocol of Karlstad October 23, L&05, and definitely 
established by the conventions of Stockholm of October 26. 

5. CONVENTIONS OF STOCKHOLM. 

These were five in number and provided that (!) all differences 
between (he I wo countries which. could not be settled by diplomacy 
should be submitted to The Hague tribunal, except qu ns involv- 
ing the "independence, integrity, or vital interests" of either coun- 
try. (2) The common frontier was to be neutralized. (3) The Lap- 
landers were to be allowed their ancient rights of pasturing their 
reindeer on both sides of the border. ( ! ) Reciprocal rights for tran- 
sit of goods through both countries was established for a period of 
thirty years. (5) For lakes and waterways common to both countries, 
each s<ate might make regulations the benefits of which were open 

[ually to citizens of both countries. (See Appendix I, 74.) 

6. ADJUSTMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS. 

The process of separating the t wo kingdoms required for complete- 
ness an adjustment of their relations with other countries, especially 
•with a number of the great powers. On November 21, 1855, during 
the course of the Crimean war, Sweden and Norway, fearing en- 
croachment on the part of Russia, had entered into a treaty with 
England and France (British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 15, 
pp. 33-34) by which the northern kingdoms agreed not to permit 
Russia to obtain or occupy any part of their territories, while Eng- 
land and France agreed to furnish military and naval aid to resist 
any attempted encroachment by Russia. This treaty was still in 
force at the time of the separation in 1905. Its existence had been 
constantly regarded by Russia as an offensive imputation upon Rus- 
sian good faith. To meet the changed situation a new arrangement 
was negotiated. On November 2, 1907, Norway, France, and England 

ue ! a declaration abrogating the treaty of November 21, 1855, so 
far as the three governments were concerned (Ibid., vol. 101, p. 187). 
On the same day Norway entered into a treaty with France, England, 
Russia, and Germany, by which Norway agreed not to cede to any 
power nor to permit the occupation of any part of the Norwegian 
territory, while those governments agreed to respect the integrity of 



364 

Norway and to loud their aid if the integrity of Norwegian terri 
tory should be threatened. This treaty was for a period of ten 
years, with a provision for automatic renewal unless denounced at 
least two years before its expiration. (Archives Diplomatiques, third 
series, vol. L07, pp. L79-180.) A somewhat similar arrangement was 
made by Sweden early in the following year. On April 23, L908, 
Sweden signed with France and England a declaration identical with 
thai which Norway had signed with those countries mi November '_', 
L907 (British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 101. p. L88). On the 
same day Sweden entered into the Baltic and North Seas Conven- 
u msof L908 (See article, thai title). These conventions gave Sweden 
an arrangement which, though different in terms, was designed to he 
the equivalent in protection of that which Norway secured by the 
treaty of November 2, L907. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

DOOUMEH is. 

Archives Diplomatiques, third series, vol. <)7. pp. 313-357, contain 
the Stockholm conventions and other important documents of earlier 
date. See citations above for documents of Later date. 

NAEBATIVES AM) discissions. 

Waultrin, R. Un siecle d'union suedo-norvegienne et la fondation 

du royaume de Norvege, L906. Annales des sciences politiques, vol. 
21, pp. II 71, 229- 256. 

Froticelli, 0. In siecle d'union. Histoire des relations diplo- 
matiques des royaumes de Suede et de Norvege (1815-1912) (Mont- 
pellier, Firmin, 1913). Careful study. 

Jordan, L. La separation de la Suede et de la Norvege (Paris, 
Pedone, L906.) 

Aall. A. A. F, Die Norwegisch-Schwedische Union, ihr Bestehen 
und ihr Losung (Breslau, Marcus, p.»P_'). An exhaustive treatise. 

Gjerset, K. History of the Norwegian People, Vol. I, pp. 561 
Pro-Norwegian. 

ivenow, L. !n ( ambridge Modern History, vol. L2, pp. 281 290. 
Pro-Swedish. 

Among- the most important of the controversial publications are: 

Nansen, F. Norway and the Union with Sweden (London. Mae- 
millan, 15)05.) Pro-Norwegian, 

Nordlund, K. The Swedish-Norwegian Crisis. (Upsala, Alm- 
quist, L905.) Pro-Swedish, well documented. 

Eden, N. Sweden for Peace. (Upsala, Almquist, 1905.) 

Brackstad, II. L. North American Review, vol. 181. pp. 281-295, 
Pro-Norwegian. 



365 
123. THE BALTIC AND NORTH SEA CONVENTIONS OF 1908. 

1. INTRODUCTION. 

The treaty of 1855 by which France and Great Britain guaranteed 
the integrity of Norway and Sweden against Russia was distinctly 
distasteful to Russia (Sec article, The Separation of Norway from 
Sweden). Russia was anxious to replace i\ by a more friendly 
arrangement. After the dissolution of the union of Norway and 
Sweden, Norway sought from the great powers a guaranty of her 
integrity. Sweden whs more sensitive about her sovereignty and 
unwilling to admit dependence on the great powers. Under th 
circumstances were opened negotiations which led to the Bailie and 
North Sea Conventions. 

2. NEGOTIATIONS FOE BALTIC CONVENTION. 

The Baltic agn emeni was signed by Germany, Sweden. Russia, and 
Denmark, all Stales bordering on that sea. Its origin is not fully 
established. There were some who ascribed its inception to a Ger- 
man plan to alienate Russia from France and Great Britain. Others 
believed Germany was trying to exclude these latter powers from 
the Baltic to balance the Mediterranean accord. On the other hand, 
there were German statements that Russia initiated the negotiations 
with a view to escape her obligations not to fortify the Aland 
Islands. Tt was apparent that Sweden, however, would be the chief 
beneficiary of any arrangement to settle the statu- of the small 
northern States. 

:>,. TERMS OK BALTIC CONVENTION, APRIL ::•"., L908. 

This agreement (Sec Appendix I. 84) declared the purpose of the 
four contracting powers to preserve the status quo in the lands encir- 
cling the Baltic. In case this were threatened the;: bound themselves 
to enter into communication with one another with a vi;-w to agreeing 
upon such measures as they might consider advisable in the interests 
the maintenance of the. statu quo. A memorandum was added 
that the convention "could in no manner be invoked when there was 
a (in: .-! ion of tie exercise of the righ< ; of sovereignty of the high 

contracting parties in (heir respective possessions." This was done at 
the instance of Russia, who was unwilling to he a party to a pledge 
(hat the Aland Cslands hould not be fortified. Sweden was anxious 
for such a guarantee, bul Russia firmly refused to repeal her humilia- 
tion of 1855. 



366 

I. NORTH SEA CONVENTION, APRIL l'". 1908. 

The parties to the North Sea convention were Great Britain, Ger- 
many, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, ami Sweden. It provided 
(See Appendix [, 83) for the status quo in the North Sea in terms 
similar to the Baltic arrangement. It was accompanied also by the 
memorandum regarding sovereignty. 

5. SIGNIFICANCE. 

These conventions together constituted a single arrangement for 
the small States of northern Europe. Norway ami Belgium were 
not included, for their integrity had already been guaranteed, the 
former by the treaty of November, VM)7 (See article, The Separation 
of Norway from Sweden), the latter by the treaty of L839. Sweden 
was the greatest gainer by the conventions, for since the separation 
from Norway she had been left uncertain about any guarantee from 
the great powers. Denmark felt that her position was strengthened. 
The Dutch appeared indifferent, for as one of their writers ex- 
pressed it: "Holland exists by the grace of England and France." 
They regarded the German promises as of "no value" but relied 
upon the strength of her two other great neighbors. 

The agreements Left unsettled the question as to whether or not 
the Baltic was a closed sea. The fact that any agreement was pos- 
sible led many to hope that a more kindly feeling was developing 
in European politics. German papers pointed to Hie arrangement 
a.s an evidence thai their country had no thought of aggression. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

La Vie Politique, L907 L90S, vol. 2, pp. 253 256. (Paris, AJcan, 
1908.) A good brief account. 

" Britannicus," Northern Question in North American Review for 
August. 1908. vol. 188, pp. 2^7-2-17. Discusses the significance of 
the conventions. 

North Sea and Baltic Agreements in Fortnightly Review for May, 
1908. vol. SO, pp. 932-935. Brief comments. 

Annual Register lor L908. (London. Longmans, L909.) pp. 303 
364. Summary of opinions. 

Floeckher, A. de. La Convention relative a la Baltique* et la ques- 
tion de la fortification des iles d'Aland, in Revue generale de droit 
international public. L908, vol. L5, pp. 271-275. A German view. 
Also an article by the same writer, vol. 15, pp. L25 L29. 

Gurchen, Viscount de. La Question de la Baltique et la Question 
Danoise, in Questions diplomatiques et coloniales for 1908, vol. 25, 
pp. 829-831. 



367 

Dutch view of the North Sea Agreement in Review of Reviews for 
August, 1908, vol. 38, pp. 242-243. Extracts from Dutch news- 
papers. 

Texts of Baltic Convention in British and Foreign State Papers, 
vol. 101 (London, 1912), pp. 974-975. Text of North Sea Convenl ion 
in Ibid., pp. 179-180. 

124. THE SECOND HAGUE CONFERENCE, 1907. 

1. PUBPOSE. 

Acting upon the request of the Interparliamentary Union, Presi- 
dent Roosevelt suggested on September 21. 1904, the meeting of a 
Second International Peace Conference, and recommended the fol- 
lowing questions as proper subjects of consideration: (1) The ques- 
tion- for the consideration of which the First Hague Conference bad 
expressed a wish thai a future conference be held. (See article, The 
First Hague Conference, L899.) (2) The negotiation of arbitration 
treaties between the nations represented at the conference to be con- 
vened. (3) The advisability of establishing an international con- 
gress to convene periodically for the discussion of international 
questions. 

Owing, however, to the continuance of the Russo-Japanese War 
until September 5, 1905, to the outbreak of the Russian revolution 
which followed, and to the further delay caused by the meeting of 
the Third Tan American Conference, the Second Hague Conference 
did not meet until June 15, 1907. 

President Roosevelt generously conceded the honor of calling the 
Se ond Hague Conference to Czar Nicholas IT, who, for obvious 
reasons, omitted the subject of "limitation of armaments" from the 
Russian program. But Great Britain insisted upon raising this 
important question, and the United States was determined to ask 
for a consideration of the so-called Drago doctrine in a modified form, 
i. e., the question of forbidding the use of armed force for the re- 
covery of contract debts unless arbitration were refused, or ii 
of failure to submit to an arbitral award. 

Owing mainly to the opposition of Germany, Austria, Japan, and 
Russia, the British Government failed in its attempt to -"cure a con- 
sideration of the question of a limitat ion of armament or restrict ion 
of military expenditures. Germany even opposed the insertion of 
the words "more urgent than ever" in the resolution which was 
adopted confirming the resolution of 1899 relative to this matt< r. 

2. RESULTS. 

Though the Second Hague Peace Conference of 1907 failed in 
many respects to meet the expectations even of conservative stafo 



368 

men and international jurists, it must be admitted that it was, on 
the whole, a considerable success. The fact that the principles laid 
clown in its conventions were violated in a wholesale manner by the 
Central Powers during the World War increased the measure of con- 
demnation which the world at large passed upon the atrocities com- 
mitted by the armies of those powers. 

The final act of the conferences included the following 13 con- 
ventions : 

(I) Convention (of 97 articles) for the pacific settlement of 
international disputes — a revision of the convention of 1899 dealing 
with this subject. The codes of procedure bearing upon arbitration 
and international commissions of inquiry were considerably enlarged 
and elaborated, and a short code for arbitration of a more summary 
procedure added. The various projects for obligatory arbitration 
were defeated, owing mainly to the opposition of Germany. But 
in the final act the conference declared itself unanimously in 
favor of the "principle" of compulsory arbitration, and declared 
that " certain disputes, in particular those relating to the interpreta- 
tion of treaties and application of the provisions of international 
agreements may be submitted to compulsory arbitration without re- 
striction." 

(II) Convention (of 7 articles) respecting the employment of force 
for .the recovery of contract debts. This was a modification of the 
Drago doctrine known as the Porter resolution which practically 
prescribed obligatory arbitration in one class of cases, namely, con- 
tract debts. A majority of the powers represented at the Second 
Hague Conference (though many of those who signed subsequently 
failed to ratify) agreed " not to have recourse to armed force for the 
recovery of contract debts claimed from the government of one coun- 
try as being due to its nationals," unless the debtor State refused to 
arbitrate or failed to submit to the arbitral award after having ac- 
cepted arbitration. 

(III) Convention (of 8 articles) relative to the opening of hos- 
tilities. This convention declared, in effect, that hostilities are not 
to begin without prior warning in the form either of a declaration 
of war or an ultimatum, and it also provided for notice to neutral 
powers. 

(IV) Convention (of 56 articles) regarding the laws and customs 
of land warfare. This was a revision of the Hague Code of 1899. 

(V) Convention (of 25 articles) regarding the rights and duties 
of neutral powers and persons in case of war on land. 

(VI) Convention (of 11 articles) relative to the status of enemy 
merchant ships at the outbreak of hostilities. 

(VII) Convention (of 12 articles) relative to the conversion of 
merchant ships into warships. 



:J69 

(VIII) Convention (of 13 articles) relative to the laying of sub- 
marine mines. This convention was very imperfect, and was only 
concluded for a period of seven years. 

(IX) Convention (of 13 articles) respecting bombardments by 
naval forces in time of Avar. This convention applies to naval war- 
fare the rules governing bombardment on land. 

(X) Convention (of 28 articles) for the adaptation of the prin- 
ciples of the Geneva Convention of 1906 to maritime warfare. It 
relates to the treatment of the sick, wounded, and shipwrecked in 
naval warfare. 

(XI) Convention (of 14 articles) relative to certain restrictions on 
the exercise of capture in maritime warfare. This convention in- 
cludes provisions relating to the inviolability of postal correspond- 
ence; the exemption from capture of vessels engaged in coast fishing, 
etc. ; and regulations regarding the disposition of the crews of enemy 
merchant ships captured by a belligerent. 

(XII) Convention (of 57 articles, with an annex showing distribu- 
tion of judges) relative to the establishment of an international prize 
court. This convention did not go into effect, owing to the failure of 
the contracting parties to ratify it. Opposition to the convention 
was very pronounced in England. 

(XIII) Convention (of 33 articles) respecting the rights and duties 
of neutral powers in naval war. 

In addition to the above conventions, the Second Hague Peace Con- 
ference renewed " for a period extending to the Third Peace Confer- 
ence " the declaration of 1899 prohibiting the " discharge of projectiles 
and explosives from balloons or by other new methods of a similar 
nature." 

The conference made the notable recommendation that the signa- 
tory powers adopt a project or draft of a convention (consisting of 
35 articles) for the organization of a court of arbitral justice as soon 
as they shall have reached an agreement upon the selection of judges 
and the constitution of the court. To remedy the defects of the Hague 
Tribunal, or so-called Permanent Court of Arbitration (which was not 
really a court, but a mere list or panel of judges), the Second Hague 
Conference attempted to create a so-called Court of Arbitral Justice. 
Put its labors in this respect were unsuccessful. A draft convention 
providing for the organization of such a court was elaborated and 
readily adopted in plenary session, but the conference was unable to 
agree upon a mode of selection for the appointment of judges. The 
project was, therefore, merely recommended to the signatory powers 
for negotiation and agreement. 

The following additional "wishes" and recommendations (voeux) 
were expressed: (1) That " in case of war the proper civil and mili- 
53706— IS 24 



370 

tary authorities make it their very special duty to insure and protect 
the maintenance of peaceful intercourse, and notably the commercial 
and industrial relations, between the peoples of the belligerent States 
and of neutral States." (2) That " the powers settle, through special 
conventions, the situation, in respect to the support of military 
charges, of foreigners residenl within their territories." (3) That 
"the elaboration of regulations relative to the laws and customs 
of maritime warfare may figure in the program of the next 
conference, and that in any case the powers apply, as far as possible, 
in maritime warfare the principles of the convention relative to the 
laws and customs of war on land." (4) That the powers hold a 
"third peace conference, which might take place within a period 
similar to that which has elapsed since the preceding conference, on 
a date to be set by joint agreement among the powers." 

BIBLIOGRAPHY ON THE TWO HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES OF 1899 AND 

1907. 

The best documented and most authoritative accounts of the Hague 
conferences in English are the following: 

Higgins, A. P., The Hague Conferences and Other International 
Conferences (Cambridge, University Press, L909) ; Holls, F. W., The 
Peace Conferen eat The Hague (New York, Macmillan, L900) ; and 
Scott, J. B., The Hague Peace I !o iferences of L899 and L907 | Ba] 
more, Johns Hopkins Press, 1909. in 2 vols.). For briefer accounts, 
see Hull, W. I., The Two Hague Conferences (Boston, Ginn, 1908) ; 
and Lawrence. T. J.. International Problems and Hague Conferences 
(London. 1909). 

Among the best accounts in French and German are the following: 

Lapradelle, G. de, La Conference de la paix, in Revue generale de 
droit international public for 1899, VI, pp. 651-846; Lapradelle, G., 
and Politis. N., La deuxieme conference de la paix. Revue de droit 
international public (1909). \\T, 385-437; Renault L., and Bour- 
geois, L., L'oeuvre de la Have. Annales des sciences politiques, 
vol. 23, pp. 429—167; Lemon on. E., La seconde conference de la paix 
(Paris, 1908) ; Fried, A. H., Die zWeite I laager Konferenz (Leipzig, 
L907) : Meurer, Ch., Die Haager Friedenskonferenz (in 2 vols., Miin- 
chen, 1905-07) : Nippold, O., Die zweite Haagerkonferenz (Leipzig, 
1908); and Renault. L., LVuvre de la Have (Paris, 1908). 

For texts of the Hague Conferences, see especially Higgins, A. P., 
The Hague Peace Conferences (Cambridge, 1909) ; Scott, J. B., 
Texts of the Peace Conferences at The Hague (Boston, Ginn, 1908) ; 
Ibid., The Hague Conferences of L809 and 1907 (Baltimore, 1909), 
Vol. II; and Supplement to American Journal of International Law 
for 1908, Vol. II. 



371 
125. THE REVAL INTERVIEW, 1908. 

1. INTRODUCTION. 

In June, 1908, Edward VII paid a visit to the Czar at Revai. As 
i!i An tro-Russian ;■■<■■■:,]•<] in regard to Macedonia, the Miirsteg pro- 
gram, had recently broken down (Si tide, The M ia i (^ 
tion, 1878-1908), and as the situation in Macedonia called impera- 
tively for action, there was a widespread belief in Germany and 
Austria-Hungary thai the purpose of the meeting was to arrange for 
a plan of joint English and Russian action in a form hostile to I 
interests and wishes of Austria-Hungary. 

2. THE FACTS REGARDING THE BEVAL MEETING. 

The fa<-i regarding (lie Reval interview, •> far as known, seern 
to be as follow 

The King and Queen of England Left Charing Cros on the 
evening of June .">. L908, arriving ■■■' R< val escorted by warships on 
June 9. Here they were visited by the Czar and the Imperial 
family, a visit which they at once returned on the [mperial yacht. 
The speeches at the staff banquet in the evening laid sti on the 
effect of the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1007 in drawing the two 
countries together and in consolidating the peace of the world. 
The press announced that Sir Charles Hardinge and M. Isvolsky, who 
had accompanied their respective sovereigns, had come near to a 
complete agreement on the projected reforms of Macedonia. 

The meeting at Reval appears to have been greeted with great 
satisfaction by the Russian press as a further step in the rapproche- 
ment between England and Russia and as strong ntee of I 
ropean peace. It was the belief of a good many competent observers 
that the Reval interviews probably, and quite without any intent on 
the part of the British and Russian Governments, hastene I the out- 
break of the Turkish Revolution. (See article, that title. ) 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

For the main facts, see Annual Register for 1908, pp. 131 and 
320; Steed, H. W., Hapsburg Monarchy, 237-238 /London. Consta- 
ble, 1914). Reventlow, Deutschlands auswlirtige Politik, 1888-1014 
(Berlin Mittler, 1916), gives a distorted Pan-German version of the 
interview. 

126. THE TURKISH REVOLUTION OF 1908-9. 

1. CAUSES OF THE REVOLUTION. 

The revolution was in essence the overthrow of the Sultan's auto- 
cratic power by the upper class Turks, and the substitution therefor 
of parliamentary government under their control. The earlier at- 



372 

tempi to secure constitutional government, connected with the name 
of Midhat Pasha and resulting in the constitution of December 23, 
1876, was a failure, due to the lack at that time of any feeling for 
its necessity among the ruling caste. Thirty years of increasingly 
centralized government, the universal espionage which made all life 
miserable, the assassination or exile of all who opposed the regime in 
the slightest detail, the loss ol' territory and of prestige, the con- 
sciousness thai the economic penetration of the foreign powers could 
end only in the dissolution of the Empire, forced I he Turks of all 
classes to consider the constitution their only salvation. The leaders 
in Paris studied, in detail successful revolutions of th« past, arranged 
their differences as between radical and conservative, invited in the 
other nationalistic revolutionary parlies, especially the Armenians, 
but retained control in their own hands. 

' •_'. OUTBREAK OF THE REVOLUTION. 

The revolution seems to have been hastened by the announcement 
of Austria in February, 1908, that a railroad would he built through 
Novibazar, linking up the Bosnian and Salonika Lines, which would 
bring all the western part of the Balkan peninsula under Austrian 
influence, and by the Reval interview ( See article, that title). 

The disturbance in Macedonia had brought together Large numbers 
of Turkish troops. The common soldiers were unpaid and wasting 
their time, the officers were unable to preserve order and dissatis- 
lied with the presence of the foreign officers, who were a constant 
reminder that the days of the Empire were numbered. Emissaries 
sent out from Paris found a good reception, and the revolution was 
proclaimed duly 6, 1908. At first foreigners thought little of it. but 
adhesion was rapid. Troops sent against the rebels refused to light. 
Freedom was proclaimed for the Christians, and safety for foreign in- 
terests. The Sultan suddenly surrendered by granting a constitution 
xm\ calling for an election. The rule of Abdul Hamid had been 
supported by Germany, even through the Armenian massacres. 
Popular feeling naturally turned against it. while France, the home 
for many years of the leaders of the Young Turks, and England, 
the friend of liberty, were much favored. In their turn, they ac- 
claimed the revolution as a marvel, which it was in many respects. 
During this period, the grand vizier, Kiamil Pasha, was Anglophile. 
English and French aid largely was used in reconstructing the gov- 
ernment. 

3. GROWTH of GERMAN INFLUENCE. 

The new regime was soon discredited by the declaration of inde- 
pendence by Bulgaria, the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by 



373 

Austria, the declaration of annexation of Crete to Greece (See articles 
on those subjects). Whether all these were the result of the intrigues 
of the Central Powers they played the game of those powers. Long 
negotiations were needed to settle the railroad question in Bulgaria; 
the return of Xovi Bazar did not prevent a boycott of Austrian goods 
by the Turks; the questions remained for long irritating. The new 
Parliament assembled December 17, not without frauds and the stir- 
ring up of racial hatreds, with the possibility of foreign troubles. 
Against the party supported by the Committee of Union and Prog- 
ress, devoted to centralization, Ottomanization, and destruction of 
special privileges for national, religious, or foreign interests, was the 
liberal party, in touch with Greek, Armenian, Bulgarian. Arab, and 
Albanian nationalists, suspected of alliance with the Sultan and re- 
action. Kiamil Pasha found his support here and was forced to 
resign. Himil Pasha was less strongly English. The capital was 
temporarily secured by the troops of the Sultan (April 13) , but troops 
loyal to the revolution were called up from Macedonia, the city was 
retaken on the 24th, and three days later Abdul Humid was deposed 
and Mehmet V ascended the throne. The Young Turks had been 
greatly aided in their march on Constantinople by the expert advice 
of the Central Powers and especially of the Neue Freie Presse of 
Vienna. The military party had been pro-German because of their 
German training, in Germany or under Von der Goltz. As the revo- 
lution became more military, those who remembered Paris played less 
part. The Adana massacres and the failure to adequately punish 
those responsible, caused a corresponding coolness of the English and 
French toward the Young Turk. The growing power of Enver 
Pasha, the "hero of the revolution," was also thrown toward tier- 
many. In spite of all this, it is probable that at the beginning of the 
World War the majority of responsible officials and thinkers in Tur- 
key were not pro-German. 

BIBLIOGRAJ'IIV. 

Every discussion of the Eastern question and every book of travel 
tells the story of the regime of Abdul Hamid. Perhaps the best col- 
lection of the facts, with special reference to the revolution they 
produced, is La Revolution Turque, by Victor Berard (Paris, Colin, 
1909). Eyewitnesses were for the most part interested in the pictur- 
esque details of the fraternization of the various hostile races, to the 
exclusion of more important matters. Sir Edwin Pears has given an 
excellent account out of an unusually wide and accurate knowledge 
in Forty Years in Constantinople (New York, Appleton, 1916). 
Of the hundreds of more or less valuable accounts and discussions 
in the magazines we may note as of especial importance those by 



374 

Georges Gaulis in Le Journal des Debats and by E. J. Dillon in the 
Contemporary Review and also the notes of the Fortnightly Review. 
A complete presentation of the documents of diplomatic character in 
the Archives Diplomatiques, third series, vol. 107, 251ff; vol. 109, 
219ff; the old constitution is given, vol. 107, 25411. See also Staats- 
archiv, vol. 78, pp. 245-311. An excellent presentation of the 
parliamentary questions is given by A. H. Lybyer, The Turkish 
Parliament, Proceedings of the American Political Science Asso- 
ciation, vol. 7 (1910), 65ff. For the revolution in its historical 
background, le V te de la Jonquiere, Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman 
(Paris, Hachette, 1914). 

127. THE ANNEXATION OF BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA, 1908. 

1. INTRODUCTION. 

Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin gave Austria-Hungary the right 
to "occupy and administer" Bosnia-Herzegovina (See articles The 
Congress of Berlin and Austria-Hungary and the Balkan Settlement 
of 1878). At the time there was a widespread expectation that within 
a few years the Provinces would be formally annexed to the Dual 
Monarchy. A variety of circumstances, connected with both the for- 
eign and internal affairs of Austria-Hungary, prevented any serious 
effort to convert occupation and administration into annexation. As 
time passed objections of the domestic order ceased to be as pro- 
nounced as in the years soon after 1878. Under the leadership of 
Count Aehrenthal, Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Government of 
the Dual Monarclry found in the Turkish revolution of 1908 (See 
article, that title), a convenient opportunity for annexation. 

The Government of the Dual Monarchy alleged that the Turkish 
Revolution in 1908 made it necessary for Austria-Hungary to define 
her position in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The constitutional reforms 
announced by the Young Turks required that Turkey grant a degree 
of autonomy to the provinces and representation in the Turkish Par- 
liament. This made it necessary, in the interest of the welfare of 
the provinces, that Austria-Hungary should no longer leave their 
status ill defined. 

2. PREPARATION FOR ANNEXATION. 

Vienna was probably determined on an early annexation after 
the revolt broke out in Turkey in July. Though Isvolsky, Rus- 
sian minister of foreign affairs, was told that the act would take 
place " au moment favorable" and with ample warning, Russia was 
not notified until October 3, and the other powers were uninformed 
until October 6. The diplomacy of Aehrenthal, minister of foreign 
affairs of Austria-Hungary, was perplexingly intricate. (Steed, 
246-251.) 



375 

3. ANNEXATION PROCLAIMED. 

On October 6 a circular note to the powers announced the evacua- 
tion of the Sandjak of Novi Bazar, and the grant of constitutional 
autonomy to Bosnia-Herzegovina. (See Appendix I, 86.) On Oc- 
tober 7 the Emperor-King announced to the inhabitants of the prov- 
inces his reasons for annexation. (See Appendix I, 87.) 

4. SETTLEMENT WITH TURKEY. 

On October 8 the Porte protested to Vienna that the Treaty of 
Berlin and the convention of Constantinople could be altered only 
by the consent of the signatory parties. (See Appendix I, 88.) A 
Turkish boycott on Austrian goods caused such losses that on No- 
vember 22 Pallavicini, ambassador of Austria-Hungary at Constanti- 
nople, promised concessions if the boycott was raised. Kiamil Pasha 
ordered it stopped on December 5. On January 11 Pallavicini offered 
the Porte £2,200.000 to compensate for Turkish property in the prov- 
inces, this payment, he asserted, having nothing to do with the 
annexation (Aktenstiicke, nos. 9^-95). This and other compensa- 
tions Avere embodied in the protocol of February 26. by which Turkey 
recognized the annexation. (Appendix I. 90.) 

5. CONFLICT WITH SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO. 

On October 7 Serbia demanded complete restoration of the Treaty 
of Berlin or compensation (Archives diplomatiques, third series, vol. 
109. pp. 291-292). Montenegro demanded that Antivari be freed 
from Austrian control. Milovanovitch, minister of foreign affairs of 
Serbia, was urged by the powers to avoid hostilities and await an in- 
ternational conference. He replied that Serbia wished a recognition 
of Serbian and Montenegrin integrity, and the strip between the 
Sandjak and Bosnia-Herzegovina as a buffer between Austria and 
Turkey. 

6. ATTITUDE OF THE POWERS. 

The attitude of the powers was as follows : The interests of Eng- 
land and France were not directly concerned. Russia was anxious 
to bring the matter before a congress of the powers (Dipl. Akt. no. 87 
Beilage). Italy was bound by the Triple Alliance. Germany ap- 
proved a fait accompli, but wished Austria to go no further. ( Albin, 
233-234; Annual Eegister, 1908, 322.) Aehrenthal would consent to 
a congress only with the proviso that the annexation should not be 
discussed, but should be simply ratified as a matter of legal form 
(Archives Diplomatiques, third series, vol. 109, p. 296). A plan for 
the congress was drawn up, but Austria-Hungary pronounced it un- 
acceptable (Aktenstuekc. no. 89 Beilage). 



376 

7. WHY NO CONGRESS WAS HELD. 

The idea of a congress was abandoned for two reasons: The atti- 
tude of Germany and the retreat of Russia, Serbia, and Montenegro. 
The Berlin Government, supporting Austria-Hungary, insisted that 
annexation be excluded from discussion, and that no compensation be 
given Serbia and Montenegro without Austria's consent. 

In the Reichstag, on December 7, Von Biilow said that Germany 
would stand by her ally. In March. 1909, he notified Russia that, if 
Russia intervened to aid Serbia, in case of war Germany would sup- 
port Austria. Russia at once recognized the annexation. 

8. SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO YIELD. 

In February and March, 1909, Austria mobilized three army corps 
and the Danube flotilla, and demanded categorical renunciation of 
the Serbian claims. As Russia had withdrawn her support early in 
March (Aktenstiicke, no. 117), Serbia on March 31 renounced her 
opposition to annexation and promised to restore her army to the 
status of the spring of 1908. (See Appendix I, 91.) 

On April 6 Montenegro renounced her opposition in return for the 
suppression of article 29 of the Treaty of Berlin, giving Austria con- 
trol of Antivari (Aktenstiicke, no. 178). 

9. SETTLEMENT AMONG THE POWERS. 

As the powers most nearly concerned agreed to the annexation, the 
remaining powers consented to the suppression of article 25 of the 
Treaty of Berlin. Italy consented April 11, Germany April 7, Eng- 
land April 17, Russia and France April 19 (Aktenstiicke. nos. 179, 
182, 18o-187). 

10. RESULTS. 

The results of annexation for Austria were an indemnity of £2,200,- 
000 to Turkey; trade losses by tho, Turkish boycott; £14,000,000 for 
the mobilization of the army: the alienation of most of the powers 
from Austrian policy; and a heavy obligation to Germany. The 
whole episode became the starting point and was in large measure the 
immediate cause for the series of events, all of them connected with 
the affairs of the Turkish Empire, which filled the years 1908 to 
1914 and led directly to the World War. 

See also article. The Bosnian Crisis of 1908-190!). 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

DOCUMENTS. 

Austria-Ministerium des Auessern. Diplomatische Aktenstuecke 
betreffend Bosnien und Hercegovina Oktober 1908 bis Juni 1909. 



377 

(Wien, K. K. Hof-und Staatsdruckerei, 1909.) Official publication 
of important dispatches from Austrian Archives. 

Albin, P. Les Grands Traites Politiques. Recueil des principaux 
textes diplomatiques depuis 1815 jusqu'a nos jours. Paris, Alcan, 
1912.) Contains important documents not printed in the Austrian 
collection. 

Archives Diplomatiques. third series, vol. 109, pp. 278-303. 

YEARBOOKS. 

The Annual Register 1908, 1900. Valuable record of course of the 
crisis. 

Viallate, A. La vie politique dans deux mondes 1908-1909. 

Jellinek, G. ; Laband, P. ; Piloty, R. edit. Jahrbuch des oeffent- 
lichen Rechts der Gegenwart 1908-1909. 

SECONDARY AUTHORITIES. 

Koyitch, D. S. L'annexion de la Bosnie-Herzegovine et le droit 
international public. Dissertation. University of Paris. (Paris, 
191-2. ) 

Krunsky, B. L'annexion de la Bosnie-Herzegovine en 1908: 
etude de droit international et l'histoire diplomatique. Disserta- 
tion. University of Paris. (Paris, 1912.) 

Steed, H. W. The Hapsburg Monarchy, pp. 238-263 (London, 
Constable, 1914). Valuable account by well-informed Vienna cor- 
respondent of the London Times. 

Fournier, A. Wie wir zu Bosnien kamen. (Vienna, 1909.) An 
historical sketch by one of Austria's best historians. The authorized 
Austrian publication and apologia. 

Von Sosnosky, T. Die Balkanpolitik Oesterreichs-Ungarns seit 
I860. 2 vols. (Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1913-1914.) 

PAMPHLETS. 

Cvijie, Prof. J. L'annexion de la Bosnie et la Question Serbe. 
Paris, 1909. The Belgrade point of view at its best. 

Masaryk, Prof. T. G. Der Agramer Hochverratsprozess und die 
Annexion von Bosnien und Herzegovina. (Vienna, 1909.) By a 
prominent Czech publicist. 

Sisic, Prof. F. Nach der Annexion. Eroerterungen, geographi- 
scher, ethnographischer, und staatsrechtlicher Fragen, Herzegowina- 
Bosnien betreffend. Zagreb, 1909. 

MAGAZINE ARTICLES. 

Blaskovich, Alex. de. L'annexion de la Bosnie-Herzegovine. La 
Nouvelle Europe. Annee I. 5-23. 1909. 



378 

Blociszewski, J. L'annexion de La Bosnia et de I'HerzSgovine. 
Revue generale de droit international public XVII,417 L9 (1910). 
Austrian Defense of the Annexation. 

Evanovitch, M. R. Europe and the Annexation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Fortnightly Review, vol.85, I -IS (1000). 

Pinon, R. La Politique europeenne et l'annexion de la Bosnie- 
Herzegovine. Revue des Deux Mondes, vol. 51, 839-873 (1000). 

Vesnitch, M. R. L'annexion de la Bosnie-HerzegoVine et le droit 
international. Revue de droit international et de legislation com- 
pared. 2e sci ie, vol. 11, 123-11. 

MAPS. 

[nstitut Imperial et Royal GSographique militaire de Yienne, 
Carte generale de la Bosnie-Herzegovine. Vienna, 1892. 1 : 800,000. 

In Capus, 6. A t ravers la Bosnie et I'Herzegovine. Paris, 1806. 
The best map available. 

Cvijic, J. ("arte ethnographique de la nation Serbe. Paris, 1000. 
1:2,750,000. 

In Cvijid, J. L'annexion de la Bosnie et la question Serbe. Paris, 
1000. 

Freytag, (J., and Berndt. Handkarte von Montenegro und den 
angrenzenden Gebieten Oesterreichs-Ungarns, Serbiens, und Al- 
baniens. Wien, 1913. 

Holder, A. Map of Bosnia- Herzegovina. 1:1,800,000. 

In Ashboth, J. An official tour through Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
London, 1800. 

Kiepert, II. Die oeuen Grenzen auf der Balkan Ilalbinscl, nach 
den Bestimmungen des Vertrags von Berlin. Berlin, L878. 1:3.- 
000,000. 

Olivier, B. Ethnic, linguistic,, geographic, etc., charts in La Bosnie 
et I'Herzegovine. Paris, 1001. 

128. THE AUSTRIAN OCCUPATION OF NOVIBAZAR, 

1878-1909. 

I. ORIGIN OF THE OCCUPATION. 

In planning the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina before the 
Treaty of Berlin, it seemed desirable to Austria to have a foothold 
in the Sanjak of Novibazar. A double purpose would be served 
thereby, of keeping Montenegro and Serbia apart, and thus hinder- 
ing the impulse of the Serbo-Croats toward political unity, and 
of holding the door open for an advance of i, if ' ,( >t by politi- 

cal control, at any rate by commercial penetration, toward Salonica. 
The proposal was broughl forward at the session oi' the Congress of 
Berlin on June 28, and despite protests from the Turkish plenipo- 



379 

tentiaries, on July 4 and July 10, was adopted on July 11, with no 
other change (ban a sentence appended concerning agreement as to 

details. 

2. TREATY OF I5KRLTN. 

Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin provided as follows: 

ivernment of Austria-Hungary, nol desiring to undertake the ad- 
i] <>i' the Sanjab of Novibazar, which extends between Serbia and 
Monl 'o in ;i southeasterly direction to the other side of Mitrovitza, Hi" 

Ottoman Government will continue to exercise Its functions there. Neverthe- 
less, in order to ;issur<> the maintenance of the new political state <>f affairs, 
as well us freedom arid security of communications, Austria-Hungary reserves 
the righl of keeping garrisons and having military and commercial nfids in' 
Hi" whole of this pari <>!' the ancienl Vilayel of Bosnia. To this end the 
Governments of Austria-Hungary and Turkey reserve to themselves i<> e<»nu> to 
:in understanding on Mi" details. (See Appendix I, 17.) 

On the same day that I lie Treaty of Berlin was signed, for reasons 
which are still obscure, Iiussia, entered into a secret convention with 
Austria-Hungary binding her not to raise any objections if. in conse- 
quence of inconvenience arising from the maintenance of Turkish 
administration, Austria-Hungary should he brought to occupy Novi- 
bazar definitively as in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. (Steed. 
Hapsburg Monarchy, 213. Text in Albin, Grands Traites, 234.) 

3. AUSTRO-TTJKKISII CONVENTION OK APRIL J 1 . 1879. 

In the convention of April 21. 1870. between Austria-Hungary and 
Turkey (Hertslet, 2855-9; articles 7-10, and annex), the Emperor- 
King undertook to give notice beforehand of the time when his 
troops should enter the sanjak. Questions concerning their sub- 
sistence, quartering, etc.. were to be arranged by the authorities and 
commanders of the two Governments, and all expenses were to he 
paid ))Y Austria. The presence of the Austrian troops was nol to 
interfere with the function of Ottoman administrative officers, judi- 
cial or financial. The Porte might also maintain regular troops, 
hut not irregular, in the same places, " on a footing of perfect equal- 
ity with regard to their number and military advantages, and (lie 
freedom of their movements." Austria would for the time being 
place troops only at three points on the Lim, namely, Pribol, Prie- 
poliye, and Bielopoliye, to a total number of between 4.000 and 
5.000 men. 

I. OCCUPATION, I 879 -1908. 

This wry limited occupation began on September 10. 1879. Bie- 
lopoliye was presently exchanged for Plevlye. The Austrians ap- 
pointed only one civil official. Good relations were steadily main- 
tained between the Austrian and Turkish officials, largely due on 



380 

(lie Turkish side t<> the friendliness of Ferik Suleiman, pasha for 
many years in Plevlye. The area garrisoned by the Austrians was 
after a time set off as a separate sanjak (thai of Plevlye) by the 
Turks. (Miller, in Cambridge Modern History, XII. p. 401.) The 
inhabitants of the sanjak had no affection for (he Austrians, bu1 
nothing occurred l<> disturb the situation for almosl :'><> years. 

A\'1umi I Iw question of railways was taken up actively early in 
L908, Baron Aehrenthal asked permission of Hie Porte to survey a 
railway through Hie .sanjak from Uvats in Bosnia to Mitrovit/.a. 
The Serbians presented as a counter proposal, with the support of 
Italy and Russia, a line across from the Danube 1<> San Giovanni di 
Medua. Action was prevented by the outbreak of the*Turkish Revo- 
Inlion. 

5. TERMIN \Tlox, i 908 l 909. 

October 5, I ik)s. Austria announced (lie annexation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. The Porte protested, ami Turkish popular opinion 
was expressed by a boycotl on all Austrian goods. Austria withdrew 
her troops from Novibazar on October 28. Afler long negotiations 
(he iToung Turk Government was obliged to conform to the situa- 
tion, and in the treaty of February 26, L909, Austria obtained the 
cession of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but renounced all her rights in 

the Sanjak of Novihaxar. In the course oi ihe next few weeks, (he 
powers signatory of (he Treaty of Berlin consented to (he abolition 
of (he 25th article. 

The reasons which led (he Austro-Hungarian Government to with- 
draw from Xovihaxar are nol fully known. Il is believed that Italy 
demanded withdrawal as (he price for Italian recognition of the an- 
nexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and (hat the Austrian genera] staff 
reported the true strategic line of advance toward Salonica to lie 
along (he valley of (he Morava in Serbia. (Seton- Watson, Contem- 
porary Review, vol. 101, p. :'>•_!('>. ) 

Sec also (he article. The Bosnian Crisis of L908 L909. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

See bibliography of articles on Congress of Berlin and on Annexa- 
tion of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 

129. THE BULGARIAN DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, 

1908. 

I. [NTRODUCTION. 

The (rea)ies of San Sbl'ano and Berlin (1878), to which (he 

principality of Bulgaria owed its legal existence, though providing 



38] 

for practically complete autonomy i'ur the principality, recognized 
;n favor of Turkey certain ill-defined rights of suzerainty over Bul- 
garia. (Sec articles, 'I he Congress of Berlin, and Bulgaria and The 
Balkan Settlement of 1878.) Ordinarily these rights were of little 
value to Turkey and limited very slightly the independent action of 
Bulgaria. There was, however, in Bulgaria a strong desire \'<>i com 
plete independence. Prince Ferdinand on several occasions sounded 
the courts of Russia and Austria in regard to the matter, but was 
advised to wait. The Turkish Revolution of July, L908, furnished 
an oppori unity. 

2. THE DECLARATION OF TORNOVA. 

On October 5, 1908, Prince Ferdinand formally proclaimed the 
independence of Bulgaria at Tornova. (See Appendix 1, 85.) All the 
circumstances of the occasion indicate that the declaration was issued 
in consequence of an understanding previous ly arranged bet w een i he 
Bulgarian and Austro-Hungarian Governments. The decision not to 
defer the declaration until a later time was probably due to a fear 
lest the powers, coming info dispute over the action of the Dual 
Monarchy, would forbid Bulgaria to take any action as to independ- 
ence. The decision was to confront Europe with a fail accompli. 

3. NEGOTIATIONS, OCTOBER, L 908, TO APRIL, 1909. 

The course taken by Bulgaria was an act of defiance toward 
Turkey, owing to its suzerain rights, and an infraction of the Treatj 
of Berlin (1878), to which all of the powers were parties. It there- 
fore led to a period of acute tension, marked at limes by consid- 
erable military preparation, between Bulgaria and Turkey and to a 
complicated negotiation. In the first phase of this negotiation 
Russia supported Turkey in a decided manner; Germany pursued 
a rather equivocal course; France and England used their influ- 
ence at Constantinople to prevent war. In the second and final 
phase, Russia, changing its attitude, contributed in large measure to 
facilitate a financial transaction which paved the way for a settle- 
ment. The attitude of the powers; throughout was that they would 
consent to modify the Treaty of Berlin as to this matter whenever 
Bulgaria and Turkey should compos*; their differences, but that the 
independence of Bulgaria could not be recognized until that had 
been done. 

4. SETTLEMENT AND RECOGNITION. 

The main obstacles to a pacific adjustment between Bulgaria and 
Turkey w ntimental and financial. Tin-key at an early' date 

indicated willingness to recognize the independence of Bulgaria upon 
the payment of a sum of money of an amount to be determined. 



382 

Turkey demanded that the sum to be paid include the arrears of 
tribute and a share of the Ottoman debt. The amount demanded was 
also placed at a high figure. Bulgaria replied that it would not buy 
its independence, but would conquer it. At a moment when the 
situation had become very threatening, with Turkey demanding a 
rectification of the frontier and both States again making extensive 
military preparations, Russia came forward with a plan which 
quickly paved the way to a solution. The plan allowed Turkey, as 
compensation for claims of all sorts, a sum amounting to 125,000,000 
francs, which was substantially the final amount claimed by the 
Turks', while Bulgaria was willing to pay only 82ijQ00,000 franc -. 
Payment was to be made by way of reduction in the installments on 
the sums due to Russia from Turkey by the Treaty of Berlin (1878). 
Russia, in turn, agreed to accept from Bulgaria the sum of only 
sj.000,000 francs. (The agreements are in British and Foreign State 
Papers, vol. 102, pp. 384—387.) Turkey, therefore, signed a conven- 
tion at Constantinople, April 9, 1909, recognizing the independence 
of Bulgaria (British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 102, pp. 386- 
387). Recognition by the powers promptly followed. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

The best detailed account is an article by Georges Scelle, L'lnde- 
pendance bulgare, in the Revue genera le de droit international pub- 
lic, vol. 16, pp.521-649 (especially 540-541, 623-649) . The writer was 
a strong admirer of Ferdinand of Bulgaria. Some of his interpre- 
tations arc unduly favorable to Ferdinand, but his statements of fact 
are generally accurate. Part of this account, with some alteration, 
has been reproduced in the American Journal of International Law. 
Vol. V, 144-177, 394-413, 680^714; VI, 86-106, 659-678, in articles 
entitled Studies on the Eastern Question, and Bulgarian Independ- 
ence. The same writer has a shorter account in the Annales des 
sciences politiques, vol. 25, pp. 465-489. There is an excellent short 
account by Rene Henry in La vie politique dans deux mondes, 1908- 
1909 (Paris, Alcan, 1910), 305-308. T. J. Lawrence, The Principles 
of International Law (London, Macmillan, 1910, fourth edition), 
discusses briefly the status of Bulgaria prior to independence. The 
Bulgarian Government published a Green Book dealing with the 
whole matter. 

130. THE BOSNIAN CRISIS OF 1908-1909. 

1. INTRODUCTION. 

The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hun- 
gary in October, 1908, led to a controversy between the Dual Mon- 
archy and Turkey. (See article, The Annexation of Bosnia-Herze- 



383 

govina.) It also led to international complications which for several 
weeks early in 1909 threatened to end in a general European Avar. 
This was the Bosnian crisis. 

2. OCCASION FOR THE CRISIS. 

By article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin, 1878 (See Appendix I, 17), 
Austria-Hungary was permitted to occupy and administer Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. This arrangement was made in consequence of 
an under-landing between Russia and the Dual Monarchy, entered 
into on the eve of the Russo- Turkish War of 1877-1878 (See article, 
The Austro-Russian Accord of 1877) and of the support given to the 
Austro-Hungarian claims by England and Germany at the Congress 
of Berlin. As the provinces were inhabited chiefly by Serbs, and as a 
route across that region would afford Serbia the most convenient 
form of the long-desired access to the Adriatic, the Serbian agents 
at the Congress of Berlin tried to protest against the arrangement. 
(See article, Serbia and the Balkan Settlement of 1878.) But the 
congress would not even hear the protest. 

From the beginning of the occupation Austria-Hungary counted 
upon ultimately obtaining permanent possession. Serbia, however, 
continued to hope that the provinces, or at least such a portion of 
them as would give access to the Adriatic, would some day be secured 
to her. The crisis in 1908-1909 sprang from the fact that Serbia 
believed that she must prevent the consummation of annexation 
by Austria-Hungary or give up permanently her long-cherished 
hopes. 

3. SERBIAN DEMANDS. 

Soon after the proclamation of annexation Serbia called a part of 
the reserves to the colors and lodged a vigorous protest with the 
powers, demanding either a return to the status quo ante or compen- 
sations calculated to assure the independence and material progress 
of Serbia (Archives diplomatiques, third series, vol. 109, pp. 291- 
292). Serbian newspapers demanded a strip of territory extending 
across Novi-Bazar and Bosnia-Herzegovina to the Adriatic. The 
Government of the Dual Monarchy refused to receive the Serbian 
protest. It denied that Serbia had any right to raise a question as to 
the annexation. 

4. ATTITUDE OF THE POWERS. 

For a time the attitude of the powers was uncertain. With the 
exception of Germany, whose attitude at first was extremely re- 
served, all of the powers objected to the action of Austria-Hungary, 
but apparently more to the form than to the fact of annexation. 



384 

As the controversy developed Germany came quickly and decidedly 

to the support of its Austro-Hungarian ally. Jn Russia public 
opinion expressed itself strongly in support of Serbia. The Rus- 
sian Government, which at first had shown a disposition to do no 
more than record a formal protest against the infraction of the 
Treaty of Berlin, responded by supporting the demand first made by 
Turkey for an international conference t<> consider the matter. 
(Aktenstiicke, No. 87 Beilage.) The British and Italian Govern- 
ments then supported this demand with considerable vigor, while 
France sought to play a conciliatory role. 

5. NEGOTIATIONS FOB A CONFERENCE. * 

Austria-Hungary declared that it was not opposed on principle to 
a conference, but made its acceptance depend upon the program for 

(he conference, which it insisted must be agreed upon in advance. 
It took the position that the conference ought not to discuss the 
validity of the annexation, but should confine i elf to registering 
the measure as a fait accompli. Russia, after considerable exchange 
of opinion with the other powers, submitted a project for a program 
which included an item dealing with advantages to be accorded to 
Serbia and Montenegro. (Aktenstiicke, No. 50.) Austria-Hungary, 
in reply, did not flatly reject the Russian proposal, but suggested that 
the advantages for Serbia and Montenegro should be economic only. 
While the discussion was in progress the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
ment was endeavoring to prevent the calling of the proposed con- 
Eerence by settling its controversy with Turkey. Such a settlement 
was arranged in principle on January'12, 1909. (Ibid., No. 95.) 
After that Aust ria-Ilungary claimed that there was no longer any 
occasion for the meeting of a conference. 

6. SERBIA FORCED TO YIELD. 

Popular feeling in Serbia did not abate. There was a strong 
demand that opposition to the annexation should be pushed vigor- 
ously. To avert the danger of war. Russia proposed to the powers a 
collective demarche at Vienna and at Belgrade. Germany promptly 
refused to take part, while Austria-Hungary hastened to make 
known that it would refuse to receive any such proposition. Learn- 
ing that France and England were not inclined to lend their sup- 
port. Russia quickly dropped the proposal. 

The crisis was brought to a close in a manner which involved a 
triumph for Austria-Hungary over Serbia and for Germany and 
Austria-Hungary over Russia— a triumph which left behind it much 
bitterness of spirit in the states which were forced to yield. The 
humiliation that Russia and Serbia were compelled to endure was un- 



385 

doubtedly a very considerable factor in determining the whole course 
of events which from that date led directly to the World War. The 
precise manner in which Serbia was forced to yield was at the time 
veiled in a good deal of mystery, giving rise to numerous conflicting 
accounts of just, what happened. Complete information is not yet 
available. It is clear, however, that Russia, under some form of 
strong pressure from Germany, was forced to abandon Serbia. 
The Kaiser subsequently asserted that he stood beside bis ally, 
Austria-Hungary, "in shining armor" (Archives diplomatiqu 
third series, vol. L15, p. 375), while. Prince von Biilow declared that 
"the German sword had been thrown into the scale of European 
decision" (Biilow, Imperial Germany, p. 51). Even then Serbia 
yielded only under constraint from all the powers. Her humiliation 
was recorded in the declaration she was forced to send to Vienna 
(March 81, L909).: 

Serbia recognizes that the situation created In Bosnia-Herzegovina does not. 
Involve any Injury to the rights of Serbia. In consequence, Serbia will conform 
to the decision which the powers are going to take in regard to article 25 of 
the treaty of Vienna. Serbia, conforming to the advice of the powers, agrees to 
renounce H" 1 attitude of protest and opposition which she lias taken since the 
month of October of Iasl year. She agrees to modify the line of her political 
conduct in regard to Austria Btungary and to live In the future on good terms 
With it. In conformity With this declaration and confident of the pacific in- 
tentions of Austria-Hungary, S< rbia will bring back her army, in the matter of 
organization, distribution, and of state of activity, to the situation existing in 
the spring of 1908. She will disband the volunteer bodies and will prevent the 
formation of Irregular bands upon her territory. (Archives Diplomatiques, 
third serie . vol. 1 10, pp. 'J(;:}-264.) 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

W. Beaumont in La vie politique dans les deux mondes — 1908- 
1900 ( edited by A. Viallate, Paris, Alcan, 1910), pp. 100 187 gives 
probably the best short account. It is rather pro-Austrian but well 
documented and gives essential facts. 

A. Debidour, Histoire diplomatique de l'Europe depuis le Congres 
dc T>orlin jusqu'a nos jours (Paris, Alcan, 1910, 2 vols.), IT. 113-124. 

Prince l>ernhard von Biilow, Imperial Germany, 50-54 (London. 
Cassell, 1914). ■ 

See also bibliography of article, The Annexation of Bosnia-Herze- 
govina, 1908. 

131. THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION, 1878-1908. 

1. MACEDONIA AND TUB TREATY OF BERLIN. 

The, region known as Macedonia may be roughly defined as (he 
basins of the Vardar. Struma, and Mesta Zara Rivers, except the 
headwaters of the Struma. Nowhere in the Balkan peninsula or in 

5370G— 18 25 



386 

the Near East are races and nationalities so inextricably intermin- 
gled as in Macedonia. The population includes large numbers of 
Bulgars, Greeks, Serbs, Roumanian YTacks, Turks, and Jews. Much 
of the difficulty of the Macedonian problem lies in the common an- 
tagonisms of these peoples, and in the ambitions of the neighboring 
Balkan Stales, and in the sympathy of their inhabitants !'or the 
Macedonian members of their own nationality. The strategic po 
lion of Macedonia, especially Salonika, controlling one of the princi- 
pal highways of trade between the Near East and central and westerii 
Europe and the Drang nach Osten ambitions of the Dual Monarchy 
added to the complexity and difficulty of the problem. • That the Mace- 
donian question developed into an almost constant source of anxiety 
to the diplomatists and statesmen of Europe for many years prior 
to 1914 and became in large measure the emisa causans of the Bal- 
kan wars of 1912-1913, thereby contributing materially to the out- 
break of the World War, must be imputed in large measure to the 
Balkan settlement arranged by the Congress of Berlin. (See article, 
The Congress of Berlin, and other articles dealing with the Balkan 
settlement of 1878.) 

The Treaty of San Stefano (See article, that title) had included 
marly all of Macedonia in the Great Bulgaria which Russia de- 
signed to establish. But the Congress of Merlin, influenced by a 
natural and not wholly unjustified suspicion of Russia, decided thai 
Macedonia should rem:'. in under Turkish rule with only a few vague 
guarantees for improved government. Experiences soon showed that 
these guarantees were Wholly ineffective. The decision to leave 
Macedonia under Turkish rule was the fatal error of the Congress 
of Berlin. 

■2. BALKAN RIVALRY IN MACEDONIA, 1885-1897. 

Turkish administration, despite the projected law of vilayets of 
1880 (a measure agreed upon between the Turkish Government and 
European commissioners, but never promulgated; La Joncquiere, 
II. 158; a brief abstract is given in Hertslet, 2990-'J!) < .>r> ) . went on 
unchanged, embodying the customary evils of Turkish rule. Condi- 
tions were perhaps no worse than for generations past, but they were 
becoming more and more out of harmony with the advancing time-'. 
The Bulgarian Revolution of 1885 altered the situation (See article. 
thai title). The people of the strengthened principality began to aid 
their still subjugated brethren. At firs! 'ley \\<vd only peaceful 
methods, by instituting and supporting schools and churches, and 
working to secure Bulgarian bishoprics according to the firman of 
Is70. which instituted the Bulgarian Exarchate. (A Bulgarian 
bishop could be appointed for a district in which two-thirds of the 



387 

inhabitants were shown to be Bulgarian. Two or three appointments 
were secured in 1890 and a like number in 1894. (Miller, Ottoman 
Empire, 443.) The Bulgarian educational work developed along 
propagandist lines, which were rivaled by similar efforts of Greeks, 
Serbians, and, after a time, Roumanians. Committees were organ- 
ized, with more or less connivance of officials. An insurrection in 
Bulgarian interest was attempted in 1895, but failed. 

.:. MACEDONIA AND THE TURKO-GKEEK WAR OF 1897. 

At the time of the Greco-Turkish War of 1897 (See article, that 
title) action on the part of Bulgaria and Serbia was prevented by an 
agreement reached between Austria and Russia to preserve the status 
quo in European Turkey. (Miller, Ottoman Empire, 444.) The 
remaining powers were glad to escape the responsibility and prac- 
tically commissioned the two empires to act for all. Plans of uniting 
Macedonia with Bulgaria, or dividing it between the neighboring 
Christian States, or securing for it separate autonomy or independ- 
ence, Avere laid aside, and for 10 years the futile method of attempt- 
ing to reform the Turkish rule was the only one admitted by the 
Concert of Europe. 

4. AGITATION IN MACEDONIA, 1899-1902. 

.Such was not the will of the Balkan peoples. In January, 1899, 
a Macedonian committee was organized at Sofia, to work for an au- 
tonomous regime in Macedonia, under ;: governor-general chosen for 
five years from the "predominant nationality." (Miller, Ottoman 
Empire, 444.) Greeks and Serbians could see in such a plan only 
a Bulgarian advantage. The committees in the different small states 
began to encourage brigand bands, on the theory that if Macedonia 
be made anarchial by robbery, rape and murder, fire and sword, 
Europe would be aroused to genuine and effective action. Europe 
took little notice, however, until 1902, when conditions had become ex- 
ceedingly serious. The Sultan then sought to anticipate interfer- 
ence by himself instituting changes. In. November he ordered the 
organization of a mixed gendarmerie, under an inspector general 
with the iank of vizier. (La Joncquiere, IT. 164. Archives Diplo- 
matiques, third series, vol. 8.".. pp. i> 65. For Macedonian affairs in 
L902, pp. 44-47: Instructions regarding vilayets.) 

5. Tin: MUBZSTEO PROGRAM, 1903. 

It was felt that the Sultan's plan did not go far enough, and in 
February, 1903, Austria-Hungary and Russia transmitted a memo- 
randum, which urged the use of foreign officers to command the new 
gendarmerie, that Mohammedans and Chrisf ian.-, should compose it 



388 

in proportion to population, and belter financial arrangements for 
the support of the scheme. (La Joncquiere, IT, 164. Archives Dip- 
lomatiques, third cries, vol. 85, pp. 279-292. Austro-Russian project 
analyzed, pp. 288 291. Also vol. 88, pp. 106-112.) Thisplan met with 
the approval of the oilier powers. (London Times, Feb. L9, L903; pp. 
3, 5; and Feb. 25, L903, p : 5). The Porte accepted the modifications, 
but matters became much worse in th L903, and it was evi- 

dent thai more must be done. The Emperors of Austria and Russia 
met a! the end of September, and their chancellors, Counts Golu- 
chowski and Lamsdorff, proceeded to draw up the new "Murzsteg 
program," which was intended to strengthen and elaborate the plan 
of February (Archives Diplomatiques, third series, vol. 88, pp. L23 
IL'7). Austrian and Russian civil agents were to be attached to the in- 
spector. A foreign general was to c rid the gendarmerie, and cer- 
tain much-needed administrative and judicial improvements were to be 
made with the participation of the Christian population. (La 
Joncquiere, H, 164-166.) The Porte bent before the will of the 
great powers, the new generals were appointed, and the other 
changes taken in hand. In 1904 the Bulgarian and Turkish Gov- 
ernments agreed on measures for the prevention of the activities 
of irregular armed bands. The situation was improved somewhat, 
but brigandage did not cease. Nor did the Turkish officials, who 
resented the presence of foreign officers, mend their ways materially. 

6. BRITISH NOTE OF M \Y L8, L906. 

In 1905 the British Government, feeling that further steps should 
be taken, took the initiative in proposing financial reforms. (Miller, 
Ottoman Empire. I IT.) This resulted in a note of May 18, 1906, 
aimed mainly at securing more revenues to support the administration 
in Macedonia (the three vilayets of Saloniki, Monastir, and ITskub). 
The, Porte, of course, accepted the recommendation, especially since 
it was accompanied by the consent of the powers to increase the du! 
on goods imported into Turkey. But anarchy continued, and 
threatened to make of Macedonia a shambles and a desert. It was 
evident that the attempt at set (lenient by Turkish reform could 
have no success. 

T. kNGLO-RUSSIAN PROJECT FOB REFORMS, 1908, 

The difficulty was thai the agreement of Austria and Russia, in 
suppressing their mutual rivalry, suppressed also nearly all action. 
A wholly new face was put upon affairs by the understanding arrived 
at between England and Russia on August 31, 1907. (Sec article. 
The Formation of the Triple Entente, and Appendix I, 81.) The 
opposition of 50 years' duration was changed into harmonious action. 



389 

the effect of which speedily became apparent in Turkish affairs. In 
March of 1908 the former arrangements For Macedonia were pro- 
longed for six years. Sir Edward Grey set forth in the House 
"1' Co] (Parliamentary Debates, fourth series, vol. 1 s 1 pp. 

L692 1708) a plan which would take the step, so Long deferred, of 
virtually withdrawing the region from Turkish control. Mace- 
donia was to have a governor general nominated by the powers, 
and the number of Turkish troops was to b< reduce d. Russia joined 
promptly in the recommendation, adding furth in the direc- 

tion of strengthening European control. (Miller, Ottoman Empire, 
448. La Joncquiere, II, 169.) The legal so ity of '1 urkey was 

to he insisted upon in order to check the ambitions of the neighbor- 
ing small nal ions. 

The project created ' great emotion in Turkey, and, in conjunction 
with the Reval rvicw (See at thai title), was one of the 

elements which led to the Revolution of July, 1908. The Yoi 
Turks expected to save Macedonia for Turkey by a com] i ige 

of government. The powers and the Balkan willingly gave 

(hem a chance, and the whole structure and scheme of foreign inter- 
ference was immediately withdrawn. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

DOCUMENTS. 

Archives Diplomatiques, third series, vol. 85, pp. 9 r >">: vol. 88, pp. 
L06 L30 print valuable docu the French Yellow Books 

and from Russian and German nc srs. 

aatsarchiv, vol. G8, pp. 1-120, reprints numerous documents of 
1900-1903 from the British Blue Books. ■ 

rtslet, Sir Edward. The Map of Europe by Treaty. Vol. 1. 
1-1891. (London. L891.) 
Albin. Les grands trails p< recueil des principaux 

tes diplomatiques depuis 1815 jusqu'a nos jours. (Paris, A 'can, 
1912.) 

BOOKS. 

Brailsford, 11. M. Macedonia; its races and their future. (Lon- 
don. Methuen. 1906.) 

Eliot, Sir Charles ("Odysseus"), Turkey in Europe. New edi- 
tion. (London. Arnold, 1908.) 

Miller. The Ottoman Empire (Cambridge, University Press, 
L913.) 

Young. George. Nationalism and War in the Near East. (Ox- 
ford, Clarendon Press, 1915.) Pp. 81-116. Contains discussion and 
reflection rather than narrative of events. 



390 

Berard, V. La Macedoine. 2d edition. (Paris. Colin, 1000.) 
Also by the some author: Pro Macedonia (Paris, Colin, 1904) and 
Le Sultan, l'lslam et les Puissances. (Paris, Colin, 1907.) 

Voinor, I. F. La Question Macedoine et les Reformers en Turquie. 
(Paris. 1905.) 

Draganof. La Macedoine et les Rcformes. (Paris, Plon-Nourrit, 
1906.) 

Villari, Luigi. The Balkan question. The present condition of the 
Balkans and of European responsibilities. By various writers, 
(London. Murray. 1905.) Contributions by a number of well-in- 
formed writers. 

Steed, H. W. Hapsburg Monarchy (London, Constable, 1914). 
By the well-informed correspondent of the London Times at Vienna. 

Cabuet, A. La question d'orient dans l'histoire contemporaine, 
1821-1905. (Paris, Dujarric, 1905.) 

Abbott. G. F. A Tour in Macedonia. (London, Arnold, 1903.) 

Durham. Edith. The Burden of the Balkans. (London, Arnold, 
1905.) 

Wyon, R. The Balkans from within. (London, Finch, 1904.) 

King-Lewis, G. Critical Times in Turkey. 1904. 

AETICLES. 

Hulme-Beaman, A. The Macedonian Question. Fortnightly Re- 
view, March, 1891. pp. 427-138. 

Macedonia and the Macedonians (author's name not given). Con- 
temporary Review, September, 1895. pp. 305-325. 

The Macedonian Problem and its Factors. Edinburgh Review. 
October, 1901. pp. 390. 

Engelhardt. E. La question macedonienne. Revue de droit inter- 
national public (1905-1906), XII, 544-551, 636-644; XIII, 29-40, 
164-174. 

Rangier. A. L'intervention de l'Europe dans la question de Mace- 
donie. Revue de droit international public (1906). XIII. 178-200. 

Scott-James. R. A. The Austrian Occupation of Macedonia. Fort- 
nightly Review, November. 1905. pp. 894-903. 

Pears, Edwin. Macedonia and the Neutralization of Constanti- 
nople. Contemporary Review. February. 1907. pp. 153-173. 

An English Traveler and Writer. The danger spot of Europe. 
World's Work, August, 1907, pp. 9243-52. 

Buxton, Noel. Diplomatic Dreams and the Future of Macedonia. 
Nineteenth Century. May. 190s. pp. 722-33. 

Dillon, E. J. Austria-Hungary in the Balkans. Contemporary 
Review, March. 1908, pp. 365-73. 

A British Policy for Macedonia. The Living Age, March, 1908, 
pp. 813-15. Entente between Austria and Russia. Fortnightly Re- 
view. March, 1908, pp. 539-519. 



391 

ETHNOGRAPHICAL MAPS 0*' THE BALKAN PENINSULA, SHOWING MACEDONIA. 

Boue, Ami. Ethnographical Map of Europe, in the first edition 
Berghaus's Physicalischer Atlas. 1849. 

Lejean, G. Ethnographie cle la Turquie d'Europe. Contains large 
and very clear map showing nationalities of Turkey in Europe 
(Greece excepted). Based on maps of A. Balbi and Ami Boue, cor- 
rected by observations of travelers and of two authors on journeys. 

Mackenzie, G. Muir, and Irby, A. P. Travels in the Slavonic 
Provinces of Turkey in Europe. London, 1867. Facing p. xv. Map 
of the south Slavonic countries. " From Frohlich's Map of the 
Austrian Empire, and Lejean's Map of the Nationalities of Turkey 
in Europe, corrected here and there " by observations of travelers. 

Berghaus. Physicalischer Atlas. 1892. Map 67 is a careful ethno- 
graphical map of Europe based oh Ami Boue's contribution of a 
similar map to the first edition of 1849. 

Die Geographische Zeitschrift, vol. 3. 1897. Map showing areas 
inhabited by Greeks, and suggesting a suitable geographical area 
for Greece, and a larger area showing practicable frontiers which 
would contain most of the Greeks. 

Debes. Handatlas. 1911. Map 12c shows ethnography of Europe. 

Dominian, L. The Frontiers of Language and Nationality in 
Europe. (New York, Holt, 1917.) Facing p. 334: Map— part of 
Europe showing languages having political significance. " Based 
on sheet no. 12c (September, 1911), Debes Handatlas and other 
sources." The same map is given at the close of vol. 1, no. 2, of "A 
league of nations," World Peace Foundation, Boston, December, 
1917. 

132. THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION, 1908-1912. 

1. THE TURKISH REVOLUTION OF 19 OS. 

Early in 1908 Russia and Austria-Hungary fell out over the exe- 
cution of the Mi'irzsteg program ( See article on The Macedonian Ques- 
tion, 1878-1908), by the terms of which a system of reform had been 
instituted in Macedonia. In January, 1908, Baron Aerenthal 
announced that Austria-Hungary had applied for permision to sur- 
vey the ground for a railroad to connect the terminus of the Bosnian 
Railway with the line running from Metrovitza to Salonica. Russia 
was especially disturbed by this announcement, which she regarded 
as destructive of the joint action which she and Austria-Hungary 
had been commissioned by the powers to exercise over Macedonia. 
Baron Aerenthal promptly dispelled all doubts as to the correct- 
ness of Russia's inference by declaring that the special task of Rus- 
sia and Austria in Macedonia was concluded. In June, 1908, King 



392 

Edward of England and Czar Nicholas met at Reval and drew up a 

further program for the pacification of Macedonia. The execution 
of this program was interrupted by the startling series of events 
which transpired during the latter half of 1908. (See article, The 
Reval Interview.) 

On Juty 24, 1908, the bloodless revolution by which the rule of 
Abdul Hamid was overturned and the Young Turk regime estab- 
lished in the Ottoman Empire was effected; on October 5 Prince 
Ferdinand proclaimed the independence of Bulgaria; on October 6 
the Emperor Francis Joseph announced the formal annexation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Hapsburg dominions; and on October 
12 the Cretan Assembly voted the union of the island of Crete with 
the Kingdom of Greece. 

2. THE YOUNG TURK PROGRAM AX!) MACEDONIA. 

The belief of the Young Turks that a regeneration of the 
Empire was necessary to prevent the inevitable and irretrievable 
loss of European Turkey precipitated the revolution of 1908, 
and the paramount plank in the program of regeneration was the 
solution of the Macedonian problem. The policy which the Young 
Turk adopted to solve the Macedonian problem was to strengthen 
the Moslem element and to enroll Christians in the army. 

3. MOSLEM MIGRATION TO MACEDONIA. 

After the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (See article, that 
title) by Austria-Hungary the Young Turks sent agents into those 
countries to induce the Moslem population to emigrate to Macedonia. 
These immigrants, or muhadjer . ;. were called, were settled by 

the Government in those districts where the Moslem population was 
weak. The experiment, which was not without precedent, proved dis- 
astrous. The element which could be induced to emigrate was ignor- 
ant, unruly, fanatical, and economically worthless. The presence of 
this lawless, malcontent element in Macedonia ended in irretrievable 
disaster for Turkey. They readily united with the Albanian Moslem 
immigrants to perpetrate the succe: sion of massacres in 1912 which 
resulted ultimately in the formation of the Balkan Alliance. (See 
article, that title.) 

4. MACEDONIA A XI) MILITARY SERVICE. 

The second policy adopted by the Young Turks to secure the 
loyalty of their Christian subjects in European Turkey was the 
abolition of the Karadj or head tax, by which Christians were ex- 
empted From military service, and the enrolling of them in the army. 
This policy w as attractive in theory but impracticable in application. 
The social, educational, temperamental, and religious incompati- 



393 

bility of Moslems and Christians, and the unspeakable and criminal 
conditions of the service rendered the plan of forming mixed regi- 
ments, officered exclusively by Moslems, a dismal failure. This 
system of obligatory military service was used from its inception as 
a means of extortion and terrorism; Jews and Christians who were 
financially able were forced to pay the £40 prescribed for exemption, 
and those who were unable to pay were practically reduced to mili- 
tary servitude. Under these conditions the Christian elements pre- 
ferred exile, and between 1909 and 1914 Turkey lost hundreds of 
thousands of its best subjects by emigration. 

5. RESULTS OF YOUNG TURK RULE IN MACEDONIA. 

The net result of the emigration and settlement of the muhadjers 
and the enrollment of the Christians for military service was that 
the people of Macedonia definitely abandoned the advocacy of auton- 
omy under the suzerainty of the Sultan and sought to enlist the 
assistance of the Balkan States to emancipate them from Turkish 
rule. 

6. CONCLUSION. 

The failure of the Young Turk policy in Macedonia and the series 
of outrages perpetrated there between 1909 and 1912 induced the 
Balkan States to compose their differences and to enter into the 
Balkan League. This league was i:>erfected by a series of treaties, 
the first of which was signed on March 13, 1912, by Serbia and 
Bulgaria and the- second by Greece and Bulgaria on May 10, 1912. 
On September 22, 1912, the defensive alliance of Greece and Bul- 
garia was followed by a detailed military convention. (See article 
1 The Formation of the Balkan Alliance of 1912.) 

In the spring of 1912 occurred the successful Albanian uprising. 
The Albanian insurgents were joined by a part of the Turkish troops 
who had been operating against them and presently demanded the 
cession to them of the entire vilayets of Monastir and Uskub. This 
demand aroused Greece and Serbia. Bulgaria was stirred to action 
by the massacre of Macedonian Bulgars at Kotchana and Berana. 
On August 14 a popular demonstration was held at Sofia to demand 
immediate autonomy for Macedonia and Thrace or war against the 
Porte. On August 26 Bulgaria agreed that war should be declared 
in October. In September the members of the Balkan League ap- 
pealed to the powers to join them in demanding immediate and 
radical reforms in Macedonia. On October 8 the powers presented an 
identical ultimatum at Sofia, Belgrade, Athens, and Cettinje. On the 
same day Montenegro declared war on Turkey. On the 14th Serbia, 
Bulgaria, and Greece presented their ultimatum. On October 18 the 
Porte declared war on Bulgaria arid Serbia, and on the same day 
Greece declared war on Turkey. 



394 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

H. A. Gibbons. The New Map of Europe. (New York. Century, 
1914.) 

J. A. R. Marriott. The Eastern Question. (Oxford. Clarendon 
Press, 1917.) 

J. E. Gueshoff. The Balkan League. (London, Murray. 1915.) 
English translation. Contains many original documents of first-rate 
importance, including the Balkan treaties of 1912. 

See also bibliography for article, The Macedonian Que tion, 1878- 
1908. 

133. THE CRETAN QUESTION, 1897-1908. 

1. CRETE AND THE GRECO-1URKISH WAR OF L897, 

Insurrection in Crete early in 1897 led directly to the Greco- 
irkish War of thai year (See article that title). The ' i reek s, beaten 
by German-trained Turkish troops, called on the powers, who, before 
mediating, demanded that Cretan autonomy under Turkish suze- 
rainty, instead of the annexation of the island by Greece, be accepted 
by the Greek Government. Greece submitted. 

The heads of the Cretan insurrection, although with great reluc- 
tance, also accepted the idea of the autonomy of Crete. While the 
powers found difficulty in settling peace terms and in securing a 
governor for Crete, the admirals, despite trouble caused by the pres- 
ence of Turkish troops, restored order and introduced reforms. 

2. SETTLEMENT OF 1S9S-1S99. 

In April, 1898, Germany and Austria left the European conceit on 
the Cretan question because of their growing interest in Turkey 
and withdrew their ships from the blockade. Great Britain, France, 
Russia, and Italy thereupon divided Crete into four departments 
which they severally administered, Canea being occupied by a joint 
force. The powers urged the departure of the Turkish troops, who 
were still troublesome. Turkey, having delayed with characteristic 
subterfuges, finally yielded, and on November 28, 1898, the last Turk- 
ish troops left Crete. 

On November 26, 1898, largely at the suggestion of Russia, the 
powers having scoured Europe for a Cretan governor acceptable to 
all, invited Prince George of Greece to be high commissioner of the 
powers in Crete for three years. He accepted, the blockade was 
soon raised, and December 21, 1898, he landed on the island. The ad- 
mirals having handed over the government to him, requested their 
own recall, and only a few foreign troops and the stationnaires re- 
mained. The Cretan flag was raised. Tranquillity followed, but 



395 

Moslems departed in great numbers, the 1900 census showing them 
only about one-ninth of the population, as against about one-third 
in 1881. 

In April, 1899, a constitution drafted by Venizelos and presented 
by a constitutional assembly, was promulgated, according to which 
foreign affairs were to be determined by the representatives of the 
four protecting powers at Rome. 

3. TRANQUILLITY UNDER PRINCE GEORGE, 1899-1904. 

In 1899. things seemed to go well, but soon trouble developed. The 
Cretans were restless under Turkey; some wanted complete inde- 
pendence; some annexation to Greece (the stronger movement) ; 
many were at odds with the administration, which they charged with 
extravagance, inefficiency, and neglect. 

Further annexationist appeals were made to the powers, who, 
though determined to maintain peace and the status quo (especially 
Germany and Austria, desirous of humoring Turkey, to advance 
their interests and hinder those of Russia), and fearing the opening 
of the Balkan question, still felt that that question must be solved. 

The situation between prince and deputies became very strained 
in 1901. The unpopularity of Prince George was due to the fact (1) 
that his repeated attempts (1900-1904) failed to influence powers 
toward annexation, and (2) that he unwisely seemed to take meas- 
ures toward perpetuation of the existing arrangement, regarded by 
Cretans as only temporary. Differences developed between his parti- 
sans and those of Venizelos, who, now a popular hero, became head 
of the insurgent movement. Naturally opposed to autonomy, he 
gradually yielded to it as a " further stage toward the realization of 
the national ideal.'' 

4. ATTEMPTED UNION WITH GREECE, 19 04-19 0G. 

In July and August, 1904, at the request of the Cretans, Prince 
George again appealed to the powers for annexation to Greece. The 
powers refused (April. 1905), and the revolutionary movement 
gained full sway. Union with Greece was again proclaimed. On 
July 30, 1905, the powers put Crete under martial law and interna- 
tional troops occupied the chief cities. 

In November, 1905, Venizelos conferred with the consuls of the 
powers who granted concessions, but refused to alter the status qiio. 
Fighting stopped (July-September, 1906) ; Prince George resigned, 
claiming unwillingness to rule under new conditions, but really 
forced thereto by insurgents. 



396 

King George, asked by the powers to nominate a Greek subject, 
designated M. Zaimis as high commissioner. Order was restored. 
The powers failed to solve the Cretan question fast enough for the 
Cretans. 

5. CRETE AND THE TURKISH REVOLUTION OF 1908. 

In May. 1908, the powers announced that soldiers would gradually 
be withdrawn when order should be assured, and began withdrawal 
on announcement from M. Zaimis that order was guaranteed. 

The Young Turk revolution at Constantinople, Jury, 1908, was fol- 
lowed by stirring events in the Balkans (on October 5, the. proclama- 
tion of Bulgarian independence, and on October 7, the*annexation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina). On October 7. also, Crete proclaimed 
union with Greece (ratified by Chamber October 12). M. Zaimis 
had left Crete October 3 "provisionally," and in his absence the 
Cretan Chamber appointed an executive commission (including 
lizelos) [o govern in the name of King George till Greece should 
take charge. Turkey protested. On October 28, 1908, the powers, 
declining either to recognize or repudiate the union, and anxious to 
allay the resentment of the Young Turks on the one hand and the 
ardor of Greek unionists on the other, promised that the matter 
would be made the subject of negotiations with Turkey, provided 
order was maintained and the rights of Moslems respected. 

The close of 1908 left the matter in this anomalous situation. 

See article, The Cretan Question, 1908-1913. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

Marriott, J. A. R. The Eastern Question. (Oxford, Clarendon 

Press, 1917.) 

Driault. La question d'Orient. (Paris, Alcan, 1914.) 
Andrews, Charles M. The Historical Development of Modern 

Europe. (New York, Putnam, 1898.) 
Gibbons, H. A. The New Map of Europe. (New York, Century 

Co., 1914.) 

Cambridge Modern History, vol. XII. (New York, Macmillan. 

1910.) 
Kerofilas. C. Eleutherios Venizelos. (London. Murray. 1915.) 
Hazell's Annual, 1903-1907. (London, Hazell, 1886.) 
The International Year Book. 1899-1902. (New York, Dodd, 

1899.) 
The New International Year Book, 1908. (New- York, Dodd, 

1909.) 



397 
134. THE CRETAN QUESTION, 1908-1913. 

1. INTRODUCTION. 

The years of 190G to 1912 witnessed a signal exhibition of the 
Inability of the powers to decide upon an enforceable policy in regard 
o Crete. 

During this period, at first, the affairs of Crete were controlled 
by a concert of six powers, but soon Germany and Austria withdrew, 
leaving England, France, Italy, and Russia in charge. Germany and 
Austria then began cultivating a closer connection with Turkey. 

li. PROCLAMATION OF UNION AVITH GREECE, OCTOBER, 1908. 

From December 21, 1898, till 1906, Prince George of Greece ruled 
Crete under direction of Russia, Italy, France, and England. When 
he resigned the four nations asked him to appoint a high commis- 
sioner in his stead. He chose Zaimas, a Greek, who governed till 
October, 1908, when, upon the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
by Austria and the declaration of Bulgarian independence, the Cre- 
tans proclaimed a union with Greece. Turkey, of which Crete was 
a nominal possession, at once protested to the powers. Negotiations 
dragged along. (See article, The Cretan Question, 1897-1908.) 

3. EFFORTS FOR RECOGNITION, 1908-1912. 

During the- period October. 1908, to October, 1912, the status in 
Crete was more than ever anomalous. The Cretan Assembly had 
proclaimed the union of the island with Greece. The Greek Govern- 
ment was anxious for annexation, but did not dare to proclaim it for 
fear of offending the powers. They, in turn, were unable to agree 
upon a settled line of policy as to the Cretan question. Meanwhile 
the Turkish Government, under the sway of the Young Turks, was 
pursuing a vigorously hostile policy toward all Greeks on account 
of the Cretan situation. In 1909 the powers announced that they 
would withdraw their garrison from the island, but would keep four 
warships in its waters, at the same time warning Greece not to annex 
Crete and Crete to maintain its autonomous government under a high 
commissioner. During the year there was considerable rioting at 
Canea, and it was necessary at one time for an allied force of marir 
to land and pull down a Cretan flag from over Canea. In 1910 the 
sentiment for union with Greece had become so earnest that four 
additional warships were sent to the island by the protecting powers. 
To the demand of the Cretans for union the powers answered that no 
negotiations would be taken up till the Cretans had established a 
stable government. Turkey, in the meantime, was requesting of the 



398 

powers that thej settle the Cretan question. In 1910 the Cretan offi- 
cers were required by their Government to take an oath of allegiance 
to Greece. This the Moslems refused to do, and the powers threat- 
ened (o Land troops and take possession. The Cretan Government 
lost control of the situation almost completely in 11)11, but the powers 
still held that i( was not n propitious time to settle the fate of the 
island and ordered (he status quo maintained. Early in 1912 the 
Cretans elected delegates to the Greek Assembly, but these were pre- 
vented from sill inn- by I he interposition of Great Britain acting for 
(he powers. 



I. CRETE AM) THK BALKAN WARS. 



« 



Finally, on the outbreak of the First Balkan War, Cretan delegates 
were seated, October 12, 1912, in the Greek Assembly. Cretan in- 
dependence was formally acknowledged by the Treaty of London. 
May 30, L913, the island being ceded by Turkey to the Balkan allies. 
Neither the Treaty of Bucharest, at the end of the Second Balkan 
War. nor the Treaty of Athens, signed by Turkey and Greece on 
November 11, 1913, contained any express mention of Crete, but the 
signing of the treaties amounted to a virtual recognition on the part 
of Turkey and all the Balkan States that Crete had become an in- 
tegral pail of the Kingdom of Greece. Recognition of" the fait 
aceompliby the powers was finally obtained in December, L913. 

BIBM0GRAPIIY. 

Gibbons, II. A. The New Map of Europe, ch. 13. ■ (New York, 
Century, 1914.) 

Marriott, J. A. R. The Eastern Question. (Oxford. Clarendon- 
Press. L917.) 

Xicolaides. N. Les grecs et la turquie. (Brussels. Th. Dewa- 
richet, 1910.) 

Ion. T. P. The Cretan Question. American Journal of Interna- 
tiona] Law, April, 1910, IV, 276-284. Clear, concise account to 1910. 

Cavaglieri, Das Kretaproblem, Jahrbuch des Volkerrechts, II, 
Pari two, pp. 339 303. 

Dillon, E. J. Contemporary Review, vol. 97, pp. 110-P2S (Janu- 
ary, 1910), and vol. 98, pp. L19-128 (July, 1910). 

Brooks, S. The Cretan Problem. Living Age, vol. 275, pp. 437- 
['69. 

135. THE CASABLANCA AFFAIR, 1908-9. 

I. ORIGIN. 

On September 25, L908, six deserters, (hive of German nationalit 
and three non-Germans, from the French Foreign Legion, then in 
occupation at Casablanca, Morocco, under a safe conduct issued by 



399 

the German consul and under the personal protection of the chan- 
cellor of the consulate, aided by a Moroccan soldier attached to the 
consulate, attempted to take passage upon a German vessel. The 
deserters were seized by the French officials after considerable vio- 
lence. 

2. CLAIMS. 

The arrest of the deserter gave rise to a controversy between the 
French and the German governmnts, in the course of which the fol- 
lowing claims were advanced : 

For France. — (1) Germain had no right to afford protection to 
persons in Morocco not of German nationality. (2) The territory 
within French military occupation in Morocco was subject to ex- 
clusive French jurisdiction, and therefore Germany had no authority 
to protect even the three deserters of German nai ionality. 

For (icrinany. — (1) The deserters of German nationality were, 
by virtue of the extraterritorial jurisdiction which by treaty Ger- 
many exercised within Morocco, subject to the exclusive jurisdic- 
tion of the German consul at Casablanca. (2) The forcible arrest 
was a breach of the inviolability of consular agents. (&) The de- 
serters of German nationality should be given up. 

::. AGREEMENT FOE ARBITRATION. 

On November 10, 1908, a protocol was signed at Berlin by which 
France and Germany agreed to submit all questions to arbitration 
and to express regrets following the decisions which the arbitrators 
should render. Each party was to choose two arbitrators from the 
members of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, and 
these four should choose an umpire. Germany chose Guido Fusinato, 
of Italy, and Dr. Kriege, of Germany. France chose Sir Edward 
Fry, of England, and Louis Renault, of France. The four then 
selected H. L. Hammarskjold. of Sweden, as the fifth member. By 
article 1 the tribunal was charged with the decision of all questions, 
both of law and fact, thus following the example set by Great 
Britain and Russia in the Dogger Bank case (See article, thai title). 

Meetings of the arbitrators were held from May 1 to May 19 and 
the award was given May ±1. 

l. ARGUMENTS BEFORE TIIK HAGUE TRIBUNAL. 

For France. — The French argued that the German consul acted 
contrary to both the principles of international law and the regula- 
tions of the German consular establishment, which recognize that Ger- 
mans employed without authorization in civil or military services of 
foreign states are not entitled to protection. Precedents of similar 



400 

instances of desertion at Port Said in 1895 and Cairo in 1900, in 
which German consuls refused to grant protection to Germans, were 
cited. The consul also violated international rights belonging to a 
military occupant of foreign soil. Immunity from local jurisdic- 
tion attaching to the occupant implies not only that the troops are 
under military law, but that all offenses against the army come under 
the same jurisdiction. 

For Germany.— Germany argued that German nationality was not 
lost by enlistment in the service of a foreign state; that Germany 
had by treaty complete jurisdiction over all Germans in Morocco; 
that the French troops were not in military occupation, but were 
acting merely as police, and that pacific occupation did not have the 
same juridical and legal effects as military occupation; conse- 
quently the powers of the occupant were no greater than those of 
the occupied state; therefore the consular jurisdiction obtained from 
Morocco by treaty was unchanged. 

5. THE AWARD. 

The award showed evidence of an attempt at a political com- 
promise rather than a clear-cut legal decision. Reasoning that there 
was a case of conflict between the two jurisdictions, and that "the 
jurisdiction of the occupying army ought, in case of conflict, to have 
the preference when the persons belonging to this army have not 
left the territory placed under the immediate, actual, and effective 
control of the armed force," it was held that " a grave and manifest 
fault " had been committed in attempting to have embarked on a 
German steamship deserters from the French Foreign Legion who 
were not of German nationality, and that the German consulate had 
not, "under circumstances of this kind, the right to grant its pro- 
tection to deserters of German nationality." It was also held that 
the French military authorities ought to have respected as far as 
possible the actual protection exercised over these deserters by the 
German consulate, and that under the circumstances the force used 
by the French authorities was not warranted. The French military 
authorities, however, were not called upon to surrender the deserters. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

Scott, J. B., editor. The Hague Court Reports. (New York, Oxford 
Press, 1916, pp. 110-120.) Contains a brief of the case, with trans- 
lations of the official documents. Pages 476-486, French texts of the 
same. 

Wilson, G. G. The Hague Arbitration Cases. ( Boston: Ginn & 
Co., 1915.) Page; 8-2-101 give on parallel pages the French and 
English texts of the above. 



401 

The American Journal of International Law, III (1909), pages 
176-178, 755-700, an English translation of the agreement for arbi- 
tration and the award of the tribunal with brief comments. 

Stowe]], E. C., and Munro, H. F., International Cases. (Boston, 
Houghton, 1910). Pages 377-385 contain abstracts of the same, to- 
gether with extracts. 

Archives Diplomatiques, third series, vol. 112 (1909), pages 43-58 
give the texts of the documents in both French and German. 

Gidel. G. L'arbitrage de Casablanca. Revue de droit interna- 
tional public, XVII, 320^07. Valuable, detailed study. 

136. THE MOROCCO CONVENTION OF 1909. 

1. FRANCE AND MOROCCO, 1906-1009. 

The Act of Algeciras conferred upon Fiance and Spain the task 
of organizing an international police in the open ports of Morocco 
(See, article. The Morocco Crisis of 1905-1900). The natives pro- 
tested against this by killing several Frenchmen, and as a result 
the French Government sent troops into several Provinces; this 
in turn provoked a rebellion against the reigning Sultan and 
ended in his deposition. The new ruler, Mulai Hafid, was now 
presented with a program of reforms and a bill of expenses for the 
French military operations. For the former the continued presence 
of French troops was necessary, for the latter a loan from the French 
Government, and it was with great reluctance that Mulai Hafid 
signed the convention of March 4, 1910. (See Appendix I, 95.) 
This agreement did not destroy the sovereignty of the Sultan, but 
many considered it scarcely in keeping with the Act of Algeciras, 
holding it must result in the establishment of a French protectorate. 

2. CONVENTION OF FEBRUARY 8, 1909. 

This development, even in its early stages, was not favorably 
regarded in Germany. The German Government thereupon de- 
vised a new policy. By a convention signed on February 8, 1909 
(See Appendix I, 89), it frankly recognized "the special politi- 
cal interests " of France in Morocco and declared itself " resolved 
not to impede those interests." In return the French Govern- 
ment, " firmly attached to the maintenance of the integrity and inde- 
pendence of the Shereefian Empire," was "resolved to safeguard the 
principle of economic equality, and consequently not to obstruct 
German commercial and industrial interests in that country." Both 
Go^ ernments," being equally anxious to facilitate the execution of the 
Act of Algeciras," agreed not to " pursue or encourage any measure 
53706—18 26 



402 

■ 

of a nature to create in their favor or in that of any power an eco- 
nomic privilege, and to associate their nationals in affairs for which 
the latter may obtain a concession." 

3. EFFECT OF THE CONVENTION. 

Tims Germany had, apparently, conceded the fundamental point — 
the political interests of France — which she had refused to recog- 
nize in 1905. The Act of Algeciras was virtually superseded. But 
the German policy was not understood in French circles. To the 
Germans the important feature of the convention of 1909 was the 
pledge to associate Frenchmen and Germans in affairs for which they 
might obtain concessions. When, therefore, the ^German Govern- 
ment, on June 2, 1909, proposed to establish an economic condo- 
minium of French and German financiers in Morocco, the French 
Government was completely taken aback. Too late it perceived that 
it had pledged itself to a policy which, a clear violation of the open 
door, would place Morocco industrially and commercially at the 
mercy of Germany and might severely strain the entente with Great 
Britain. For the next two years the Quai d'Orsay vainly endeavored 
to find some escape from this agreement, but all the schemes proposed 
fell short of the minimum demanded by Berlin. 

4. MOROCCO, 10 00-1911. 

Meanwhile conditions in Morocco went from bad to worse, culmi- 
nating in rebellion in 1911 against Mulai Hafid, who appealed to the 
French for assistance. This was granted, a French column entering 
Fez on May 21. The German Government now gave warning that 
such a step meant the reopening of the entire Morocco question, and 
frankly told the French ambassador in Berlin that the French must 
retire from Fez or abide by the convention of 1909. But realizing 
that the French could not, under the circumstances, evacuate Fez, the 
German Government on July 1, 1911, notified the powers signatory to 
the Act of Algeciras that the gunboat Panther had been dispatched 
to the port of Agadir. (See article on Morocco Crisis of 1911.) 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

See bibliography for article, The Morocco Crisis of 1911. 
137. THE MOROCCO CRISIS OF 1911. 

1. ORIGIN OF THE CRISIS. 

The Morocco crisis of 1911 arose out of the dispatch of the Ger- 
man gunboat Panther to Agadir on July 1. (See article, The 
Morocco Convention of 1909.) The ostensible ground for this 



403 

action was the request of German firms in Agadir for protec- 
tion in the disordered state of the country. But inasmuch as 
there were no German subjects at Agadir and the port was not 
open to Europeans, it was clear that the real motive was a desire to 
reopen the whole question. The German Government resented the 
complete failure of the convention of 1909, and determined now, by 
a show of force, to prevent a further French penetration unless 
France would negotiate for a final settlement of the problem. 

2. THE GERMAN PURPOSE. 

It is highly probable that Germany hoped to break up the Triple 
Entente. It is also probable that at the beginning of the affair Ger- 
many expected to obtain part of Morocco for itself, counting upon 
the known military weakness of France and the confusion in Eng- 
land produced by the struggle over the House of Lords to prevent 
serious opposition. 

3. FIRST STAGE OF NEGOTIATIONS. 

• 

The absolute reserve of Sir Edward Grey and his insistence that 
Great Britain must be consulted in any arrangements concerning 
Morocco ; the attitude of Mr. Balfour, who declared that the opposi- 
tion would support the Government in its policy; the rally of all 
shades of French opinion; these circumstances, and perhaps also 
some pressure from Russia, apparently caused the German Govern- 
ment to reconsider. At any rate, as early as July 7, the German 
ambassador in Paris informed the French Government that Ger- 
many cherished no territorial aspirations in Morocco and would 
negotiate for a French protectorate on the basis of " compensation " 
for Germany in the French Congo region and the safeguarding of 
her economic interests in Morocco. Thus the first stage of the nego- 
tiations was safely passed. But stormy times vert 1 still ahead. 

4. GERMAN DEMANDS. 

The German terms, as presented on July 15, while containing an 
offer to cede the northern part of the Cameroons and Togo! and. de- 
manded from France the whole of the French Congo from the River 
Sangha to the sea (Documents diplomatiques, Maroc, 1912, pp. 
414-415) : to which was later added the transfer of France's right 
to the preemption of the Belgian Congo. The Germans also showed 
every disposition to limit the scope of the French protectorate and 
to seek for themselves special economic privileges, in the spirit of the 
convention of 1909 (See article, The Morocco Convention of 1909). 
So great a price France was not prepared to pay, and she refused 



404 

the German demand. The danger lay in a continued French refusal 
and a continued German insistence. The dispute would then be 
thrown back on Morocco. 

5. ENGLISH ACTION '. THE MANSION HOUSE SPEECH. . 

It was to obviate this danger that Great Britain now intervened; 
she was pledged to support the policy of France in Morocco and 
would do so to the very end; on the other hand, she would not inter- 
fere in, and would heartily support, any reasonable accommodation 
between France and Germany, that is, any settlement in Africa 
which France, acting as a free agent, was disposed „to make. As 
the German Government had so far made no statement of its policy 
to the British Government. Mr. Lloyd George, at the request of Sir 
Edward Grey, delivered on July 21 his famous Mansion House speech, 
in which he declared that national honor was more precious than 
peace: a speech everywhere construed, especially in view of the 
orator's pacifist Leanings, as a definite warning to Germany that she 
could not impose an unreasonable settlement on France. A difficult 
week followed, in which certain British naval preparations were made, 
while the foreign secretary and the German ambassadors were hold- 
ing exceedingly stiff conversations. But the speech had done its 
work. The Wilhelmstrasse. impressed also, perhaps, by panicky con- 
ditions on the Berlin Bourse, became conciliatory, giving assurance 
that designs on Morocco formed no part of its program, and reaching 
an agreement with France, in principle, as to the future settlement. 

G. SECOND STACK OF NEGOTIATIONS. 

In spite of all this, little progress was achieved. It was officially 
admitted that the situation was "grave," and on August 18 the ne- 
gotiations were broken off. the German Government taking ad- 
vantage of a railway strike in England to revive certain pretentions 
with respect to Morocco. After a long consultation with his Govern- 
ment, the French ambassador in Berlin on September 4 resumed his 
conversations with the German foreign office. On the 9th there was 
a great crash on the Berlin Bourse, also renewed rumors of military 
and naval preparations on both sides. But in the end good sense pre- 
vailed. On October 4 the two negotiators initialed a convention 
which gave France a protectorate de facto in Morocco, although the 
term was not used; in return she pledged herself most explicitly to 
observe the principle of the open door. 

7. CONVENTIONS OF NOVEMBER 4, 1911. 

The French Government was now willing to discuss the compen- 
sation to be awarded Germany in the Congo. On November 2 it was 



405 

agreed thai Germany should receive two prongs of French territory 
which would bring the Cameroons in touch with the Congo and 
Ubangi Rivers at Bonga and Mongumba, respectively, while Ger- 
many surrendered the Duck's Beak in the Lake Chad region. The 
only difficulty arose over the German demand that France transfer 
lo Germany her right of preemption to the Belgian Congo; but 
with the assistance of the Russian Government a formula was found 
hv which any change in the status of the Congo was reserved to the 
decision of the powers signatory of the Berlin African act of 1885. 
(See article, The Berlin Conference of 1884-1885.) On Novem- 
ber 4, 1911. the Morocco and Congo conventions (See Appendix I, 
100) were signed in Berlin, a letter from the German foreign secre- 
tary to the French ambassador being annexed, in which Herr von 
Kinderlen-Waechter recognized the right of France to erect her 
protectorate in Morocco. 

8. APPRAISEMENT. 

The settlement was a great triumph for France, secured by the 
manifestations of national solidarity at home and the diplomatic 
assistance of Great Britain. Many Frenchmen regretted the cession 
of French territory, but Morocco was certainly far more valuable 
than the Congo, and above all the Republic had scored a distinct 
victory over the mighty Empire which had defeated it in 1870-1871. 
In Germany there was a corresponding discontent, which mani- 
fested itself in bitter criticisms of the Imperial Government's diplo- 
macy and in violent outbursts of hatred for Great Britain, whose 
intervention was believed to have spoiled the German game. It is 
also to be observed that the land which Germany received was 
valuable chiefly as the entering wedge for further penetration of 
the Belgian Congo. Such designs had long been suspected, and they 
were proved by a conversation between the French ambassador in 
Berlin and the German foreign minister, Herr von Jagow, in the 
spring of 1014, in which the latter declared that Belgium was not 
in a position to develop the Congo adequately and ought "to give 
it up" (Belgian Grey Book, 11, 1915, no. 2, Baron Beyens to M. 
Davignon, April 2, 1914). If, as has been recently stated by so 
eminent a personage as Herr August Thyssen, the German Emperor 
and his general staff in the year 1912 decided upon a world war 
(Current History Magazine of the New York Times, March, 1918, 
p. 480), it is most probable that the reverse sustained in this diplo- 
matic bout with France and Great Britain was a decisive factor, for 
it had been brought home to the war lords of Berlin that diplomati- 
cally the Triple Entente was stronger than the Triple Alliance. It 
must also have been clear to them that the sympathy of the world 
had been with France in the controversy of 1911. 



406 

ri.. Nothing has been s;iid about the secret negotiations cod 
ducted between M. Caillaux, the French prime minister, and Baron 
von Jancken, of the German foreign office. As yet the facts are not 

fully known. There is much different E opinion as to whether the 

final settlement was grea"tly affected by the tortuous diplomacy of 
Caillaux. 

BIBLIOGR \!'liV. 
DOCUMENTS. 

Eiouard de Card. E. Documents diplomatique pour servir h L'his 
toire de la question marocaine. (Paris. 1913.) » 

Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres. Affaires du Maroc, L901 L912. 

6 volumes. (Paris. !!)().. l:»L'.) 

Auswaertiges Ami Weissbuecher. Berlin, 1905. 

Morel, E. 1). Morocco in Diplomacy. Appendix. (London. Smith. 
1912.) 

Rapports parlimentaires de M. Long el M. P. Baudin. Paris,1912. 
(Reporl to the French Parliament.) 

The American Journal of [international Law, VI. Supplement, 
pp. II 66. Contains a good selection of documents bearing on this 
and earlier phases of the Morocco question. 

Staatsarchiv, vol. 83, pp. 18-348. 

8ECONDABT GENERAL. 

Bernard, A. Le Maroc (Paris, Alcan, L913.) 
Anliin. E. Morocco To-day. (London, Dent, L906.) 
""Well word) reading." Sir Harry II. Johnston. 
Meakin, B. TheMoorish Empire. (London, Sonnenschein, L899.) 
Dupuy, E. Comment nous avons conquis le Maroc, 1845 P.)PJ. 
(Paris. Roger, 1913.) Another summary. 

Piquet, V. Le Maroc (Paris, Colin, 1917.) M. Piquel lias writ- 
ten a number of handy volumes on the North African colonies. 

SECONDAB1 DIPLOMATIC. 

Schmitt, B. E. England and Germany, 1740 L914. (Princeton 
University Press, L916.) Pp. 228 240, no:'. 345, give the fullest ac- 
count in English. 

Debidour, A. Histoire diplomatique, 18T8-1916, II, ch. 5. (Paris. 
Alcan, l!>17.) 

t'inon. P. L'Empire de la Mediterranee, chapters i vi. (Paris. 

Perrin, 1904.) Invaluable for the period before L904. 

Tardieu, A. La Conference d'Algesiras. (Paris. Alcan, 1906.) 
The standard work on the crisis of L905 1906. 



407 

Tardieu, A. France and the Alliances. (New York, Macmillan, 
1908.) in certain chapters a briefer account of the crisis of 1S05 will 
be found. 

Tardieu, A. Le Mystere d'Agadir. (Paris, Callman-Levy, 1912.) 
The standard and most, illuminating account of the crisis of 1011 and 
its antecedents. 

Tardieu, A. Cinq ans dc la politique marocaine, in Revue polit- 
ique et parlementaire, 10 November, 1008. 

St. Victor, S. B. La geriese de I'accord franco-allemand. Revue 
des sciences politiques, vol. 26, pp. 908 927 (1911). 

Harris, N. D. Intervention and Colonization in Africa. (Boston, 
Houghton, L913.) Pp. 243 289. Useful, but not very critical. 

Morel. E. D. Morocco in Diplomacy. (London, Smith Elder. 
1912.) Bitterly critical of French and British diplomacy; one-sided 
and unreliable; but valuable for documents. The German case is 
presented here so well that no German books are cited. 

138. THE POTSDAM ACCORD, 1910. 

1. REASONS FOR THE ACCORD. 

Germany desired to counterbalance the effect of the Reval meet- 
ing. (See article, The Reval Interview.) The growth of German in- 
fluence in Persia after the Persian Revolution threatened Russia's 
interests. After the expiration of the Russo-Persian Railway agree- 
ment in 1910, Russia faced the prospect of Germany's linking the 
Bagdad Railway with Teheran, before the Russian line, Baku- 
Teheran, was finished. (London Times, Aug. 21, 1911.) Germany 
faced the possibility of a competing line from the north, compromis- 
ing the Bagdad Railway plan. 

2. TUP: POTSDAM MEETING. 

On November 4, 1910, the Tsar arrived at Potsdam for a 30-hour 
visit to the Kaiser. At Potsdam and Berlin Sazonoff had long con- 
versations with Kiderlein-Waechter and Bethmann-Hollweg. The 
negotiations thus begun continued through the winter 1910-11. 

3. INTERPRETATION. 

On November 10 Sazanoff declared to the Novoe Vremya that the 
discussions had not involved in any way the stability of the Triple 
Entente. They had concerned Russian and German interests in 
Turkey and Persia. Complete consonance had been established. 
(See Appendix I, 97.) 

On Decemher 10 Bethmann-Hollweg said in the Reichstag that 
Germany gladly admitted Russia's i pedal interests in Persia. The 



408 

former mutual confidence had been reestablished. (Verhandlurgen 
des Reichstags, vol. 232, p. 3561. ) A few months later the understand- 
ing reached at Potsdam was translated into a convention, signed at St. 
Petersburg, August 19, loll. (See Appendix I. 00.) 

4. TERMS 01 THE ACCORD. 

The (wo powers agreed (hat Russia had special interests in Persia, 
while Germany had only commercial aims. Germany would seek 
no concessions in North Persia. Russia undertook to conned the spur 
from the Bagdad Railway with the railway system of North Persia, 
by a branch from Teheran, to he built within a specified term of 
years. Russia would not hinder foreign financial participation in the 
Bagdad Railway. Both nations would facilitate international traffic 
without differential treatment on the aforesaid connecting line. 

5. RESULTS OF THE ACCORD. 

English policy hostile to the Bagdad Railway appeared to have 
been isolated and discredited. Germany obtained an open door for 
her trade in Persia. The Sadidjeh-Khanikin branch promised to be 
very profitable. Russia agreed not to hinder foreign investment in 
the Bagdad project. German accord with Russia furnished a lever 
against Austrian unruliness. (Garvin, J. L., in Fortnightly, vol. 
95, 1!) 1-208.) 

Russia obtained recognition of her sphere of influence in North 
Persia. The Triple Entente was still intact, though weakened so far 
as Persia and Arabia were concerned. German projects for branches 
north from Mosul. Xissihin. and llarran were abandoned. The 
Turkish project for a railway. Trebizond-Erzerum, thence across 
the Persian frontier to Tabriz, was abandoned. The Bagdad plan 
was safe from Russian competition. (London Times. Jan. 9, L911.) 
If Germany failed to keep promises, Russia could retaliate by de- 
clining to build a connecting link from the future Persian Railway. 
(Novoe Vremya, Nov. s. L9i0.) 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

The London Times: Nov., Dec.. 1010: Jan., Apr., Aug.. 1011. 
Contains foreign press comment, and texts of some speeches, as well 
as text of the accord. 

Ma/el. <i. Be Chemin de i'er de Bagdad: etude economique et 
Internationale. Pp. 361 365. (Montpelier, Universite de Mont- 
pelier, L911.) Gives study of the financial aspect of the question 
from 1902 to 1011. Explains the effect of the accord on the powers. 

Garvin, J. L. From Reval to Potsdam. Fortnightly, vol. 95, pp. 



409 

191 208. Feb., 1911. History of the accord with special reference 
to England. 

Reyentlow, E. Deutschlands auswartige Politik. Pp. 366 369. 
(Berlin, 1915, Mittler, Zweite Auflage.) Pan-German point of view. 

Pinon, R. L'Europe et la jeune Turquie, pp. 243 250. (Paris, 
1913.) 

Seymour, C. The Diplomatic Background of the War. (New 
Haven, Yale Press, 1916.) 

Schmitt, B. E. England and Germany, 1790-1914. (Princeton, 
Princeton Press, 1916.) 

Gibbons, H. A. The New Map of Europe. Pp. 91-95. (New 
York, Century, 1914.) 

MAI'S. 

Reimer, D. (Ernst Vohsen) in Rohrbach, P. Die Bagdadbahn, 
Berlin, 1902. Berlin, 1902. 1 : 4,000,000. Good on the Bagdad Rail- 
way. Not much of Persia shown. 

Bystrom, A. II. In lledin, Sven. Zu Land nach Indien (Leipzig, 
1910). 1 :5,000,000. Map of Persia to (he Tigris-Euphrates Valley. 

139. THE BAGDAD RAILWAY, 1899-1914. 

1. THE PtJILDING AND FINANCING OF THE LINE. 

. The Bagdad line, as foreshadowed in the concession of 1893 to 
the German Anatolian Railway Company (See article. Railway (Jon- 
cessions in Turkey), was to be a continuation of the Angora branch 
of the Anatolian railway, through Armenia, entering the Euphrates 
valley from the north and avoiding much expensive mountain tun- 
nelling and grading.' Russia, for economic and strategic reasons, 
blocked this plan an'd eventually the concession was for a railroad 
running from the end of the Konia railway to Bagdad, (hen to l>as- 
sqra, at the head of deep water navigation on the Shatt-el-Arab, to 
the mouth of the Tigris, and finally to a port, not specified, on the 
PersiamGulf. The concession was authorized in 1899, after the visit 
of the 'Kaiser to the Sultan in 1898. Great influence was exerted on 
the Sultan to secure this concession, which was looked upon by the 
Ger mans as -assuringg greaj market for their goods and capital in the 
development of the district traversed, and even in some quarters ai 
;i means of colonization and of the acquisition of political power in 
Asia-Minor. The firman for the concession was finally issued in 
1!>03. It was for ninety-nine years, assured high kilometric guaran- 
tees, gave mining rights in a twenty kilometer zone on each side of 
the line, important electric power and other privileges, and the right 
to build ports at Bagdad, Bassora, and at the Persian Gulf terminus. 



r~ 



410 

It required the formation of :i Turkish corporation to operate the 
concession. 

Strong hostility to the project developed in Russia and France, 
and the British government, al first indifferent, look an unfriendly 
attitude. Russia feared the economic competition with her projected 
railways through Persia and opposed the road vigorously. The 
German syndicate intended to finance the project largely in France 
and England and also wanted the Indian. mail contracts. It, there- 
fore, proposed that French and English interests should be associated 
in the company. The Germans, however, refused to le1 control out 
of their hands, so these plans for obtaining foreign financial aid 
with government approval came to nothing. In spite, however, of 
official opposition, a large amount of French money was obtained 
for the enterprise through a strong French group of bankers, and 
with this and money provided through the Deutsche Bank the road, 
was finished. 

The building of the road was financed by the sale of Turkish 
bonds. The Government issued its bonds to the company, secured 
by thi> kilometric guarantees, which in turn was secured on the rev- 
enues of i\\v provinces traversed foe the first series, for the second 
and third on the surplus revenue turned over to the Government by 
the commission of the debt, and on revenues of provinces traversed 
for the balance. The bonds were sold by the Deutsche Bank, for 
the concessionaire company, with a small brokerage fee; the share 
capital was small. 

2. THE KOWEIT [NCIDENT, 1899 I'm::. 

British main opposition to the execution of the Bagdad Railway 
project was based upon its political aspects, more particularly the 
menace to Britain's position in Egypt and India. British diplomacy 
succeeded in preventing the consummation of one cherished German 
design, namely the extension of the railway from Bassorah to the 
Persian ( dill. 

In January, JH!)!>. the Sheikh of Koweit, denying that he was a 
vassal of the Sultan, secretly accepted the protection of the I5ritish 
Government, in return for a promise not to <'(^\' any territory with- 
out the consent of Great Britain. Consequently he refused to lease 
or sell terminal facilities to the Germans in J'.)00, and was protected 
against German and Turkish intrigue by British cruisers. In 1901 
Turkey was virtually forced to PeCOgnize his independence, and in 
May, 1903, Lord Lansdowne, then British foreign secretary, an- 
nounced that, Great Britain "would regard the establishment of a 
naval base or a fortified port in the Persian Gulf as a Aery grave 
menace to British interests, and would certainly resist if by all means 
at her disposal." 



411 

i 

.".. THE POTSDAM AGREEMENT, 1 <M o. 

Russia had also been opposed to some features of the Bagdad 
Railway enterprise; but, at the famous Potsdam interview (See 
article, The Potsdam Accord, 1910) between the German Emperor 
and the Czar in November, 11)10, Russia accepted the project on con 
dition that no branch lines were bnili into Armenia and Kurdistan. 
Germany withdrew her opposition to Russian railway schemes in 
northern Persia. 

!. SITUATION AT THE 01 TBREAK OF THE WAR. 

The settled opposition of Greal Britain to the extension to the 
Gulf and to Bassorah, under German control, led to new arranj 
ments. The Bagdad Company, in L911, go! a concession for the 
port of Alexandreiln on (he Mediterranean and for :i railroad to 
connect the pori wit li the Bagdad main line; the line to Bassorah 
was to be built by an Ajiglo-German group with a1 least two English 
directors; and the branch to the Persian Gulf was given up. By 
treaty of Angusl L9, L91 1. Russia withdrew opposition to the Bagdad 
Railway and France in 1914 came to an agreement with Germany 
in respect to French interests in the road. 

5. CONCLUSION. 

When the war broke out, Germany had in the main succeeded in 
! er Bagdad design. Tie' work was well advanced and when com- 
pleted the road wonld run from Bagdad to Constantinople, with n 
branch line to the excellent port of AJexandretta on the Mediter- 
ranean. In addition to its great commercial value, so long as the 
alliance with Turkey lasted, tin- Bagdad Railway, connecting with 
Syrian roads and the Hedjaz running to Arabia, opened Hie way for 

an attack on Egypl and the Suez and on India by route:: which 

British warships could not dominate. Said Rohrbach, (he chief 
German authority on the subject: "The railroad is political life 
insurance for Germany." 

For the subsequent rapprochement between England and <!er 
many, in respect to the Bagdad Railway, see article, The Projected 
Anglo ( rerman A.ccord of lid 1. 

BEBLIOGRAPB Y. 

The mo I important documents may he found in Parliamentary 
Papers, Bagdad Railway, No. 1 (1911); British and Foreign State 
Papers, vol. 102. pp. 833 886; and in "The Near East," passim, 

1'.) H) II. 

For the main facts and a fairly complete account of the negotia 
tionfi ami concessions, see Jastrow, M.. The War and the Bagdad 



412 

Railway (Philadelphia, Lippincott, 1917). See also Cheradamc, 
A., Le Chemm de Fer de Bagdad (Paris, 1903) ; Rohrbach, P., Die 
Bagdadbahn (Berlin, 1902), and Germany's Isolation (Chicago, Mc- 
Clurg, 1915) ; Berard V., Le Sultan, l'Islam et les Puissances (Paris, 
L907),pp. 199 t43; Pinon, R., L'Europe et l'Empire Ottoman (Paris, 
1908), (lis. 7-8; Cumin, L., La question du chemin de fer de Bagdad 
( Paris, 1013) ; Pears, Sir Edwin; Abdul Hamid, pp. 153-162; Mura- 
tet, A., Le Chemin de Fer de Bagdad (P. Aurillac, Imprimerie 
Moderne, 1914) ; Lewin, E,, The German Road to the East, chap. 3 
(London. Heinemann, 1916); Eraser, D., The Short Cut to India 
(Edinburgh, London, W. Blackwood & Sons, 1909) ; H. F. B. Lynch, 
The Bagdad Railway, in Fortnightly Review for 191*1, vol. 89, n. s., 
pp. 375-387, 771-780; A. Geraud, A New German Empire, in the 
Nineteenth Ccnttury for 1914, vol. 75, pp. 958-972, 1312-1326; 
O'Coner, T. A., "The Bagdad Railway," in Fortnightly Review 
for 1914, vol, 101, pp. 201-216: and "The Bagdad Railway Negotia- 
tions," in Quarterly Review for October, 1917, No. 453; Lemonon, 
E.. Le chemin de fer de Bagdad. Revue generale de droit interna- 
tional public (1910), XVII, 201-220; (1912), XIX, 318-328. 

A good brief account may be found in Schmitt, B. E., England 
and Germany (Princeton University Press, 1916), pp. 266-275. See 
also Sarolea, C, The Anglo-German Problem (Putnam's. X. Y., 
1915), pp. 182-208. 

140. THE HALDANE MISSION TO BERLIN IN 1912. 

1. INTRODUCTION. 

Shortly after the close of the Morocco crisis of 1911 (See article, 
that title) an effort for the arrangement of an accord between Ger- 
many and England was undertaken and vigorously prosecuted on both 
sides for a period of three or four months. The episode is usually 
known as the Haldane Mission to Berlin from the fact that a visit 
of the British minister to the German capital in February. 1912, 
formed part of the negotiation and at the time little else was pub- 
licly known in regard to the matter. It appears, however, that the 
most important exchanges of views and propositions took place at 
London after the return of Haldane from Berlin. 

L'. DISCLOSURES. 

At the time little information in regard to the matter was made 
public. Since the World War began both Governments have from 
time to time issued statements and published documents bearing upon 
the matter. A statement by Mr. Asquith in his Cardiff speech of 
October 2, 1914, after a long delay, elicited a reply from the German 
Government in the semiofficial Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung of 



41.", 

September 7 or 8, 1915, and a statement by Chancellor Bethmann- 
Hollweg in his Reichstag 1 speech of August 19, 1915. To these the 
English Government made reply in a letter of Sir Edward Grey to 
the Times, August 25, and in an official statement issued by the For- 
eign office on August 31. In , 1917, the Manchester Guardian 
published an article on the subject in which it was evident that the 
writer had been furnished with information derived from Lord Hal- 
dane's report on his mission to Berlin. Finally in June, 1918, the 
British Government made public the report of Lord Haldane. From 
these disclosures, supplemented at a few points by unofficial data, the 
proposals which were made are now known and the course of the 
negotiation is clear in general, though some important details are 
still lacking. 

. 3. BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATIONS. 

The initiative in the proceedings seems to have been taken by the 
German Government. An English account, attested as correct by 
Lord Haldane, ascribes it to the personal act of the Kaiser: "lie 
sent a private message to one of our ministers, not Lord Haldane, by 
a personal friend in England saying that he was concerned about the 
cloud which had gathered over our relations, and suggesting that the 
two cabinets should confer together" (Begbie, Vindication of Great 
Britain, p. 133). It seems to have been in consequence of this mes- 
sage, though perhaps after considerable preliminary negotiation, that 
Lord Flaldane went to Berlin in February, 1912. 

4. IIALDANe's VISIT TO BEIIL1N. 

At Berlin Haldane had two interviews with the Chancellor, Beth- 
mann-Hollweg, and an interview with the Kaiser. Bethmann-Holl- 
weg, and Admiral Tirpitz. In these interviews there was much dis- 
cussion in an amicable mood of the* general subject of Anglo-German 
relations and especially of the navy problem. Attention in the mat- 
ter of definite agreements was directed toward the discovery of two 
formulas which both Governments would be willing to accept. One 
related to naval increase, the other to the course which England 
would follow if a war should occur in which Germany was involved. 
These negotiations disclosed the fact that no agreement on the sub- 
ject of naval increase seemed possible. Haldane's report indicates 
that Bethmann-Hollweg showed some tendency to yield a little, but 
that Tirpitz " held out for the new German naval program." It 
does not show whether the Kaiser gave any indication of his personal 
attitude beyond the significant fact that no offer of concession came 
from the German side. 



414 

5. NEGOTIATIONS AT LONDON. 

At Berlin the negotiations had dealt chiefly with the naval ques- 
tion. In the negotiations which were continued at London shortly 
afterwards attention appears to have been directed chiefly, perhaps 
exclusively, to the problem of finding a formula for the case of a 
war, in which Germany took part, that both Governments would ac- 
cept. 

0. PROPOSALS FOR A FORMULA. 

The first formula considered appears to have been brought forward 
by Bethmaiin-Hollweg while Haldane was at feerlin. ' It was as fol- 
lows; 

"1. The high contracting parties assure each other mutually of 
their desire of peace and friendship. 

" -1. They will not either of them make or prepare to make any 
(unprovoked) attack upon the other, or join in any combination or 
design against the other for purposes of aggression, or become party 
to any plan or naval or military enterprise alone or in combination 
with any other power directed to such an end, and declare not to be 
bound by any such engagement, 

"3. If either of the high contracting parties become entangled in 
a war with one or more powers in which it can not be said to be die 
aggressor, the other party will at least observe toward the power so 
entangled a benevolent neutrality, and will use its utmost endeavor 
for the localization of the conflict. If either of the high contracting 
parties is forced to go to war by obvious provocation from a third 
party, they bind themselves to enter into an exchange of views con- 
cerning their attitude in such a conflict. 

u 4. The duty of neutrality which arises out of the preceding arti- 
cle has no application in so far as it ma} 7 not be reconcilable with ex- 
isting agreements which the high contracting parties have already 
made. 

" 5. The making of new agreements which render it impossible for 
either of the parties to observe neutrality toward the other beyond 
what is provided by the preceding limitation is excluded in con- 
formity with the provisions in article 2. 

"6. The high contracting parties 'declare that they will do all in 
their power to prevent differences and misunderstandings arising 
between either of them and other powers." (Current History Maga- 
zine, vol. 8, p. 169, July, 1918.) 

This proposal was rejected by the British Government because the 
operation of articles four and five would have been to leave Germany 
free to support her allies in any war in which they might engage 
while England, not having an alliance with either France or Russia 



415 

would have been required to abstain from lending them any assist- 
ance. It is manifest that the German proposition virtually 
amounted to a proposal that England bind itself to an unconditional 
neutrality. The statement published by the German Government in 
September, 1915, admits that this was the character of the original 
German proposition. 

England then proposed the following formula : 

" England will not make an unprovoked attack on Germany and 
will refrain from an aggressive policy toward Germany. An attack 
on Germany is not included in any agreement, or combination to 
which England is a party. England will not join any agreement 
which aims at such an attack." (Bethmann-Hollweg's Reichstag 
speech of Aug. 19, 1915, printed in the London Times, Aug. 21, 1915.) 

As the German Government rejected this formula the British 
Government proposed to modify it by prefixing the words : "As both 
pow r ers mutually desire to secure between themselves peace and 
friendship." (Ibid.) 

Bethmann-Hollweg thereupon offered to accept the modified Brit- 
ish proposel, but upon condition that it be further modified by add- 
ing at the end the words: " England therefore will, of course, observe 
benevolent neutrality should war be forced upon Germany." (Ibid.) 

The second German proposal was, therefore, the following formula : 

"As both powers mutually desire to secure themselves peace and 
friendship, England will not make an unprovoked attack on Ger- 
many and will refrain from an aggressive policy toward Germany. 
An attack on Germany is not included in any agreement or combi- 
nation to which England is a party. England will not join any 
agreement which aims at such an attack. England will therefore, of 
course, observe benevolent neutrality should war be forced upon 
Germany." 

7. END OF NEGOTIATIONS. 

This proposal was rejected by England. According to Bethmann- 
Hollweg (Reichstag speech of July 19, 1915) Sir Edward Grey re- 
jected it because " it would endanger the existing British friendship 
with other powers." It is, of course, manifest that the second Ger- 
man proposition differed from the first proposition for unconditional 
neutrality only in form. Had England accepted the German pro- 
posal she would have virtually agreed to remain neutral in any war 
at all likely to occur, since Germany would assert that any war in 
which she engaged had been forced upon her. Such an arrangement 
would have left Germany free to attack France and Russia and after 
they had been conquered or rendered powerless she could attack Eng- 
land, which under those conditions would be left without an ally. 



416 



8. APPRAISEMENT. 



Although the Haldane mission to Berlin and the subsequent nego- 
tiations at London failed to produce the desired agreements the 
tension of the -(rained relations between England and Germany ap- 
pears to have been somewhat relieved by the attempt. Sir Edward 
Grey at least did not lose hope that something might still be done 
by way of diplomacy to bring about better Anglo-German relations. 
Conn! Metternich reporting to the German Government on the final 
conference related that after the failure of the negotiations had be- 
come apparent Sir Edward Grey "emphatically declared that he did 
not intend or wish to drop the negotiations but on the contrary, he 
hoped that the intimate relations, for which ;i way lftul been pre- 
pared, would be further extended, and that an agreement on colonial 
territorial questions would be furl her striven for, and that a Tier some 
time had elapsed negotiations for a political agreement similar to that 
which Great Britain had proposed would be resumed. Afteralull had 
set in regarding the present naval questions a political agreement 
which proved the good will of both Governments, together with an 
agreement on colonial questions, would not fail to have a favorable 
effect on public opinion in both countries and he hoped, would also 
exert an indirect influence on the armament question." (Nord- 
deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung of Sept. 7 or 8, 1915, reprinted in the 
London Times. Sept. 9, 1015.) Negotiations along the line thus in- 
dicated by Sir Edward Grey began during the next year, resulting in 
the nearly successful projected Anglo-German accord of 1914. (See 
article, that title.) 

BIBLIOGRAPIIV. 

The most important sources have been indicated in section 2 
above. They may be found at or close to the dates indicated in the 
London Times. The Haldane report is in the Current History Mag- 
azine, July. 1918, vol. 8, pp. 166-169. Begbie, Vindication of Great 
Britain ( London, Methuen, 1916), has an important chapter (number 
three) on the subject which before publication was submitted to 
Lord Haldane, who attested that '"in no point is it inaccurate."' 
Schmitt. England and Germany, 346-351 (Princeton, University 
Press. 1915) has a good brief account written before the publication 
of the most important sources of information. German versions can 
be found in Reventlow, Deutschlands auswartige Politik, third edi- 
tion (Berlin, Mittler, L916), and in Schiemann, Wie England eine 
Verstandigung mit Deutschland yerhinderte (Berlin, Reimer, 1015). 



417 
141. THE TRIPOLI QUESTION, 1902-1911. 

1. INTRODUCTION. 

There seems to be good reason for the belief that among the dip- 
lomatists assembled at the Congress of Berlin there was some in- 
formal discussion of the Tripoli question. Lord Salisbury, accord- 
ing to De Launay, one of the Italian representatives, intimated that 
Italy might look forward to expansion in Tripoli or Tunis (Crispi, 
Memoirs, II, 114-118). 

After the French acquisition of Tunis in 1881 Italian aspirations 
in regard to Tripoli were generally recognized and even encouraged 
by the powers. In an exchange of views between Lord Salisbury and 
Crispi in 1890, the former, according to the report of Catalini, 
Italian Charge d'Affaires at London, declared himself convinced 
that on the day when the status quo in the Mediterranean should 
suffer any alteration the occupation of Tripoli by Italy would be- 
come an absolute necessity (Ibid., II, 144— ff). At the same time he 
advised Italy to wait. 

In 1890 Crispi endeavored to get from the great powers permis- 
sion for Italy to take possession of Tripoli. France was rather non- 
committal. Germany, Austria-Hungary, and England thought that 
Italy had strong claims upon Tripoli and expressed their willingness 
to see Italy in control of it, but advised her to wait. (Crispi, 
Memoirs, II, 436-47G.) 

Differences of opinion among Italian statesmen, in conjunction 
with the high cost and small success of Italian colonial enterprises 
in the Red Sea area, account for the failure of Italy to take any 
definite steps for obtaining control over Tripoli until 1900. 

2. FRANCO-ITALIAN CONVENTION OF 1902. 

In 1900 Italy entered into a secret convention with France cover- 
ing their respective interests in North Africa. This convention was 
not ratified until 1902. Though the text of the agreement was not 
published, the general nature of the arrangement was made public by 
M. Delcasse in an interview in an Italian newspaper. Italy agreed 
that France should have a free hand as regards Morocco, receiving 
for herself from France a similar assurance as regards Tripoli. (See 
article, Italy and the Morocco Question.) 

3. PACIFIC PENETRATION. 

From about the time of this agreement and doubtless largely in 
consequence of it, Italy began to push steadily the process of pacific 
penetration in Tripoli. The only steamships running regularly to 
Tripoli were Italian; the Banco di Roma maintained an agency in 
Tripoli and exerted a great influence. A considerable school system, 
subsidized by the Italian Government, was established. Railroads 
53706—18 27 



418 

were projected. Tripoli was enabled to enjoy the advantages of the 
Italian parcel post system. As a result of these Italian activities, 
" except for its political status, Tripoli was in 1908 practically an 
Italian province" (Seymour, p. 219). 

4. THE TURKISH REVOLUTION (1908) AND TRIPOLI. 

The Turkish Revolution of July, 1908, by bringing the Young 
Turks into control at Constantinople, threatened to change this 
situation radically. Hitherto the process of taking over control of 
Tripoli on the part of the Italians had encountered little opposition 
from the Turkish officials. Now all that was changed. The officials 
sent out to Tripoli, evidently under instruction, vigorously resisted 
the efforts of Italians along the lines of pacific penetration. (Ibid.) 
A series of " incidents " occurred which led to decisive action by 
Italy in the fall of 1911. 

5. THE ITALIAN ULTIMATUM. 

A lively agitation in the Italian press during the early days of 
September, 191 1, heralded the action taken by the Italian Govern- 
ment on the 27th of that month. In a short incisive note the Italian 
Government asserted the absolute necessity for putting an end to the 
disorder prevailing in Tripoli and the right of that region to be 
admitted to the benefits of the same progress enjoyed by other parts 
of North Africa. The Turkish Government was charged with the 
constant manifestation of hostility toward the legitimate activity 
of Italy in Tripoli. Owing to the recent arrival there of military 
transports, the Italian Government announced that it had decided 
to prosecute the occupation of Tripoli. Twenty-four hours were 
allowed for a reply, but the Italian note clearly stated that no other 
solution than Italian occupation would be acceptable. The ulti- 
matum was rejected by Turkey (September 28) and war began. The 
decision of Italy to delay no longer the long-foreshadowed taking 
of Tripoli appears to have been closely connected with the Morocco 
crisis of 1911. (J. A. R, Marriott, The Eastern Question, 388-389.) 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

Quentin-Bauchart, P., in La vie politique dans les deux mondes, 
1910-1911 (Paris, Alcan, 1912), pp. 335-340. Coquet, Etienne, La 
guerre Italia-Turque an point de vue du droit international (Paris, 
Pedone, 1912), pp. 5-23. Anon., " LTtalie et la Tripolitaine " in Le 
Correspondant, tome 245, pp. 1-30. Barclay, Sir T., Der italienisch- 
tiirkisrhe Krieg Jahrbuch des Volkerrechts, I, 496-520 (1913). 
Rapisardi-Mirabelli, Ibid, pp. 521-539. Crispi, Memoirs, 3 vols. 
(London, Hodder, 1912). Harris, N. D., Intervention and Coloniza- 
tion in Africa, ch. 12 (Boston, Houghton, 1914). McClure, W. K., 
Italy in North Africa (London, Constable, 1913), pro-Italian. Bar- 



419 

clay, Sir Thomas, The Turco-Italian War and its Problems (London, 
Constable, 1912), sharply hostile to Italy. The Italian ultimatum 
and the Turkish reply are in Archives Diplomatiques, third series, vol. 
120, pp. 59-62. Seymour, Charles. Diplomatic Background of the 
War (New Haven, Vale Press, 1916), pp. 218-219. 

142. TREATY OF LAUSANNE, OCTOBER, 1912. 

1. INTRODUCTION. 

Italy declared war on Turkey September 29, 1911, because the 
latter had failed to accept the Italian 24-hour ultimatum to allow 
Italy to occupy Tripoli and Cyrenaica. (See article, The Tripoli 
Question, 1902-1911.) By formal royal decree, November 5, 1911, 
confirmed by an act of Parliament, February 25, 1912, these two 
provinces were declared to be under the full and entire sovereigntj^ 
of the Italian Kingdom. 

2. NEGOTIATION. 

Russia suggested mediation, February, 1912. but the reply of the 
Marquis de San Giuliano, March 15, and the statement of the Porte, 
April 23, furnished the powers no opportunity for such action. In- 
formal diplomatic conversations were opened at Caux, Switzerland, 
in July, and later these were continued at Ouchy. Agreement was 
impossible, since the Turkish representatives insisted that any action 
on the part of the delegates must be sanctioned by their respective 
parliaments. Italy saw in this demand the familiar Turkish play for 
delay. Finally an Italian ultimatum gave Turkey three days, October 
12 to 15, in which to accept the Italian proposals. As Montenegro had 
declared war on Turkey, October 9, and the other States of the 
Balkan League were preparing to follow, the Turkish delegates were 
authorized to conclude a treaty. (See article, The Formation of the 
Balkan Alliance of 1912.) Terms of the protocol were accepted 
on the 15th, but the final draft was signed on the 19th. In 
the interim, the Ottoman Government by a firman, October 16, 
granted autonomy to Tripoli and Cyrenaica and the Sultan ap- 
pointed a spiritual representative for the provinces. An irade of the 
Sultan guaranteed administrative and juridical reforms for the 
Aegean Islands. By royal proclamation the Italian Government 
granted amnesty and guaranteed religious freedom to the two 
provinces. A commission was appointed, consisting in part of 
natives, to make civil regulations respecting local customs. 

3. TERMS OF THE TREATY. 

The final draft of the Treaty of Lausanne (See Appendix I, 105) 
was signed October 18, 1912, by Pietro-Bertolini, Guido Fusinato, 
and Giuseppe Volpi, plenipotentiaries for Italy, and Mehemmed 



420 

Naby Bey and Roumboyoglon Fahreddin Bey, plenipotentiaries for 
Turkey. It provided for : 

Article 1, immediate and simultaneous cessation of hostilities. 

Article 2, Turkey's immediate recall of officers, troops, and civil 
functionaries from Tripoli and Cyrenaica, this to be followed imme- 
diately by Italy's withdrawal from the Aegean Islands (the Dode- 
canese). (It is to be noted that there is no formal recognition of any 
change in territorial sovereignty and that Italy has not withdrawn 
from the Islands.) 

Article 3_ immediate exchange of prisoners and hostages. 

Article 4, mutual and full amnesty for all hostile acts, crimes at 
common law excepted. 

Article 5, resumption of all treaties as before the war. 

Article 6, an Italian engagement to conclude a treaty of commerce 
without the " capitulation " servitudes whenever the other powers 
do so. 

Article 7, an Italian engagement to suppress Italian post offices in 
the Ottoman Empire whenever other powers do so. 

Article 8, the signification of willingness on the part of Italy to 
lend support to the powers for the general suppression of the "capitu- 
lations " in the Ottoman Empire. 

- Article 9, a Turkish engagement to restore dismissed subjects of 
Italy to their administrative positions in the Empire without loss of 
retirement pension rights and a promise by Turkey to use her influ- 
ence with nongovernmental institutions to act in a similar manner. 

Article 10, an Italian pledge to pay into the Turkish treasury an 
annual sum equivalent to the average sums which for the three years 
previous to the war had been allocated for the use of the public 
debt to the two provinces ; the amount to be determined by a commis- 
sion of three — one Turkish, one Italian, and a, third chosen by the 
two. In case of failure to agree each State was to choose a power as 
mediator and the two powers thus designated were to select a chief 
arbitrator. Italy was given the right to substitute for the annuity a 
sum corresponding to the amount capitalized at the rate of 4 per 
cent. (The commission fixed on 2,000,000 lire annually.) 

1. CONCLUSION. 

The vagueness of the treaty as regards the questions at issue is 
taken to mean that the provisions of the ultimatum, the acts of an- 
nexation, the proclamation of amnesty and religious freedom, the 
firman and the irade had already accomplished the settlement of 
these matters. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

The American Journal of International Law, Official Documents 
Supplements, vol. 6, pp. 12-13, 58-62; vol. 7, pp. 11-12. 



421 

The Annual Register, 1912, New Series, p. 352. 
McClure, W. K. Italy in North Africa. (London, 1913.) 
Rapisardi-Mirabelli, Andrea. La guerre Italo-Turque et le droit 
des gens. (Brussels, 1913.) 

PERIODICAL LITERATURE. 

Cure, E. C. "Treaty of Lausanne." National Review, vol. 60, 
p. 577, December, 1912. 

Diplomatist. Closing of the Dardanelles. Empire Review, vol. 
23, p. 213, May, 1912. 

Abbot, G. T. Tripolitan War. Quarterly Review, 217, p. 249, 
July, 1912. 

Pinon, R. L'Europe et la guerre Italo-Turque, Revue des deux 
Mondes, June 1, 1912. 

Fiori, P. Der Friede von Lausanne. Jahrbuch des Volkerrechts, 
I, 640-649 (1913). 

143. THE FORMATION OF THE BALKAN ALLIANCE OF 1912. 

1. INTRODUCTION. 

The negotiations through which the league between Bulgaria, 
Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro was formed were carried on in the 
latter part of 1911 and the earlier part of 1912. The negotiations 
were conducted in secret. The treaties likewise were kept secret by 
express stipulations of the treaties themselves. Rumors that such 
an alliance was being formed were first circulated several months 
after the conclusion of the more important treaties and definite 
knowledge that the league existed did not reach European capitals 
until the eve of the war between the league and Turkey in October, 
1911. The Russian Government was promptly informed of the Bul- 
gar- Serbian alliance, for reasons which will appear. The treaties 
and military conventions were published, in French translation, in 
Le Matin, Paris, November 24 and 26, 1913. 

The question of combination or cooperation (with regard to rela- 
tions with Turkey, particularly concerning Macedonian affairs) had 
been before the four countries almost constantly during the last 
four decades. The severity of the Ottomanizing policy of the 
Young-Turkish regime and the outbreak of the Turko-Italian War 
in September, 1911, clarified and energized, in all the countries simul- 
taneously, the impulses toward joint action. It is not possible to 
ascribe to any one of the Governments concerned primary responsi- 
bility for taking leadership in the negotiations of 1911-12 now to 
be reviewed. 



422 

2. GREEK PROPOSALS TO BULGARIA IN 1911. 

Venizelos became prime minister of Greece in October, 1910. His 
express policy at the outset was to avoid difficulty with Turkey. The 
Turkish Government by renewing with increased energy its boycott 
of Greek commerce in Salonica and its policy of repression and 
assassination in Macedonia forced him out of his pacific attitude. 
He thereupon made efforts to secure the cooperation of Bulgaria 
in a defensive agreement. In April, 1911, he transmitted to Sofia, 
through private channels, a proposal that the two countries enter 
into an understanding for joint defense of Christians in Macedonia 
and for an eventual defensive alliance against Turkey. 

Gueshoff became prime minister of Bulgaria in the spring of 
1911, supported by two parties which had always advocated a con- 
ciliatory policy toward Turkey; and Gueshoff announced that he 
would use every effort to avoid provocatory movements of any sort. 
Moreover, his doubts as to the military strength of Greece and his 
suspicion that a Greco-Turkish War over the Cretan question was 
imminent, led him to make no response to the proposal of Venizelos. 

3. NEGOTIATIONS OF THE BTJLGAR-SERBIAN TREATY. 

Turkish abuses in Macedonia and the obstinate procrastination 
of the Turkish Government in the matter of the promised junction of 
the Turkish and Bulgarian railways, changed the conciliatory atti- 
tude of Gueshoff, and the outbreak of the Turko-Italian War in Sep- 
tember, 1911, made more impatient and aggressive the disposition of 
Bulgarian public opinion. 

Realizing that Serbian military assistance would be indispensable 
in an alliance against Turkey, the Bulgarian Government took steps 
to procure the cooperation of "Serbia before negotiating with Greece. 
Serbia, which had for several years, under Russian auspices, sought 
an alliance whereby she might regain " Old Serbia," made known her 
readiness to receive proposals. King Ferdinand and Gueshoff were 
on holiday in Vichy at the time of the outbreak of the Italian War. 
Rizoff (Bulgarian minister to Italy, in Sofia on leave of absence) 
and Thcodaroff (Bulgarian minister of foreign affairs) held con- 
ferences with Milovanovitch (Serbian prime minister) in Belgrade 
and Sofia, as a result of which arrangement was made for a secret 
interview between Gueshoff and Milovanovitch. This took place at 
night on the train from Belgrade to Nish. Through this three-hour 
conference an agreement was reached to enter into negotiations on 
the basis of Macedonian autonomy, with, however, a preliminary 
determination of spheres of influence of the two States. 

Definite negotiations were taken up in December at Sofia, Dr. 
Spalaikovitch being appointed Serbian minister to Bulgaria for the 



4Z3 

purpose in hand. Kings Ferdinand and Peter were consulted on 
more important questions, and Dr. Daneff, president of the Bulgarian 
National Assembly, and Paschich, Radical leader in the Serbian 
Parliament, were consulted on certain matters. Russian interests in 
the negotiations were represented through the Russian minister and 
military attache at Sofia, who used their influence to secure accommo- 
dation of territorial claims and to press the parties to a conclusion. 
The treaty was signed February 29-March 13, 1912, by Gueshoff 
and Milovanovitch, and also by the Bulgarian and Serbian monarchs. 

4. TERMS OF THE BULGAR-SERBIAN TREATY. 

There are two parts to the Bulgar-Serbian treaty. (See Appendix 
I, 101.) One part created a defensive alliance between the contract- 
ing parties, in which they pledged themselves to " succor one another 
with their entire forces in the event of one of them beino; attacked 
by one or more States." The other part is the " secret annex," in 
which they provided for possible war against Turkey, in the event of 
internal or external troubles of Turkey which might endanger the 
national interests of either of the contracting parties or threaten the 
maintenance of the status quo in the Balkan peninsula. The im- 
portant feature of this part is the agreement as to territorial divi- 
sions in the event of a victorious outcome of such a war. All lands 
were to be held in common until after the signing of peace. Follow- 
ing peace, territory north of the Shar Range, including the Sandjak 
of Novi Bazar and " Old Serbia," were to go to Serbia, and the ter- 
ritory south and east of the Rhodope Range and the Struma River 
to Bulgaria. Autonomy was to be given to the intermediate region. 
If, however, both parties should agree that autonomy for this region 
was not feasible, it was to be divided between them according to 
lines defined in the treaty, with the exception of a further interme- 
diate region left undivided and to be subsequently apportioned 
through arbitration by the Czar of Russia. The territorial arrange- 
ments represent an attempt to reconcile the Serbian desire for parti- 
tions and access to the Adriatic with the Bulgarian plan for Mace- 
donian autonomy. Finally the treaty provided that the Czar should 
be arbitrator in other questions that might arise from the treaty. . 

5. THE GRECO-BULGARIAN TREATY. 

In the last week of February, 1912, negotiations between Bulgaria 
and Greece were begun. The negotiations between the prime minis- 
ters were carried on through Panas, Greek minister at Sofia. Veni- 
zelos proposed that the treaty should embrace territorial arrangements. 
But since the rigid claims of Greece would inevitably conflict with 
Bulgarian aspirations for Salonica, and since there was no time for 



424 

delay, it was decided to omit all territorial understandings. The treaty 
was signed by GuesliofF and Panas on May 29, 1912. By this 
treaty (See Appendix I, 103) the two States bound themselves to 
aid each other, if attacked by Turkey either by invasion or by sys- 
tematic violation of rights derived from treaties or the fundamental 
principles of the law of nations, and to use their influence over their 
co-nationalists in Turkey, so as to assist in the peaceable existence of 
all the nationalities forming the population of the Turkish Empire, 
and to obtain for Bulgars and Greeks in Turkey the enjoyment of 
the rights assured to them by treaties or grants. 

6. AGREEMENTS WITH MONTENEGRO. * 

King Nicholas of Montenegro had always been eager for a combi- 
nation against Turkey, and had made several proposals for an alli- 
ance with Russian aid. Immediately after the outbreak of the 
Turko-Italian War he suggested to the other States common military 
action. Serbia, at that time looking to possible negotiations with 
Turkey, declined. Bulgaria and Greece promptly signified their ap- 
proval, though formal agreements were not entered into until after 
the conclusion of the treaties above described. Near the middle of 
April, 1912, Theodoroff, Rizoff , and Daneff held a conference with the 
Montenegrin prime minister in Vienna, where he had accompanied 
King Nicholas on an official visit to the Austrian Emperor, and an 
agreement was easily reached. No formal treaty was signed. The 
agreement on Bulgaria's part was to give financial assistance to Mon- 
tenegro in case war should break out. A formal agreement with 
Greece was reached soon thereafter. 

Agreement with Serbia was more difficult because of mutual sus- 
picions of dynastic intrigues. However, the alliance was finally 
achieved, through the intermediation of Bulgarian officials, near the 
end of May, 1912. This completed the formation of the Balkan 
League. 

7. MILITART CONVENTIONS. 

It was necessary to supplement the Bulgar- Serbian and Greco-Bul- 
garian treaties by military conventions in order to determine the re- 
spective military obligations of the parties in the event of war with 
Turkey. A convention between Bulgaria and Serbia was concluded 
April 29-May 12. This was supplemented by agreements between the 
general staffs concluded June 19-July 1, August 23-September 5, 
and September 15-28. A military convention between Bulgaria and 
Greece was concluded September 22-Octob*er 5. (For these conven- 
tions see Appendix I, 102, 104.) 



425 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

The important treaties and conventions have been indicated above. 

Bourchier, James D. "The Balkan League," in the London Times, 
June 4, 5, 6, 11, 13, 1913. A series of articles by the Times corre- 
spondent in the Balkan Peninsula. They constitute the best single 
source of information as to the various proposals, conferences, and 
negotiations by which the alliance was created. The writer was fre- 
quent lv in the confidence of the statesmen, and on some occasions 
acted as intermediary in the secret communications between them. 

Gueshotf, L. E. L'Alliance Balkanique (Paris, Hachette, 1915). 

Gueshoff, L. E. The Balkan League. Translated by Constantin 
C. Mincoff, first secretary of the Bulgarian legation at London. 
(John Murray, London, 1915.) The two last-named volumes, the 
latter a reliable translation of the former, contain valuable inti- 
mately first-hand information from a leading negotiator of the 
treaties. In the appendices the treaties and military conventions are 
printed in full. 

Gauvain, Auguste. L'Europe avant la guerre. (Paris, Colin, 1917.) 
Contains a clear and critical account of the negotiations, difficulties, 
and conflicting motives. 

" Balkanicus," pseudonym for Prolic, S. The Aspirations of Bul- 
garia. Translated from the Serbian. (London, Simpkin, 1915.) 
Written from a Serbian point of view. Designed to convict Bul- 
garia of perfidious policies, seconded by Austria, in connection with 
the negotiations of the alliance and the conduct of the war. 

Report of the Interna tional Commission to Inquire the Causes and 
Conduct of the Balkan Wars. Carnegie Endowment for Interna- 
tional Peace. Division of Intercourse and Education. (Published 
by the Endowment. Washington, 1914.) " Section 3. The Alliance 
and the Treaties." Pp. 38-49 of the Report. Based partly on first- 
hand information of members of the Commission. Useful brief ac- 
count, containing a few errors and ambiguities. 

" M," " The Balkan League : History of its Formation." Fort- 
nightly Review, March, 1913, Vol. 99, pp. 430-39. Probably undue 
emphasis upon Bulgarian initiative in the negotiation. 

Nikolaides, Kleanthes. Griechenlands Anteil an den Balkenkrie- 
gen, 1912-13. (Vienna, Holder, 1914.) Contains, pp. 18-31, an ac- 
count of the negotiations from a Greek standpoint, by an observer 
having first-hand information. 

Powell, E. Alexander. "The Balkan Union Against Turkey." 
Review of Reviews, November, 1912. Vol. 46, pp. 554-64. 

Freeman, George. " The Balkan War : Some Underlying Causes." 
Ibid. pp. 564-70. The two last-mentioned articles are in popular 
style, but are informing and illuminating as to political, religious, 
military, and nontechnical factors. 



426 

LIST OF MAPS. 

Large Scale Strategical War Map of Europe: Balkan Area. 
Edited by George Philip, F. R. G. S. Compiled from continental 
staff maps and other official sources. Scale 1:1,140,000 (18 miles 
to 1 inch). London, undated (probably 1916). London Geo- 
graphical Institute. Also C. S. Hammond and Company, New 
York. 

Reproduction of a reduced and simplified copy, published in the 
Echo de Bulgarie of June 7-20, 1913, of the map annexed to the 
Bulgo-Serbian treaty of February 29-March 13, 1912. In report of 
the Carnegie Balkan Commission, page 45. Shows contested 
regions. 

Carte des delimitations successives de la Bulgarie. By Ch. Bon- 
nesseur. Appended to Gueshoff's L' Alliance Balkanique. Shows 
territorial arrangements between Serbia and Bulgaria. 

Karte vom vergrosserten Griechenland mit einer farbigen Volk- 
er und Spracheneinteilung der von den Balkanstaaten neueroberten 
Gebiete. Scale 1 : 3,000,000. Cartographer, Anstalt G. Freytag and 
Berndt. Vienna, 1913. Alfred Holder. Appended to Nikolaides, 
Griechenlands Anteil an den Balkankriegen (Vienna and Leipzig, 
Holder, 1914). 

144. THE EFFORTS OF THE POWERS TO PREVENT THE 
OUTBREAK OF THE FIRST BALKAN WAR. 

1. INTRODUCTION. 

The efforts of the Powers to prevent the outbreak of the First 
Balkan War probably elates back to the latter part of 1911, when 
the situation in Albania and Macedonia attracted attention. In 
January, 1912, the Russian Government brought to the attention 
of the English and French Governments the dangers that might 
arise from this situation. The three Governments associated them- 
selves in a joint demand on Turkey to put down the insurgent bands 
and to reform the Government. (Speech of M. Paul Douniier, 
Archives Diplomatiques, third series, vol. 126, p. 124.) In the early 
spring of 1912 it was known that a rapprochement had been effected 
between Serbia and Bulgaria and that one between these two and 
Greece was under way. 

2. BALKAN ALLIANCE NOTIFIED TO THE POWERS. 

In May, 1912, Danef, Bulgarian special ambassador, notified 
Sazonof, Russian foreign minister, of the conclusion of the Balkan 
Alliance and also called his attention to the bad situation in Mace- 
donia which might necessitate vigorous action by tne Balkan allies 



427 

•against Turkey. Sazonof counselled moderation and caution. 
(Gueshoff, Balkan League, p. 45.) 

3. AUSTRIAN PROPOSAL OF AUGUST 14, 1912. 

Austria became alarmed, and on August 14 Count Berchtold, min- 
ister of foreign affairs, sent a note to the powers urging (1) "pro- 
gressive decentralization" of the government in Macedonia, (2) the 
maintenance of the status quo in the Balkans, (3) the strength- 
ening of Turkey. (Note unpublished, information from Questions 
diplomatiques et coloniales, vol. 34, p. 305, and speech of M. Dou- 
mier, Archives Diplomatiques, third series, vol. 126, p. 125.) This step 
was welcomed by all the powers (Ibid., vol. 126, p. 125), although 
they requested a definition of the phrase " progressive decentraliza- 
tion." (Dillon in Contemporary Review, vol. 102, p. 718.) Berch- 
told then visited Roumania personally in order to induce her to take 
steps to restrain the Balkan allies. Russia also continued her appeals 
for moderation. (Gueshoff, Balkan League, p. 51.) 

4. TURKISH MILITARY MANEUVERS. 

In late September the Turks decided to hold army manceuvers 
at Adrianople. The powers of the Triple Entente felt that this 
would provoke the Balkan allies to mobilize also, and sent a note to 
Turkey protesting against these manceuvers. Turkey, in reply (Sept. 
27), refused to give up the plan, but promised to limit the number 
of men taking part. 

5. FRENCH PROPOSAL OF OCTOBER 4, 1912. 

On September 30 the Balkan States mobilized, and October 1 Tur- 
key followed suit. Sazonof, who had been visiting in England, ar- 
rived in Paris October 2, and he and Poincare at once started to devise 
a plan to ward off war. October 4 France opened negotiations with 
the various European chanceries with the view of either (1) joint 
action by all the powers or (2) joint action by Austria and Russia 
in the name of Europe. (Speech of M. Doumier, Archives Diplo- 
matiques, third series, vol. 126, p. 126; speech of M. Poincare, Ar- 
chives Diplomatiques, third series, vol. 125, p. 184.) After some 
delay (Dillon in Contemporary Review, vol. 102, p. 719), England 
accepted the proposal in the form that Russia and Austria should 
act jointly in the name of Europe in the Balkan capitals and that 
all the powers should act jointly in Constantinople. Austria accepted 
this plan October 6 with the proviso: (1) Maintenance of Ottoman 
integrity and sovereignty (Balkan status quo) ; (2) general lines of 
Berchtold note of August 14 to be followed in this new procedure; 
(3) the accord of the powers not to be communicated to Turkey. 



428 

These amendments were accepted by France, and the other powers 
rallied to the French proposition. (Speech of M. Doumier, Archives 
Diplomatiques, third series, vol. 126, p. 126.) 

6. AUSTKO-RUSSIAN NOTE OF OCTOBER 8, 1912. 

On October 8, 1912, an Austro-Russian joint note was handed in 
at the Balkan capitals. It stated that (1) the powers would not per- 
mit a breach of the peace; (2) they would themselves take in hand 
the question of Macedonian reforms; (3) should war break out, the 
powers will not permit any change in the Balkan status quo; (4) 
collective action will be taken in Constantinople. (Archives Dip- 
lomatiques, third series, vol. 126, p. 126.) Some hours before .its 
presentation in Cettinje, Montenegro declared war on Turkey. The 
remaining members of the alliance replied October 13 (Questions 
diplomatiques et coloniales. vol. 34, p. 554), thanking the powers for 
their action, but stating that they preferred to deal directly with 
Turkey. 

7. NOTE OF THE POWERS TO TURKEY, OCTOBER 10. 1912. 

On October 10 the collective note of the powers was handed in at 
Constantinople. It demanded reforms in Macedonia in accordance 
with the law of 1880. (Archives Diplomatiques, third series, vol. 
126, p. 127.) Turkey replied October 14 with a promise of reforms. 
(Archives Diplomatiques, third reries, vol. 126, p. 129.) But before 
further action could be taken war broke out. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

Gueshoff, T. E. The Balkan League.' trans, by C. C. Mincoff. 
(London, Murray, 1915.) Account of the Balkan League, by one of 
its main authors, the former prime minister of Bulgaria. Pro-Bul- 
garian, but probably accurate in respect to the facts given. The 
best authority on the subject. 

Report of the International Commission to inquire into the causes 
and conduct of the Balkan Wars. (Washington. Carnegie Endow- 
ment, 1914.) The report of the commission sent out by the Car- 
negie Endowment for Peace. Their work was accurately and care- 
fully done, although the pro-Bulgarian bias of one member, M. 
Miliukov, probably affected the report to some extent. 

Hanotaux, G. La Guerre de Balkans et L'Europe. (Paris, Plon, 
1913.) Papers contributed to the " Figaro " weekly by the former 
French minister of foreign affairs. Valuable for the views on 
Europe, few facts. 

Sloane, W. M. The Balkans: a laboratory of history. (New 
York, Eaton, 1914.) Brief account of this phase. 



429 

Schurman, J. G. The Balkan Wars, 1912-1913. (Princeton Uni- 
versity Press, 1914.) Brief but clear.- 

Dillon, E. J. Foreign Affairs in Contemporary Review, Novem- 
ber, 1912, vol. 102, pp. 715-736. Dillon is exceedingly well informed, 
tells much, but gives little chance to check up his information. 

Charmes, F. Chroniques de la Quinzaine, in Revue des Deux 
Mondes, Vol. II, series 6, pp. 228-238, 951-956. (September 1, and 
October 15, 1912.) Well informed on events, few facts. 

The most important documents are in Archives Diplomatiques, 
third series, vol. 126 (pages indicated above) and Questions diplo- 
matiques et coloniales, vol. 34 (pages as indicated above). 

145. THE TREATY OF LONDON, 1913. 

1. FIRST MEETING OF THE LONDON PEACE CONFERENCE, DECEMBER 16, 1912. 

The armistice for the cessation of the First Balkan War was signed 
on December 3, 1912, and the London Peace Conference, composed 
of delegates from the Balkan allies, including Greece, who had not 
signed the armistice, and Turkey, held its first meeting on December 
16, 1912. At the same time a Conference of Ambassadors, consisting 
of Sir Edward Grey and the London representatives of all the 
powers, was also in session. 

2. DEMANDS OF THE BALKAN ALLIES. 

The Balkan allies demanded a war indemnity, as also the cession of 
all European Turkey (excepting Albania), Crete, and the islands 
in the Aegean Sea. Turkey was to be allowed to retain Constanti- 
nople, together with a strip of territory extending from Midia on 
the Black Sea to Rodosta on the Sea of Marmora, as also the penin- 
sula of Gallipoli or the Thracian Chersonese. 

Turkey was unwilling to give up Adrianople, a sacrifice insisted 
upon by Bulgaria. The " Divan," or Turkish National Assembly, de- 
cided, however, on January 22, 1913, that the demands of the allies 
must be conceded. Kiamil Pasha telegraphed the Turkish commis- 
sioners at London that same night, directing them to yield Adrian- 
ople and agree to the cession of all Turkey in Europe beyond a line 
running from Enos on the Aegean Sea, at the mouth of the Maritza 
River, to Midia on the Black Sea. 

3. COUP D'ETAT OF JANUAUY 23, 1913, AT CONSTANTINOPLE 

But on the following day, January 23, as a result of a successful 
coup d'etat, Kiamil Pasha was driven from power and Nazim Pasha 
murdered by Enver Bey, who placed himself at the hend of a new 



430 

government. When the news of the coup d'etat reached Lor don it 
was recognized that further negotiations were useless and that the 
London Peace Conference had failed. 

4. TERMS PROPOSED BY THE POWERS. 

Adrianople having been captured by the Bulgarians, assisted by 
the Serbs, on March 28, 1913, the time was ripe for a resumption of 
peace negotiations. On March 22 the great powers had proposed the 
following terms as a basis for the renewal of negotiations: (1) A 
frontier line from Enos to Midia to follow the course of the Maritza, 
and the cession to the allies of all the territories west of that line, 
with the exception of Albania, whose status and frontiers were to be 
determined by the powers. (2) The question of the Aegean Islands 
to be decided by the powers. (3) Turkey to abandon all claims to 
Crete. (1) The powers would not entertain favorably the demand 
for an indemnity, but were willing to admit the allies to participa- 
tion in the discussion of an international commission which should 
meet in Paris for the equitable settlement of their participation in 
the Ottoman debt and the financial obligations of the territories 
newly acquired. Turkey was to be asked to take part in the labors 
of this commission. (5) An end of hostilities immediately after the 
acceptance of this basis of negotiations. 

Turkey agreed to these stipulations, but the allies insisted, among 
other things, that the Aegean Islands be ceded directly to them and 
were eager for an indemnity. 

5. SECOND MEETING OF THE LONDON PEACE CONFERENCE, MAT, 1913. 

It was not until April 20 that the Balkan States finally agreed 
to accept the mediation of the powers. When the Balkan delegates 
and the representatives of the great powers finally met for the second 
time at London on May 20 they found a treaty embodying the 
original terms of the powers all ready for them to sign. They de- 
murred at first, but when, on May 27, Sir Edward Grey frankly told 
them that they must either sign or leave London they signed without 
much further delay on May 30, 1913. 

6. DISCUSSION AMONG THE BALKAN ALLIES. 

The long delay in the negotiations was largely due to differences 
among the allies regarding the division of the spoils. Mutual hatred 
and suspicion and conflicting territorial ambitions made agreement 
almost impossible. The action of the Conference of Ambassadors 
in regard to Albania added greatly in the difficulty of the situation, 
since Serbia was thereby prevented from extending its territory 
westward to the Adriatic and would be left with onlv a relativelv 



■ 431 

small recompense for its sacrifices in the war, unless Bulgaria could 
be induced to consent to a modification of the Serbo-Bulgar treaty 
of March 13, 1912 (See article, The Formation of the Balkan League 
of 1912), a thing to which she was unwilling to agree. Even before 
the declaration of war Serbia had suggested a rectification of her 
frontier as outlined in the Serbo-Bulgar treaty of March, 1912. (See 
article, The Formation of the Balkan Alliance of 1912.) Her de- 
mands grew with her victories, with the free hand in Macedonia al- 
lowed her and. Greece by Bulgaria's preoccupation in Thrace, and with 
her exclusion from the sea by the creation of Albania. Bulgaria, 
on the other hand, cared intensely for expansion in Macedonia. Very 
bitter feeling was generated between Bulgaria and Serbia, culminat- 
ing in warlike preparations, some actual hostilities, and a final de- 
mand on May 25 on the part of Serbia for revision of the treaty of 
1912. Meanwhile Serbia had been approaching Greece suggesting 
conterminous bounds in Macedonia and alliance against Bulgaria, 
and a final agreement with her was reached on May 19-June 1 
(American Journal of International Law, vol. 12, Supplement, pp. 
89-92). 

A second question was raised by Roumania, who hoped to gain 
Silistria and a more advantageous military frontier for her Dobrudja 
region. Bulgaria refused her suggestions as to compensation for 
neutrality (made at the London conference), and war almost re- 
sulted, but was averted by a Petrograd conference which gave Rou- 
mania Silistria without fortifications (May 7). On April 19 Serbia 
offered her a treaty against Bulgaria, and on May 2 the Greeks made 
a similar offer. She desired, however, to remain free until war was 
actually begun, fearing the effect of an alliance of all against Bul- 
garia. 

7. TERMS OF THE TREATY OF LONDON, MAY 30, 1913 (SEE APPENDIX 

I, 107). 

The terms were practically those proposed by the powers on 
March 23. (1) Turkey ceded to the Balkan allies her territory in 
Europe beyond a line drawn from Enos near the mouth of the 
Maritza River on the Aegean Sea to Midia on the Black Sea. (2) 
The status and boundaries of Albania were to be fixed by the great 
powers. (3) The Sultan of Turkey ceded Crete to the Balkan allies 
in whose favor all rights of sovereignty were renounced. (4) To 
the great powers was left the decision upon the fate of the islands 
in the Aegean Sea (excepting Crete) and the status of Mount Athos. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

For the text of the London treaty, see Martens, G. Fr. de, Nou- 
veau recueil general de traites par H. Triepel (Leipzig, 1914), troi- 



432 

sieme serie, T. VIII, premier livraison, pp. 16-19; or the Report of 
the International Commission to inquire into the Causes and Conduct 
of the Balkan Wars (Washington, Carnegie Endowment for Inter- 
national Peace, 1914). 

Gueshoff. The Balkan Alliance. (London, 1915.) Written from 
the Bulgarian point of view. Many documents. 

The New International Year Book. (New York, Dodd, 1912, 
1913.) 

Duggan, S. P., in Political Science Quarterly, vol. 28, pp. 95ff, 
627ff. Excellent, 

The Annual Register. (London, Longmans, 1912, 1913), pp. 347- 
348. 

Hanotaux, G. La Guerre des Balkans. (Paris, Plon, 1914.) In- 
ternational aspects. 

Schurman, J. G. The Balkan Wars. (Princeton, University 
Press, 1914.) Clear and suggestive. 

Gibbons, H. A. The New Map of Europe. (New York, Century 
Co., 1914.) Popular but useful. 

Kerofilas. Eleutherios Venizelos. (London, Murray, 1915.) 

Cassavetti, D. J. Hellas and the Balkan Wars. (London, Unwin, 
1914.) 

Cheraclame, A. Douze ans de propagande, 1900-1912. (Paris, 
Plon, 1913.) 

Marriott, J. A. R. The Eastern Question. (Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1917.) 

Schmitt, B. E*. The Balkan Revolution (reprint from Western 
Reserve University Bulletin, Vol. XVII, No. 3), pp. 26-30. 

146. THE ALBANIAN QUESTION IN THE BALKAN CRISIS 

OF 1913. 

1. ORIGIN OF THE CRISIS. 

When the Balkan Alliance began war with Turkey in 1912 Austria - 
Hungary considered herself directly and vitally affected. Not only 
did she see danger to her ambition to reach the Aegean, but she consid- 
ered that a powerful Serbian state might be dangerous if it reached 
the sea and developed a navy, since under the influence of Russia it 
might be able to close altogether Austria's only outlet, the Adriatic. 
Therefore some of the bolder statesmen of the Dual Monarchy de- 
sired to keep Serbia always dependent ; but Count Berchtold, with the 
support of the Emperor, preferred the scheme of erecting between 
Serbia and the sea a buffer state, Albania, whose ports might be 
used by Serbia for commerce, but not for developing naval power. 
(Annual Register, 1913, p. 331.) It is possible also that Austria 
desired to postpone settlement for the present, until a later and more 



433 

favorable opportunity came for acquiring this country for herself. 
At the beginning of 1913 the situation was very threatening, since 
Russia, supporting Serbia, had large forces mobilized, along the 
Galician frontier, while an Austrian army was watching them. (Ibid., 
p. 332.) 

2. THE LONDON CONFERENCE OF 1912-13. 

In the last month of 1912, the matter had been brought to issue. 
December 16 a conference of delegates from the Balkan States as- 
sembled in London (Archives Diplomatiques, third series, vol. 124, 
p. 192), and at the same time a gathering of the ambassadors of the 
powers (See article, The Treaty of London, 1913). December 20 
the powers had agreed, in order to avert a European war, that there 
should be an autonomous Albania. (The Times, December 21, 1912, 
published the official statement issued by the British Foreign Office.) 
The danger of such a conflict sprang chiefly from the fact that two 
of the great powers were determined that Serbia, Greece, and Monte- 
negro should not be permitted to divide Albania between them, as 
they desired and as undoubtedly they would have done if not pre- 
vented. Austria -Hungary led the opposition. Its reasons for pur- 
suing that course have already been indicated. Italy supported 
Austria-Hungary because of Italian ambitions in Albania and in 
order to prevent the coast opposite Italy from falling under the 
control of States which in the future might become dependencies of 
Russia, or possibly of Austria-Hungary. 

A month earlier the factions of this mountain country had laid 
aside their differences and, assembling at Avlona, proclaimed their 
independence and neutrality (Annual Register, 1912, p. 356). Under 
strong pressure from the powers, on January 21 the Serbian dele- 
gates to the London Peace conference presented a memorandum 
declaring that they would conform their conduct to the interests 
and desires of the great powers, and that they would not object to 
an Albanian State. But they desired to have Skutari and other 
places. (Archives Diplomatiques, third series, vol. 125, pp. 119, 
120.) Meanwhile Franz Josef had sent an emissary to the Czar to 
open negotiations on the subject, and in March an agreement was 
made by which Serbia was to have the Albanian towns of Ipek, 
Prizrend, Dibra, and Diakova, while Skutari, even if captured by 
the Montenegrins, was to be a part of the new State. (Annual Reg- 
ister, 1913, p. 332.) 

During this time the forces of Montenegro were making heroic 

efforts to capture Skutari, and declared that they sought it to satisfy 

their political aspirations (Ibid., p. 344). April 21 the other allied 

states accepted the mediation of the powers, on the basis that the pow- 

5370&— 18 28 



434 

ers were to delimit an autonomous Albania, among other things 
(Ibid., p. 346; Archives Diplomatiques, third series, vol. 126, p. 140), 
but the Montenegrins, refusing to accede, continued the siege until 
Skutari was yielded to them. (Annual Register, 1913, p. 345.) Per- 
emptory demand was now made by the powers that Montenegro 
withdraw from the fortress. (Archives Diplomatiques, third series, 
vol. 128, p. 80.) Yielding to this pressure, to the threats of Austria, 
and to the advice of Russia, King Nicholas finally placed Skutari 
in the hands of the powers May 5. (Annual Register, 1913, p. 346.) 
May 30 a treaty of peace was made at London between the Balkan 
allies and Turkey (See article. The Treaty of London, 1913). In 
the third article of this treaty the frontiers of Albania were marked 
off as the powers had decided. (Nouveau Recueil General de Traites, 
3d series, VIII, pp. 16-19.) 

3. THE SETTLEMENT. 

The settlement, from the standpoint of the powers, was explained 
to the House of Commons by Sir Edward Grey, who more than any- 
one else during this crisis assisted in preventing a war: 

This agreement is that there should be an autonomous Albania. We willingly 
became a party to this, for the Albanians are separate in race, in language and, 
to a great extent, in religion. ... It was decided that the littoral and Skutari 
should be Albanian, while Ipek, Prizrend Dibra, and (after much negotiation) 
Djakova should be excluded from Albania-. (Parliamentary Debates, 5th series, 
vol. 51, p. 817.) 

The arrangement was very unsatisfactory to the Albanians, for 
many of the mountaineers were in this manner cut off from the only 
market towns to which they had access. (Annual Register, 1913, 
p. 356.) There was much fighting between Serbians and Albanians, 
and several raids later in the year which finally brought stern sum- 
mons to Serbia from Austria-Hungary (Ibid.). 

The action of the powers in regard to Albania became a powerful 
factor in bringing about the Second Balkan War. By the creation 
of an independent Albania, Serbia was deprived of expected ad- 
vantages to which she believed herself fairly entitled by her sacri- 
fices and success in the First Balkan War. She, therefore, demanded 
that Bulgaria, whose gains by that war had been very large, should 
consent to a revision of the territorial arrangement contained in the 
Serbo-Bulgar treaty of March 13, 1912. Bulgaria refused to consent 
to any revision. Out of the resulting controversy came the Second 
Balkan War. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

The Annual Register, 1912-1913, contains a full and detailed ac- 
count of Balkan matters, written with no great admiration of the 



435 

Balkan peoples, and with sympathetic consideration of the desires of 
Austria-Hungary. 

Archives Diplomatiques, 1912-1913, contains some of the diplo- 
matic papers, but is much less full and helpful than for earlier years. 

Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates, 5th series, vols 51-56, 
(1913) contain a number of important statements before Parliament 
upon foreign policy. 

Martens (continued by Triepal, H.,) Nouveau Recueil General de 
Traites, 3d series, VIII (Leipzig, 1915) contains the Treaty of Lon- 
don, May 17-30, 1913. 

Gibbons, H. A., The New Map of Europe (New York, Century Co., 
1914), has an excellent chapter (XVIII) on " The Albanian Fiasco." 

147. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PRINCIPALITY OF 

ALBANIA, 1912-1913. 

1. THE LONDON CONFERENCE OF AMBASSADORS AND ALBANIA. 

The principality of Albania was established by act of the powers 
at the London Conference of Ambassadors at the special instigation 
of Austria and Italy. (See article, The Albanian Question in the 
Balkan Crisis of 1913.) Its boundaries were to be established on eth- 
nographic lines by an international commission. The new situation 
inherited two problems from the one previous to 1912. (1) The 
hostile relations between Serbia and the Albanians owing to the 
incursions into Serbian territory of Albanian bands and the sore- 
ness in Serbia on account of the refusal of the Conference of Ambas- 
sadors to grant her access to the Adriatic through Albania. (2) The 
status of the Greeks in Epirus, provisionally included in Albania 
and constituting a source of difficulty between Greece, Albania, and 
the powers. 

2. SERBIA AND ALBANIA. 

Under pretext of defence against Albanian bands Serbia closed her 
frontier in June, 1913, shutting off Albanians from access to markets 
at Dibra and Djakoritza. The powers protested against this as ham- 
pering to the economic life of Albania and Serbia yielded on the ques- 
tion of these markets. (Questions Diplomatiques et Coloniales, vol. 
36, p. 501.) Incursions of Albanians continued and on September 20, 
1913, Serbia warned the powers she would take defensive measures in 
case these raids continued. (Ibid., vol. 36, p. 429.) On September 23 
further attacks occurred and Serbia sent troops to the frontier and 
occupied positions within Albania. (Ibid., vol. 36, p. 430.) Serbia 
explained this to the powers as a defensive measure. (Ibid., vol. 36, 
p. 501.) Austria protested, at first "amicably," warning Serbia 



436 

against any violation of the Albanian frontier. (Ibid., vol. 36, p. 
5()l ; .) Serbia replied again that her measures were only defensive 
(Ibid., vol. 36, p. 502), but October 18 Austria sent an ultimatum 
ordering Serbia to evacuate Albania within eight days. (Ibid., vol. 
36; p, 553.) Serbia yielded to this. (Ibid., vol. 36, p. 554.) 

3. GREECE AMD ALBANIA. 

October 30, 1913, Austria and Italy sent a collective note to 
Greece charging that Greek terrorization in Epirus prevented the de- 
limitation work of the commission, that in such cases of terrorization 
the commission would consider the village ipso factfi> Albanian, and 
finally demanded that Greece evacuate Albanian territory by De- 
cember 31, 1912. (Quoted, Questions Diplomatiques et Coloniales, 
vol. 36, p. 621.) The Greek reply (November 3) denied these charges 
and declared that the trouble arose from the inclusion of Greek pop- 
ulation in Albania. (Quoted Ibid., vol. 36, p. 622.) December 13 
Sir Edward Grey sent a note to all the powers urging postponement 
of date for Greek evacuation of Epirus, division of contested terri- 
tory (without waiting for completion of the work of the commis- 
sion) between Greece and Albania, and compensation for Greece in 
the acceptance of her claims in the iEgean Islands. (Ibid., vol. 37, 
p. 1. Note paraphrased. It has not been published.) This com- 
promise, evidently aimed at saving the peace and ending a dangerous 
question, was accepted at once by France and Russia and finally (De- 
cember 31) w r ere agreed on in principle by the powers of the Triple 
Alliance, but securities were demanded that Greece would evacuate 
at the agreed time. (Ibid., vol. 37, p. 105, note quoted.) After an- 
other interchange of notes an agreement was reached between the 
powers on the general basis of Sir Edward Grey's first proposals. 
(Notes quoted or paraphrased, Ibid., vol. 37, p. 374.) Collective 
notes of the powers to Turkey and Greece were accepted by both with 
relation to Epirus boundary and settlement of iEgean Islands. But 
Greece, in her note of acceptance also demanded: (1) guarantees of 
religious equality for Greek Christians in Albania; (2) rectification 
of frontier; (3) permission for Greeks in Southern Albania to be en- 
rolled in the Albanian gendarmerie as a protective measure. The 
first and last of these were accepted by the powers, the frontier recti- 
fication was refused. (Collective note of April 24, Ibid., vol. 37, p. 
558.) On April 27, Greece finally evacuated Albanian Epirus and 
the question was closed. 

See also the article. The Albanian Question in the Balkan Crisis 
of 1913. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

Marriott, J. A. R. The Eastern Question. (Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1917.) The best brief account of the situation. 



437 

Lamouche, L. La naissance cle l'etat Albanais. Revue politique 
et parlementaire, vol. 80, pp. 220-239. May, 1914. 

The course of events can be readily followed through 1913 and 
early 1914 in the reviews of foreign policy (a) Foreign Affairs 
by E. T. Dillon in the Contemporary Review, (b) Chronique de la 
Quinzaine by Francois Charmes in the Revue des Deux Mondes. 
Both are exceedingly well-informed, Dillon being especially close to 
the Greek Government. 

148. THE EFFORT TO PREVENT OUTBREAK OF THE 
SECOND BALKAN WAR, 1913. 

1. THE TREATY OF LONDON, MAY 30, 1913. 

The Treaty of London (See article, The Treaty of London, 1913) 
signed on May 30, 1913, settled the frontier line between the Balkan 
States and Turkey, but left conflicting claims between themselves 
unsettled. On June 9 the London Peace Conference met for the last 
time, the attempt to reach an agreement on the points left unsettled 
by the Treaty of London having been abandoned and a protocol 
adopted leaving it to the Balkan States to supplement the treaty by 
direct conventions. 

2. THE DISPUTE BETWEEN GREECE AND BULGARIA. 

Of this there was, however, very little prospect. There was, in the 
first place, the dispute between Greece and Bulgaria respecting their 
respective shares of Macedonia. The Greeks had occupied Salonika, 
which Bulgaria greatly desired, and Bulgaria found herself in pos- 
session of Thrace, which she did not much care for. 

3. DISPUTE BETWEEN SERBIA AND BULGARIA. 

There was a similar dispute between Bulgaria and Serbia, the lat- 
ter being in possession of that section of Macedonia of which Monas- 
tir is the center — a city and section that Bulgaria claimed as her 
portion. Bulgaria insisted that Serbia execute the arrangements 
agreed upon as to the future frontier between the two States in the 
treaty of March 13, 1912 (See article, The Formation of the Balkan 
Alliance of 1912). But Serbia maintained that the creation of an 
independent Albania invalidated the provisions of the treaty. (For 
the Serbian point of view see the speech of Pashitch, the prime min- 
ister, in the Skupshtina on May 28. The Times (London), May 29, 
1913.) 

4. ALLIANCE BETWEEN SERBIA AND GREECE, 1013. 

After their return from London, Premiers Vcnizelos and Pashitch, 
representing Greece and Serbia respectively, made an offensive and 



438 

defensive alliance for 10 years directed against Bulgaria, and mili- 
tary conventions were arranged. (See Appendix I, 108.) 

5. THE CZAR PROPOSES TO ACT AS ARBITRATOR. 

On May 28, Serbia demanded that Bulgaria should renounce her 
rights under the treaty of March 13, 1912. (See article, The Forma- 
tion of the Balkan Alliance of 1912, section 4.) The Czar of All the 
Russias then stepped in as peacemaker, sending, on June 8, an iden- 
tical telegram to the Kings, of Bulgaria and Serbia, offering to act as 
arbitrator in this " fratricidal war," in accordance with the terms of 
their treaty of alliance. * 

Neither of the disputants appears to have desired the arbitrament 
by the Czar, but both agreed to submit to Russian arbitration (The 
Times (London), June 13, 1913), Serbia and Greece proposing that 
each of the three countries involved reduce its army one-fourth, in 
order to facilitate a pacific solution of the controversy. 

6. BULGARIA BEGINS THE SECOND BALKAN WAR. 

But in the meantime a new cabinet had been formed in Bulgaria, 
where the warlike Dr. Daneff replaced the pacific M. Gueshoff 
as premier. On June 15, Bulgaria proposed simultaneous demobiliza- 
tion on condition that the contested districts should be occupied by 
mixed garrisons. Under circumstances which are still somewhat 
obscure, on June 29, Bulgaria began the Second Balkan War by an 
attack on the Serbian and Greek positions. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

The best and most important accounts of these matters are probably 
those to be found in the Report of the International Commission to 
Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars (Washing- 
ton, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1914) , pp. 49-69 ; 
and The Annual Register for 1913 (Longmans, London, 1914), pp. 
347-357. See also Hanotaux, G., La Guerre des Balkans et l'Europe, 
1912-13 (Paris, 1914), chs. 31 and 34; Ford, C. S., The Balkan Wars 
(Press of the Army Service Schools, 1915), Lect. 3; Gueshoff, J. E., 
The Balkan League (London, Murray, 1915), ch. 4; and Schmitt, 
B. E., The Balkan Revolution (Reprint from Western Reserve Uni- 
versity Bulletin, Vol. XVII, No. 3) ; Marriott, J. A. R., The Eastern 
Question (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1917). 

For treaties and documents see Nationalism and War in the Near 
T£ast. By a Diplomatist (George Young) (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
1915), Appendices; and Gueshoff, J. E.. The Balkan League (Lon- 
don. Murray, 1915), Appendix. . 



439 
149. THE TREATY OF BUCHAREST, AUGUST 10, 1913. 

1. NEGOTIATION. 

The Treaty of Bucharest was concluded on August 10, 1913, by the 
delegates of Bulgaria, Roumania, Serbia, Montenegro, and Greece. 
As Bulgaria had been completely isolated in the Second Balkan War, 
and as she was closely invested on her northern boundary by the 
armies of Roumania on her western frontier by the allied armies 
of Greece and Serbia, and in the East by the Turkish Army, she 
was obliged, in her helplessness, to submit to such terms as her vic- 
torious enemies chose to impose upon her. All important arrange- 
ments and concessions involving the rectification of the controverted 
international boundary lines were perfected in a series of committee 
meetings, incorporated in separate protocols, and formally ratified 
by subsequent action of the general assembly of delegates. 

2. TEliJIS. 

By the terms of the treaty (See Appendix I, 109), Bulgaria ceded 
to Roumania all that portion of the Dobrudja lying north of a line 
extending from the Danube just above Turtukaia to the western 
shore of the Black Sea, south of Ekrene. This important territorial 
concession has an approximate area of 2,687 square miles, a popula- 
tion of 286,000, and includes the fortress of Silistria and the citieb 
of Turtukaia on the Danube and Baltchik on the Black Sea. In ad- 
dition, Bulgaria agreed to dismantle all existing fortresses and 
bound herself not to construct forts at Rustchuk or at Schumla or 
in any of the territory between these two cities, or within a radius 
of 20 kilometers around Baltchick. 

3. Serbia's gain in territory. 

The eastern frontier of Serbia was drawn from the summit of 
Patarika, on the old frontier, and followed the watershed between 
the Vardar and the Struma Rivers to the Greek-Bulgarian boundary, 
except that the upper valley of the Strumnitza remained in the 
possession of Bulgaria. The territory thus obtained embraced cen- 
tral Macedonia, including Ochrida, Monastir, Kossovo, Istib, and 
Kotchana, and the eastern half of the sanjak of Novi-Bazar. By 
this arrangement Serbia increased her territory from 18,650 to 33,891 
square miles and her population by more than 1,500,000. 

4. Greece's gain in territory. 

The boundary line separating Greece from Bulgaria was drawn 
from the crest of Mount Belashitcha to the mouth of the Mesta River, 



440 

on the zEgean Sea. This important territorial concession, which 
Bulgaria resolutely contested, in compliance with the instructions 
embraced in the notes which Russia and Austria-Hungary presented 
to the conference, increased the area of Greece from 25,014 to 41,933 
square miles and her population from 2,660,000 to 4,363,000. The 
territory thus annexed included Epirus, southern Macedonia, Salon- 
iki, Kavala, and the iEgean littoral as far east as the Mesta River, 
and restricted the iEgean seaboard of Bulgaria to an inconsiderable 
extent of 70 miles, extending from the Mesta to the Maritza, and giv- 
ing access to the JEge&n at the inferior port of Dedeagatch. Greece 
also extended her northwestern frontier to include the great fortress 
of Janina. In addition, Crete was definitely asigned Ito Greece and 
was formally taken over on December 14, 1913. 

5. Bulgaria's gain in territory. 

Bulgaria's share of the spoils, although greatly reduced, was not 
entirely negligible. Her net gains in territory, which embraced a 
portion of Macedonia, including the town of Strumnitza, western 
Thrace, and 70 miles of the TEgean littoral, were about 9.663 square 
miles, and her population was increased by 129,490 (Carnegie Re- 
port, p. 418). 

6. APPRAISEMENT OF THE TREATY. 

By the terms of the Treaty of Bucharest, Roumania profited most in 
proportion to her sacrifices. The unredeemed Roumanians live mostly 
in Transylvania, the Bukovina, and Bessarabia, and therefore the 
Balkan wars afforded her no adequate opportunity to perfect the rec- 
tification of her boundaries on ethnographic lines. 

The humilitating terms imposed on Bulgaria were due to her own 
impatience and intemperate folly. The territory she secured was 
relatively circumscribed; she had failed to emancipate Macedonia, 
which was her avowed purpose in entering the war ; she lost the dis- 
tricts of Ochrida and Monastir, which she especially coveted ; she was 
assigned only a small line on the Aegean, with the wretched port of 
Dedeagatch; and she was obliged to forfeit her ambition as the 
leader of the Balkan hegemony. 

Greece, though gaining much, was greatly dissatisfied. The ac- 
quisition of Saloniki was a triumph; she was assigned the port of 
Kavala and the territory eastward at the insistence of the King and 
the army and contrary to the advice of Venizelos; in the northwest 
Greece encountered the opposition of Italy by urging her claims to 
southern Albania; in the assignment of the Aegean Islands she was 
profoundly dissatisfied; and she still claims 3.000,000 unredeemed 
conationals. 



441 

The fundamental defects of the .Treaty of Bucharest were that (1) 
the boundaries which it drew bore little relation to the nationality 
of the inhabitants of the districts affected, and that (2) the punish- 
ment meted out to Bulgaria, while perhaps deserved in the light of 
her great offense in bringing on the Second Balkan War, was so 
severe that she could not accept the treaty as a permanent settle- 
ment. While Serbia, Greece, and Roumania can not escape a large 
share of the blame for the character of the treaty, it should not be 
forgotten that their action at Bucharest was in large measure due 
to the settlement forced upon the Balkan States by the great powers 
at the London conferences. (See articles on the Treaty of London, 
1913, and the Albanian question in the Balkan crisis of 1913.) 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 
BOOKS. 

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.. Report of the 
International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct 
of the Balkan Wars (Washington, Carnegie Endowment, 1914). 

Gibbons, H. A. The New Map of Europe. (New York, Century 
Co., 1914.) 

Marriott, J. A. R. The Eastern Question. (Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1917.) 

Hayes, C. J. H. A Political and Social History of Modern Europe. 
(New York, Macmillan, 1917.) 2 vols. 

MAGAZINE ARTICLES. 

Duggan, S. P. European Diplomacy and the Balkan Problem. 
Political Science Quarterly, March, 1913. Vol. 28, pp. 95-122. 

Duggan, S. P. The Balkan Adjustment. Political Science Quar- 
terly, December, 1913. Vol. 28, pp. 627-645. 

Joerg, W. L. G. The New Boundaries of the Balkan States and 
Their Significance. Bulletin of the American Geographical Society. 
Vol. 45, 1913. Map. 

SOURCES. 

Text of the treaty in the American Journal of International Law, 
VIII, Supplement, pp. 13-27. 

150. THE GRECO-SERBIAN ALLIANCE, 1913. 

I. CIRCUMSTANCES. 

Even before the signing of the Treaty of London (See article, The 
Treaty of London) on May 30, 1913, during the interval between the 
First and Second Balkan Wars (See article, The Effort to Prevent 
the Outbreak of the Second Balkan War), Bulgaria showed signs of 
renewing the struggle. 



442 

As early as May of that year the Bulgarians had attacked Greek 
■outposts, and it was in anticipation of more serious attacks that the 
Serbo-Greek alliance was formed, June 1, 1913. 

2. TERMS. 

By the terms of the treaty of alliance (See Appendix I, 108) the 
two states agreed upon a mutual guarantee of territory, promised not 
to come to any separate understanding with Bulgaria in regard to the 
division of the former Turkish territory in Europe, drew a common 
boundary line for the two states, defined a Serbo-Bulgarian boundary 
line which was to be claimed, and bound themselves ""to afford assist- 
ance with all their armed forces," if Bulgaria "should attempt to 
impose her claims by force." The alliance was to last for at least ten 
years. The treaty included a stipulation that it "be kept strictly 
secret." 

By this treaty Serbia secured, as she hoped, the possession of 
Monastir and the surrounding districts, and Greece secured Saloniki 
and Ka valla. The treaty was, of course, one of reciprocal obligation. 
If Bulgaria threatened Greece, Greece was entitled to call upon 
Serbia for aid. Should Serbia be attacked by Bulgaria, Greece was 
bound to go to the aid of Serbia. 

The latter contingency actually arose in the autumn of 1915. 
Serbia was attacked in the rear by Bulgaria during the Austrian 
invasion at that time. Premier Venizelos who, almost since the 
beginning of the Great War, had favored the participation of 
Greece on the side of the allies, strongly advocated the fulfillment 
of the obligations which Greece had contracted toward Serbia, and 
this both on grounds of law and policy. 

King Constantino and his adherents took a different view. They 
maintained that the obligations which Greece had incurred toward 
Serbia only applied to the case where Bulgaria, acting independently, 
attacked Serbia and did not apply to the situation created by a gen- 
eral European war. The view of the matter taken by the King 
and his friends prevailed, Venizelos was dismissed from power and 
office in the most unconstitutional fashion (i. e., after his triumphant 
vindication at the polls), and Serbia was left to her fate. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

The most important documents were published by the Greek Gov- 
ernment after the overthrow of King Constantine. They have been 
reprinted in American Journal of International Law, vol. 12. Sup- 
plement, pp. 86-108 (April, 1918). 

On the Greco-Serbian alliance, see Venizelos, Greece in Her True 
Light, trans, by Xanthaky & Sakellarios (N. Y., 1916). passim; 



443 

Passaris, M., L'Entente et la Grece (Geneve, 1917) by a Greek parti- 
san of King Constantine; Headlam, J. W., Belgium and Greece 
(London, Hodder, 1917) ; and Annual Register for 1915, pp. 254 ff. 

151. THE TREATY OF CONSTANTINOPLE, 1913. 

1. INTRODUCTION. 

During the Second Balkan War Turkey took advantage of the 
helpless plight of Bulgaria to recover Adrianople. The powers 
thereupon " most categorically " demanded the evacuation of Adrian- 
ople in accordance with the terms of the Treaty of London, but 
failed to enforce their demand. 

Bulgaria having made terms with her other enemies — Greece, 
Serbia, and Roumania — by means of the Treaty of Bucharest (See 
article, The Treaty of Bucharest), decided to negotiate directly with 
the Porte. 

2. TERMS OF THE TREATY. 

Negotiations began on September 3, 1913, and the treaty was 
signed on September 29. The Enos-Midia line was preserved, but 
was made to curve northward from the Black Sea and westward 
across the Maritza in such a way that Turkey obtained not only 
Adrianople, but also Kirk Kilisse and Demotica. The Bulgarians 
were not even left masters of the one railway leading to Dedeagatch, 
their sole port on the Aegean Sea. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

For brief accounts see Schmitt, B. E., The Balkan Revolution 
(Reprint from Western Reserve University Bulletin, Vol. XVII, 
No. 3), pp. 48-50; and Annual Register for 1913, p. 355. 

For text of the treaty, see American Journal of International Law, 
VIII, Supplement, pp. 27-45. 

152. THE PROJECTED AUSTRIAN INTERVENTION IN 

SERBIA IN 1913. 

The ex-premier of Italy, Signor Giolitti, in a speech delivered in 
the Chamber of Deputies on December 5, 1914, revealed the fact that 
in 1913 Austria-Hungary had planned to attack Serbia. He said that 
on August 9, 1913, he had received the following telegram from the 
Marquis di San Giuliano : 

Austria has communicated to us and to Germany her intention of taking 
action against Serbia, and defines such action as defensive, hoping to bring into 
operation the casus foederis of the Triple Alliance. 



444 



He replied : 



If Austria intervenes against Serbia, it is clear that a casus foederis can not 
be established. It is a step which she is taking on her own account, since there 
is no question of defense, inasmuch as no one is thinking of attacking her. 

The fact that the Treaty of Bucharest was signed on the day fol- 
lowing- Giolitti's receipt of the telegram reveals Austria's motive as 
a desire to prevent Serbia from profiting by the conclusion of a 
highly advantageous treaty. 

The telegram indicates that the assassination of the Archduke 
was the occasion rather than the cause of Austria's ultimatum, to 
Serbia: and it reveals the reason for Austria's action yi July, 1914. 
in omitting to notify Italy in advance of her demands upon Serbia. 

The authenticity of the telegram is established by the fact that 
the Austrian Government has not denied it. Its contents are brought 
into relief by the statements of M. Pichon, ex-minister of foreign 
affairs of France. The Paris correspondent of II Giornale d'ltalia 
reported (December 29, 1914) a conversation which he had with M". 
Pichon on the subject of Giolitti's disclosure. M. Pichon said that 
in June, 1913, when he was minister of foreign affairs, at the time of 
the affair of Scutari, the Italian Government had informed him that 
Austria had notified it of her intentions with regard to Serbia, and 
that the Italian Government had replied that the casus foederis was 
not applicable. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

The text of Signor Giolitti's speech is in the appendix to the 
Serbian Blue Book. Comment by M. Pichon in Giornale d'ltalia, 
December 29, 1914. R. Fester, Giolitti's Enthullung, in Deutschland 
der Grossere (ed. by P. Rohrbach, Kiepenheuer, Weimar), 1915, 
p. 151. 

153. NAVAL AND MILITARY CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN 
ENGLAND AND FRANCE, 1905-1912. 

1. INTRODUCTION. 

In 1904 the Entente Cordiale was developed by the two countries. 
It was not an alliance, but the parallel policies pursued by the two 
States and the fact that each had reason to fear the hostility of Ger- 
many brought them to plan joint military and naval action in case of 
specified contingencies. 

2. MAY AND JUNE, 1905. 

That some such arrangements had been already made as early as 
May or June, 1905. seems probable from the somewhat guarded lan- 
guage used by Delcasse in an interview in the " Gaulois." (July 12, 



445 

1905, quoted Morel, Ten Years of Secret Diplomacy, p. 94.) In Oc- 
tober, 1905, M. Lausanne in the " Matin " (Morel, p. 94) declared that 
in the final session of the cabinet before his resignation, Delcasse had 
asserted (See article, that title) that England was willing to mobilize 
her fleet, seize the Kiel Canal, and land 100,000 men in Schleswig-Hol- 
stein. Jaures declared that a member of the cabinet told him the 
same, soon after the meeting (Morel, p. 95). The "Matin" state- 
ment received a carefully worded denial in England, and was prob- 
ably incorrect as to details. 

3. IN 1906. 

In the latter part of the Morocco crisis of 1905-1906 France ap- 
proached Sir Edward Grey with the request that he authorize naval 
and military conversations between England and France (Grey's 
speech, August 3, 1914.) Grey consulted a portion of the cabinet, 
iater all of the cabinet, and it was agreed that the conversations 
should take place, provided that they did not bind either Govern- 
ment to specific action. These conversations occurred " from time to 
time " up to 1912. (Grey to Cambon, November 22, 1912.) 

4. IN 1912. 

November 22, 1912, Grey, after gaining the acceptance of the cab- 
inet (speech of August 4, 1914), put in writing, in a letter to Cam- 
bon, the hitherto verbal arrangement as to these conversations. If 
either nation had grave reason to fear an unprovoked attack the two 
governments were to consult together as to cooperative measures to be 
taken. About the same time, almost certainly through agreement, 
the British Navy was, as far as possible, concentrated in the North 
Sea and that of France in the Mediterranean. It was this arrange- 
ment, which left the northern coast of France defenceless, and 
brought Grey to state to the German Ambassador that England 
would defend these coasts if they were attacked by Germany. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

Parliamentary Debates, August 3, 1914. 

Collected Diplomatic Documents relating to the outbreak of the 
European War. (London, Stationery Office, 1914.) 

Schmitt, B. E. England and Germany. (Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 1916.) Gives the essential facts. 

Morel, E. D. Ten Years of Secret Diplomacy. (London, National 
Labor Press, 1915.) Bitterly hostile to policy of Sir Edward Grey, 
must be used with caution. 

Nielson, F. How Diplomats Make War. (New York, Heubsch 
(2nd edition), 1916.) Disconnected account, but with some addi- 
tional data. Also bitterly hostile to Grey. 



446 

154. MILITARY CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN ENGLAND 
AND BELGIUM, 1906-1912. 

1. INTRODUCTION. 

During the decade preceding the outbreak of the World War 
Germany was engaged in the construction of a number of railroads 
leading to the Belgian frontier. As there did not appear to be any 
considerable economic need for these roads their construction ex- 
cited alarm. There was widespread belief in Belgium, France, and 
England that the real purpose of the roads was to facilitate an in- 
vasion of France across Belgian territory. The English military 
authorities, alarmed at the situation and fearing lest Belgium should 
be overrun by German troops before England and France could 
come to the aid of the Belgians, began the consideration of plans by 
which English assistance could best be given if there should be need. 

2. NEGOTIATIONS OF 190H. 

In order to secure effective cooperation in the working out of a de- 
fensive scheme, Lieut. Col. (later General) Barnardiston, the military 
attache of the British Embassy at Brussels, opened negotiations with 
Gen. Ducarne, the Belgian Chief of Staff. These negotiations were 
confined to the formulation of a plan by which a British expedition- 
ary force should cooperate with the Belgian Army in case of the vio- 
lation of Belgian neutrality by Germany. The negotiators agreed 
that British troops should enter Belgium only after Belgian neutral- 
ity had been violated by Germany. No convention or agreement of 
any kind was drawn up. The negotiations did not bind either party 
to any given course of action. Later in 1906 further conversations 
took place between Ducarne and Gen. Grierson, the British Chief of 
Staff during the French review at Compiegne. 

3. NEGOTIATIONS OF 1912. 

In 1912 further progress of the German plans for strategic rail- 
ways brought about a second series of conversations between Lieut. 
Col. Bridges, British military attache at Brussels, and Gen. Jung- 
bluth, then Belgian Chief of Staff. In these conversations Col. 
Bridges argued that British troops ought to be landed even before 
the actual invasion of Belgian territory by German troops began, on 
the ground that Belgium alone could not defend herself against 
Germany and that British aid would arrive too late if England 
should wait for a Belgian invitation to assist. Against this view 
Gen. Jungbluth protested and insisted that no troops should be 
landed until asked for by the Belgian Government. This attitude of 
the English attache appears to have caused some nervousness in Bel- 



447 

gium, and on April 7, 1913, Sir Edward Grey, who was probably in- 
formed of the general tenor of these negotiations, wrote to the 
English minister at Brussels a letter to be shown to Belgian Gov- 
ernment. In it he disclaimed any intention on the part of the 
.British Government to violate Belgian neutrality and promised that 
England would not be the first to send troops into Belgium (quoted, 
Scott, II, p. 1032). 

4. GERMAN PUBLICATION AND ANGLO-BELGIAN RErLIES. 

After the German occupation of Belgium the reports of these con- 
versations were found in Brussels and published, November 24, 1914 
(a summary was given Oct. 13, 1914), by the Norddeutsche Allge- 
meine Zeitung. An attempt was made b} r the Germans to show 
that the reports proved that Belgium had forfeited its neutrality 
prior to 1914. 

The British and Belgian Governments in reply pointed out (1) 
that all the military plans discussed during the course of the conver- 
sations in both 1906 and 1912 were for the contingency of a war in 
which Germany in attacking France would violate the neutrality of 
Belgium; (2) that no convention had been arranged, as the Germans 
alleged; (3) that in view of German threats against Belgian neutral- 
ity, especially in the matter of the German railroads leading to the 
Belgian frontier, England and Belgium had a right to enter into nego- 
tiations for appropriate action to meet the threatened danger. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

The most important documents have been indicated above. The 
Brussels documents published by the German government have been 
reprinted by Scott, J. B., Diplomatic Documents relating to the 
outbreak of the European War, II, 837-860, and the Belgian docu- 
ments published in reply, I, 492-511. 

155. THE ATTEMPTED ANGLO-GERMAN NAVAL AGREE- 
MENT, 1907-1914. 

1. OPENING OF DISCUSSION. 

During the decade which preceded the outbreak of the World War 
there was much discussion in regard to projects for an Anglo-German 
agreement to limit naval armament. Consideration by statesmen 
charged with official responsibility for naval policy started with an 
article by Sir Henry Campbell-Bannermann, the English prime 
minister, in the first number of The Nation (London, March 2, 1907), 
inviting Germany to discuss the whole problem. Von Bulow re- 
fused to consider it. (Reichstag speech, April 30, 1907.) 



448 



2. SECOND HAGUE CONFERENCE. 



The British Government endeavored to have the matter taken up 
•it the Second Hague Conference, but Germany refused to attend if 
this question was raised. (Cook, How Britain Strove for Peace, 
p. 11.) At the conference a British delegate read a declaration that 
England was ready to exchange naval estimates with any power 
with a view to mutual reduction. (2nd Conference de la Paix, Actes 
et Documents, I, pp. 94-95.) 



3. NEGOTIATIONS, 190S. 



In the summer of 1908 the British Government again endeavored 
to come to an understanding with Germany. Edward VII explained 
to the German Emperor at Cronberg during his visit to Germany 
that naval rivalry aroused suspicions and embittered relations, then 
friendty and natural between the two countries. William II de- 
clared he would rather go to war than discuss this question, and the 
foreign office was equally decisive in refusal. (Cook, Ibid., pp. 
13-14.) England tried to get the Austrian Emperor to use his influ- 
ence, but with no result. (Hardin, Monarchs and Men, p. 33.) 
Edward VII is believed to have returned to the charge in his visit 
to Berlin in February, 1909. (Schmitt, p. 184.) 

4. PROPOSAL TO RETARD CONSTRUCTION, 1909. 

Both sides then began building warships at great speed until Ger- 
many reopened the conversations with a speech by Von Tirpitz in 
the Reichstag. (Eeichstag speech, March 17, 1909.) England paid 
no attention to this, but in the summer of 1909 the new German 
Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, endeavored to secure British neu- 
trality in case of a continental war, promising in return to " retard " 
her construction without abandoning the program mapped out up 
to 1918. (Cook, Ibid., p. 20.) This offer was refused as inadequate. 

5. FINAL EFFORT AT AGREEMENT, 1910-11. 

After some informal exchange of views, the German chancellor 
proposed (Reichstag speech of Dec. 10, 1910) that England and 
Germany exchange views and form an understanding as to their 
economic and political interests, and in return for this understand- 
ing Germany would agree not to increase the German program. 
The British Government was considering this when the German 
Emperor intervened and declared he would not consent to any pro- 
gram binding Germany not to enlarge her naval program. (Cook, 
Ibid., p. 25.) On March 30, 1911, the German chancellor in the 
Reichstag declared (Reichstag speech of that date) that any attempt 



449 

to limit naval armaments was impracticable. In late 1911, just 
before the Haldane mission (See article, The Halclane Mission, 1912), 
Sir Edward Grey indicated acceptance of a proposal that both sides 
should exchange views on naval matters. This was left unanswered. 
(Cook, Ibid., p. 25.) From that time on conversations ceased, ex- 
cept as the matter was discussed in connection with the Haldane 
Mission to Berlin. (See article, that title.) 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

Sir Edward Cook. How Britain Strove for Peace. (London, 
Macmillan, 1914.) Based on " authoritive sources," evidently the 
British foreign office. Leaves little to be added. 

B. E. Schmitt. England and Germany. (Princeton University, 
1916.) Probably the best account of Anglo-German relations. In 
this phase based mainly on Cook and speeches in Reichstag and 
Commons. Clear and adequate. 

E. von Reventlow. Deutschlands auswartige Politik. 2d edition. 
(Berlin, Mittler, 1915.) More general, but presents the German view. 

The diplomatic corespondence is summarized in Sir Edward Cook, 
How Britain Strove for Peace. The facts given have never been 
denied by Germany except in one detail. The article of Sir Henry 
Campbell-Bannermann which opened the proposal is in The Nation 
(London) for March 2, 1907. Bethmann-Hollweg's proposition of 
1910 is to be found in the Reichstag debates under date of December 
10, 1910. His refusal to consider further propositions is to be found 
in Reichstag debates under date of March 30, 1911. 

156. THE PROJECTED ANGLO-GERMAN ACCORD, 1914. 

1. IMPROVED ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS, 1913-14. 

After the Morocco crisis of 1911 (See article, that title), the rela- 
tions between England and Germany were somewhat improved by 
the cooperation of the two Governments during the Balkan wars 
of 1912-13 and their success in localizing those conflicts. A large 
section of English public opinion, including many influential Radi- 
cals, insistently urged such a policy and the English Government 
was manifestly anxious to bring about more amicable relations 
with Germany. Consequently there was some lessening of distrust 
on the part of both nations, and an Anglo-German rapprochement 
seemed possible, at least in respect to certain differences. 

Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg repeatedly stated that "ever 
since he had been chancellor the object of his policy had been to 
bring about an understanding with England," and Prince Lichnow- 
sky, the German ambassador to London, was sincerely desirous 
of bringing about an understanding between the two countries. 
53706—18 29 



450 

2. NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ENGLAND, GERMANY, AND TURKEY, 1914. 

Negotiations between England and Germany seem to have been 
initiated early in 1913. By June 29, 1914, the day after the assassina- 
tion of the Archduke Ferdinand, various agreements relating to the 
Portuguese colonies in Africa, the Bagdad Railway, and other mat- 
ters had been made on the part of England and Germany, in some 
of which Turkey also was included. Some of the agreements with 
Turkey had been signed, but those with Germany, though ready for 
signature, had not been signed, pending the completion of certain 
negotiations between Germany and Turkey. Differences of opinion 
over the question of publication seems also lo have been a cause for 
delay. The British Government desired publicity, tfut the German 
Government objected to the publication of the projected agreement 
as to the Portuguese colonies in Africa. (Lichnowsky Memorandum, 
pp. 287-291.) 

3. THE ANGLO-GERMAN-TURKISH AGREEMENTS OF 1914. 

These agreements have never been published, but their general 
scope and purport is well known, from the revelations made by Sir 
Edward Grey to the House of Commons on June 29, 1914, and 
from the Lichnowsky Memorandum. It appears that Great 
Britain withdrew her claim to participate in the construction 
of the Bagdad-Bussora section of the Bagdad Railway in re- 
turn for the assurance that the section beyond Bussora or to the 
Persian Gulf would not be built without British consent. Great 
Britain thus obtained the assurance that the Bagdad Railway would 
not go beyond Bussora. British traffic was to enjoy equal rights and 
equal rates on the whole Bagdad line, as a guaranty of which two 
Englishmen were to be admitted to the board of directors. 

The navigation of the Tigris was recognized as a distinct British 
interest. Great Britain admitted the suzerainty of Turkey over the 
Sheikh of Koweit, on condition that his autonomy be not interfered 
with, and that the status quo, or predominance of British interests in 
the Persian Gulf, be recognized. In return for these concessions the 
British Government agreed to the increase of the Turkish customs to 
15 per cent. 

The projected treaty in regard to the Portuguese colonies in Africa 
is described by Lichnowsky as a highly advantageous arrangement 
for Germany (Memorandum, pp. 281-287). It was to have been a 
revision of the secret Anglo-Germany treaty of 1898 (See article, 
The Question of the Portuguese Colonies). 

4. CONCLUSION. 

Though the projected accord of 1914 related exclusively to colonial 
matters, it is clear that on the part of Sir Edward Grey it was in- 



451 

tended to have a wider significance. It was manifestly intended to 
further the realization of a hope which he had expressed to Count 
Metternich in 1912 at the moment when it had become apparent that 
the accord with Germany then sought by the British Government 
could not be secured. (See article, The Haldane Mission to Berlin, 
1912.) Count Metternich in a dispatch to the German Government on 
March 27, 1912, reported that in conversation with him Grey had 
" emphatically declared that he did not intend or wish to drop the 
negotiations, but, on the contrary, he hoped that the intimate rela- 
tions, for which a wa}^ had been paved, would be further extended, 
and that an agreement on colonial territorial questions would be fur- 
ther striven for, and that after some time had elapsed negotiation- 
for a political agreement similar to that which Great Britain had 
proposed would be resumed. After a lull had set in regarding the 
present naval questions a political agreement which proved the good 
will of both Governments, together with an agreement on colonial 
questions, would not fail to have a favorable effect on public opinion 
in both countries, and, he hoped, would also exert an indirect influ- 
ence on the armament question." (North German Gazette, Sept. 7 
or 8, 1915. Reprinted by the London Times, Sept. 9, 1915.) 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

For Sir Edward Grey's account of the Anglo-German-Turkish 
Agreements of 1914, in the House of Commons, British Parlia- 
mentary Debates, Commons, fifth series, vol. 64, pp. 114—117. 
For the account of Lichnowsky, see the Smith and Munro edition 
of The Lichnowsky Memorandum in No. 127 of International Con- 
ciliation, pp. 279-295. See also the comment of the editors, pp. 
234-236. 

For a good brief secondary account, see Schmitt, England and 
Germany (Princeton, University Press, 1916), pp. 368-373. 

157. THE LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE OF 1909. 

1. CALLING OF THE CONFERENCE. 

The Second Hague Peace Conference (See article, that title) had 
agreed upon a project for the organization, with appropriate sphere 
of jurisdiction, of an international prize court, but failed to draw 
up a code of international maritime laws to govern its decisions. 
There was a general feeling that this state of affairs should be 
remedied. 

The British Government took the initiative, and on February 27, 
1908, sent a circular note to the other leading maritime powers pro- 
posing a naval conference to consider questions of contraband, block- 
ade, continuous voyage, destruction of neutral prizes, unneutral serv- 



452 

ice, enemy character, conversion of merchantmen on the high seas, 
transfer to a neutral flag, and the question of domicile or nationality 
as determining enemy ownership of property. 

The invitation was accepted, and the conference which met at Lon- 
don on December 4, 1908, was attended by delegates from the follow- 
ing 10 naval powers : Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, 
Russia, Japan, Austria, Hungary, Netherlands, and the United 
States. 

2. THE DECLARATION. 

The results of the deliberations of the conference, which continued 
into February, 1909, was a declaration consisting ofi 9 chapters, 70 
articles, and an official report to serve as an official commentary upon 
the various articles of the declaration. The most important features 
of the declaration were as follows (figures in parentheses refer to 
articles) : 

PRELIMINARY PROVISION. 

"The Signatory Powers are agreed that the rules contained in 
the following chapters correspond in substance with the generally 
recognized principles of international law." 

Chapter I — Blockade, 
definition. 

A blockade must really prevent access to the enemy coast line in 

order to be effective (2), but its effectiveness is a question of fact (3), 

and a blockade is not regarded as raised if the force is withdrawn 

by stress of weather (4). A blockade must be applied to ships of all 

nations, although the commander of the blockading force may give 

permission to a war ship to enter and leave a blockaded port (6), and 
in circumstances of distress to a neutral vessel provided she neither 

discharges or ships cargo (7). 

These provisions are but the rules worked out by the courts in 
the application of the Declaration of Paris, 1856. 

DECLARATION AND NOTIFICATION. 

To be binding a blockade must be declared by the blockading 
power or its naval authorities (8) and notified to the neutral powers 
by the blockading power and to the local authorities by the com- 
mander of the blockading force (11). The declaration must indi- 
cate (a) the date on which it begins, (6) the geographical limits, 
(c) the period in which neutral vessels may depart (9). This notifi- 
cation is presumed to give knowledge to all vessels leaving a neutral 
port subsequent to the notification (15). 

These rules for declaration and notification follow the American 
and English practice rather than the French, Italian, Spanish and 



453 

Swedish, "which require notification to each individual vessel as it 
approaches the coast line, and the entry of such warning on the 
ship's papers. 

LIMITATIONS. 

A blockade must not extend beyond the ports or coast line belong- 
ing to, or occupied by, the enemy (1). The blockading force must 
not bar access to neutral ports or coast line (18). Neutral vessels 
may not be captured for violation of blockade, except within the 
area of operations of the warships detailed to render the blockade 
effective (17). 

PENALTY FOR BREACH OF BLOCKADE. 

The penalty for the violation of a blockade is capture and con- 
demnation — this liabilit} 7 continues as long as the pursuit continues 
(20). The cargo is also condemned, unless it be proved that at the 
time of the shipment of the goods the shipper neither knew nor 
could have known of the intention to break the blockade (21). 
The liability for attempted breach thus depends upon' knowledge, 
actual or presumptive (14, see Notification). If a vessel has not 
actual presumptive knowledge she is notified and the warning 
entered upon her papers (16). If through the negligence of 
the officer commanding the force no declaration of blockade has been 
notified to the local authorities, or no period has been mentioned 
within which vessels may come out, neutral vessels may come out and 
pass free (16). Whatever may be the ultimate destination of a vessel 
or her cargo she can not be captured for breach of blockade if at the 
moment she is on her way to a nonblockaded port (ID). 

Chapter II — Contraband, 
definition. 

The Declaration of London divided commodities into four classes: 
(a) Absolute contraband, which included articles generally used 
solely in war (22 contains the list) ; (b) conditional contraband, 
which included articles susceptible of use in war as well as peace 
(24 contains list) ; (c) articles which were not susceptible of use in 
war and which may not be declared contraband (28 and 29 contain 
the list) ; (d) articles susceptible of use in war which were to be pro- 
visionally excluded but might be added to the conditional contraband 
list by means of a declaration to that effect (25). 

PENALTIES. 

Absolute contraband is liable to capture if it be shown to be des- 
tined for the territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy or for 
the armed forces of the enemy. " It is immaterial whether the 



454 

carriage of the goods is direct or entails transshipment or a subse- 
quent transportation by land" (30). This is but a statement of the 
doctrine of Great Britain and the United States regarding contin- 
uous voyages. 

Proof of the destination is furnished by the ship's papers unless 
she is clearly out of her course (32) and is complete when (a) the 
goods are documented for discharge in an enemy port or for delivery 
to the armed forces of the enemy, (b) when the vessel is to call at 
enemy ports only or is to touch at any enemy port or meet the armed 
forces of the enemy before reaching a neutral port for which the 
goods are documented (31). „ 

Conditional contraband is liable to capture if it is shown to be des- 
tined fur the use of armed forces, or a government* or department 
of (he enemj Slate, unless in (his Latter case the circumstances show- 
that the goods can not in fact be used for the purposes of war in 
progress (33). Enemy destination is presumed it' goods are con- 
signed to enemy authorities or a contractor in enemy country who 
supplies articles of this kind, a fortified place, or base of the enemy. 
Such presumption does not arise if it is sought to condemn a mer- 
chant vessel herself when so destined. If these presumptions do not 
arise I lie destination is supposed to be innocent (34). 

Conditional contraband is not liable to capture except when the 
vessel is bound tor the territory belonging to or occupied by the 
enemy, or for the armed forces, and when it is not discharged in an 
intervening port. The ship's papers are the proof unless the vessel 
is found clearly out of the course indicated by her papers (35). 
Xol withstanding the foregoing, conditional contraband, if shown to 
have the destination referred to in 33, is liable to capture in cases 
v here the enemy country has no seaboard (36). 

Thus the doctrine of continuous voyage which is allowed in the 
case of absolute contraband is rejected for conditional contraband 
except where the country has no seaboard. This was contrary to the 
desire of England, who believed that the destination of the goods, not 
the vessel, should determine the character of the goods. 

Contraband goods are liable to condemnation (39). Goods lie- 
longing to the owner of the contraband and on the same vessel are 
also liable to condemnation (42). 

Vessels carrying contraband, absolute or conditional, may be cap- 
tured anywhere at any time throughout their voyages, but may not 
be captured if the carriage of the contraband is completed (37, 38). 
Vessels carrying contraband may be condemned if the contraband 
reckoned either by value, weight, volume, or freight forms more 
than one-half the cargo (40). If the vessel is released she may be 
compelled to pay cost and expenses (-11). Contraband articles on 
board a vessel encountered on the high seas, but unaware of the out- 



455 

break of hostilities or of the declaration of contraband or without 
opportunity to discharge the contraband, can not be condemned 
except on payment, nor is the vessel condemned. Vessels are deemed 
to be aware of a state of war or of the declaration of contraband if 
they have left a neutral port subsequent to notification of contra- 
band or an enemy port after the outbreak of hostilities (-43). A 
vessel not liable to condemnation on account of the proportion of 
contraband on board may, when circumstances permit, be allowed to 
turn over the contraband and proceed. This contraband the captor 
may destroy (44). 

Chapter III. — Unneutral Service. 

The Declaration of London makes a distinction between unneu- 
tral services which are similar to the carriage of contraband and un- 
neutral services which vest the neutral with enemy character. (Op- 
penheim, II, 524.) 

(a) Unneutral services analogous to the carriage of contraband 
render the vessel liable for condemnation, and consist in (1) special 
voyages with the view of transporting individual passengers who are 
embodied in the armed forces of the enemy or with a view to the 
transmission of intelligence in the interest of the enemy. (2) Knowl- 
edge of either owner, charterer, or the master that the vessel is trans- 
porting a military detachment of the enemy or one or more persons 
who, in the course of the voyage directly assist the operations of 
the enemy (45). 

( b ) Unneutral service vesting the ship with enemy character con- 
sists in (a) taking a direct part in the hostilities, (b) being under 
the control of an agent of the enemy government on board the ship, 
(<?) being in the exclusive employment of the enemy government, (d) 
being exclusively engaged in transmission of enemy troops or in- 
telligence in the direct interest of the enemy. 

In these cases the vessel will be condemned and in general receive 
the same treatment as an enemy merchantman (46). 

Any individual who is embodied in the armed forces of the enemy 
and who is found on board a neutral merchant vessel may be made a 
prisoner of war, even though there be no ground for the capture of 
the vessel (47). 

Chapter IV. — Destruction of Neutral Prizes. 

The destruction of neutral prizes is generally forbidden by article 
48, but article 49 provides that " as an exception, a neutral vessel 
which has been captured by a belligerent warship, and which would 
be liable to condemnation, may be destroyed if the observance of 
article 48 would involve danger to the safety of the warship or the 
success of the operations in which she is engaged at the time." 



456 

The Declaration provides that before the destruction all persons, 
papers, and documents must be placed in safety (50). A .captor who 
has destroyed a neutral prize must establish that he acted only in 
the face of exceptional necessity ; if he fails to do this he must make 
compensation (51). If the capture is held subsequently to be in- 
valid, although the destruction justifiable, compensation must be 
given (52). If neutral goods not liable to condemnation are de- 
stroyed compensation must be given to the owner. Finally the 
captor has the right to demand the handing over, or may proceed 
himself to the destruction, of any goods liable to condemnation found 
on board, provided the circumstances warranting the destruction are 
present (54). The same obligations rest upon the captor with regard 
to destruction of cargo as in the case of destruction of vessel. 

Chapter V. — Transfer to a Neutral Flag. 

Transfer to a neutral flag is recognized as valid if effected before 
the outbreak of hostilities, unless it is proved that such a transfer 
was made in order to evade the consequences to which an enemy 
vessel would be exposed. 

When the transfer is effected 30 days before the outbreak of war, 
the presumption is that it is valid if it is unconditional, complete, 
and in conformity with the laws of the countries concerned, and if 
its effect is such that neither the control of, nor profits arising from 
the employment of the vessel, remain in the same hands as before the 
transfer. If the transfer has taken place less than 60 days before 
the outbreak of hostilities and the bill of sale is not on board, the cap- 
ture of the vessel gives no right to damages (55). 

Transfer to a neutral flag after the outbreak is void unless it is 
proved that such transfer was -not made in order to evade the con- 
sequences to which an enemy vessel, as such, is exposed. There is, 
however, an absolute presumption that a transfer is void: (a) If the 
transfer has been made during a voyage or in a blockaded port, (5) 
if the right to repurchase or recover the vessel is reserved to the 
vendor, (c) if the requirements of the municipal law governing the 
right to fly the flag under which the vessel is sailing have not been 

fulfilled (56). 

Chapter VI. — Enemy Character. 

The character of a vessel is determined by the flag which it is 
entitled to fly (57). The Declaration did not pronounce upon the 
vexed question of neutral vessels engaged in a trade closed to them 
by belligerents in time of peace. That question was expressly de- 
clared to remain outside of the scope of the rule just stated (57). 
The report which accompanied the Declaration stated that on this 
subject " an understanding could not be reached," and that the " ques- 



457 

tion remains absolutely open." (See Parliamentary Papers, Miscel- 
laneous, No. 5 (1909), p. 370.) 

Further than this the chapter gave few definite principles. It 
merely stated the generally accepted practice that the neutral or 
enemy character of the goods found on an enemy vessel was deter- 
mined by the character of the owner (58). In absence of proof of 
the neutral character of goods on an enemy vessel they are presumed 
to be enemy goods (59). 

Enemy goods retain their character until they reach their desti- 
nation, notwithstanding any transfer except that prior to capture 
a former neutral owner, on the bankruptcy of the existing owner, ex- 
ercises recognized legal rights, in which cases they regain their neu- 
tral character (60). 

Chapteb VII. — Convoy. 

Great Britain had consistently refused to admit that convoyed 
neutral ships were exempt from search, but by article 61 it was 
agreed that neutral vessels under the convoy of their own nation are 
exempt from search. By 61 and 62 investigations of allegations as to 
the presence of contraband are left to the officer commanding the 
convoy. If such an investigation reveals the presence of vessels not 
entitled to convoy they must be given up. 

Chapter VIII. — Resistance of Search. 

Resistance to search has always been punished by condemnation. 
By British and American practice goods on board were also confis- 
cated, but by the continental practice only the vessel was liable to 
confiscation. 

By article 63 a vessel acquires enemy character through forcible 
resistance and is liable to condemnation. The cargo is liable to the 
same treatment as the cargo of an enemy vessel. Goods belonging to 
the master or owner of the vessel are treated as enemy goods. 

Chapter IX. — Compensation. 

If the capture of a vessel or of goods is not upheld by the prize 
court, or if the prize is released without judgment being given, the 
parties interested have the right to compensation, unless there were 
good reasons for capturing the vessel or goods (64). 

3. CONCLUSION. 

The Declaration of London was never ratified. Consequently it 
never acquired the character of an accepted statement of what inter- 
national law is nor of a convention accepted by certain powers and 
governing their conduct. Rather it is a statement of what, before 
the World War began, it was felt international law should be. It 
can in no sense be said to form a part of international law. 



458 



BIBLIOGRAPHY. 



The best accounts of the London conference of 1909 are perhaps 
the following: 

Bentwick, N., The Declaration of London (London, Sweet, 1911) ; 
Lemonon, E., La conference navale de Londres (Paris, 1909) ; Nie- 
meyer, T., Das Seekriegsrecht nach des Londoner Dcklaration 
(Berlin, 1910) : and International Law Topics, The Declaration of 
London (Washington, Govt. Printing Office, 1910). 

See also Stockton, C. H., " The International Naval Conference of 
London," in American Journal of International Law for 1909, Vol. 
Ill, pp. 596-618 ; Reinsch, P. S., " The Declaration c-f London," in 
North American Review for 1909, vol. 190, pp. 479-487; and West- 
lake, J., " The Declaration of London," in The Nineteenth Century 
for 1910, vol. 67, pp. 505-515. 

For destructive criticism, see Bowles, T. ,G., Sea Law and Sea 
Power (London, Murray, 1910). 

For the Proceedings of the Conference and Correspondence Relat- 
ing thereto, see British Parliamentary Papers, Miscellaneous Nos. 
4 and 5 (1909), Miscellaneous No. 4 (1910) and Miscellaneous No. 8 
(1911). Higgins, A. P. The Hague Peace Conference and other 
international conferences (Cambridge, University Press, 1909), pp. 
538-613, gives the final protocol, the Declaration, and the report of 
the conference. 

158. THE ROMAN QUESTION, 1871-1914. 

1. INTRODUCTORY. 

The Italian Government, taking advantage of the defeat and depo- 
sition of Emperor Napoleon III, seized the city of Rome on Septem- 
ber 20, 1870, and after a favorable plebiscite of the inhabitants, in- 
corporated it in the Kingdom of Italy. The position of the Pope 
was defined by the Law of Guarantees enacted by the Italian Parlia- 
ment on Mav 13, 1871. ' (See article, The Roman Question, 1870- 
1871.) 

The earlier nineteenth-century plans for ending the temporal 
sovereignty of the Pope in Italy (e. g. the decree of 1809 uniting the 
Papal States to the French Empire, the Concordat of 1813, 'article 8 
of the constitution of the Roman Republic (1849), Cavour's project 
communicated to Cardinal Santucci in 1861, and the memorandum 
of the Italian Government of Aug. 26, 1870) all contained stipula- 
tions designed to safeguard the spiritual independence of the Pope, 
which were analogous to those of the Law of Guarantees, but in ad- 
dition stipulations that the arrangements in question (1) should re- 
sult from an accord between the secular government and the Pope, 



459 

and (2) should be ratified by the Catholic powers. In 1871 by the 
Law of Guarantees the Italian Government attempted to accord the 
papacy a juridical international position by means of a unilateral 
act; the Pope refused the arrangement. 

2. THE POSITION OF PIUS IX, 1S70-1S7S. 

From 1870 to his death in 1878, Pius IX maintained an attitude 
of protest pure and simple against the Italian Government. (For 
the most important protests see article. The Roman Question, 1870- 
71, sec. 5). He asserted that the temporal power was necessary to 
the freedom of the church, refused to accept the Law of Guarantees, 
and declared himself a " prisoner." He had already by the decreo 
Non expedit (Feb. 29, 1868) forbidden the Italian Catholics to hold 
office or vote for representatives in the Parliament of the Kingdom 
of Italy. 

The powers by their silence apparently acquiesced in the action of 
the Italian Government. But it should be remarked that, in as much 
as their attitude was a negative one, the course they pursued perhaps 
left a way open for them to raise the Roman question subsequently, 
especially if Italy should alter or violate the Law of Guarantees. No 
( atholic sovereign visited King Victor Emmanuel II at Rome after 
1870. Outside of Italy there was much popular feeling, particu- 
larly in France, Spain, and Austria, in favor of the restoration of 
the Pope's temporal sovereignty. All the Catholic powers, and the 
Netherlands and Russia, too, continued as before to maintain diplo- 
matic relations with the Vatican and to recognize the juridical posi- 
tion of the Pope in international affairs. 

3. THE POSITION OF LEO XIII, 1ST 8-1 90 3. 

Leo XIII pursued the general policy marked out by his predeces- 
sor. In the allocution pronounced on March 28, 1878, he affirmed 
that " this Apostolic See, violently stripped of its temporal sove- 
reignty, is reduced to a condition in which it can in no wise enjoy the 
full, free, and unimpeded use of its powers/ He reaffirmed (Dec. 
80, 1886) the Non expedit of Pius IX, forbidding Catholics to vott 
in elections for the Italian Parliament, but permitting them to par- 
ticipate in communal and municipal elections. Again and again he 
stated that there can be no peace with Italy until his territorial in- 
dependence is restored. He persistently refused to recognize Hum- 
bert as King of Italy, and in 1900 he protested against the accession 
of Victor Emmanuel III. Throughout his pontificate he success- 
fully prevented the visit of any Catholic sovereign to Rome. 

In the main the Italian Government honorably observed the Law 
of Guarantees and gave few pretexts to the Catholic powers to inter- 



460 

vene in behalf of the Pope. The most celebrated cases in which con- 
flict developed over the operation of the Law of Guarantees between 
the papacy and the Italian Government were the Martinucci case 
and the case of the property of the Propaganda. In the former the 
Italian courts, by affirming (1882) their competency to try civil cases 
involving employees of the Vatican, denied the papal right of extra- 
territoriality. In the latter, the courts, by decreeing (1884) the con- 
version of the property of the Propaganda into State bonds, sub- 
jected an international agency of the Pope to Italian law. Notes of 
Cardinal Jacobini, papal secretarjr of state, on these matters elicited 
protests to the Italian Government from the Governments of France 
and Austria; and the Spanish Government, in answer to a question 
raised in the Cortes, declared in July, 1881, that it recognized the 
rights of the Pope to temporal sovereignty. 

The protests of Leo XIII, however, were directed less against the 
alleged violations of the letter of the Law of Guarantees by the Ital- 
ian Government than against a succession of anticlerical public 
demonstrations of hostility to the papacy. The most important of 
these demonstrations took place in connection with the translation of 
Pius IX's body in 1881, the Masonic celebration of the six-hundredth 
anniversary of the Sicilian Vespors (1882), the unveiling of the 
statue of Giordano Bruno at Rome in 1889, and the visit of the 
French pilgrims to the Vatican in 1892. On all such occasions the 
Pope renewed his protests. 

4. THE ROMAN QUESTION AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. 

So long as France was governed by the Monarchists, the Pope re- 
lied upon the " eldest daughter of the church " to protect his interests, 
and the Italian Government was correspondingly apprehensive of 
France. What prevented forceful action on the part of France in 
the seventies was not only her weakness resulting from her military 
defeat in 1870-71, but the fact that in that period Austria had an 
anticlerical ministry and Germany was in the midst of a great kul- 
turkampf against the Catholic Church. Even after the Republicans 
had gained the upper hand in France, French foreign policy was 
still much influenced by the traditions of popular loyalty to the Pope; 
by 1881 Austria was again more inclined to clericalism ; and in Ger- 
many Bismarck was seeking to conciliate the Catholics. Without 
allies, Italy was hopelessly outmatched; the Roman question might 
range Germany and Austria as well as France against her. " Italy is 
no friend of ours," said Bismarck when the papal nuncio asked him 
in 1881 if he would oppose the restoration of the temporal power. 
It was the common belief in Italy that France intended sooner or 
later to restore the Pope, or at least to raise the question of the Pope's 



461 

position under the Law of Guarantees. French occupation of Tunis 
in 1881 seemed to confirm the suspicion of the Italians. 

This menacing situation was a potent factor in forcing Italy into 
the Triple Alliance, thereby obliging her to bear a still heavier 
burden of armaments. Crispi, the Germanophile Italian statesman, 
asserted that " what has determined the attitude of Italy and her 
entry into the Triple Alliance, is France's perpetual intention of 
raising the Koman question." At any rate the Triple Alliance effect- 
ually prevented the formation of a league of Catholic powers. 

French policy for some years after the conclusion of the Triple 
Alliance was directed toward obtaining the withdrawal of Italy 
from the Teutonic alliance by means of economic pressure through 
unfavorable tariff arrangements and likewise by continued threats 
of raising the Roman question. In 1887 a conciliatory utterance by 
Leo XIII was promptly followed by an intimation from Paris that 
it was inopportune for the Pope to make peace with Italy. Cardinal 
Rampolla, who became papal secretary of state in that year, was 
quite Francophile, and paid due attention to the French suggestion. 
Thenceforth, until near the end of Leo's pontificate and Rampolla's 
secretariate, the ties between the Vatican and the French Republic 
seemed to be growing closer. 

Nevertheless, despite the opposition of the Pope and of Catholics 
in Germany and Austria as well as in France, the Triple Alliance 
was renewed in 1891 and again in 1902. On the other hand, the Pope 
certainly welcomed the alliance between France and Russia, and his 
appeal to the French Catholics to rally in support of the Republic 
was probably not unconnected with the Roman question. In 1898 
the Vatican was included among the powers which Nicholas II of 
Russia planned to invite to the first peace conference at The Hague ; 
the Italian Government, however, refused to participate in the con- 
gress if the Pope were represented ; and the Czar consequently with- 
drew his invitation to Leo XIII. 

In the last years of the pontificate of Leo XIII the international 
aspects of the Roman question were gradually changed. The Drey- 
fus case, the advent of Delcasse to the French foreign office in 1898, 
and the formation of Waldeck-Rosseau's bloc ministry in 1899 led 
to an alteration in the ecclesiastical policy of the French Republican 
Government. The French law of associations (1901) created serious 
friction between France and the Vatican ; and the rapprochement 
effected by Delcasse in 1902 between France and Italy boded no good 
to the temporal claims. At this juncture Leo XIII died (1903) ; and 
any hope of securing the continued support of France for the Vati- 
can was dispelled in the ensuing conclave when Austria by the exer- 
cise of it's veto compelled the abandonment of the candidacy of 
Cardinal Rampolla, the most Francophile of the cardinals. Out of 



462 

this conclave Cardinal Sarto, patriarch of Venice, finally emerged 
as Pope Pius X. He was not particularly Francophile and was 
rather a pious priest than an adroit statesman. 

Shortly after the accession of Pius X, the President of the French 
Republic, despite the energetic protests of the pope, visited King 
Victor Emmanuel III at Rome (Apr. 24, 1904). It was the first 
time since 1870 that the head of a Catholic power had visited an 
Kalian king in formerly papal territory. In July, 1904, France 
broke off diplomatic relations with the Vatican, and the French sep- 
aration of church and state in 1905 formally removed France from 
the list of "Catholic powers." 

5. ATTITUDE OF PIUS X AND BENEDICT XV. 

Pius X. during his pontificate (1903-1914), made few direct al- 
lusions to the Roman question. Formally he assumed the role of 
"prisoner of the Vatican" and repeated the condemnation of "the 
interference of the Italian Government with the liberty of the 
church and of the Holy See." But informally there were improved 
relations between Italy and the Vatican. In May, 1904, Cardinal 
Svampa met King Victor Emmanuel III at Bologna, with the 
pope's approval. And in the encyclical letter Cerium consilium, ad- 
dressed to the Italian episcopate on June 11, 1905, Pius X so far 
modified the Non eaepedil of Pius IX as to permit Italian Catholics 
in certain cases on the recommendation of the bishops to participate 
in parliamentary elections. In February, 1906, however, he pub- 
licly condemned a book by the bishop of Cremona which urged 
acceptance of the Law of Guarantees. In an allocution pro- 
nounced in 1913 on the occasion of the sixteenth centennary of Con- 
stantino's edict, the pope demanded "liberty" for the Church and 
especially for himself. Benedict XV, upon his election in 1914, de- 
clared his intention to follow in the footsteps of his predecessor. Xo 
new specific protest was directed by him against the Italian Gov- 
ernment. 

By 1914 it was generally considered by all waiters on the subject, 
outside of a lew Zelanti in the Roman Curia and a few ultraradi- 
cals in Italian Freemasonry, that the Roman question was no longer 
a question of the restoration to the pope of temporal sovereignty 
over the states of the church as they had existed in 1859, or even 
over the entire envy of Rome. What seemed to concern Catholic- 
most was the fear that the pope, were he to accept an Italian law 
of guarantees, would become an Italian subject and would thereby 
lose his international position and prestige. On the Roman ques- 
tion the great majority of Catholics and possibly Pope Benedict 
XV himself would seem to be willing to compromise with the 
Italian Government on the basis of Italy's recognition of the pope's 



4G3 

complete temporal sovereignty over a very limited district of Rome 
(perhaps the Leonine City) and on the basis of an international 
law of guarantees. Benedict XV clearly intimated that the Roman 
question was an international, rather than an Italian, question. 

159. FRANCO-GERMAN RELATIONS, 1871-1914. 

1. INTRODUCTION. 

Franco-German relations between 1871 and 1914 may be roughly 
divided into four periods, each with certain pronounced characteris- 
tics: (1) 1871-1878; (2) 1878-1893; (3) 1893-1904; (4) 1904-1914. 

2. 1871-1878. 

This period, which begins with the Treaty of Frankfort and ends 
with the Congress of Berlin, is marked in France by recovery from 
the wounds left by the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-71 and in Ger- 
many by the consolidation of the new Empire. In general it was 
marked by no small degree of hostility between the two nations. 
Bismarck apparently hoped that the war would reduce France to a 
minor position in European affairs; her rapid recovery and, es- 
pecially, the reconstitution of her army seemed to have been a severe 
disappointment to him. He was especially aroused by the emergence 
in France of a government inclined to royalism and clericalism, par- 
ticularly at the time when, through the Kulturkampf, Bismarck had 
alienated the Roman Catholic Church from the German Empire. 
The fear that France might gain the support of the church and 
through her of Austria in order to gain " revenge for 1871 " seemed 
to have been one of the factors in the " war scare of 1875 " (See article, 
that title). Whether such a league was possible is very doubtful. 
The position at the head of foreign affairs in Austria of Andrassy, 
who had defeated the Austro-French alliance project of 1870, would 
argue against Austrian support for such a scheme. Nor was France, 
still exhausted from 1870-71, in a warlike state of mind, and the 
expression of the " revenge " idea given by the anti-German Gam- 
betta — "think of it always, speak of it never" — shows no present 
intention of an attack on Germany. 

The vexed question of the 1875 incident is dealt with elsewhere 
(See article, The War Scare of 1875). Whether or not Bismarck 
really intended to attack France — and the question is still doubtful — 
there can be little doubt that the intervention of England and Russia 
worked a sensible appeasement in the hostile relations between 
France and Germany. It also appears that there opened more clearly 
to the French diplomats the vista of a new move, an alliance with 
Russia. But this hope, for it was little more than that, troubled Bis- 



464 

marck little, as he felt sure of the support of Alexander II. Another 
cause that contributed to the betterment of Franco-German relations 
was the growth in France of a Colonial Party, which hoped to find 
in expansion abroad compensation for the losses of 1871. As Bis- 
marck was not interested in spheres outside of Europe he gladly wel- 
comed and even assisted a movement which would attract French in- 
terest from the " gap in the Vosges." At the Congress of Berlin 
Bismarck appears to have promised German support for the French 
occupation of Tunis — support which, in his role of honest broker, 
he appears to have previously promised Italy. The policy of Bis- 
marck was clear : To bring about an Italo-French clash over Tunis, 
in the hope that Italy would be forced to rely on Germany for sup- 
port. In this he was not mistaken, for after the Treaty of Bardo in 
1881 Italy fell back on Germany and ultimately became a partner in 
the Triple Alliance. (See article, The Formation of the Triple 
Alliance.) 

3. 1878-1894. 

This period may be sharply divided into two parts : The first last- 
ing until the fall of the Ferry Ministry in France in March, 1885 ; the 
second lasting to the conclusion of the Franco-Russian alliance in 
1894. 

The first half of the period is marked by the ascendancy in French 
politics of the Colonial Party, with its expansionist aims and an 
apparent willingness to gloss over differences with Germany, in order 
to obtain a free hand for colonial expansion. With the exception of 
brief intervals this party held power in France during the entire first 
half of the period, and the result was , a visible " detente " in the 
relations between France and Germany. Bismarck, who was ab- 
sorbed in home politics, the formation of the Triple Alliance, and in 
the relations of Germany with Russia, had little reason to quarrel 
with the new French policy. He was, in general, not interested in 
extra-European matters, and no doubt hoped that the French policy 
would lead to complications with England, the great colonial 
power of the world, and thereby further isolate France in Europe. 
So he made not the slightest objection to the acquisition of Tunis by 
France in 1881 — it gained him the adhesion of Italy to the Triple 
Alliance — and took pains to point out that Germany viewed with no 
hostility the new acquisitions of France in Asia and Africa. 

This phase came to an end with the resignation of Ferry, the leader 
of the Colonial Party, in March, 1885. The new controlling forces 
in France were adverse to the policy of " distant adventures," much 
more inclined to devote attention to the European situation, and 
especially to the situation in Alsace-Lorraine, where the German 
Government had utterly failed to establish itself in the hearts of 



465 

the population. A continuation of strong anti-German feeling, in- 
creased interest in the army, and renewed agitation for a Russian 
alliance marked the change in French policy. France had no inten- 
tion of making war on Germany, but it stood more stiffly on its rights 
and its dignity. The change of tone in Paris was soon reflected in 
Berlin, and for the remainder of the period the relations between the 
two countries were correct, but frigid. The stern and oppressive 
government of Germany in Alsace-Lorraine aroused much sympathy 
in France for the Alsatians, and a series of frontier incidents — of 
which the Schnaebele affair was the most important (See article, The 
Schnaebele Affair) — complicated relations yet more, but the states- 
men df neither country had any desire that these incidents should 
lead to war and they were promptly settled. The anti-German senti- 
ment in France between 1886 and 1889 centered in the leadership of 
Gen. Boulanger, for a time minister of war, but the movement met 
with the steady opposition of the leading French statesmen and 
came to nothing. After Bismarck was dismissed in 1890 the relations 
of France and Germany remained as before, cold but correct. 

The growing rapprochement between France and Russia aroused 
the German Government to the possibility of a " war on two fronts." 
After 1890 William II tried to parry this danger by personal ad- 
vances to France, which, though well received, changed but little the 
fundamental relations of the two countries. This period of detente 
came to an abrupt end as the result of an unfortunate incident at the 
time of the visit of the Empress Frederick to Paris in 1891, and there 
was talk of war in the German newspapers. All the blandishments 
and threats of Germany failed to stop the conclusion of the Franco- 
Russian alliance (See article,' Th$ Formation of the Dual Alliance 
between France and Russia, 1887-1893), which was finally consoli- 
dated in 1893. In the meantime the situation in Alsace-Lorraine 
continued to arouse French sympathy and a growing hostility seemed 
evident between the two countries. 

4. 1894-1904. 

This period again may be sharply divided into two divisions : The 
first between 1894 and 1898, the second between 1898 and 1904. 

The first division may be styled after the man who, except for a 
brief interval, was in charge of French foreign affairs during the 
entire period, Gabriel Hanotaux. His policy was a revival of that 
of the French Colonial Party prior to 1885: Expansion in Asia and 
Africa, less attention to the affairs of Europe. This policy led 
France once more into hostility with England, the great colonial 
power of the world, then with Germany. The latter power had 
started on an expansionist policy also, whose origin dates back to 
53706—18 30 



466 

the early eighties, but this policy also clashed more with the inter- 
ests of England than with those of France. Indeed, after a brief 
period of friendship with England in the years immediately follow- 
ing the fall of Bismarck, the policy of Germany abruptly changed 
to hostility toward England and friendship for France, England's 
rival in Africa. In 1804 and again in 1897-98 Germany made 
definite approaches toward France to secure the latter's cooperation 
in Africa against England: nor was Hanotaux. anxious to secure all 
possible aid for his expansionist aims, indisposed to accepting German 
support. How far Germany would have been willing actually to 
aid France against England is uncertain, but it appears probable 
that the main German aim was to embroil France a*nd England in 
order that Germany might mediate at a price. (See article, The At- 
tempted Franco-German Accord of 1898.) At least, it appears that 
this Anglo-French hostility left the Triple Alliance supreme on the 
Continent, especially as France's partner, Russia, was involved in 
the Far East, where she, too, was meeting an increasing measure of 
English hostility. But the immediate result of the two policies was 
a period of calm and almost of friendship in Franco-German rela- 
tions, a situation which found its symbol in the participation of 
French warships in the review at Kiel in 1895. 

The Hanotaux policy was ruined by the Fashoda affair. (See 
article, that title.) Just before the matter came to negotiation 
Hanotaux was succeeded at the Quay d'Orsay by Theophile Del- 
casse, whose views were very different from those of his predecessor. 
To his mind the great fact was the supremacy of Germany in 
Europe, a consideration which far outweighed the colonial gains 
which might result from the Hanotaux policy. A combination with 
England for defence against Germany was necessary, and to attain 
this it appears that Delcasse as early as 1898 was willing to liqui- 
date the colonial difficulties between France and England. As an 
influential section of English public opinion w T as strongly inclined to 
favor an Anglo-German Entente, despite the bitter feeling between 
Germany and England growing out of the Boer War, it was neces- 
sary for Delcasse to feel his way, a fact which made French policy 
appear wavering for a few years. But when this Anglo-German 
rapprochement failed Delcasse again took up the policy of approach 
to England, and in 1904 successfully liquidated the points at issue 
between the two countries (See article, The Formation of the Entente 
Cordiale). Outwardly the attitude of the German Government to- 
ward this new entente was calm, Von Buelow, the German chancellor, 
expressly stating in the Reichstag, April 12, 1904, that Germany 
could not object to it. But beneath the surface trouble was brewing 
and was sure sooner or later to cause an explosion. 



467 

5. 1904-1914. 

During this period the main effort of German diplomacy appears 
to have been to weaken or even bring about the dissolution of the 
Entente Cordiale between England and France. During the first five 
years of the period the German Government hoped by threats of 
war to attain its ends. Morocco, guaranteed by England to France 
in 1904, was chosen as the weak spot in the combination, and every 
effort was made to drive a wedge between England and France on 
this issue. Delcasse seemed to have wished to defend vigorously 
French interests on this issue, even to the extent of going to war with 
Germany. But the French ministry, conscious of France's military 
weakness, refused to follow, and Delcasse resigned. The German 
hints that his dismissal would be acceptable to Germany do not 
appear to have been the major cause of his resignation, for he re- 
mained in office some time after these hints were given (See article, 
The Resignation of Delcasse). France agreed to submit the Moroc- 
can question to an international conference at Algeciras, but the 
entente was maintained, and at the conference Germany suffered a 
severe check. (See article, The Morocco Crisis of 1905-1906.) 

About 1909 Germany appears to have changed her method and to 
have directed her efforts toward bringing about a Franco-German 
detente and toward securing French cooperation in German schemes, 
especially in the Near East. It was an attempt to bring France back 
to the policy of 1894-1898. It secured support in France among cer- 
tain international bankers, who saw great profits in such a scheme of 
cooperation, and among a section of the French socialists, who feared 
a European war. But the danger lest such a policy would weaken the 
entente and isolate France in Europe caused French statesmen to 
draw back, and an abrupt return to the policy of threatening on the 
part of Germany in 1911 had merely the result of stiffening the resist- 
ance of France against German aims and German policy. This took 
the form of the dispatch of a German warship to Agadir, a port on 
the west coast of Morocco, followed by a demand either to reopen 
the Moroccan question or to compensate Germany elsewhere. The 
real motive behind the act was probably to test the strength of the 
Anglo-French entente when confronted by the threat of war at a 
time when both nations were controlled by supposedly pacifist min- 
istries. (See article, The Morocco Crisis of 1911.) In this hope the 
Germans were deceived, as both France and England refused to bow 
to the threat and drew closer together. In its immediate aim Ger- 
man policy was more successful, in that France bought German con- 
sent to the establishment of a French protectorate over Morocco by 
yielding to Germany a large strip of the French Congo. 



468 

From 1911 to the outbreak of war in 1914 the relations of France 
and Germany grew steadily more hostile. Public opinion in Ger- 
many was won to the idea that German supremacy on the Continent 
required the elimination of France, and a flood of pamphlets and 
articles denounced French " chauvinism " and expounded French 
" decadency." The German general staff strengthened the army and 
perfected the plans which were acted on in 1914. In France the 
army was strengthened to meet the German threat, and the French 
people came to regard war as almost inevitable. The outbreak of 
war in 1914 was probably no surprise to the statesmen of either 
country. * 

160. THE GROWTH OF EUROPEAN ARMAMENTS IN RELA- 
TION TO EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY, 1871-1914. 

The years 1871-1914 in European history, if examined from the 
point of view of the growth of armaments, falls naturally into two 
periods, 1871-1901 and 1901-1914. During the first' of these 
periods the growth of armaments, the natural result of the birth of 
new states and the growth of population, was due to more or less 
local causes and was not necessarily aggressive in its character. In 
the second period Europe took on the form of two vast hostile coali- 
tions; armaments developed with extraordinary rapidity and as- 
sumed proportions hitherto undreamed of; Europe was clearh' arm- 
ing itself for a possible world war. 

1—1871-1904. 

i. GERMANY, FRANCE, AND ALSACE-LORRAINE. 

In the foreground of the first period, as the chief cause of the 
increase of European armaments, stands the hostility between France 
and Germany, due to the seizure of Alsace-Lorraine, one of the 
most important causes of the World War. Only by means of the 
reorganization and enlargement of its army could France hope to 
recover and maintain a real independence in the face of victorious 
Germany. For many years, until 1899, in spite of the rapid growth 
of Germany's population and the automatic increase in the size of 
its army, the peace effectives of the two countries — about half a 
million men — remained substantially equal. 

2. THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE. 

During the first 20 years that followed the Treaty of Frankfort, 
Germany did not trust solely to her own army for security against a 
French attack. The alliances with Austria (1879), Italy (1882), 
and the secret treaties with Russia (See article, Bismarck's Reinsur- 



469 

ance Treaty) kept France isolated and added many potential army 
corps to Germany's strength in case of a defensive war. As a result 
of the alliances, Germany secured a position on land as dominating 
as England's position on the seas; the impossibility of attacking 
Germany under such conditions was so self-evident that France, 
gradually adjusted herself to the situation and the idea of a war of 
revanche was practically abandoned. The tension between the two 
States was further lessened by the colonial policy of France in the 
Mediterranean, that diverted her attention from the Rhine and led 
to a serious misunderstanding with Italy, a misunderstanding that 
was fully exploited by Germany, the Dual Alliance being expanded 
into the Triple Alliance (See articles, The Formation of the Dual 
Alliance 1879, and The Formation of the Triple Alliance, 1882). 
Italy at the same time entered upon an ambitious colonial policy in 
Africa, and for several years, under Crispi, large sums were spent 
on the army and navy. With the close of the century, the failure 
of Italy's colonial policy, and the renewal of friendly relations with 
France (See article, The Franco-Italian Rapprochement, 1896-1902) 
made it possible to pay less attention to military preparedness. 

3. THE ARMIES OF THE BALKAN STATES. 

The Balkan situation, with its rivalry between Russia and Austria, 
and the struggle of the Balkan States against Turkey led not un- 
naturally to a steady increase in the size of armies and an improve- 
ment in armaments, but it was not until the second period that the 
armies of the Balkan States played much more than a secondary 
role in the wars of the peninsula; compared with the armies of 
Germany, Austria, Russia, and France, they were small, poorly 
equipped, poorly disciplined, and inefficient. They were, however, 
under the tutelage of the great military powers ; their officers studied 
in France, Germany, Austria, or Russia, and their military supplies, 
for the most part, were drawn from France and Germany. 

4. THE EUROPEAN ARMIES IN 1871 AND 1904. 

In 1871 the peace footing of the armies of the great powers was 
approximately: Germany, 402,733; France, 380,000; Austria-Hun- 
gary, 246,695; Russia, 700,147; and Italy, 333,555 (fit for immediate 
service). By 1904 there had been considerable increases; Germany 
had a peace footing of 605,975; France, 598,003; Austria-Hungary, 
391,766; Russia, 1,100,000; Italy, 278,156. In the majority of cases 
the armies had increased 50 per cent in 33 years; Italy formed a 
solitary exception. But the increase, although considerable, was 
spread over a long period of time and, with the exception of France, 
was the natural result of an increase of population. The diplomatic 
revolution of 1904-1907 produced a marked increase of armaments. 



470 
II.— 1904-1914. 

5. THE DIPLOMATIC REVOLUTION, 1904-1907. 

The diplomatic revolution that took place in the years 1904-1907 
(See articles, The Formation of the Entente Cordiale, and The 
Formation of the Triple Entente) marked the beginning of the 
last period and led to unusual increases in the size of the armies 
of Germany and France and to striking improvements in arma- 
ments that rendered the armies more efficient. The vast economic 
development of Germany, her ambitions in the Balkans, in Asia 
Minor, in China, in Africa, in South America, and in Belgium; 
her demand for " a place in the sun " ; the announcement by the 
Kaiser that "Germany's future lies on the water"; Germany's 
great naval program, clearly directed against England ; her activities 
in Morocco and in Asia Minor; her support of Austria-Hungary 
against Serbia and Russia: all these facts forced the States threat- 
ened by the growing military domination of Germany to settle 
all questions tending to produce international misunderstandings, 
questions that were evidently of minor importance in the face of the 
German peril. In 1904 France and England came to an understand- 
ing concerning the position of England in Egypt and of France in 
Morocco ; each was to be allowed freedom of action in its own sphere ; 
England was no longer required to set a definite date for withdrawal 
Prom Egypt and France was practically permitted a free hand in 
Morocco (See article, The Formation of the Entente Cordiale). 
Three years later, in 1907. the long-standing feud between 
Russia and England in the east came to an end; in Thibet, in 
Afghanistan, and in Persia a settlement was reached satisfactory 
to both parties, and making possible cooperation of both States against 
Germany's aggressive program (See article, The Formation of the 
Triple Entente). The alliances and ententes that thus came into 
existence, binding together Russia, England, France, and to some 
extent Japan, by common interests in opposition to Germany, 
constitute the most extraordinary diplomatic revolution in mod- 
ern history. Germany claimed that the new alignment was an 
"encirclement" directed against herself. (See article, The Forma- 
tion of the Triple Entente.) Her program expressed itself in the 
words "Weltmacht oder Untergang " (world power or downfall). 
She determined to break the circle before it became too strong for 
her. The diplomatic situation and Germany's " will to power " 
naturally led to a tremendous increase in armaments and finally to 
the precipitation of a world war. 

c. Germany's increased armaments. 

In 1905 Germany increased her peace strength by 10,000 men, and 
a similar increase was effected in 1911. The most important changes, 



471 

however — changes that seemed to indicate the expectation of war 
in the near future — took place in 1912-13. In 1912 the peace strength 
of the army (not including officers) was raised to 544,211 and the 
number of army corps was augmented by two. It was also decided 
to carry out at once the important provisions of the laws of 1911 
and 1912 instead of spreading the execution over three years. This 
last law "increased enormously the readiness of the army for war 
and was the greatest effort made by Germany since 1870." The 
peace strength was now about 723,000. The law of 1912 was hardly 
in force before a new bill was laid before the Reichstag raising the 
peace strength to 870,000 and providing for a large financial levy 
that would make possible the immediate execution of the plan. The 
law and the levy were passed in June, 1913. In this year it was 
estimated that Germany could put 3,100,000 trained men in the field, 
that it had a reserve of 900,000 men of active army and reserve age 
who had never served, and 3,000,000 more, mostly untrained, over 
36 years of age. 

7. FRANCE MEETS GERMANY'S CHALLENGE. 

In the face of such threatening preparations France clearly could 
not be idle. In August, 1913, a law was passed restoring the military 
service of three years that had been reduced to two in 1905. Only by 
keeping her citizens one year longer under arms could France in- 
crease the size of her active army. It was a defensive measure, one 
that was taken most unwillingly and taken so late that France was in 
the midst of reorganization when the war storm burst upon her. 
Under the new law her peace strength was estimated at about 
673,000, or nearly 100,000 less than the peace strength of Germany. 
What efforts was Russia making to restore the balance? 

8. Russia's military activities. 

Russia had suffered so severely from the Russian-Japanese war 
that the whole European situation was affected by it for nearly 10 
years (1905-1914), and the belief that even in 1914 she had not suffi- 
ciently recovered to count as a decisive factor in a European war 
undoubtedly weighed heavily with the German Government in 1914 
when it faced the great question of war or peace. The reorganiza- 
tion of the Russian Army had begun in 1909 and was practically 
complete in 1912. During that period the peace strength had varied 
little, being about 1,300,000; the new law of 1913 brought it up to 
1,700,000. The war strength was estimated at 5,400,000. In spite 
of this Russia was not ready for war; several years more were needed 
to properly equip and train this army and to construct the necessary 
strategic railways along the German and Austrian frontiers. Ger- 
many understood the military situation in Russia as well as in 
France. 



472 

9. MILITARY PREPARATION IN AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. 

Germany looked to Austria-Hungary to restore the balance against 
France and Russia, and in the critical years 1912 and 1913 there were 
marked increases in the size of the Austro-Hungarian Army. In 
1012 the annual contingent to the common army was raised from 
103,000 to 159,500, increasing the peace strength from 295,000 to 
350,000 and the war strength from 900,000 to 1,500,000. In 1913 it 
was proposed to bring the annual contingent up to 270,000, making 
the peace strength 500,000 and the war strength about 2,000,000. 
Naturally, this formidable force was not to be directed .solely against 
Serbia ; the chief obstacle to the realization of German-Austrian- 
Hungarian ambitions in the Balkans was Russia. Twice since 1908 
Russia has attempted to protect Serbia against Austria-Hungary, 
and twice she has been cowed by the threat of German intervention. 
Would she resist in 1914? 

10. INCREASE IN MILITARY EFFICIENCY. 

The whole story of military armaments between 1904 and 1914 is 
not included in the statement of the increase in the size of the 
European armies; an army is something more than an aggregate of 
men. Noteworthy changes were made in armaments, methods of 
transportation, and in the introduction of new weapons of warfare; 
science, especially in Germany, was being applied to the prepara- 
tion for war in a manner hitherto undreamed of. Great progress 
had been made both in the production of field artillery that in size, 
rapidity, and accuracy of fire made the old pieces obsolete. The 
machine gun made its appearance and was manufactured in large 
numbers in Germany. Germany, especially, recognized the impor- 
tance of motor transportation and of aerial reconnoissance. The 
great gun factories in France, Germany, and Austria were being 
worked to the limit. The armies were not only to be larger but more 
destructive. 

11. NAVAL RIVALRY BETWEEN GERMANY AND ENGLAND. 

A summary review of the growth of military armaments in rela- 
tion to European diplomacy would be incomplete without at least 
a mention of the naval rivalry between Germany and England 
between 1900 and 1911. Germany's plans of violent expansion over- 
seas could not be carried out so long as the British Fleet dominated 
the seas. It is true that this British Navy had not interfered with 
Germany's peaceful economic expansion, but it certainly would not 
stand idly by if Germany attempted to improve the situation by 
the seizure of territory in Africa, Asia, or South America. Germany 



473 

must. then, for the realization of her plans, have a fleet in the North 
Sea strong enough, if need be, to take issue with England. Clearly, 
England's safety depended upon her ability to keep ahead of Ger- 
many in the building of warships. In the fact that her navy was 
to be created almost de integro, Germany had a distinct advantage; 
she had few old ships that must be scrapped. England, on the con- 
trary, was obliged to rebuild her navy between 1904 and 1914 to 
keep pace with Germany. She was obliged to do more than that; 
in order to keep in the North Sea a fleet large enough to meet the 
full strength of Germany, she was forced to come to an understand- 
ing with Japan and France, allowing the one to defend the Pacific, 
the other the Mediterranean. This concentration of England's naval 
strength in the North Atlantic was the natural result of the policy 
with which the Triple Entente met Germany's threatening policy. 

12. GERMANY DECIDES TO STRIKE. 

In 1914 the situation in Europe seemed to be favorable to an 
aggressive policy on the part of Germany. The situation appeared 
even to demand it, if she hoped to realize her ambitious plans. To 
Germany it appeared that delay would improve the military situation 
of Russia, would solidify the situation in the Balkans unfavorable 
to Austria -Hungary and Germany, and would bar the route to the 
East. An immediate war, Germany believed, would find France 
filled with political dissension and in the midst of her army reorgani- 
zation; it could probably be undertaken without the interference of 
England, weakened by civil war in Ireland and by a widespread 
pacifist sentiment. Germany was ready, " the day " seemed to have 
dawned, and Germany, plunged the world into war. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

Almanach de Gotha, 1913. 

Army Review, Jan., 1914, 224-225. 

American Annual Cyclopedia and Register of Important Events 
for the Years 1871 and 1872. 

Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. XV, pp. 20 ff. 

Hazell's Annual, 1914. 

Internationale Revue iiber die gesammten Armeen und Flotten, 
XXXI Jahrgang, Jan., 1913, pp. 127-134. 

Literary Digest, Aug., 1914, pp. 224^225. 

Militar Wochenblatt, 1913, Jan., June, July, Dec, 1913. 

Morgan, F., and Davis, H. W. C. French policy since 1870. 
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Steed, H. W., Phillips, W. A., Hannay, D. A. Short History of 
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Seymour, Charles. The Diplomatic Background of the War. 
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Tardieu, A. France and the Alliances. New York, Macmillan, 
1908. 



Appendix I. 

D0CU3IENTS. 

1. Treaty of Prague, August 23, 1866. Albin, Les Grands Traites 
Politiques, pp. 34-38. 

2. Russian circular of October 31, 1870, in regard to Black Sea 
clauses of Treaty of Paris (1856). Hertslet, Map of Europe by 
Treaty, Vol. Ill, pp. 1892-1895. 

3. Treaty of London, March 13, 1871. Hertslet, Map of Europe 
by Treaty, Vol. Ill, pp. 1919-1923. 

4. The Treaty of Frankfort, May 10, 1871. Hertslet, Map of Eu- 
rope by Treaty, Vol. Ill, pp. 1954-1963. 

5. The Andrassy Note, December 30, 1875. Hertslet, Map of Eu- 
rope by Treaty, Vol. IV, pp. 2418-2429. 

6. The Berlin Memorandum relating to the Eastern Question, May 
13, 1876. Hertslet, Map of Europe by Treaty, Vol. IV. pp. 2459- 
2463. 

7. The British Reply to the Berlin Memorandum, May 19, 1876, 
with two inclosures. Hertslet, Map of Europe by Treaty, Vol. IV, 
pp. 2464-2470. 

8. Convention of Chefoo, September 13, 1876. Hertslet, China 
Treaties, Vol. I, No. 12, pp: 73-80. 

9. Circular containing proposals for a conference at Constanti- 
nople, November 4, 1876. Hertslet, Map of Europe by Treaty, Vol. 
IV, pp. 2516-2517. 

10. Correspondence on Turkish Affairs, November 7, 1876-Janu- 
ary 9, 1877: (a) Gorchakov to Shuvalov, November 7 (18), 1876, 
Parliamentary Papers, vol. 91, 1877, No. 2, p. 62; (h) Derby to 
Salisbury, December 22, 1876, Parliamentary Papers, vol. 91, 1877, 
No. 2, p. 56; (c) Safvet Pasha to Musurus Pasha, December 24, 1876, 
Parliamentary Papers, ibid., p. 62 (No. 87) ; (d) Derby to Salisbury, 
January 8, 1877, ibid., p. 182 (No. 148) ; (e) Musurus Pasha to 
Derby, January 5, 1877, ibid., p. 140 (No. 134) ; (/) Derby to Salis- 
bury, January 9, 1877, ibid., p. 183 (No. 150). 

11. Instructions of the Marquis of Salisbury concerning the con- 
ference of Constantinople, November 20, 1876. British and Foreign 
State Papers, vol. 68, pp. 1064-1080. 

12. London Protocol, March 31, 1877. Hertslet, Map of Europe 
by Treaty, Vol. IV, pp. 2563-2567. 

(475) 



476 



y^ 



13. Treaty of Adrianople, January 31, 1878. Hertslet, Map of 
Europe by Treaty, IV, pp. 2658-2660. 

14. Treaty of San Stefano, March 3, 1878, Hertslet, Map of Eu- 
" rope by Treaty, IV, No. 518, pp. 2672-2696. 

15. Secret Agreement between Great Britain and Eussia, May 30, 
1878. Avril Adolph d', Traite de Berlin (Paris, Leroux, 1886), pp. 
345-346. 

16. Convention between Turkey and Great Britain, June 4, 1878 
(Cyprus), British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 69, p. 744^748. 

17. The Treaty of Berlin, July 13, 1878. Hertslet, Map of Europe 
by Treaty, pp. 2759-2799. 

18. Treaty between Germany and Austria-Hungary* October 7, 
1879 (Dual Alliance). British and Foreign State Papers (1881-82), 
vol. 73, pp. 270-272. 

19. The Treaty of St. Petersburg, February 12, 1881. Cordier, 
Eelations dc la Chine, Vol. II, pp. 223-227, 240. 

20. The Pretoria Convention, August 3, 1881. Hertslet, Map of 
Africa by Treaty, Vol. I, p. 223. 

21. Treaty between the United States and Korea, May 22, 1882, 
Malloy, United States Treaties, Vol. I, pp. 334-340. 

22. British Circular Note, January 3, 1883. British and Foreign 
State Papers, vol. 75, pp. 676-679. 

23. The Ultimatum of June, 1883, sent by France to the Hova 
Government. De Clercq, Becueil des Traites, Vol. XV, pp. 925-927. 

24. Treaty between Great Britain and Korea, November 26, 1883. 
British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 74, pp. 93-105. 

25. Treaty between Germany and Korea, November 26, 1883. 
British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 74, pp. 633-650. 

26. The London Convention, February 27, 1884. Hertslet, Map 
of Africa by Treaty, Vol I, p. 227-234. 

27. Convention of Tientsin (Fournier Convention), May 11, 1884. 
Cordier, Eelations de la Chine, Vol. II, p. 435, 436. 

28. Treaty between Korea and Italy, June 26, 1884. British and 
Foreign State Papers, vol. 75, pp. 308-320. 

29. The General Act of the Berlin Conference, February 26, 1885. 
Supplement to American Journal of International Law for 1909, 
Vol. Ill, pp. 7-25. 

30. Treaty of Tientsin, June 9, 1885. Cordier, Eelations de la 
Chine, Vol. II, pp. 531-535. 

31. Turco-Bulgarian Convention, April 5, 1886. British and For- 
eign State Papers, vol. 77, pp. 386-387. 

32. Treaty between Korea and France, June 4, 1886. British and 
Foreign State Papers, vol. 77, pp. 500-516. 

33. Convention of Peking (O'Conor Convention), July 24, 1886. 
Hertslet, China Treaties, Vol. I, no. 15, pp. 88-90. 



477 

34. Anglo-German Convention of 1886, October 29, 1886. British 
and Foreign State Papers, vol. 77, pp. 10-22. 

35. The Treaty of Triple Alliance, March, 1887. Austro-Hun- 
garian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Documents concern- 
ing the Eelations of Austria-Hungary with Italy from July 20, 
1914, to May 23, 1915 (Austrian Government Publications). 

36. Excerpt from Speech of German Emperor on opening Reich- 
stag, June 25, 1888. British and Foreign State Papers, 18S7-1888, 
vol. 79, p. 808. 

. 37. Treaty of Constantinople, October 29, 1888. Albin, Les 
Grands Traites Politiques, pp. 382-387. 

38. Anglo-German Agreement, July 1, 1890. British and Foreign 
State Papers, vol. 82, pp. 35-47. 

39. Declarations exchanged between Great Britain and France 
respecting Territories in Africa, August 5, 1890. Parliamentary 
Papers, 1890, vol. 81, Africa (No. 9). 

40. Communications exchanged between France and Germany with 
respect to Madagascar and the continental territory of the Sultan 
of Zanzibar, November 17, 1890. De Clercq, Traites de la France, 
XVIII, 681. 

41. Treaty between Korea and Austria-Hungary, June 23, 1892. 
British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 84, pp. 120-136. 

42. Treaty of Bangkok, October 3, 1893. Cordier, Histoire des 
Relations de la Chine, Vol. Ill, pp. 131-133. 

43. Convention between Great Britain and China (commercial 
privileges, mining and railway concessions), March 1, 1894. Herts- 
let, China Treaties, Vol. I, no. 20, pp. 99-109. Rockhill, Vol. I, no. 1, 
pp. 5-13. 

44. Treaty of Shimonoseki, April 17, 1895. Hertslet, China 
Treaties, Vol. I, no. 62, pp. 362 ff. 

45. Proclamation of the Resident General relative to the taking 
possession of Madagascar by France, January 18, 1896. De Clercq, 
Traites de la France, Vol. XX (1900), pp. 358, 359. 

46. Agreement between Great Britain and China, modifying the 
Convention of March 1, 1894, relating to Burma and Tibet, February 
4, 1897. Rockhill, vol. 1, pp. 40-44. 

47. Chinese declaration concerning the nonalienation of the Island 
of Hainan, March 15, 1897. Rockhill, vol. 1, p. 173. 

48. Identic Notes (Explanatory) (a) of the Provisions of the 
Commercial Convention between France and China of June 20, 
1.895; (b) of the Railway Contract of June 5, 1896 exchanged at 
Peking June 12, 1897, between French Minister and Chinese Foreign 
Office. Rockhill, vol. 1, pp. 24-25. 

49. Letter of Sir E. Monson to M. Hanotaux, December 10, 1897. 
Archives Diplomatiques, second series, vol. 68, p. 24. 



478 

50. Letter of G. Hanotaux to Sir E. Monson, December 24, 1897. 
Archives Diplomatiques, second series, vol. 68, pp. 52-53. 

51. Chinese Declaration concerning the nonalienation of the 
Yangtze region, February 11, 1898. Eockhill, vol. 1, p. 174-175. 

52. Agreement between China and Germany respecting lease of 
Kiao-chau, March 6, 1898. Hertslet, China Treaties, vol 1, no. 59, 
pp. 350-353. 

53. Eusso-Chinese Agreement respecting lease of Port Arthur and 
Talien-wan, March 27. 1898. Hertslet, China Treaties, vol. 1, no. 88, 
pp. 505 ff. . 

54. Declaration by Great Britain respecting Wei-Hai-Wai, April 
19, 1898. Rockhill, Vol. 1, p. 180. 

55. Convention of Paris (Spheres of Influence in Central Africa), 
June 14, 1898. British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 91, pp. 38-55. 

56. Agreement between Great Britain and China respecting lease 
of Wei-Hai-Wei, July 1, 1898. Hertslet, China Treaties, vol. 1. no. 
25, pp. 122-123. 

57. British and German Agreement on E ail way Construction in 
China, September 2, 1898. Parliamentary Papers. China, no. 1 
(1899), pp. 213-215. 

58. Letter of M. Delcasse to M. Geoffray, September 8, 1898. 
Archives Diplomatiques, second series, vol. 68, pp. 53-54. 

59. Anglo-French Declaration completing the Convention of June 
14, 1898, March 21, 1899. British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 
91, pp. 55-57. 

60. Identic Notes exchanged between the United Kingdom and 
Eussia with regard to their respective railway interests in China, 
April 28, 1899. Eockhill, vol. 1, pp. 183-184. 

61. John Hay, Secretary of State, to Andrew D. White, Ambas- 
sador at Berlin, September 6, 1899. Foreign Eelations of the United 
States, 1899, pp. 129-130, further correspondence in Moore's Digest 
of International Law, vol. 1, p. 534, et seq. 

62. Memorandum of French Eailway and Mining Concessions in 
China, published in French Yellow Book (China), Juin-Octobre, 
1900, pp. 23-27. Eockhill. vol. 1, pp. 402-406. 

63. Agreement between Great Britain and Germany defining their 
mutual policy in China, October 16, 1900. Eockhill, vol. 1, p. 62. 

64. Anglo- Japanese Alliance, January 30, 1902. British and For- 
eign State Papers, vol. 95, pp. 84-86. 

65. Eusso-Chinese Convention for Evacuation of Manchuria, April 
8, 1902. Hertslet, China Treaties, I, no. 90, pp. 509-512. 

66. Treaty of Vereeniging, May 31, 1902. British and Foreign 
State Papers, vol. 95, pp. 160-162. 

67. The Anglo-French Arbitration Agreement, October 14, 1903. 
Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres Les Progres de l'Arbitrage Obli- 



479 

gatoire de 1903 a 1908 (n. d.). British and Foreign State Papers, 
1902-1903, vol. 96 (London, 1906), p. 35. 

68. Anglo-French Convention, April 8. 1904. British and Foreign 
State Papers, vol. 97, pp. 31-55. 

69. The Lhasa Agreement between Great Britain and Thibet, Sep- 
tember 7, 1904. Hertslet, China Treaties, vol. 1, no. 32, pp. 202-208. 

70. M. Delcasse, Minister des Affaires Etrangers a M. Bihourd, 
Ambassadenr de la Eepublic Francaise a Berlin, Paris, 14 avril, 1905. 
Documents Diplomatiqnes, Affaires du Maroc, 1901-1905, p. 211. 

71. Interview with Prince Henckel, of Donnersmarck, published 
by Le Gaulois. June, 1905. Tarclien, France and the Alliances (New 
York, Macmillan, 1908), p. 183-185. 

72. Anglo-Japanese Treaty, August 12, 1905. British and Foreign 
State Papers, vol. 98, pp. 136-138. 

73. Treaty of Portsmouth, September 5. 1905. Foreign Relations 
of the United States, 1905, pp. 821-828. 

74. Conventions of Stockholm, October 26, 1905. British and 
Foreign State Papers, vol. 98, 820-832. 

75. The Treaty of Peking (Komura), December 22, 1905. Rock- 
hill, Vol. II, 131-137. 

77. The Algeciras conference. General act and an additional Pro- 
tocol, April 7, 1906. (Washington, Gov't Printing Office, 1907.) 

78. Convention (China and Great Britain) confirming the Lhasa 
Agreement of Sept. 7, 1904, April 27, 1906. Hertslet, China Treaties, 
Vol. I, no. 32, pp. 202-208. 

79. The Red Sea Convention or The Agreement respecting Abys- 
sinia, December 13, 1906. Albin, Pierre, Les Grands Traites Poli- 
tiques, pp. 408-114. 

80. Japanese-Korean Convention of July 24, 1907. Rockhill, vol. 
2, no. 66, p. 280. 

81. Anglo-Russian Convention, August 31, 1907. Albin, Les 
Grande Traites Politiques, pp. 416-422. 

82. Treaty of Christiana, November 2, 1907, Archives Diplo- 
matiqnes, third series, vol. 107, pp. 179-180. 

83. The North Sea Convention, April 23, 1908. British and For- 
eign State Papers, 1907-1908, vol. 101, pp. 179-181. 

84. The Baltic Convention, April 23, 1908. British and Foreign 
State Papers. 1907-1908, vol. 101, pp. 974-975. 

85. The Declaration of Tirnovo, October 5, 1918. Revue Generale 
de Droit International Public, vol. 15 (1908), Documents, pp. 30-31. 

86. Circular Note sent by Austria-Hungary to the Powers re Bos- (, 
nia-Herzegovina, Vienna, October 6, 1908. Diplomatische Akten- 
stiicke betr. Bosnien u. Herzegovina, October, 1908-June, 1909 
(Wien, K. K. Hof und Staatsdruckerei, 1909). 



s 



480 

87. Imperial Proclamation announcing the Annexation of Bosnia- 
Herzegovina to Austria-Hungary, October 7, 1908. Diplomatische 
Aktenstiicke betr. Bornien u. Herzegovina, October, 1908- June, 1909 
(Wien, K. K. Hof und Staatsdruckerei, 1909). 

88. The Protest of Turkey against the Annexation of Bosnia- 
Herzegovina, October 8, 1908. Diplomatische Aktenstiicke betr. 
Bosnien u. Herzegovina, October, 1908-June, 1909 (Wien, K. K. Hof 
und Staatsdruckerei, 1909). 

89. Franco-German Convention, February 8, 1909. Ministre des 
Affaires Etrangeres, Affaires du Maroc, V, 1908-1910, p. 73. 

90. The Austro-Turkish Accord, February 26, 1909. Albin. 
Pierre, Les Grands Traites, pp. '237-240. » 

91. Serbian Note renouncing Opposition to the Annexation of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, March 31, 1909. Diplomatische Aktenstiicke 
betr. Bosnien u. Herzegovina, October 1908-June, 1909 (Wien, K. K. 
Hof und Staatsdruckerei, 1909). 

92. The Manchurian Convention between China and Japan. Sep- 
tember 4, 1909. Albin, Les Grands Traites Politiques, pp. 499-501. 

93. Count Komura, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan to U. S. 
Ambassador O'Brien, January 21, 1910. Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1910, pp. 251^252. 

94. Aide-Memoire of Russian Foreign Office to American Am- 
bassador Rockhill, January 22, 1910, Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 1910, pp. 249-250. 

95. The Morocco Convention, March 4, 1910. Documents Diplo- 
matiques, Affaires du Maroc, 1908-1910, pp. 343-348. 

96. The Treaty between Japan and Korea, August 22, 1910 (An- 
nexation of Korea). British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 103, 
pp. 992-993. 

97. Sazonoff's Statements to the Novoe Vremya relating to Rus- 
sian and German interests in Turkey and Persia, November 8, 1910. 
The London Times, January 7, 1911. 

98. Anglo-Japanese Treaty of July 13, 1911. British and Foreign 
State Papers, vol. 104, pp. 173-174. 

99. Russo-German Agreement signed at St. Petersburg (embody- 
ing results of Potsdam Conference, 1910-11), August 19, 1911. 
American Journal of International Law, VI, Supplement, pp. 120- 
122. 

100. Franco-German Convention, November 4, 1911. Ministere des 
Affaires Etrangeres, Affaires du Maroc, VI, 1910-1912, pp. 622-635. 

101. Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between Bulgaria and Ser- 
bia (including the Secret Annex), March 13, 1912. American 
Journal of International Law, VIII, Supplement, pp. 1-5. 

102. The Military Conventions between Bulgaria and Serbia, July 
1, 1912. American Journal of International Law, VIII, Supple- 
ment, pp. 5-11. 



481 

103. Treaty between Bulgaria and Greece, May 29, 1912. Ameri- 
can Journal of International Law, VIII, Supplement, pp. 81-83. 

104. The Military Convention between Bulgaria and Greece, Octo- 
ber 5, 1912. American Journal of International Law, VIII, Supple- 
ment, pp. 83-85. 

105. The Treaty of Lausanne, October 18, 1912. American Journal 
of International Law, Supplement, vol. 7, pp. 58-62. 

106. The Eusso-Mongolian Agreement of 1912, November 3, 1912. 
American Journal of International Law, Supplement for 1916, Vol. 
X. pp. 239-246. 

107. The Treaty of London, May 30, 1913. Martens, G. F. de, 

Nouveau Recueil General de Traites, 3d series, Vol. VIII, pp. 16-19. 

108. Treaty of Alliance between Serbia and Greece, June 1, 1913. 
American Journal of International Law, XII, Supplement, pp. 
89-92. 

109. The Treaty of Bucharest, August 10, 1913. American Jour- 
nal of International Law, VIII, Supplement, January. 1914, pp. 
13-27. 

' 110. The Treaty of Constantinople, September 29, 1913. American 
Journal of International Law, Supplement, for 1915, Vol. VIII, pp. 
27-45. 

111. The Russo-Chinese Declaration of 1913, November 5. 1913. 
American Journal of International Law, Supplement, for 1916, Vol. 
X, pp. 239-258. 

112. The Russo-Mongolian Railway Agreement of 1914. September 
30, 1914. American Journal of International Law, Supplement, 
1916, Vol. X, pp. 249-250. 

113. Chino-Japanese Treaties and Exchange of Notes, May 25, 
1915. The Chino-Japanese Negotiations. Chinese Official Statement 
(Peking, 1915), pp. 49-70. Millard, T. E., Our Eastern Question, 
pp. 496-510, appendix. 

114. The Tripartite Agreement of 1915 between Russia, China, and 
Mongolia, June 7, 1915. American Journal of International Law, 
Supplement, 1916, Vol. X, pp. 251-258. 

53706—18 31 






Appendix II. 

COLLECTIONS OF TREATIES AND DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS MOST FREQUENTLY 

CITED. 

Albin, P. Les Grands Traites Politiques * * * c ] e p U i s 1815 
jusqu'a nos jours (Paris, Alcan, 1912). 

The American Journal of International Law. Published by the 
American Society of International Law (New York, Baker, Voorhis 
&Co.). 

Cordier, H. Historie des Relations de la Chine avec les Puissances 
Occidentals 1860-1902. Three volumes. (Paris, Alcan, 1901.) 

De Clercq, M. Jules. Recueil des Traites de la France (since 1713) 
22 volumes (Paris, A. Pedone, 1880-1907). • 

France: Archives Diplomatiques. Recueil de Diplomatic, D'His- 
toire et de Droit International (Paris, H. Champion, 1861 on). 
Three series, 190 volumes. 

Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, Documents Diplomatiques. 
Many volmes, each paper being a separate publication (Paris, Im- 
primerie Nationale, 1861 on). 

Great Britain: British and Foreign State Papers, 107 volumes 
(London, 1841-1914). 

Parliamentary Papers. Many volumes, each paper being a sepa- 
rate publication. 

Hertslet, Sir Edward. China Treaties (London, Harrison & Sons, 
1908). Two volumes. 

Hertslet, Sir Edward. Map of Africa by Treaty. (London, Har- 
rison & Sons, 1909.) Three volumes. 

Hertslet, Sir Edward. Map of Europe by Treaty. (London, Har- 
rison & Sons, 1891.) Four volumes. 

Martens, G. Fr. de. Nouveau Recueil General de Traites continue 
du grand Recueil de Traites * • * * depuis 1761 deG. Fr.de Mar- 
tens, par H. Triepel. (Leipzig, Dietrich, 1909.) Third series. 

jRockhill, W. W. Treaties and Conventions with or concerning 
China and Korea, 1894-1904. (Washington, Government Printing 
Office, 1904) . Supplement to the foregoing, containing treaties, etc., 
between October, 1904, and January, 1908. (Washington, Govern- 
ment Printing Office, 1908.) 

United States: Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the 
United States. Annual volumes 1868-1910. (Washington, Gov- 
ernment Printing Office.) 

Das Staatsarchiv Sammlung der offizielen Aktenstucke zur Ge- 

schichte der Gegenwart. Edited by Aegadi, Klauhold. Roloff, et al. 

Eighty-four volumes. (Hamburg, Munich, Leipzig, Meissner et al.,. 

1 861-1914. ) 

(482) 

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